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1. INTRODUCTION
Transitional Hong Kong's endgame formally came to a close
with the territory's reversion to Chinese rule on July 1, 1997. How-
ever, a legal and institutional order and a "rule of law" for Chi-
nese-ruled Hong Kong remain works in progress. They will surely
bear the mark of the conflicts that dominated the final years pre-
ceding Hong Kong's legal transition from British colony to Chinese
Special Administrative Region ("S.A.R."). Those endgame conflicts
reflected a struggle among adherents to rival conceptions of a rule
of law and a set of laws and institutions that would be adequate
and acceptable for Hong Kong. They unfolded in large part
through battles over the attitudes and allegiance of "the Hong
Kong people" and Hong Kong's business community.
Hong Kong's Endgame and the Rule of Law (I): The Struggle over
Institutions and Values in the Transition to Chinese Rule ("Endgame I")
focused on the first aspect of this story. It examined the political
struggle among members of two coherent, but not monolithic,
camps, each bound together by a distinct vision of law and sover-
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eignty in the domestic realm. The People's Republic of China
("P.R.C." or "China") and its allies and surrogates in Hong Kong
approached issues of the rule of law and legal institutions from a
primarily positivist perspective, invoking procedural standards of
legitimacy and insisting upon substantive sovereign discretion. A
looser alliance of Hong Kong's "liberal" or "pro-democracy" poli-
ticians and the colonial and British governments proceeded from a
perspective grounded in more "natural law"-like principles. They
asserted that legitimate legal rules and institutions had to meet
substantive standards of what justice demands of a good sover-
eign.
Endgame I examined how the political clash between these two
camps was highly polarized and how the camps were, to varying
degrees, unstable and fragmented internally during the 1990s.
These seemingly paradoxical traits, Endgame I argued, stemmed
from the endgame's inevitable focus on quite specific aspects of a
legal and institutional order for the S.A.R. On one hand, the end-
game's focus on these final and highly concrete issues of Hong
Kong's transition made it impossible for the participants to avoid
addressing fundamental conflicts between their perspectives by
postponing hard questions until later rounds of bargaining and
conflict. This focus on matters of legal and institutional detail also
made it harder for the participants to shroud the fault lines be-
tween their visions in the ambiguities of the broad "framework"
laws and agreements on Hong Kong's future order that had been
the main concern of earlier phases of negotiations. On the other
hand, the endgame's emphasis on specific legal and institutional
arrangements exposed how each broad vision of law was suffi-
ciently indeterminate to permit its adherents to adopt disparate
and shifting positions on the specific controversies of the era while
credibly claiming to be faithful to the vision's core principles.
Two contingent political events that marked the beginning of
the endgame, the Tiananmen Incident of June 4, 1989 ("Tiananmen
Incident") and the installation of Christopher Patten as Hong
Kong's last colonial governor in 1992, also contributed to the pat-
tern of sharply clashing yet substantially indeterminate visions.
On one hand, these developments deepened the political rift be-
tween Hong Kong liberals, democrats, and colonial officials on one
side and the P.R.C. and its allies on the other. The crackdown on
the Beijing protests and Hong Kong's reaction to it seemed to lay
bare fundamental gaps between the perspectives on law and gov-
ernance dominant in the P.R.C. and in the territory. Patten's
1526 [Vol. 25:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/7
HONG KONG'S ENDGAME (II)
agenda of legal and institutional reform, his methods for pursuing
it, and China's reaction to Patten's goals and means all seemed to
point to a widening of the gaps that the Tiananmen Incident had
exposed. On the other hand, the pair of political developments
that signaled the endgame's beginning also heralded the emer-
gence of a complex and volatile political environment in Hong
Kong. This environment was conducive to divergent and changing
assessments within each camp about what strategies were political-
ly possible or prudent in the quest to settle the legal and institu-
tional questions of transitional Hong Kong's endgame on favorable
or acceptable terms.
This Article takes up the second aspect of the story of Hong
Kong's endgame. It focuses on the battles that the key political
participants, who comprised the two blocks identified in Endgame
I, fought over "the people" of Hong Kong and Hong Kong's busi-
ness community. In Hong Kong in the 1990s, these two social con-
stituencies appeared to be potentially vital allies or formidable op-
ponents for the principal political actors who were striving to
establish their preferred legal or institutional arrangements in the
final run-up to reversion, in what Endgame I called a "colloquial"
endgame scenario. These constituencies also seemed to be promis-
ing sources of effective post-reversion pressure on the S.A.R. re-
gime to implement, go beyond, or retreat from the legal and insti-
tutional arrangements formally, but perhaps meaninglessly,
adopted during the last years of colonial rule, in what Endgame I
identified as a "technical" endgame scenario.
As Endgame I also indicated, the factors that fostered polariza-
tion and intramural schisms and shifts among the principal par-
ticipants in the political conflicts of Hong Kong's endgame also re-
inforced the key political actors' determination to obtain support,
or at least acquiescence, from the people of Hong Kong and the
business community. The focus on concrete legal and institutional
questions to which fundamental visions of law mandated no single
answer allowed adherents to a particular vision to consider how
various arrangements that were arguably acceptable in principle
might be received in practice in Hong Kong. They could do so
without betraying core principles of the vision of law and sover-
eignty that they embraced, or sacrificing the benefits that they
thought would accompany a legal and institutional order compati-
ble with those principles. In addition, the vastly more powerful
popular politics and the increased politicization of the powerful
business community in 1990s Hong Kong made either group's
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views on legal and institutional issues obviously and immediately
relevant to the political struggles of the day. Because the main par-
ticipants in the political conflict over Hong Kong's future legal and
institutional order sought a rule of law that was viable in practice
as well as acceptable in principle, they could ill-afford to ignore the
attitudes and values of the people or the business community.
Section 2 of this Article discusses the struggle over "the Hong
Kong people." Section 2 begins by examining the long-standing
impediments to the emergence of an influential popular constitu-
ency in Hong Kong politics, the gradual and accelerating pressures
for its development and accommodation since the 1960s, and the
indications of a growing recognition of "the people" as an impor-
tant target for prediction and persuasion in the endgame struggle
to shape S.A.R. laws and institutions. The discussion also notes the
potentially salient fault lines running through the people, whom
the key political participants in the struggles of the endgame none-
theless addressed as a near-monolith.
The principal subsections of Section 2 assess, in turn, the "Brit-
ish and Hong Kong liberal-democratic" and "China and 'pro-
China' Hong Kong" approaches to the struggle over the people.
These subsections examine how members of each of the sometimes
internally divided groups sought to claim or cultivate popular
backing or acceptance in clashes over general questions of "rule-of-
law" values and four key legal-institutional issues of the endgame:
the Bill of Rights, including broadly related amendments to laws
restricting civil and political liberties; the Legislature, including
both the democracy-expanding electoral reform laws introduced
by Governor Patten to govern the last colonial elections and the
P.R.C.'s decision to install a post-reversion "Provisional Legisla-
ture" named by a P.R.C.-selected committee; the Court of Final
Appeal ("C.F.A." or "Court"), including issues of its membership,
jurisdiction, and establishment date under Sino-British accords
reached in 1991 and 1995; and the Chief Executive selection proc-
ess, including issues raised by the initial occupant Tung Chee-
hwa's pre-reversion use of his position as Chief Executive-
designate.
Section 2's analysis reveals several common features in the ar-
guments that the key political players addressed to the people. On
one dimension, the arguments ranged from claims about the peo-
ple's existing beliefs, to attempts to persuade, frighten, or coerce
the people to adopt preferences that they concededly did not ini-
tially hold, to arguments that blended claims that a proposed ar-
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rangement was or could be popular with reminders of the political
players' ultimate, popularity-indifferent insistence that a legal and
institutional solution must satisfy the minimal demands of a fa-
vored vision of law, whether Chinese-style positivist or liberal-
democratic and broadly naturalist. Along another dimension, ar-
guments ranged from ones that invoked a wide variety of rule-of-
law and related normative and political principles, at times
claimed to be subjectively important to the people of Hong Kong,
to other arguments that focused immediately on ordinary Hong
Kongers' pragmatic concerns with stability, prosperity, and pre-
dictability. In practice, the result was a rich tapestry of arguments
that blurred the lines among analytically distinct claims about ac-
tual and potential popular beliefs, popular preferences and inter-
ests, and the relative importance of consensus and principle.
Section 3 discusses the battle over Hong Kong's business com-
munity and has the same structure as Section 2. Section 3 begins
with an account of the business community's long-established po-
litical importance in Hong Kong, the extensive measures taken by
colonial and P.R.C. authorities to accommodate the business com-
munity's interests and preferences in the decades preceding the
endgame, and the emergence of the business community as an im-
portant object of conflict, and a fairly reluctant participant, in the
contentious and highly public political struggles of the endgame.
The opening subsection also notes the business community's con-
siderable diversity of political views and politically relevant eco-
nomic interests - a diversity that the key political participants all
but ignored their skirmishes for the allegiance and acquiescence of
the elite business sector during the 1990s.
Section 3's main subsections, similar to Section 2's, address, re-
spectively, the British and Hong Kong liberal-democratic block's
and the China and pro-China Hong Kong block's approaches to
the political battle over the territory's business community during
transitional Hong Kong's endgame. As in Section 2, the analysis
within each of the two subsections focuses on how members of
each of these sometimes fissiparous camps tried to assert or to de-
velop approval or acquiescence from the business community for
preferred positions on broad rule-of-law questions and the four
specific legal and institutional controversies of the period. Key po-
litical participants made arguments to and about business elites
that were similar to their arguments concerning the people. Here
too, arguments rooted in rule-of-law and related principles mixed
with appeals and threats to more material interests. More than the
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arguments addressed to the people, they placed special emphasis
on arguments that had discernible connections to economic con-
cerns that presumably were at the core of business elites' interests
and preferences. Claims about "business'" pre-existing prefer-
ences mingled extensively with attempts to convince, or to warn,
business elites about what they should or must demand or accept.
There was, however, seemingly less of an effort to create genuine
changes in this target group's apparently less pliable preferences
than was the case with arguments addressed to the people.
Finally, a concluding section considers what the battles over
the people and the business community in the run-up to Hong
Kong's reversion and legal and political developments during the
S.A.R.'s first months add to the analysis offered in Endgame I. Sec-
tion 4 first briefly summarizes the pre-reversion patterns analyzed
in Endgame I and in the principal sections of this Article, and con-
cludes that the evidence remains consistent with a conclusion that
key political participants perceived that they were involved in any
of the three types of endgames identified in Endgame I. Section 4
then notes the continuity in the identities of Hong Kong's main po-
litical participants and the changes in their roles since reversion,
and sketches key post-reversion events that have continued the
story of the major endgame controversies. These events include:
early steps to enact new civil liberties-related legislation; litigation
concerning the Provisional Legislature's constitutionality, debates
about the propriety of the interim body's early post-reversion ac-
tions, and the crafting of electoral laws to govern the selection of
the first full-fledged S.A.R. legislature; the installation of members
of the C.F.A. and a lower court's decision in a case challenging the
Provisional Legislature; and Tung Chee-hwa's on-going shaping of
the Office of Chief Executive and the S.A.R. administration. Sec-
tion 4 concludes that Hong Kong seems to have been facing an
endgame that most closely approximates Endgame I's "end of the
game/ on-going games" scenario, although it remains possible that
the more starkly discontinuous "technical" endgame or the more
smoothly continuous "colloquial" endgame may ultimately pro-
vide a more persuasive account of the struggles to shape a legal
and institutional order in transitional Hong Kong.
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2. RULE-OF-LAW VALUES (I) -THE STRUGGLE OVER THE "HONG
KONG PEOPLE"
2.1. The Hong Kong People and Stability
During the final decade of colonial rule, the participants in the
political battle to define the laws and institutions of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region struggled to claim the allegiance of
an ill-defined but assumedly vital group: the Hong Kong people.
The territory's citizens became the object of sharp conflict and pro-
digious efforts to pressure, persuade, and predict. Their views on
the rule of law and the specific controversies of the era became a
critical element in the territory's prospects for stability-the first
half of the universally embraced "stability and prosperity" formula
for Hong Kong's future and a prerequisite to achieving the second
half.
2.1.1. The Hong Kong People and the Politics and Government of
a Borrowed Place
It is no small irony that the Hong Kong people became a focus
of such an intense struggle on the eve of the final implementation
of a deal struck between the territory's past and future rulers. The
conventional wisdom long had been that the territory's inhabitants
were more concerned with commerce than politics. They were
thought to be disinclined or ill-equipped to create pressures for
holding the territory's government accountable to its people or for
allowing popular participation in the territory's governance.1 So-
cial and demographic factors encouraged a generally apolitical ori-
entation. For most of Hong Kong's existence, most of the terri-
tory's residents have been recent arrivals. 2 Primarily through
immigration from neighboring parts of China, the colony's popula-
tion grew from a few thousand inhabitants of Hong Kong Island in
1842 to 1.6 million in the expanded colony less than a century later,
to more than six million by 1995.3
During the 1980s, when China and Britain were negotiating
1 See generally LAU SIU-KAI & KUAN HSIN-CHI, THE ETHOS OF THE HONG KONG
CHINESE 69-117 (1988).
2 See, e.g., Hugh D.R. Baker, Life in the Cities: The Emergence of Hong Kong Man,
95 CHINA Q. 469, 470 (1983) (stating that immigrants vastly outnumber native
Hong Kongers).
3 See HONG KONG GOV'T INFO. SERVICES, HONG KONG 1997, at 396, 407-09
(1997).
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Hong Kong's return and the issues of the endgame began to loom
on the political horizon, nearly half of the territory's population
had been born elsewhere. Generally, these recent immigrants re-
garded themselves as sojourners or transients, and many planned
to return home eventually (if only to be buried) or to use Hong
Kong as a platform for moving overseas. Moreover, members of
Hong Kong's predominantly Chinese population retained strong
cultural and personal ties to their former homes despite the fact
that many fled political and economic hardship in the mainland.4
This peculiar mixture of rootlessness in the territory and rooted-
ness elsewhere inhibited the development of a strong local Hong
Kong identity among the bulk of the population.
Geography and politics had a similar impact. On the one hand,
a physically and culturally remote imperial power ruled colonial
Hong Kong. Such literal and metaphorical distance prevented the
vast majority of the territory's residents from regarding themselves
as British subjects. The United Kingdom's ("U.K.") nationality leg-
islation, including amendments to the Nationality Act passed
partly in response to fears of an influx from Hong Kong, made
clear that the U.K. would not accept many Hong Kong residents as
full British citizens.5 More subjects than citizens at home as well,
Hong Kong inhabitants had very few opportunities under British
colonial rule to participate in the territory's governance. The colo-
nial government excluded Hong Kongers from joining the senior
ranks of the civil service, until the adoption of "localisation" poli-
cies during the waning years of colonial rule, and from voting for
representatives in the colony's weak legislature, until the imple-
mentation of electoral and constitutional reforms in the final dec-
ade of British control. Under British rule, Chinese Hong Kongers
also held relatively few posts in the upper echelons of a judiciary
that conducted its affairs in English and that was subject to reversal
by the Privy Council in London. While similar restrictions might
have triggered a powerful anti-colonialist or revolutionary nation-
alist reaction, in Hong Kong this legal and political order went
relatively unchallenged and proved inimical to the emergence of a
4 See LAU SIU-KAI, SOCIETY AND POLITICS IN HONG KONG 157-76 (1984); Ronald
Skelton, Hong Kong in an International Migration System, in RELUCTANT EXILES? 21-
51 (Ronald Skelton ed., 1994).
5 See generally Hugh D.R. Baker, Branches All Over: The Hong Kong Chinese in
the United Kingdom, in RELUCTANT EXILES?, supra note 4, at 291, 298-305; Skelton,
supra note 4.
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politically relevant identity among Hong Kong citizens.6
On the other hand, the political implications of the strong ties
between Hong Kong residents and the Chinese mainland also
weakened prospects for a distinct Hong Kong identity. More than
just cultural, those links included Hong Kong's economic depend-
ence on the mainland, the P.R.C.'s military ability to retake the ter-
ritory by force, and China's long-standing ideological and legal in-
sistence that Hong Kong always has been a part of China's
sovereign territory.7 Together, these circumstances precluded any
realistic possibility of independence or self-determination for Hong
Kong residents.
Despite these ties, the administrative separation of Hong Kong
from the rest of China during the colonial period assured that
Hong Kong residents were not fully Chinese, especially in the po-
litical dimensions of their lives. Frequently frosty Anglo-Chinese
relations and the colonial authorities' determination to keep the
mainland's unruly politics out of Hong Kong further limited the
development of mainland Chinese influences in Hong Kong. As a
result, colonial Hong Kong residents remained strikingly insulated
from developments that shaped political identities across the bor-
der.8 In sum, while Hong Kong provided its residents an attractive
6 See Lo SHUI-HING, THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN HONG KONG 33-60
(1997); NORMAN MINERS, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF HONG KONG 53-181
(5th ed. 1991) (describing the evolution of Hong Kong's governmental institutions
under colonial rule); STEVE YUI-SANG TSANG, DEMOCRACY SHELVED: GREAT BRITAIN,
CHINA AND ATTEMPTS AT CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN HONG KONG, 1945-1952
(1988); Albert H.Y. Chen, Law in a Foreign Language: The Case of Hong Kong, in
HONG KONG: THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSFORMATION 212-38 (Kathleen Cheek-Milby
& Miron Mushkat eds., 1989); Jane C.Y. Lee, The Civil Service, in FROM COLONY TO
SAR: HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD 39-50 Uoseph Y.S. Cheng & Sonny S.H. Lo
eds., 1995).
7 See generally James T.H. Tang, Hong Kong in Transition: Globalization Versus
Nationalization, in THE CHALLENGES OF HONG KONG'S REINTEGRATION WITH CHINA
177, 189-94 (Ming K. Chan ed., 1997); see also Anthony Dicks, Treaty, Suffrage,
Grant or Usage? Some Legal Aspects of the Status of Hong Kong, 95 CHINA Q. 427-55
(1983).
8 See generally LAU, supra note 4, at 1-13; James T.H. Tang, World War to Cold
War: Hong Kong's Future and Anglo-Chinese Interactions, 1941-55, in PRECARIOUS
BALANCE: HONG KONG BETWEEN CHINA AND BRITAIN, 1842-1992, at 107-30 (Ming K.
Chan ed., 1994) (describing Anglo-Chinese interactions in Hong Kong from 1941
to 1955). In the last half-century, the unrest in Hong Kong during the most radical
phase of China's Cultural Revolution is a striking exception, one that largely
proves the rule. By mainland standards, however, the riots in Hong Kong were
fairly minor affairs. The British authorities reacted swiftly to quell them and then
undertook political reforms to address local Hong Kong concerns that appeared to
create the social discontent that fueled the unrest. See, e.g., JOHN F. COPPER,
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wealth of opportunities under more than a century of colonial rule,
it did not transform them into "Hong Kongers." After more than a
century of colonial rule, they were neither British nor fully Chi-
nese. Yet, they also had not become members of a distinct group of
Hong Kong people with an identity that could firmly ground
popular participation, or a sense of entitlement to participate, in
the public life of the territory. 9
Beginning in the 1960s and accelerating in the 1980s and early
1990s, long-developing demographic and economic forces and pre-
cipitous political shocks began to change this pattern. The propor-
tion of Hong Kong residents born and raised in the territory rose
considerably during the final decades of colonial rule. This created
a critical mass of people, including a majority of the territory's
residents and an even larger share of the younger generation, who
viewed themselves as Hong Kong "belongers," rooted in Hong
COLONY IN CONFLICT: THE HONG KONG DISTURBANCES, MAY 1967-JANUARY 1968
(1970); KEVIN P. LANE, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE STATUS Quo: THE HISTORICAL RooTS OF
CHINA'S HONG KONG POLICY 75-78 (1990); MINERS, supra note 6, at 32-34; John D.
Young, China's Role in Two Hong Kong Disturbances: A Scenario for the Future?, 19 J.
ORIENTAL ST. 158 (1981). Colonial Hong Kong's isolation from broader Chinese
politics together with geographic proximity made Hong Kong the principal desti-
nation for those who fled political upheavals and repression in the mainland.
9 The perpetual awkwardness in finding a term to refer to the people who
live in Hong Kong reflects this situation. "Hong Kong residents" is often the pre-
ferred English term, but it connotes habitation rather than a distinct identity and
membership in a political community. "S.A.R. resident" is a hopelessly one-
dimensional and dryly administrative label. The locution "Hong Kong Chinese"
is inadequate as well, because it is used primarily to distinguish the territory's
ethnically Chinese inhabitants from South Asians and Westerners who live in
Hong Kong.
A commonly used P.R.C. term, gangren, is perhaps a better label, but it too is
ambiguous. In some contexts, it is the equivalent of the English "Hong Kong resi-
dents." In much official usage, it is definitively subordinate to Hong Kongers'
post-reversion status as Chinese citizens. That is, the core P.R.C. policy of gan-
grenzhigang, Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong, is a matter of delegating some
subsidiary aspects of China's sovereign authority over the territory to inhabitants
of Hong Kong who have, in China's view, always been Chinese nationals despite
their residence in an area controlled by a colonial power. To complicate matters
further, the constitutional and statutory arrangements implementing the gan-
grenzhigang policy contemplate that a significant minority of the seats in the legis-
lature, judiciary, and the senior ranks of the executive branch are to be occupied
by people who hold foreign passports.
The terms that best suggest a distinct Hong Kong identity, tellingly, became
fairly common usages only recently. They too may prove unsatisfactory. The
English term, "Hong Konger," has the dysphonic clunk of a neologism. The Chi-
nese xianggangren coexists uneasily with the more politically charged and much
more prevalent gangren, and has the shortcoming of sounding in its Cantonese
pronunciation very much like the English "Hong Kongian."
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Kong and sharing a uniquely Hong Kong culture and experience.' 0
A 1988 survey captured this shift, finding that almost two-thirds of
Hong Kong residents considered themselves "Hongkongese"
rather than "Chinese." More than four-fifths claimed to feel "a lot"
or "quite a lot" that they belonged to Hong Kong, with striking
consistency across socioeconomic groups."
Over roughly the same period, Hong Kong underwent a
sweeping economic transformation. Hong Kong's gross domestic
product grew at an average annual rate of seven percent between
1975 and 1995.12 By 1994, Hong Kong's per capita gross domestic
product was approximately eighty-four percent of that of the
United States.1 3 Particularly in the 1970s and after, Hong Kong
came to occupy an important place in the global and regional
economy, becoming a major trading and financial center, one of the
world's busiest ports, the gateway to China, and a shining example
of the East Asian economic miracle. A growing sense of proprie-
tary pride among the territory's residents in the considerable ac-
complishments of Hong Kong accompanied this rise to wealth and
prominence. For many of its people, Hong Kong had begun to
look and feel like a unique and attractive place with a distinctive
and successful community.
The soaring levels of affluence and education that accompanied
economic growth correlated with increased pressure for a democ-
ratic and accountable government. Facing such pressure and fear-
ing that the riots that shook the territory in the 1960s indicated that
the government was dangerously out of touch with popular con-
cerns, the colonial authorities responded. They began to provide
mechanisms for "consultation" with their subjects and for a modi-
cum of democratization. The establishment of a new Urban Coun-
cil, District Boards, and Regional Council between 1973 and 1986
put in place partially elected statutory consultative bodies.' 4 A se-
10 See LAU & KuAN, supra note 1, at 178-87 (analyzing "Hong Kong" vs. "Chi-
nese" identities in Hong Kong); see also Tu Wei-ming, Cultural China: The Periphery
as Center, in THE LIv1NG TREE: THE CHANGING MEANING OF BEING CHINESE TODAY 1,
10-11, 15 (Tu Wei-ming ed., 1994) (describing the emergence of a Hong Kong Chi-
nese cultural and political identity distinct from a mainland Chinese identity).
11 See Lau Siu-kai, Democratization and Decline of Trust in Public Institutions in
Hong Kong, 3 DEMOCRATIZATION 158, 166 (1996); Kuan Hsin-chi & Lau Siu-kai,
Mass Media and Politics in Hong Kong 8-9 (Sept. 1988) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with authors).
12 See HONG KONG GOV'T INFO. SERVICES, supra note 3, at 48.
13 See 2 EUROPA WORLD Y.B. 1996, at 3365, 3399 (1996).
14 See supra note 6; MINERS, supra note 6, at 155-57, 169-74.
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ries of government Green Papers and White Papers during the
1980s pledged gradual progress toward democratic reforms in the
process for selecting members of the Legislative Council
("Legco").15
During the final decade of colonial rule in Hong Kong, dra-
matic events accelerated the development of "mass" politics and
pressures for public participation in government. The huge public
demonstrations in Hong Kong in 1989, held in support of the stu-
dent-led democracy movement in Beijing, and in outrage at its bru-
tal suppression, showed clearly that "ordinary" Hong Kong citi-
zens could mobilize in support of political objectives.1 6 Subsequent
demonstrations, including the annual memorial gatherings on the
anniversary of the Tiananmen Incident and rallies to protest P.R.C.
and colonial government actions and policies, confirmed that the
potential for politically motivated and politically potent action by
Hong Kong citizens had to be taken seriously. To a considerable
degree, Governor Patten's electoral reforms reflected a recognition
of the potential power of popular political attitudes and mass po-
litical behavior during the waning days of colonial rule.
In addition to loosely structured popular activism and partly in
response to the colonial government's constitutional reforms,
Hong Kong, in the 1990s, produced a number of true electoral poli-
ticians who competed for newly elective positions in Legco and lo-
15 See GOVERNMENT OF H.K., WHrE PAPER: THE DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESENTA-
TIVE GOVERNMENT-THE WAY FORWARD (Feb. 1988) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER (Feb.
1988)]; GOVERNMENT OF H.K., GREEN PAPER: THE 1987 REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (May 1987) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER (May 1987)];
GOVERNMENT OF H.K., WHITE PAPER: THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF REPRESEN-
TATIVE GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG (Nov. 1984) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER (Nov.
1984)]; GOVERNMENT OF H.K., GREEN PAPER: THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN HONG KONG (July 1984) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER
(July 1984)]; Lo SHUI-HING, THE POLITICS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN HONG KONG 67-
100 (1997); Norman J. Miners, Moves Toward Representative Government 1984-1988,
in HONG KONG: THE CHALLENGE OF TRANSFORMATION, supra note 6, at 19-35; Lo
Shui-hing, Decolonization and Political Development in Hong Kong, 18 ASIAN SURV. 18
(1988).
16 Senior Executive Councillor Lydia Dunn commented in the wake of the
post-Tiananmen demonstrations that "Hongkong [sic] people have been so enthu-
siastic to speak up in a responsible way that we can no longer say people here are
not interested in politics or are politically immature." Emily Lau, Voice of the Peo-
ple, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 8, 1989, at 18. The head of the Chinese delegation to
the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group, Ke Zaishuo, conceded that the Tiananmen
Incident shook popular confidence in Hong Kong, but he argued that this reaction
occurred only because the people in Hong Kong were ignorant of what had really
happened in Beijing. See Hong Kong: Ironing Out the Wrinkles in the Face of 1997, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 1,1989.
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cal government bodies. These politicians also comprised the lead-
ership of newly established political parties.17 While still a far cry
from the big city pols that Governor Chris Patten encountered as a
young man working on a campaign in the United States, or the col-
leagues he worked with as a Member of Parliament and as a Con-
servative Party leader in Britain,1 8 these budding Hong Kong poli-
ticians nevertheless reflected and encouraged the territory's
emergent popular politics. In a fashion familiar in democratic poli-
ties, these politicians articulated and pressed the colonial authori-
ties to act on their constituents' preferences, and sometimes sought
to shape those preferences. They used election campaigns, party
organizations, floor debates in Legco, other operations of govern-
ment, and the mass media to keep up a constant drumbeat of pub-
lic discourse on issues of politics and policy.
The territory's "liberals" and "democrats" and Hong Kong's
colonial government, itself a target of liberal and democratic criti-
cism, did not monopolize Hong Kong's new popular politics. Dur-
ing the final decade of British rule, pro-China parties were estab-
lished in the territory to battle pro-democracy and business-
conservative parties in the elections mandated by late colonial re-
forms. 19 Politicians and officials of every ideological stripe claimed
to speak for the people of Hong Kong and sought to win their sup-
port. In doing so, they drew on, and encouraged, a boom in public
opinion research by Hong Kong media and academic institutions
during the 1980s and 1990s, most of which focused on popular atti-
tudes toward aspects of the 1997 question.
20
17 See, e.g., Jane C.Y. Lee, The 1997 Transition and Hong Kong's Evolving Political
Leadership, in ONE COUNTRY, MANY SYSTEMS 63-94 (Donald H. McMillen & Michael
E. DeGloyer eds., 1993); Alvin S.Y. So, The Tiananmen Incident, Patten's Electoral Re-
forms, and the Roots of Contested Democracy, in THE CHALLENGES OF HONG KONG'S
REINTEGRATION WITH CHINA, supra note 7, at 49-84; cf. LAU SIu-KAI,
DECOLONIZATION WITHOUT INDEPENDENCE AND THE POVERTY OF POLITICAL LEADERS
IN HONG KONG (1990) (describing pre-1990 absence of effective political leaders
and strong mass party organizations).
18 On Patten's earlier career and its implications for his approach to the gov-
ernorship of Hong Kong, see, for example, JONATHAN DIMBLEBY, THE LAST
GOVERNOR: CHRIS PATTEN AND THE HANDOVER OF HONG KONG 4-15 (1997); James
Bartholomew and Stacy Mosher, Last Viceroy, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 7, 1992, at
15; Denis MacShane, Governing Principles, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 7, 1992, at 31.
19 See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text (describing late colonial re-
forms in Hong Kong).
20 See, e.g., KUAN HSIN-CHI & LAU SIU-KAI, POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN A CHANGING
CONTEXT: THE CASE OF HONG KONG (1997); LAU & KuAN, supra note 1; Robert T.Y.
Chung, Public Opinion in the Late Transition Period, in FROM COLONY TO SAR: HONG
KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra note 6, at 491-526.
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In the 1980s and 1990s, Beijing appointed, directly or indirectly,
dozens of Hong Kongers to represent the interests and preferences
of Hong Kong in a succession of bodies charged with shaping the
S.A.R.'s laws and institutions. These bodies included the Basic
Law Drafting Committee, the Basic Law Consultative Committee,
the Preliminary Working Committee ("P.W.C.'), the Preparatory
Committee ("P.C."), the Selection Committee for the Chief Execu-
tive (which also voted on the Provisional Legislature's member-
ship), and the Provisional Legislature itself. 21 While the Hong
Kong members of these bodies were mostly business elites and re-
liably "pro-China" types, the appointments were not limited to
these circles and, in theory, represented all of the people of Hong
21 See, e.g., Jacques deLisle & Kevin P. Lane, Cooking the Rice Without Cooking
the Goose: The Rule of Law, the Battle over Business and the Quest for Prosperity in Hong
Kong after 1997, in HONG KONG UNDER CHINESE RULE: THE ECONOMIC AND
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF REVERSION 31, 39-40 (Warren I. Cohen & Li Zhao eds.,
1997) (describing heavy representation of business among Beijing's informal ad-
visers and on formal transition-related bodies); China Names HK Transition Com-
mittee, U.P.I., Dec. 28, 1995 (describing the membership of the Preparatory Com-
mittee ("P.C.") as dominated by pro-China people and business leaders), available
at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Louise do Rosario, Follow the Leader, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Feb. 23, 1995, at 18 (noting that the thirty-seven Hong Kong members
of the P.W.C. included business magnate Li Ka-shing, the head of the territory's
largest pro-China labor union, a long-serving, and knighted, member of the terri-
tory's Executive Council, and some prominent solicitors); Bruce Gilley, Down to
Brass Tacks, FARE. ECON. REV., Jan. 25, 1996, at 14-15 (noting that nearly half of the
ninety-four Hong Kong seats on the 150-member Preparatory Committee went to
business people); Incumbents and Legco Losers Win Selection Fight, S. CHINA
MORNING POsT, Dec. 22, 1996, at 1 (describing the party affiliation and leanings of
Provisional Legislature members); John Ridding, China's HK Move Criticized by
Patten, US, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 23, 1996, at 4; Stephen Vines, The Movers and
Shakers, ASIA TIMES, June 27, 1997, at 13 (describing the backgrounds of members
of China's informal groups of Hong Kong advisers and of key formal transitional
bodies); see also The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China, Apr. 4, 1990 (P.R.C.), translated in 29 I.L.M. 1520
[hereinafter Basic Law] annex I (mandating that members of the committee elect-
ing future Chief Executives be drawn in equal shares from (1) the industrial,
commercial, and financial sectors, (2) the professions, (3) labor, social services, re-
ligious, and other sectors, and (4) political representatives from Hong Kong); Deci-
sion of the National People's Congress on the Method for the Formation of the First Gov-
ernment and the First Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region § 3 (1990), reprinted in id. [hereinafter N.P.C. Decision] (containing a similar
provision concerning the composition of the selection committee that nominated
the first Chief Executive and elected in the Provisional Legislature); Ming K.
Chan, Democracy Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making of the Hong Kong Basic Law, in
THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR STABILITY AND PROSPERITY UNDER
CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY? 7-8, 22-24 (Ming K. Chan & David J. Clark eds., 1990) (de-
scribing the mixed but heavily pro-business composition of the Basic Law Draft-
ing Committee and, to a lesser degree, the Basic Law Consultative Committee).
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Kong.
In addition to such new features on the territory's political
landscape, established institutions also played a role in Hong
Kong's newly dynamic and contnetious public life. Officials of the
colonial government continued to hold forth as interpreters of the
people's wishes and guardians of their interests. A pro-China, left-
wing press, dedicated to conveying the P.R.C.'s views to the
masses, and a pro-China trade union had long been fixtures on the
Hong Kong political scene, and continued to be significant political
forces during the run-up to reversion. Hong Kong's deputies to
the National People's Congress ("N.P.C."), China's national legisla-
ture, and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference,
China's principal United Front organ, provided at least a formal
opportunity for popular representation of Hong Kongers alongside
their compatriots and future fellow Chinese citizens in key P.R.C.
bodies.22
The rise of more extensive political and institutional mecha-
nisms for hearing, amplifying, and directing the voice of the Hong
Kong people reflected a perception across the spectrum of political
elites that the territory's ordinary citizens were no longer reliably
apolitical. They had opinions about politics, which in transitional
Hong Kong were primarily opinions about prospective laws and
institutions for the S.A.R. Political elites recognized that these
opinions, if not addressed and accommodated, might drive Hong
Kong people to act in ways that could prove disastrous for Hong
Kong's stability and, therefore, its prosperity.
All sides in the political debates over Hong Kong's future ap-
peared to understand that disloyalty and exit were viable options
available to much of the populace. Leading participants in the
22 See, e.g., XIANFA [Constitution] arts. 57-78 (P.R.C.) (defining the composi-
tion and powers of the National People's Congress; id. pmbl. (referring to the Chi-
nese People's Political Consultative Conference ("C.P.P.C.C.")); Basic Law, supra
note 21, art. 159 (conferring on Hong Kong N.P.C. representatives the power, with
the concurrence of the S.A.R. legislature and Chief Executive, of proposing
amendments to the Basic Law); id. annex I (declaring Hong Kong N.P.C. and
C.P.P.C.C. members to be among the small pool from which one-fourth of the
members of the election conunittee for future Chief Executives are to be selected);
N.P.C. Decision, supra note 21, § 3 (containing a similar provision concerning the
eligibility for membership in the selection committee that nominated the first
Chief Executive and named the Provisional Legislature); see also Karin Chai, The
Politicization of Unions in Hong Kong, in ONE COUNTRY MANY SYSTEMS supra note 17,
at 121 (discussing the role of pro-China unions); Emily Lau, The Press Gang, FARE.
ECON. REV., Sept. 27, 1990, at 26 (describing the considerable circulation of strong-
ly pro-China and left-wing newspapers in Hong Kong).
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politics of the transition apprehended that popular discontent with
an unpalatable S.A.R. order could lead to a sapping of Hong
Kong's economic dynamism, eruptions of disorder, and, in turn,
repressive crackdowns. While the broad masses had this disloy-
alty option, a more elite stratum of Hong Kongers had a genuine
exit option because they held or could acquire foreign citizenship
or residence rights.23 Key political players appreciated that legal
and institutional arrangements unsatisfactory to this vital group
might trigger an exodus that would devastate the territory's hu-
man capital, social stability, and allure for international business.24
On the other hand, the principal participants in the political con-
flicts of the endgame also seemed to discern the increased benefits
of mobilizing popular opinion in transitional Hong Kong. Prop-
erly channeled or carefully cultivated public opinion and pressure
appeared to offer a formidable weapon in the endgame battles to
shape laws and institutions for the S.A.R.
Recognizing the dangers and opportunities presented by a
populace that identified with Hong Kong and that cared about and
could affect the territory's legal and political future, Hong Kong's
colonial rulers, the P.R.C., and the territory's "pro-democracy" and
"pro-China" political leadership undertook considerable efforts to
assert and to cultivate popular backing for their preferred packages
of laws and institutions for the S.A.R. In the final years before re-
version, the British and Hong Kong liberal side argued that the
people of Hong Kong did, should, or must endorse a set of rule-of-
law values and specific legal and institutional arrangements that
satisfied at least the minimum requirements for a just order, de-
fined in broadly liberal-democratic terms. China and its Hong
Kong allies responded in kind. They asserted that the Hong Kong
people did, should, or must embrace a set of rule-of-law values
23 See Emily Lau, Elites Take All, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 19, 1990, at 18-19.
24 By most estimates, at least several hundred thousand, probably in excess of
ten percent, of Hong Kong's population of six million hold foreign passports. See
Bruce Gilley, Red Flag over Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 7, 1995, at 72, 76
(stating that twelve percent of Hong Kong residents possess foreign passports).
This figure, however, surely understates the exit option. Tens of thousands more
have emigrated and not returned. In addition, many still in the territory without
foreign passports have the right of abode elsewhere or could acquire it. See
Louise do Rosario, Passport Politics, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 29, 1994, at 18, 20 (re-
porting that while 400,000 Hong Kong residents hold foreign passports, many
others have emigration rights). Twenty-two percent of respondents to a July 1995
poll indicated that they planned to leave Hong Kong. See Stephen Vines, Sticky
Chinese Fingers Close to the Honey Pot, INDEPENDENT (London), July 1, 1995, Com-
ment, at 17.
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and concrete resolutions of the controversies of the endgame that
were compatible with China's positivist conception of an accept-
able legal and institutional order for the S.A.R.
2.1.2. Contradictions Among the Hong Kong People
The "Hong Kong people" were not nearly as monolithic as the
label and the rhetoric tended to suggest. In the political lexicon of
contemporary Hong Kong, the term has tended to exclude expatri-
ate Westerners and those ethnic Chinese who ranked among the
top elite of the territory's business community. Even so narrowed,
however, the group was hardly homogenous. Although over-
whelmingly ethnically Chinese and Cantonese- speaking, the Hong
Kong people also included thousands of South Asians and a well-
educated segment of the Chinese population comfortable in Eng-
lish. The Hong Kong people encompassed both recent migrants
who had spent most of their lives in China, and local residents who
were born in Hong Kong, some of them members of families that
had been in the territory for generations. 25
At one extreme, the Hong Kong people included illiterate peas-
ants from the Guangdong countryside and the farmers of the New
Territories' remaining tradition-steeped villages.26 At the other ex-
treme, the label applied to cosmopolitan professionals whose edu-
cation included degrees from Western or Western-style universities
and whose work, or quests for foreign passports, had taken them
abroad for substantial periods. In between, there were hundreds of
thousands of factory workers whose jobs were increasingly threat-
25 See HONG KONG GOVT INFO. SERVICES, supra note 3, at 157-58, 467 (provid-
ing statistics on English language tertiary education in Hong Kong and students
going abroad to study); id. at 339-43 (describing the ethnic and cultural composi-
tion of the Hong Kong population); LAU, supra note 4, at 175-76 (contrasting recent
immigrants and old "Hong Kong families"); Skelton, supra note 4 (analyzing the
origins, destinations, and socioeconomic characteristics of Hong Kong emigrants
and immigrants).
26 According to one mainstream academic estimate, roughly ten percent of
Hong Kong's potential electorate was illiterate at the time of the final colonial era
elections. See Hong Kong: Mother and Father Do Not Know Best, ECONOMIST, Sept.
23, 1995, at 29 (quoting Michael deGloyer of Hong Kong Baptist University). The
colonial government's long-standing accommodation of traditional inheritance
and family laws reflected the "tradition-steeped" quality of the rural New Territo-
ries. See Louise do Rosario, Gender Wars, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 7, 1994, at 21 (de-
scribing Legco member Christine Loh's efforts to secure repeal of an inheritance
law that entrenched a traditional rural area prohibition on women inheriting
land); see also PETER WESLEY-SMrrH, THE SOURCES OF HONG KONG LAW 205-24 (1994)
(describing Chinese law and Chinese custom as a source of Hong Kong law, par-
ticularly in the New Territories).
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ened by the manufacturing industry's migration to the mainland,
and office workers whose livelihoods depended on servicing the
local, mainland, or global economies.
27
With such social and economic diversity came considerable
disparities in wealth. Hong Kong's developed-world level of per
capita income was less evenly distributed than in most industrial-
ized countries. 28 Thus, the Hong Kong people included vast mid-
dle and working classes, a group of desperately poor who lived on
the streets or, quite literally, in cages, and elite professionals who
paid rents that could shock Manhattanites. Socioeconomic class
distinctions also coincided with one of the most politically salient
fault lines dividing the Hong Kong people during the endgame:
successful businesspeople, professionals, and relatively senior civil
servants constituted the vast majority of the estimated ten to
twelve percent of Hong Kongers who held foreign passports or
rights of abode.2
9
As Hong Kong entered the final years of its protracted transi-
tion to Chinese rule, the discernible political leanings of the people
of Hong Kong ranged widely. Official P.R.C., broader pro-China,
colonial government, and Hong Kong liberal views all seemed cer-
tain to resonate in some quarters in Hong Kong. Many Hong Kon-
gers who had fled political repression or chaos on the mainland
held strongly anti-communist views and deeply distrusted the re-
gime that ruled across the soon-to-disappear border. Other resi-
dents, especially, but not exclusively, those who formed the terri-
tory's "pro-China" left, held political views that were strongly
27 See supra note 25; see also HONG KONG GOV'T INFO. SERVICES, supra note 3, at
49-62, 79-81, 93-97, 116-17 (describing the sectoral composition of the economy,
employment, and foreign trade and investment); Leonard K. Cheng, Trade and In-
dustry: 1997 and Beyond, in FROM COLONY TO SAR: HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES
AHEAD, supra note 6, at 175-96 (describing trends in the sectoral composition of the
economy and trade); Jacques deLisle, Political Alchemy, the Long Transition and
Law's Promised Empire: How July 1, 1997, Matters - and Doesn't Matter - in Hong
Kong's Return to Chinese Rule, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 69, 91-96 (1997) (assessing
the implications of pre-reversion economic integration of Hong Kong with China).
28 See, e.g., Tang Shu-hung, The Economy, in FROM COLONY TO SAR: HONG
KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra note 6, at 117, 138-42 (finding the inequality of
income distribution in Hong Kong to have risen in the 1970s and early 1980s,
reaching a Gini Coefficient of 0.48 in 1991, indicating the least equal income dis-
tribution among the newly industrialized economies of East Asia); LAU, supra note
4, at 176-180 (describing income inequality and its social and political conse-
quences).
29 See, e.g., Lau, supra note 23, at 18-19 (describing the British plan for offering
citizenship to some of Hong Kong's elite); see also supra note 24 and accompanying
text (discussing the "exit" option).
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nationalist and reunificationist. Other versions of nationalism with
substantial appeal were more anti-colonialist than pro-P.R.C., and
some were openly supportive of the Guomindang, the ruling party
in Taiwan that the Chinese Communist Party had driven from the
mainland in 1949.30 In addition, notions that Hong Kongers did or
should have rights to some form of self-determination, and even a
degree of nostalgia for fading colonial rule, found some adherents
among the Hong Kong people on the eve of reversion.
Political issues and orientations less intimately linked to ques-
tions of national identity also varied considerably in Hong Kong at
the twilight of colonial rule. In addition to orthodox Chinese
communist doctrines, conventional liberalism, social welfarism,
conservative corporatism, "Asian values"-tinged developmental-
ism, and laissez-faire libertarianism attracted followers in some
segments of Hong Kong society. The diversity in the political per-
spectives, social and economic status, ethnic and cultural back-
grounds, life experiences, and even citizenship among the Hong
Kong people portended conflicting views on the rule-of-law ques-
tions facing pre-reversion Hong Kong, and differing degrees of
vulnerability to persuasion or pressure to accept any particular an-
swers to those questions. All sides in the political conflicts over
those issues thus seemed potentially able to find natural and reli-
able supporters in some segment of the Hong Kong public.
On the other hand, the historically weak sense of a Hong Kong
identity, Hong Kongers' limited experience with participation in
the territory's politics and governance, and the apparent variety
and fragmentation of residents' attitudes toward government insti-
tutions and laws that were themselves in a state of flux, suggested
that the Hong Kong people's views on current issues remained
murky, volatile, and malleable. Attempts to predict, mold, or
merely plumb the depths of popular opinion thus appeared likely
30 See generally, KUAN & LAU, supra note 20 (finding variety and change in atti-
tudes toward politics, government, and the "existing system"); MINERS, supra note
6, at 196-202 (describing political parties' and leaders' platforms and the constitu-
encies that support them); Chai, supra note 22, at 121 (discussing political orien-
tations of Hong Kong workers); So, supra note 17, at 49, 58-61, 68-72 (describing
the formation of grass-roots support for diverse political parties and agendas);
Louise do Rosario, Grassroots Movement, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 18, 1994, at 20
(describing "United Ants," a small group pressing for uncompromisingly liberal
reforms, including selection of all Legco members by universal suffrage direct
elections); Emily Lau, The Press Gang, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 27, 1990, at 26 (de-
scribing considerable circulation of strongly pro-China and left-wing newspapers
in Hong Kong).
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to be worthwhile for key political participants in the final battles
over the rule of law and legal and institutional arrangements for
the S.A.R. Not surprisingly in these circumstances, members of
both sides in the political struggle over popular rule-of-law values
and specific laws and institutions worked diligently to claim popu-
lar backing and were able to do so with some credibility.
Still, these battles almost never explicitly recognized the nu-
merous fault lines that seemingly diveded the people whose alle-
giance or acquiescence the political players sought. The arguments
and assertions on both sides of the basic political divide remained
cast in terms of a single mandate from a monolithic Hong Kong
people. This striking, albeit implicit, rejection of conventional coa-
lition-building politics underscores that the fundamental clash of
visions of the rule of law and the nature of the sovereign's domes-
tic authority overshadowed and shaped the ordinary politics of
pursuing public support.
2.2. The Hong Kong People and the British and Hong Kong Liberal-
Democratic Vision of the Rule of Law
Throughout much of the final decade preceding Hong Kong's
reversion, officials of the Hong Kong and British governments, and
leaders of Hong Kong's "pro-democracy" parties and a broader
"liberal" political movement argued that the territory's residents
required that the rule of law be preserved. They asserted that the
continuation of Hong Kong's rule of law was an issue "of greatest
concern to Hong Kong people."31 Indeed, the Hong Kong people
regarded the rule of law as one of the truly definitive traits of Hong
Kong that "distinguished Hong Kong from all other Asian socie-
ties." 32 In his final annual policy address, Governor Patten as-
serted that the "peace and safety guaranteed by the rule of law"
had prompted much of Hong Kong's population to flee to the terri-
tory from China.33 Democratic Party leader and Legislative Coun-
cillor Martin Lee claimed that numerous reforms that had en-
hanced the rule of law in the 1990s reflected the demands of the
people of Hong Kong and their elected representatives in the legis-
31 Fung Wai-kong & Louis Won, Patten Blasts Beijing Plan on Legislature, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 3, 1996, at 1 (quoting Martin Lee).
32 Martin Lee, Need for "Rule of Law," S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 1, 1993, at
11.
33 Peter Humphrey, Patten Swansong Defends HK Democracy, Rights, Reuters,
Oct. 2, 1996, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
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lature.34
Adherents to this perspective on Hong Kong's rule of law ar-
gued that even if some or most of the people did not yet appreciate
it, their interests depended on the rule of law. Governor Patten
urged people to "stand up for the defence of their rights" lest they
be trampled upon.35 Similarly, Martin Lee warned, "It is important
that all Hong Kong people stand up to make sure our rule of law is
maintained," or else China's prosecution and jailing of dissidents,
such as Wei Jingsheng, will be the "kind of thing that will happen
in Hong Kong" after reversion.36
Proponents of this line of argument added that failure to assure
that Hong Kong's rule of law survived the transition would lead to
serious instability. They found support for this view in the fact
that hundreds of thousands of the territory's people had turned
out for street demonstrations after the Tiananmen Incident, in part
because Hong Kongers feared that the suppression of the democ-
racy movement in China portended a breach of China's promises
to preserve Hong Kong's rule of law and key laws and institutions
after reversion.37 They found additional evidence for this charac-
terization of the people's values in polls that showed flagging
popular confidence in the territory's future, and spikes in the rate
of emigration and requests for right of abode that accompanied a
number of later shocks that seemed threatening to a generally lib-
eral rule of law for a P.R.C.-ruled Hong Kong.38
Although they disagreed about some of the specifics of a rule-
of-law regime that would meet the needs of the people, the mem-
bers of the loosely knit camp of Hong Kong politicians and British
and colonial officials all envisioned a distinctly liberal and democ-
ratic version of the rule of law. They agreed that the people re-
quired preservation of the common law system, as the Joint Decla-
34 See A-G Rejects Attack on Rule of Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 13, 1995,
at 5.
35 Jonathan Mirsky, Firms "Must Give Something Back" to Hong Kong, TIMES
(London), Apr. 29, 1996, at 11.
36 Peter Lim, Hong Kong Faces New Uncertainty After Wei's Sentencing, Agence
France Presse, Dec. 17, 1995, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
37 On the impact of the Tiananmen Incident on Hong Kong politics and atti-
tudes toward a future under Chinese rule, see, for example, STEVE TSANG, HONG
KONG: AN APPOINTMENT WITH CHINA 156-80 (1997); Frank Ching, Toward Colonial
Sunset: The Wilson Regime, 1987-92, in PRECARIOUS BALANCE: HONG KONG BETWEEN
CHINA AND BRITAIN, 1842-1992, supra note 8, at 178-82; So, supra note 17, at 49.
38 See Bruce Gilley, Darkness Dawns, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 11, 1996, at 14;
Vines, supra note 24.
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ration on the Question of Hong Kong39 ("Joint Declaration") and
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of
the People's Republic of China ("Basic Law") recognized. 40 They
also agreed that a rule of law adequate and acceptable for the peo-
ple of Hong Kong entailed an independent judiciary and a non-
corrupt and legally accountable executive to administer the laws.
Governor Patten articulated this perspective, arguing that a "clean,
accountable government under the rule of law" was among the vir-
tues of Hong Kong that its people could be expected to defend.
41
Martin Lee offered another formulation of the same basic idea: "In
Hong Kong, when we think about the rule of law, key principles
come to mind: clear rules that citizens can follow; a judiciary free
from political influence; the right to sue the Government; ... and a
court system that will allow justice to be done ... "42 The Hong
Kong Bar Association made a similar point in a letter to the Chief
Executive-designate:
The rule of law does not merely mean that there is a body of
law by which the people will be ruled. ... The rule of law
also means the process of making and repealing law is
open, reasoned and in accordance with the law. If not,. . . it
will become rule by the people in power.
43
The British colonial authorities at times suggested that the rule
of law also required that the laws reflect the will of the people, as
expressed through institutions politically accountable to the peo-
ple. Governor Patten, for example, argued early in his tenure that
Hong Kong needed "a government which was accountable to a
39 The Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, U.K.-
P.R.C., 1985 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 26 (Cmnd. 9543) [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
40 See infra Sections 2.2, 2.3; Joint Declaration, supra note 39, art. 3(3), annex I,
II; Basic Law, supra note 21, arts. 8, 84, 160.
41 Fung Wai-kong, Patten Pushes Open Selection, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
29, 1996, at 4 (citing Governor Patten's belief that a clean, accountable government
under the rule of law and institutions that checked corruption were keys to Hong
Kong's success, and were virtues the Hong Kong people should support); see also
Bruce Einhorn, The Jitters Just Got Worse, Bus. WK., Feb. 3, 1997, at 26 (noting the
importance of an honest civil service and political freedoms to Hong Kong).
42 Lee, supra note 32, at 11; see also Margaret Ng, Lead Us to Transparency, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 14, 1997, at 17 (noting the importance of clear and sta-
ble laws and guarantees of judicial independence).
43 Philip Stephens, One System Fits All, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 31, 1997, at
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broadly based legislature," and needed a legislature with sufficient
democratic legitimacy to be able to "hold the executive to account
in a responsible and effective way" and to "help secure Hong
Kong's way of life," including its rule of law.44
Some democratic politicians in Hong Kong asserted an even
tighter and clearer link between the rule of law that the people of
Hong Kong wanted and needed and the development of democrat-
ic institutions. As Martin Lee saw it, "Hong Kong has managed to
uphold the rule of law ... solely because ... a democratically
elected British parliament has guaranteed our rule of law." The
rule of law's continuation beyond 1997 required "the introduction
and institutionalisation of democratic and accountable govern-
ment" that would be elected by and "answerable to the people of
Hong Kong." 4
5
In mid-1996, a new political grouping of prominent pro-
democracy legislators and activists took the argument a step fu-
ther. One of its leaders suggested that a rule of law adequate for
the people of Hong Kong additionally required that the people of
Hong Kong be allowed to draft their own constitution to replace
the faulty and P.R.C.-imposed Basic Law. 46 As many of these
comments linking the provision of an adequate rule of law to elec-
toral democracy or a strong judiciary or continuity in specific laws
suggest, liberal-democratic attempts to describe or to shape the
rule-of-law values held by the Hong Kong people were closely en-
tangled with the specific legal and institutional questions that
dominated Hong Kong politics in the 1990s.
2.2.1. The Bill of Rights Ordinance and the Rights of the Hong
Kong People
Popular support for the Bill of Rights Ordinance ("Ordinance"
or "Bill of Rights") was taken virtually for granted when the colo-
nial government moved to adopt the Ordinance at the turn of the
decade. 47 After all, the events at Tiananmen in 1989 had deeply
shaken Hong Kongers' confidence that their accustomed liberties
44 A Different Style, FARE. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at 22.
45 Lee, supra note 32, at 11.
46 See Lawmakers Create Pro-Democracy Group, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1996,
at 7.
47 Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (1991). For discussions of the context of
the Ordinance's preparation and adoption, see, e.g., MINERS, supra note 6, at 27-28;
Emily Lau, Better Late than Never, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 12, 1990; Emily Lau, Con-
fidence Building, FARE. ECON. REV., Oct. 26, 1989, at 19.
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would survive the transition to Chinese rule.48 A large portion of
the territory's population had taken to the streets to say as much in
the wake of the crackdown on China's democracy movement.
With the people's preferences thus presumed and demonstrated,
proponents of the Ordinance appeared to need to do little in assert-
ing or cultivating popular support.
The colonial authorities' and Hong Kong politicians' efforts to
claim and to cultivate popular support for the Ordinance, and for
the protection of civil and political liberties more generally, became
more elaborate in the middle of the 1990s. As Hong Kong politics
became more democratic and more volatile and the P.R.C.'s threats
to excise portions of the Ordinance and related reforms grew more
strident, British colonial officials and Hong Kong's democratic
politicians responded with stronger and more complex arguments
that the people of Hong Kong did, would, or should demand the
preservation of the Bill of Rights and other liberty-protecting laws.
The British colonial and Hong Kong liberal side's principal ar-
gument was, simply, that the people of Hong Kong strongly sup-
ported the threatened laws, and that a roll-back therefore would
undermine Hong Kongers' confidence, alienate them from the new
regime, and harm Hong Kong. Martin Lee asserted, "Hong Kong's
6 million citizens cherish their civil liberties" and "recognize that
the difference in approach to human rights" in Hong Kong and in
China "will pose the greatest threat to Hong Kong in the transition
to Chinese sovereignty."49 When China's hand-picked P.C.'s legal
subgroup announced its final proposals to revise the Ordinance
and to overturn liberal amendments to laws restricting freedom of
association and assembly, Governor Patten denounced the recom-
mendation as a step that "deprives" the S.A.R. of "public confi-
dence." 50 Patten argued, "It is already crystal clear that what the
community wants to see is the preservation of Hong Kong's cur-
rent civil liberties." 51 Independent, pro-democracy legislator Emily
48 See supra note 47; supra note 37.
49 Martin Lee, Beijing's Tiananmen Mentality Augurs Most Ill for Hong Kong,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 23, 1994.
50 Patten also described the recommendations as "ridiculous in legal princi-
ple." If the British Side Knew This Would Happen, It Should Not Have Done It in the
Beginning, WEN WEI PO, Jan. 22, 1997, at A2.
51 Peter Humphrey, China Presses on with Curbs on HK Freedoms, Reuters, Feb.
24, 1997, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File. Characteristically, U.K.
Foreign Secretary Rifkind took a more accommodating line with China, hoping
that his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen's consultations with the people of Hong
Kong would "reduce the damage caused by the repealing of these ordinances."
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Lau made a similar claim: "Hong Kong people want their lifestyle
to remain unchanged," and the threat to water down the Bill of
Rights and reverse rights-expanding amendments to colonial laws
"shattered" that "dream."5 2 "[Tihe general consensus of the com-
munity is that we want to see human rights protections entrenched
in our laws."5 3 Lau's colleague Christine Loh added, "[P]eople
here are not following Beijing's line on the Bill of Rights." 54 Ac-
cording to a leader of the Alliance in Support of the Patriotic, De-
mocratic Movement in China, the "people of Hong Kong worry the
Chinese government will apply the concept of mainland laws re-
garding treason and subversion after 1997" 55- a concept that was
foreign to existing Hong Kong law.
Even a conservative Legco member who sided with China on
many issues commented that "the common people here have ac-
cepted the Bill of Rights" and would see its repeal as a dangerous
stripping-away of "protec[tion] from government abuses."5 6 Pre-
sumably for similar reasons, a leader of the territory's leading pro-
China party reportedly urged China not to undercut the Bill of
Rights.5 7 The argument that the people were deeply committed to
the Bill of Rights and related legal reforms drew additional support
from opinion polls that found civil liberties to be high on the list of
popular concerns on the eve of reversion.58 A 1996 survey, for ex-
ample, reported that respondents rated preservation of free speech
Greg Torode & Duncan Hughes, Qian Sticks to His Guns in Final Meeting with
Rifkind, S. CHINA MORNING PoST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 1.
52 Alison Leung, China-Picked Committee on HK To Wind Up Tenure, Reuters,
Dec. 7, 1995, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
53 Emily Lau, Letter to Hong Kong (Hong Kong radio broadcast, Feb. 2, 1997),
transcribed in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 4, 1997, available at LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
54 Christine Loh, The Means To Clamp Down on Free Speech, S. CHINA MORNING
PosT, Nov. 20, 1995, at 22 (commenting on P.W.C. recommendations to roll back
rights laws).
55 Chinese, British Officials in Verbal Sniping in New HK Dispute, Agence France
Presse, Nov. 27, 1996 (quoting Cheung Man-kwong), available at LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File.
56 Bruce Gilley, Hold Your Ground, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 16, 1995, at 36
(quoting Liberal Party leader and Legco member Allen Lee).
57 See Gilley, supra note 24, at 76 (quoting Democratic Alliance for the Better-
ment of Hong Kong ("D.A.B.") leader Tsang Yok-sing).
58 See Rule of Law, Autonomy Top Post-97 List, Survey Shows, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Oct. 28, 1996, at 5. The principal controversial laws, aside from the Bill of
Rights itself, were the Societies Ordinance, Cap. 151 (1992) and the Public Order
Ordinance, Cap. 245 (1995).
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and a free press as the most important tasks for the head of the
S.A.R. government. 59 Another survey showed Chief Executive-
designate Tung Chee-hwa's popularity dropping precipitously in
the wake of his announced support for the Preparatory Commit-
tee's plan to reject parts of the Bill of Rights, Public Order, and So-
cieties Ordinances. 60 Moreover, liberal commentary suggested that
favorable poll numbers understated popular support: a "silent ma-
jority" backed the Bill of Rights and rights-protecting legislation,
but was understandably reluctant to express its views on politi-
cally sensitive issues of laws that China had placed on the chop-
ping block. 61
Some critics of the planned retrenchments warned that the true
views of the Hong Kong people ultimately would surface, and that
the Hong Kong people would surely make a decision to alter the
laws a costly one. Financial Secretary Donald Tsang cautioned that
China's and its allies' failure to "convince the people of Hong
Kong" that there were good reasons for diluting rights-protecting
laws would bring street protests, resignations from the civil ser-
vice, and increased emigration.62 Pro-democracy legislator Emily
Lau and the liberal newspaper Sing Tao Daily, respectively, pre-
dicted that moves to cut back on legal protections for citizens'
rights would "backfire and stir up resentment" 63 and would "cause
'panic among Hong Kong people.' ' 64 In a somewhat less confron-
tational vein, Governor Patten warned that attempts to "slap down
on people's freedoms in the name of greater stability" risked "pro-
duc[ing] exactly the political problems" of discontent and disorder
that the moves to retrench liberties ostensibly sought to avoid. 65
59 See Bruce Gilley, Man on the Spot, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec, 19, 1996, at 15.
60 See Ng, supra note 42, at 17.
61 See Fanny Wong, A Flawed Argument for Legal Changes, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Jan. 29, 1997, at 14.
62 See Chris Yeung, Tsang Warns on Law Changes, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan.
23, 1997, at 1.
63 Peter Lim, China To Forge Ahead with Diluted Rights Laws for Hong Kong,
Agence France Presse, Feb. 2, 1997, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
64 China Hits Out at Patten Criticism over Human Rights Laws, Agence France
Presse, Jan. 21, 1997, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; see also Michael
Binyon, Hong Kong Leader Prepared To Head Street Protests, TIMES (London), Feb. 22,
1997, at 16 (describing Hong Kong Democrats' pledge to lead street protests in
opposition to China's plans to alter the Bill of Rights and reestablish restrictive
colonial laws).
65 Jonathan Sprague, Future HK Government Blasted over Freedom Curbs,
Reuters, Apr. 10, 1997, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
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Government officials' and liberal politicians' arguments that
the Hong Kong people supported the Bill of Rights and related re-
forms and that they would react badly to their reversal were not
simply claims about the established preferences and values of the
territory's residents. The governor's and Legco members' soaring
rhetoric about Hong Kongers' love of rights and liberties sought to
persuade the people, as well as to describe them. The broadly lib-
eral camp's rather defensive invocation of the views of a "silent
majority" suggested a perception that such persuasion might be
necessary. The assertion that a roll-back of rights laws would trig-
ger social unrest also seemed to be something more than a straight-
forward prediction or even a warning to China and its allies. Al-
though the argument was not as explicit as similar ones made with
respect to other issues of the endgame, the dire prognostications
here too appeared designed to tap into the Hong Kong people's
presumed fear of instability and uncertainty as a source of support
for the liberal or pro-democracy position on rights legislation. The
calculation appears to have been that residents who might be rela-
tively unconcerned with liberal rights might support laws protect-
ing those rights if they were convinced that gutting those laws
would lead to social and economic disruption.
Other arguments from colonial authorities and pro-democracy
politicians seemed to reflect a more affirmative dimension of a
strategy to cultivate popular support for rights laws by asserting
connections to other values thought to be important to the people.
Most notably, these arguments sought to link the issue of the rights
legislation's fate to questions of democracy and local autonomy for
Hong Kong. Liberal political leaders and the governor argued that
the roll-back that China and the S.A.R. government-in-waiting
were planning could not plausibly represent the will of the Hong
Kong people. According to this line of argument, a Legco that in-
cluded democratically elected representatives of the people had
passed the endangered laws.66 But unelected bodies that included
non-Hong Kong residents, such as the Preliminary Working Com-
mittee and the Preparatory Committee, had called for the reversal
of the laws. An unelected "rubber-stamp" Provisional Legislature
created by the P.R.C.-controlled Preparatory Committee, and cho-
sen by an equally illegitimate and undemocratic Selection Commit-
tee, would complete the process by enacting new, more restrictive
66 See infra Section 2.2.2. (discussing the democratic pedigree of the 1991-
elected legislature that passed the laws).
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laws.67 Moreover, the N.P.C.- a Beijing body with minimal mem-
bership from Hong Kong -had cleared the ground for the the Pro-
visional Legislature's action when it approved the Preparatory
Committee's recommendations on striking key rights legislation.
The N.P.C., Governor Patten argued, "'appl[ied a] rubber stamp
behind closed doors"' and showed itself to be "'deaf to the almost
unanimous voice of the people of Hong Kong.' ' 68 In the same
spirit, a Democratic Party spokesperson commented that the series
of actions against the rights laws showed that China was "not go-
ing to respect the will of [the] Hong Kong people." 69 These argu-
ments strongly suggested that the people had reason to fear rolling
back of rights laws because such moves portended a broader dis-
regard of Hong Kongers' wishes and concerns.
Finally, in seeking to cultivate popular support for late colonial
rights laws, Hong Kong government officials and pro-democracy
politicians also made arguments that returned in part to their
shared notions of the substantive requirements of a just and proper
legal order. Thus, liberal and democratic voices charged that, as
both a normative and a descriptive matter, revising the Bill of
Rights and reinstating restrictions on civil and political liberties
would constitute, simply, an inexcusable betrayal of the people of
Hong Kong. Those Hong Kong pro-China or conservative political
leaders who were prepared to endorse or facilitate the roll-backs
would breach a "solemn responsibility" to the people to protect
their way of life and to maintain promised and desired continuity
of laws that committed the sovereign to protecting key human
rights.70 As a spokesperson for Governor Patten articulated the
point:
The community will have to decide whether Mr. Tung
[Chee-hwa, the future Chief Executive who would preside
over the enactment of new rights laws] ... has answered
67 See, e.g., Martin Lee, Selling an Unconsulted Future Hong Kong in America,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 28, 1995 [hereinafter Lee, Selling an Unconsulted Future
Hong Kong in America]; Martin Lee, Why the PWC Failed, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Dec. 10, 1995, at 10 [hereinafter Lee, Why the PWC Failed]; Ng, supra note 42, at 17
(presenting comments of an independent Legco member who frequently sides
with Democrats).
68 Fung Wai-kong, Patten Fears for Freedom, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 25,
1997, at 4.
69 Humphrey, supra note 51.
70 See, e.g., Lee, Why the PWC Failed, supra note 67, at 10.
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the central question: Are Hong Kong's freedoms and civil
liberties after June 30 going to be the same or not? ... If
they aren't, the community is entitled to know how the
laws are going to be-and how they can conceivably be-
consistent with the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law, and the
two international covenants on human rights.
71
When the N.P.C. acted to accept the Preparatory Committee's rec-
ommendations to reject portions of the Bill of Rights and other
laws, Governor Patten similarly derided the action as incompatible
with "the legitimate needs and expectations of a modem, open so-
ciety," the Hong Kong community's desires, and "the promises
made in the Joint Declaration and ... Basic Law." 72
Liberal and pro-democracy forces argued that, faced with such
threats to their liberties and disregard for their rightful expecta-
tions, the people of Hong Kong should act to prevent that betrayal
and to defend the besieged laws that protected their rights and
served their needs, despite their possible reluctance to do so. In-
dependent pro-democracy Legco member Christine Loh argued
that "Hong Kong people owe it to themselves" to take up the chal-
lenge and "make it clear to Beijing that Hong Kong wants to keep
its Bill of Rights without it being watered down."73 While these
arguments still made claims about popular attitudes, their lan-
guage of betrayal and moral obligation, and their hints of concern
that the people might not respond as hoped, marked them as a
blend of claims of appeals to principle and pragmatism that is
qualitatively different from simple assertions about Hong Kongers'
established views or predictions of Hong Kongers' likely actions.
2.2.2. Democratic Reforms and the Will of the People
The conflicts over the Hong Kong government's moves in the
1990s to introduce democratic reforms, particularly in laws govern-
ing elections for the Legislative Council, produced the most intense
and sustained of the battles over "the people" during the endgame.
This was to be expected. After all, the laws and policies for which
the people's support was asserted or sought were ones that would
71 Linda Choy & Chris Yeung, Tight Police Controls on Protests, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Jan. 24,1997, at 1.
72 Fung, supra note 68, at 4.
73 Loh, supra note 54, at 22.
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structure the institutions charged with representing the will and
interests of the people.
Much of the foundation for laying claim to popular backing for
Governor Patten's admittedly modest democratic reforms for
Legco was in place before he presented the outlines of his package
in 1992.74 The 1980s series of Green Papers and White Papers on
the development of representative government in Hong Kong 75
had put the issue of democratization onto the agenda of Hong
Kong politics and into the minds of the territory's prospective elec-
torate. In the late 1980s, the widely publicized drafts and final
texts of the Basic Law included extensive provisions promising the
gradual implementation of democratic elections for all seats in the
S.A.R. legislature. 76 In addition, modest institutional reforms in the
1970s and 1980s had given the people of Hong Kong a little experi-
74 See Lo Chi-kin, From Through Train to Second Stove, in FROM COLONY TO
SAR: HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra note 6, at 25-30; Frank Ching,
Cleared for Action, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at 20-22 (describing the contents
of the Patten reforms).
75 WHITE PAPER (Feb. 1988), supra note 15; GREEN PAPER (May 1987), supra note
15; WHITE PAPER (Nov. 1984), supra note 15; GREEN PAPER (July 1984), supra note
15.
76 See Basic Law, supra note 21, art. 68. "The Legislature of the Special Ad-
ministrative Region shall be constituted by election." Although the "method for
forming" the Legislature is to be "specified in the light of the actual situation" in
the S.A.R. and "in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress,"
the "ultimate aim is the election of all members of the Legislative Council by uni-
versal suffrage." Id.; id. annex II (providing for the ratio of members returned by
directly elected-and presumably universal suffrage-based -geographic con-
stituencies, by more narrowly elected functional constituencies, and by an election
committee to be 24:30:6 in the second term of the S.A.R. Legislature and 30:30:0 in
the third term); N.P.C. Decision, supra note 21, § 6 (prescribing a ratio of 20:30:10
for the first S.A.R. legislature); Draft Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Admin-
istrative Region of the P.R.C. (for Solicitation of Opinions) (April 1988), reprinted in
THE HONG KONG BASIC LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR STABILITY AND PROSPERITY UNDER
CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY?, supra note 21; id. art. 67 (providing that the S.A.R. legisla-
ture "shall be constituted by a combination of direct and indirect elections" as
prescribed in Annex II, with the procedures set forth in Annex II subject to
"modifi[cation] in light of the actual situation" in the S.A.R. and "in accordance
with the principle of gradual and orderly progress"); id. annex II (setting forth
four alternative mixes of directly and indirectly elected seats for the legislature);
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the P.R.C. (Feb.
1989) (draft) art. 67, reprinted in THE HONG KONG BASIc LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR
STABILITY AND.PROSPERITY UNDER CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY?, supra note 21 (containing
substantively the same terms as Article 68 of the final Basic Law); id. annex II
(providing a ratio of geographic to functional constituencies that rises to 40:40 in
the third and fourth terms of the legislature); cf. Joint Declaration, supra note 39,
annex I, § I ("The legislature of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
shall be constituted by elections.").
[Vol. 25:41554
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/7
HONG KONG'S ENDGAME (II)
ence with electoral democracy through the introduction of partially
elected local consultative bodies and, as of 1985, indirect elections
for a small number of Legco seats.77
By the middle to late 1980s, there were strong indications of
support among the Hong Kong people for extending democracy.
Indeed, to defend the slow pace of change advocated in its reform
plans during the 1980s, the colonial government had invoked seri-
ously flawed or rigged public opinion surveys that severely under-
stated popular support for more rapid democratization. 78 At the
advent of the endgame, there was clear popular backing for a fairly
robust form of democratic reform. The violent suppression of the
1989 student-led movement in Beijing and the perceived implica-
tions for post-reversion Hong Kong galvanized ordinary Hong
Kongers to demand changes that would give them a more direct
and institutionalized voice in the territory's governance. Reacting
to the mass sentiments that had brought one-sixth or more of the
colony's population into the streets, even the conservative mem-
bers of the entirely-appointed, cabinet-like Executive Council
("Exco") and the mostly-appointed Legco backed a proposal to
make half of the legislature popularly elected in 1995.79 Establish-
ment figures, such as Exco Senior Executive Councillor Dame
Lydia Dunn, and Legco members closely tied to business interests,
remarked publicly that the Hong Kong people were no longer
"apolitical" and should be permitted to vote in direct elections for
the territory's main representative body.80 The results of the 1991
Legco elections, the first to include directly elected seats based on
universal suffrage, further supported the conclusion that the Hong
Kong people wanted democratization. Candidates from the
United Democrats of Hong Kong ("U.D.H.K.") and Meeting Point,
77 See supra text accompanying notes 14-15.
78 See, e.g., Philip Bowring & Emily Lau, Without a Fight, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Feb. 1, 1990, at 16; Frank Ching, The Betrayal of Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REV., May
19, 1994, at 36 [hereinafter Ching, The Betrayal of Hong Kong]; Frank Ching, Past
Imperfect, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 29, 1992, at 23 [hereinafter Ching, Past Imperfect]
(describing a flawed 1984 survey understating support for universal suffrage and
a flawed 1987 survey used to justify the delayed introduction of direct election for
some Legco seats); Hong Kong: Mother and Father Do Not Know Best, supra note 26,
at 29 (describing the delayed introduction of direct balloting for Legco and attrib-
uting the delay to British authorities' succumbing to pressure from the P.R.C.).
79 See Frank Ching, Something Britain Can Do, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 10,
1994, at 30.
80 See, e.g., Lau, supra note 16, at 18 (presenting the comments of Lydia Dunn
and Legco "conservatives" with ties to the business community); Ching, supra
note 79, at 30 (describing the Exco and Legco electoral reform proposal of 1989).
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the territory's two nascent pro-democracy parties that later merged
to form the Democratic Party, and pro-democracy independents
nearly swept the contests for the new broadly and directly elected
seats.81
Against this background, the colonial government and Hong
Kong's emergent liberal and pro-democracy politicians advanced
their arguments concerning public attitudes toward legal reforms
to expand democracy in the territory. Their principal argument in
the initial conflicts over Governor Patten's program to expand the
electorate for Legco was, simply, that the Hong Kong people did in
fact want democratic reforms. The camp divided over whether the
people wanted only the Patten reforms or required more extensive
changes. Claiming a popular mandate for the proposals he had
just outlined and defending them against calls for more sweeping
moves, Patten explained that his "gut instinct" was that the Hong
Kong people wanted greater democracy but that they wanted it
"secured in a way which has a good chance of lasting" beyond July
1, 1997.82 Governor Patten argued that, to ensure their survival,
any reforms to electoral laws had to be compatible with the Basic
Law. He asserted that his plan met that criterion while the propos-
als of the more radical democrats, who sought to have half or more
of the seats in Legco directly elected in 1995, did not.83 Patten
added that his plan also would accurately reflect the democratic
81 See Stacy Mosher, Liberal Landslide, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 26, 1991, at 19
(describing the outcome of the 1991 Legco elections); see also MINERS, supra note 6,
at 116-17 (describing the evolution of electoral rules for Legco).
82 A Different Style, supra note 44, at 22.
83 See id. The N.P.C. Decision provided that "[i]f the composition of the last
Hong Kong Legislative Council before the establishment of the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region is in conformity with the relevant provisions of this
Decision and the Basic Law," its members could "become members of the first
Legislative Council of the Region." N.P.C. Decision, supra note 21, § 6. The N.P.C.
Decision further provided that a pre-reversion legislature (and thus a 1995-selected
Legco) that hoped to "ride the through train" to become the first the S.A.R. legisla-
ture had to be composed of twenty members chosen by direct election from geo-
graphic constituencies, ten members chosen by an election committee, and thirty
members selected by "functional constituencies." Id. Under Governor Patten's
plan, later passed by Legco, the Legco elected in 1995 would include twenty di-
rectly elected seats based on universal suffrage in geographic constituencies, ten
seats indirectly elected by a committee drawn from elected members of local re-
spresentative bodies, and thirty seats chosen by functional constituencies, many of
which included new or expanded electorates that, in effect, gave most employed
people in Hong Kong a "second vote" beyond their votes in a geographic con-
stituency. See Electoral Provisions Ordinance, Cap. 367 (1994); see also supra note
74.
1556 [Vol. 25:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/7
HONG KONG'S ENDGAME (II)
preferences of the territory's people. "We shouldn't be prepared to
go further than the people of Hong Kong are prepared to go," the
Governor explained, but "we shouldn't be prepared to go less far"
either.' 4 As further assurance that the reforms would reflect the
people's views, the electoral laws that would govern the 1995 bal-
loting, Patten emphasized, would be approved by the existing
Legco, which represented "the balance of opinions within the
community." 85 Looking back on the process after his proposals
passed Legco, Patten asserted that "[tihere's never been a moment
during the months of debate [on the political reform plan when]
anybody could actually claim the public was not supporting
[Patten's] proposals."
86
During the 1994 Legco debates on Patten's reform package,
leading pro-democracy Legco members agreed with the Gover-
nor's general assertion that the people desired democratization.
Meeting Point's Leong Che-hung proclaimed that it was up to leg-
islators to express the desires of the Hong Kong people by casting
votes that reflected their constituents' pro-democracy feelings and
the pro-democracy platforms on which many members had run for
their seats. Prominent Legco Democrat Szeto Wah maintained that
Legco members' voting for democratic reform was necessary, lest
"others think that the Hong Kong people want to surrender, don't
want democracy and are willing to kowtow, give in and cede."
87
Any such thoughts, Szeto's colleague Martin Lee emphasized,
were misplaced because the Hong Kong "people recognize that the
difference in approach to ... democracy" in Hong Kong from that
in China was among the "greatest threat[s]" transitional Hong
Kong faced.
88
When it came to the details, however, many of the territory's
pro-democracy leaders and lawmakers argued that the Patten re-
forms fell short of popular preferences. They warned that, not-
withstanding the Governor's claims, the British authorities in the
early 1990s were continuing their tradition of providing less de-
mocratization than the people wanted. Amid the bitter and ulti-
84 Patten To Follow Will of HK People in Reform, Agence France Presse, Dec. 3,
1992, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
85 Id.
86 Chris Yeung & Fung Wai-kong, Democracy Cannot Be Stopped, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Mar. 27, 1996, at 3.
87 What the Legislators Said, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 30, 1994, at 6.
88 Martin Lee, From Tiananmen to Hong Kong: The Next Human Rights Tragedy
Is Arriving on Schedule, WASH. POST, June 22,1994, at A21.
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mately fruitless Sino-British negotiations that preceded Governor
Patten's submission of his proposals to Legco, Meeting Point's
Cheung Bing Leung charged that Britain and China were doing
plenty of "thinking about their interests," but were not giving
enough consideration to the interests of the Hong Kong people. 89
With the outline of the Patten plan on the table, a pro-democracy
politician argued that "[p]eople in Hong Kong remain dissatisfied
because their democratic wishes have been continuously ignored"
amid a Sino-British collaboration to seek "converge[nce] with a
post-1997 political system set down in the Basic Law" which "falls
short of [the Hong Kong people's] requirements."90
Accordingly, pro-democracy politicians advocated reforms
that, they claimed, better reflected popular preferences as they un-
derstood them. Independent Legco member Emily Lau proposed,
and almost won a majority for, a substantially more democratic al-
ternative to Governor Patten's bill.91 As Martin Lee characterized
the intramural struggles of the years preceding the 1995 Legco elec-
tions, Hong Kong's Democrats had "consistently pushed for genu-
ine democracy over [both] Britain['s] and China's objections... be-
cause that is what the people of Hong Kong want."92 The pattern
of Hong Kong politicians pressing for more than the colonial gov-
ernment was prepared to grant continued after the enactment of
the Patten reforms and amid China's preparations to replace the
Legco elected in 1995. Most notably, Frontier, a political organiza-
tion founded by several pro-democracy legislators in 1996, de-
clared that its platform included equal and universal suffrage and
the right of the Hong Kong people to draft their own constitu-
tion- one that presumably would surpass the Basic Law in reflect-
ing the Hong Kong people's democratic preferences. 93
Although they differed over the details of the form of democra-
tization best suited to the wishes of the Hong Kong people, the co-
lonial government and the territory's liberal and pro-democracy
89 Louise do Rosario, Raising the Ante, FARE. ECON. REV., Dec. 9, 1993, at 14.
90 Time for Us To Command Respect, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 15, 1992.
91 See Louise do Rosario, Patten's Progress, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 14, 1994, at
20; Chris Yeung, Patten Wins; 4:35 a.m.: Narrow Defeat of Emily Lau's Bill for Full
Democracy Ends Legislators' Longest Day, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 30, 1994, at
1.
92 Edward A. Gargan, Pro-China Party Appears Big Loser in Hong Kong Election,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1995, at A8.
93 See Lawmakers Create Pro-Democracy Group, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Aug. 27, 1996,
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politicians united in arguing that the public was opposed to
China's plans to undercut and ultimately dissolve the Legco se-
lected under the Patten reform laws. At the time of the 1995 ballot-
ing, Patten remarked:
It seems to me to be an astonishing way [for China] to win
the hearts and minds in Hong Kong to say at the moment
when the people of Hong Kong are taking part in the most
credible and democratic elections in our history that you
are going to give the whole thing the thumbs down.
94
Governor Patten later commented that the plan to replace the
Legco chosen in those elections with a Provisional Legislature was
not only unlawful, but was also "plainly wrong ... in the eyes of
Hong Kong people."
95
Legco member Szeto Wah attacked China's moves to establish
the Preliminary Working Committee, which was initially designed
as part of a pro-China shadow government for pre-reversion Hong
Kong, and the Provisional Legislature, which was to succeed the
elected Legco at reversion and which functioned as a rival legisla-
ture during the final months of colonial rule. Szeto pressed Legco
to declare these moves to be contrary to the aspirations of the
Hong Kong people, as well as incompatible with the Basic Law and
the Joint Declaration. 96 Similarly Democratic Party member Lo
Chi-kin commented that "public opinion is on our side" in the
fight against a Provisional Legislature.
97
In the same vein, Martin Lee stressed that China's establish-
ment of appointed legislative and quasi-legislative bodies mani-
fested a profound disregard for popular preferences. He com-
plained that China's moves displaced Hong Kong's already
established, "well-tested, respected and effective method for know-
ing what Hong Kong people think. Not an appointment system-
but genuine democratic elections." 98 Moreover, Lee asserted that
the people of Hong Kong had shown a serious "lack of confidence
94 Gargan, supra note 92, at A8.
95 Yeung & Fung, supra note 86, at 3.
96 See Chris Yeung & Linda Choy, PWC Adamant on Body To Run Territory, S.
CHINA MORNING PosT, Dec. 7,1994, at 1.
97 Louise do Rosario, Hollow House, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 24, 1994, at 26.
98 Lee, Why the PWC Failed, supra note 67, at 10.
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in Beijing's plans" 99 to displace elected bodies. Elaborating on this
theme, Lee added that "the pandering of Hong Kong P.W.C. mem-
bers" to China's policies on Legco and other matters had "shocked
and saddened [the] Hong Kong people."100 Furthermore, the pro-
democracy critique continued, the Legco members who supported
the Preparatory Committee's formal decision to establish a Provi-
sional Legislature had abandoned the mandate from the people of
Hong Kong who had elected them to office.' 01
The ties that bound liberal politicians and colonial authorities
together in asserting the unpopularity of plans to roll back democ-
ratization began to fray when the territory's most ardent democrats
perceived the colonial government to be softening in its unwilling-
ness to compromise with China on the dismantling or displace-
ment of Legco.102 These pro-democracy politicians condemned the
Patten administration for "selling out" the electorate and
"duck[ing] the issues of greatest concern to Hong Kong people."103
Despite their disagreements on some issues, colonial govern-
ment officials and Hong Kong's pro-democracy politicians pointed
to many of the same indicators as evidence supporting their con-
tention that the people of Hong Kong wanted democratic reforms
in the early and middle 1990s and opposed China's plans to roll
back such changes. Despite China's vocal opposition from the be-
ginning, Governor Patten's proposals fared quite well in early pub-
lic opinion surveys, in anecdotal measures of popular sentiment,
and, indirectly, in the Governor's buoyant approval ratings. 04 Pro-
99 Lee, Selling an Unconsulted Future Hong Kong in America, supra note 67. Lee
added that it was up to Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office director Lu Ping, as
head of the P.W.C., to explain and presumably to rectify this popular lack of con-
fidence. Id.
100 Lee, Why the PWC Failed, supra note 67, at 10.
101 See id.; Fung Wai-Kong & Quinton Chan, Democrats Warn of'Puppet Legis-
lature': 'It's not Hong Kong People Ruling Hong Kong but Hong Kong People Ruining
Hong Kong,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 26, 1996, at 4.
102 See Martin Lee, The Sell-Out that Has To Stop, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
1, 1995, at 19 (criticizing Governor Patten's consideration of a D.A.B. leader's pro-
posal for fresh elections for a legislature under procedures more acceptable to Bei-
jing).
103 Fung & Won, supra note 31, at 1.
104 See, e.g., Frank Ching, Cleared for Action, FARE. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at
20 (describing popular support for Governor Patten's policy speech); Lim Soon
Neo, Hong Kong: Patten Fights a Rearguard Action, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Oct. 5,
1994, at 4 (discussing a survey finding Patten's approval rating at 59.6% in his first
year in office and 56.7% in his second year); Tai Ming Cheung, Pressure Tactics,
FAR E. ECON REV., Nov. 5, 1992, at 8 (discussing polls and public hearings indicat-
ing popular support for Patten reforms).
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democracy candidates' near sweep of the most broadly elected
constituencies in the 1995 elections prompted Martin Lee, Patten,
and others to proclaim a popular mandate for the democratic re-
forms and the parties and legislators who had backed them.
105 The
pro-China daily Ta Kung Pao appeared to concede the popularity of
the democrats' platforms. It reacted to the 1995 elections by sug-
gesting that the democrats' victories at the polls showed the wis-
dom of Chinese senior leader Deng Xiaoping's 1987 comment that
popularly elected leaders might not be the best choice to rule Hong
Kong.10
6
According to some observers, popular opposition to China's es-
tablishment of a full-fledged "second stove," a shadow govern-
ment to rival the colonial governor and Legco structure, was so
strong and so obvious that it prompted the P.R.C. to retreat to the
more temperate measure of establishing only the P.W.C. in re-
sponse to the Patten reforms.10 7 Public opinion surveys seemed to
confirm liberal-democratic claims that the people disliked and mis-
trusted the P.R.C.'s new appointive organs. One poll found that
nearly two-thirds of the respondents believed that the P.W.C. was
not working in the interests of the Hong Kong people as it laid
some of the groundwork for Legco's replacement by a Provisional
Legislature. 08 Another poll conducted only months before rever-
sion indicated that fewer than one in six Hong Kongers expected
the Provisional Legislature to perform better than Legco.
109
105 See, e.g., Gargan, supra note 92, at A8 (discussing Martin Lee's comments
linking Democratic Party victories in the elections to support for democratic re-
form); Sheila Tefft, How One Bold Man Stands Up to China, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Oct. 3, 1995, at 1 (quoting Martin Lee's comment, "[i]f this election shows any-
thing, it shows that the Hong Kong people want Legco to defend them" against
China's anti-democratic plans); Yeung & Fung, supra note 86, at 3 (quoting Gover-
nor Patten's comments, a few months after the election, that sixty to seventy per-
cent of the people supported the democrats in Legco).
106 See Louise do Rosario, Stand Up and Be Counted, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept.
28, 1995, at 16. The Deng-prescribed policy of Hong Kong people ruling Hong
Kong meant a rule by people who loved the motherland and loved Hong Kong -
aiguo aigang, in the usual formulation. This criterion of Chinese patriotism im-
posed an additional requirement beyond popularity with the people of Hong
Kong or success in open elections. See id.
107 See Tai Ming Cheung, Frontal Assault, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 1, 1993, at
10; see also Tai Ming Cheung, Stalling for Success, FARE. ECON. REV., July 1, 1993, at
22 (describing the P.W.C. as a possible component in the "second stove").
108 See do Rosario, supra note 21, at 18; see also Lee, Why the PWC Failed, supra
note 67, at 10 (claiming that the P.W.C.'s credibility with the Hong Kong people
reached its nadir on the eve of its supersession by the Preparatory Committee).
109 See Andy Ho, All's Well on the Economic Front, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
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Nonetheless, liberal and pro-democracy leaders and officials in
Hong Kong could not completely discount signs that popular sup-
port for Patten-style or more radical democratization was always
soft and had eroded in the face of China's increasingly shrill and
clearly uncompromising opposition during the middle of the
1990s. Many of the Hong Kong people who supported democratic
reform in general wanted an arrangement that would be acceptable
to China and thus leaned toward compromise and a more moder-
ate rate of democratization. 110 In addition, the democratic land-
slide of 1995, like that of 1991, occurred in an election in which
only a little more than one-third of the registered voters, and a still
smaller share of the eligible electorate, turned out."'
These facts suggested that the absence of popular support for
the institutional arrangements favored by the P.R.C. did not relia-
bly translate into ardent popular support for Governor Patten's or
Legco democrats' positions. Even the most zealous opponents of
China's plans conceded that popular attitudes about the legislature
and democratic reform included a desire to avoid fruitless conflict
with the territory's future masters and a pragmatic inclination not
to challenge a fait accompli. At the very least, Hong Kongers' ap-
parent confidence in the territory's economy and moderate and
stable emigration rates suggested that there were limits to the in-
tensity of the Hong Kong people's opposition to the expected fate
of democratic reforms and the last colonial Legco.
Faced with these difficulties, adherents to the liberal or pro-
democracy line argued that unfavorable indicators about the peo-
ple's actual preferences were misleading. Partisan commentators
attributed low voter participation rates not to a lack of support for
the Patten reforms or other models of democratization, but to other
factors. Among the alternative causes cited were the sudden and
dramatic expansion of the eligible electorate to include a vast num-
ber of inexperienced potential voters, a cumbersome registration
procedure, the illiteracy of nearly ten percent of the potential elec-
Dec. 31, 1996, at 17.
110 See, e.g., Danny Gittings & Dick Chan, Push Ahead on Reforms, Says Survey,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 20, 1994, at 1 (describing the mixed picture of sup-
port for democracy and disagreement about the pace of change in an early 1994
poll); Hong Kong's Clash of Wills, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1992, at 16 (describing the
slight fall in popular support for Patten reforms in the wake of weeks of P.R.C.
criticism).
111 See, e.g., Hong Kong: Mother and Father Do Not Know Best, supra note 26, at
11; C.K. Lau, Democracy Is Out for the Count, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 11,
1995, at 17.
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electorate, the failure to strike emigres from the voter rolls, the lack
of an absentee ballot option, a desire to register discontent with the
colonial government by refusing to participate in its elections, and
a sense that voting would be futile because Legco had never had
much power in Hong Kong's executive-led government or because
the arrival of July 1, 1997 would bring the dissolution of the 1995-
elected legislature.112 Liberals and democrats further argued that
the opinion polls showing mixed or waning support reflected dis-
agreements among the people about the appropriate extent or pace
of democratization, not a genuine lack of popular enthusiasm for
democracy. Pro-democracy leaders also suggested that the seem-
ingly weak public support merely showed the people's reluctance
to advocate openly positions that China had sternly rejected, not a
true lack of popular sympathy with these positions.
113
Colonial officials and liberal politicians also predicted that, re-
gardless of what measures of public opinion might seem to indi-
cate, rolling back democracy after reversion would bring instability
to Hong Kong. One democratic politician warned early in the de-
bates over democratic reform, "[U]nless, and until, Britain and
China are both willing and ready to address the issue ... [tihere
will continue to be discontent, which will bubble to the surface at
regular intervals." 114 Patten asserted that if China went forward
with plans to roll back democratic reforms, it would face the diffi-
cult task of having "to explain that to the hundreds of thousands of
people in Hong Kong who will have taken part in elections in a
calm, sensible and competent way."" 5 Failing to accomplish the
nearly impossible task of convincing the people of the need to take
such measures, Patten implied, would be costly to China and its
Hong Kong allies. Patten, Emily Lau, and others were more blunt
112 See supra note 111; see, e.g., Louise do Rosario, Colonial Standoff. Reforms Bill
Passed as Sino-British Talks Stalemate, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 10, 1994, at 22-23; do
Rosario, supra note 89, at 14; Louise do Rosario, Sharp Distinction, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Sept. 7, 1995, at 28 [hereinafter do Rosario, Sharp Distinction]; Hong Kong:
Mother and Father Do Not Know Best, supra note 26; Lau, supra note 111, at 17. In
the 1995 elections, 2.6 million votes were cast, or thirty-six percent of the much
larger electorate than that which turned out at a thirty-nine percent rate to cast
one million votes in the 1991 Legco elections. See Bruce Gilley, Old Game, New
Strategy, FARE. ECON. REV., May 23, 1996, at 31.
113 For one version of the "silent majority" argument, see Wong, supra note
61, at 14.
114 Time for Us To Command Respect, supra note 90.
115 The China Prism, FAR E. ECON. REV, Oct. 13, 1994, at 16 (interviewing Gov-
ernor Patten).
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and strident in their comments about the Provisional Legislature
arrangement on the eve of reversion, dubbing it a recipe for
"chaos" in Hong Kong." 6
Colonial government officials and Hong Kong's pro-democracy
politicians also recognized that they needed to cultivate, rather
than simply to assert or predict, popular support. Accordingly,
many of their arguments to and about the Hong Kong people
seemed designed to alter popular preferences. When Governor
Patten and the liberals in Legco made impassioned and highly
public proclamations that the people supported their proposals-
especially when they proudly recounted Hong Kongers' successful
participation in democratic elections, or invoked the special and
distinct interests and character of the Hong Kong people -these
skilled politicians were surely seeking to persuade the people, and
not just to depict popular attitudes accurately. Hong Kong gov-
ernment and liberal warnings that reversing democratic changes
after 1997 would trigger popular discontent also can not be taken
entirely at face value. They suggested a darker side of the liberal-
democratic strategy to develop mass support: the dire predictions
of "chaos" appeared to be, in part, attempts to move the people to
support democratization by appealing to their fears of instability.
At times, colonial officials and pro-democracy politicians were
more explicit about the transformative nature of their project. In
the Legco debates over Patten's proposals to reform the election
laws, Szeto Wah commented, "A vote today can decide the attitude
of the Hong Kong people towards 1997-whether it is to kowtow
or [to show] no fear."" 7 It was a matter of leading, as well as re-
flecting, popular attitudes.1 8 Much later in the endgame, Emily
Lau was a good deal more blunt about the task and perhaps less
confident about the Democrats' ability to accomplish it. She noted
that Hong Kong people still needed to be shown that democracy
was "a good system that produces good results. If I can instill in
the hearts of the people of Hong Kong a determination and desire
116 See Bruce Gilley, Standing Pat: Governor Patten Won't Bend to Tycoon's Pleas,
FAR E. ECON. REv., May 30, 1996, at 16 (quoting Governor Patten on the unaccept-
ability of compromise proposals on the Provisional Legislature); Yojana Sharma,
Hong Kong: Two Legislatures, One in Hong Kong, One in Shenzhen, Inter Press Serv.,
Dec. 21, 1996 (quoting Emily Lau on the coexistence of the Provisional Legislature
and Legco), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
117 What the Legislators Said, supra note 87, at 6.
118 See id.
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for democracy," Lau added, "then I will have succeeded."119
The colonial authorities' and liberal politicians' attempts to
shape popular opinions also included arguments that linked
China's rejection of late colonial democratic reforms to the prospect
of a betrayal of promises of autonomy and continuity in a legal,
economic, and social order that the Hong Kong people valued.
Governor Patten asserted, "If the Chinese dismantle [Legco elec-
toral] arrangements which everybody accepts are fair and open,
then it would be a step back from what Hong Kong has been prom-
ised." 120 Patten suggested that for Beijing not "to allow a fair vote
for those who run our territory" would cast into serious doubt
China's professed principle of allowing Hong Kong people to rule
Hong Kong and China's intention to "honour the undertakings
given to the [Hong Kong] people" in the Joint Declaration.121 Mar-
tin Lee asserted that the adoption of the Provisional Legislature ar-
rangement had "shattered" the P.R.C.'s "solemn promises" in the
Basic Law and the Joint Declaration of "'a legislature constituted
by elections' and 'a high degree of autonomy.'" 122 Lee warned
more specifically that a Provisional Legislature unaccountable to
the people of Hong Kong could not be expected to safeguard the
people's human rights, which the Joint Declaration and the Basic
Law had also promised to preserve. 123 Lee added that the Provi-
sional Legislature, like the P.W.C. before it, would endorse laws
that served the interests and implemented the will of Beijing, with-
out regard for the needs and wishes of the people of Hong Kong.124
A final strand in liberal politicians' and colonial officials' ar-
guments targeting the people of Hong Kong drew upon the basic
rule-of-law ideas that bound together the broadly liberal-
democratic perspective on legal and institutional issues in transi-
tional Hong Kong. This line of argument sought to combine per-
suasive statements of elements of the liberal-democratic camp's vi-
119 Kristin Choo, Days of Rage: The Voice of Democracy for Hong Kong Throws
Down the Gauntlet, Again, CHi. TRIB., Dec. 29, 1996, at 3.
120 Nick Rufford, China Watches as Colony Holds Last Election, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), Sept. 17, 1995, at 21.
121 Fung & Won, supra note 31.
122 Lee, Selling an Unconsulted Future Hong Kong in America, supra note 67.
123 See HK's Lee Says Colony Must Elect Own Legislature, Reuters, June 29, 1996,
available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
124 See Yojana Sharma, Democrats Disheartened by Beijing's Selction, Inter Press
Service, Dec. 17, 1996 (quoting Martin Lee), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Al-
lasi File; Fung & Chan, supra note 101, at 4.
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sion of a just legal and institutional order for Hong Kong with as-
sertions that the people of Hong Kong did or could embrace those
principles. Thus, Governor Patten explained that the Sino-British
negotiations over his electoral reform plan had stalled in 1993
when they "came to the heart of the Chinese position," which was
to insist upon the exclusion of the Democratic Party from a legisla-
ture that would survive the transition. Given what the governor
took to be sixty to seventy percent popular support for the Democ-
ratic Party, the Chinese stance was, as Patten saw it, irreconcilable
with both the views of the Hong Kong people and with minimal
democratic principles. Patten added that replacing the elected
Legco with an appointed Provisional Legislature was not only un-
popular but also "plainly wrong."125 Patten further argued that
rolling back democratic reforms would stifle the "natural momen-
tum of the development of civic consciousness and the creation of
the institutions of civil society in Hong Kong," and also would ig-
nore the recently expressed preferences of millions of voters. 126
At the beginning of the Patten administration, Emily Lau had
offered an argument similarly grounded in both normative princi-
ples and purported public preferences. She asserted that leaving
behind strong democratic institutions in 1997 was "necess[ary] and
desirab[le]" in its own right, as well as essential to the realization
of the true "aspirations" of the Hong Kong people.127 Just months
before reversion, Lau argued that "with the end of colonial rule the
only way to set up a legitimate legislature is to allow the Hong
Kong people to elect it through universal suffrage" -a process that
was uniquely able to yield a law-making body that would reflect
the people's positions on democracy and other issues.1 28 In the
125 Yeung & Fung, supra note 86, at 3; see also Lawrence Chung, China, Britain
Trade Verbal Broadside as Votes Cast for Assembly, Agence France Presse, Dec. 21,
1996 (describing Governor Patten's and Foreign Secretary Rifkind's criticism of
the election of the Provisional Legislature as an assault on democracy and a disre-
gard for the expressed preferences of the Hong Kong people), available at LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
126 The China Prism, supra note 115, at 16.
127 Emily Lau, Letter from Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 9, 1992, at 24
(emphasis added).
128 Hong Kong Protestors Condemn Interim Legislature, Reuters, Dec. 20, 1996
(emphasis added), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; cf. "Business as
Usual" Post-1997, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 1, 1996, at 1 (quoting Chief Secre-
tary Anson Chan's comment that "'[i]t goes without saying that a legitimate and
truly representative legislature will do much to give confidence to the people of
Hong Kong'"). While the Hong Kong government did not view a representative
legislature as one necessarily based on universal suffrage, the linking of legiti-
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same vein, Martin Lee articulated his view that the position of rep-
resentative of the people of Hong Kong, even if held only by virtue
of Beijing's appointment, was a position that imposed a "solemn
responsibility" to reflect accurately the popular will and to "defend
Hong Kong's way of life" and the Joint Declaration, including its
pledge to allow democratic elections.
129
In this line of argument, appeals to Hong Kongers' emergent
sense of local pride and political competence provided a crucial
bridge between invocation of liberal-democratic principles and in-
culcation of popular preferences. For example, Governor Patten
initially explained his democratic reform proposals as "commit-
ment[s] to a system of values ... which has near its core the propo-
sition that the average man and woman of [Hong Kong] are a great
deal better than the average." 130 The territory's most prominent
legislator made a similar point a few years later when he pro-
claimed, in the wake of the 1995 Legco elections, "We are capable
of being masters of our own house and of our own destiny." 131
Appeals to the people's self-confidence and sense of distinctive
accomplishment and character also served to rebut the China and
pro-China side's powerful plays to Hong Kongers' sense of Chi-
nese nationalism. Governor Patten derided China's "de[nunciation
of] fair elections in Hong Kong as something alien imported into
Hong Kong against the will of the people" and countered that the
turnout of millions of voters in the 1995 elections had shown
China's claim to be groundless. 32 Facing strongly nationalist criti-
cism from China and its allies, Martin Lee carefully explained that
he was pro-reunification, pro-Hong Kong, pro-Joint Declaration,
and not pro-British. To support this contention, Lee and other de-
mocrats could point to their considerable record of disagreements
with the territory's colonial rulers on democratization and a host of
other legal and political issues, and to the Chinese-sovereignty-
accepting premises of many of their criticisms of the pro-China
macy and democratic representation is similar to that reflected in Emily Lau's
conunents.
129 Lee, Why the PWC Failed, supra note 67, at 10; see also Connie Law & Louis
Won, Pledge To Stand Firm on Party Principles, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Dec. 29,
1995, at 5 (noting Martin Lee's view that members of the Preparatory Committee
"must act as if they are the true representatives of the people of Hong Kong even
though they have not been elected by [the] people").
130 A Different Style, supra note 44, at 22.
131 Gargan, supra note 92, at A8.
132 See Yeung & Fung, supra note 86, at 3.
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side.133 There were, this line of argument indicated, no inevitable
contradictions among liberal-democratic values, loyalty to Hong
Kong's interests and values, and Chinese nationalism.
2.2.3. The Court of Final Appeal, the Rule of Law, and Other
Popular Values
While the colonial government and Hong Kong's pro-democra-
cy politicians differed discernibly over "the people's" attitudes to-
ward democratization, the Bill of Rights, and related legal reforms,
a split between these two wings of the "liberal" or "pro-
democracy" forces was a central feature of the dispute over what
the people would or should think about proposed arrangements
for the S.A.R.'s Court of Final Appeal. Officials of the British and
colonial governments and Hong Kong's leading democratic politi-
cians agreed that the C.F.A. question was entwined with the pres-
ervation of a rule of law for Hong Kong that was popular with the
territory's citizenry and vital to a just and viable order for post-
reversion Hong Kong. They differed over whether to accept a
Court established under the terms the Sino-British agreements
adopted in 1991 and in 1995 (after Legco had rejected legislation to
implement the 1991 accord).
More specifically, the U.K. and the Patten administration
backed, but prominent liberal and pro-democracy politicians op-
posed, a C.F.A. arrangement that effectively limited to one the
number of foreign judges on the five-member bench, excluded
"acts of state" such as foreign affairs and defense from the court's
jurisdiction, and permitted the Court to be established a few years
before reversion, under the 1991 deal, or immediately after rever-
sion under the 1995 agreement. British and colonial officials as-
sured the territory's residents that a C.F.A. set up in accordance
with the Sino-British agreements was "in the interests of all the
people of Hong Kong." 134 Central to those interests was the pres-
133 Law & Won, supra note 129, at 5; see Lee, Why the PWC Failed, supra note
67, at 10.
134 Kate Chattaway, Hong Kong Council Urged To Back Court Deal, Press Ass'n
Newsfile, June 28, 1995 (quoting Baroness Chalker of the Foreign Office), available
at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; see also A Court To Safeguard Hong Kong, TIMES
(London), June 14, 1995 (presenting a letter from Governor Patten describing his
conviction that the C.F.A. agreement was "good for Hong Kong"); HK Governor
Leads Chorus of Calls To Pass Court Bill, Agence France Presse, June 14, 1995 (quot-
ing Patten's statement that the 1995 deal was "'profoundly in the interests of the
people of Hong Kong"'), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
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ervation of the rule of law that Hong Kong people seemed so
clearly to value. Attorney General Mathews explained that "[t]he
Government has no doubt it is in the best interests of the people of
Hong Kong to implement the 1991 agreement," in large part be-
cause China had consented to continuance of an institution that
would serve as a "crucial symbol and an embodiment of the rule of
law." 135 The Secretary for Constitutional Affairs conceded that the
1991 deal might not be all that everyone wanted, but he urged
Legco members to accept that a "moderation of aspirations" was in
order. 36 Urging acceptance of the second deal, Patten assured the
territory's citizens, whom Patten elsewhere characterized as drawn
to Hong Kong by its rule of law, that the 1995 agreement was still
"a good one for ... the rule of law in Hong Kong."137 The bill to
implement the 1995 accord, argued Chief Secretary Anson Chan,
would "ensure continuity of the rule of law in Hong Kong through
the transition" and "safeguard public ... confidence in Hong
Kong."'138
Rejecting the claims of democratic politicians, Hong Kong gov-
ernment officials argued that the Court bill, in both the 1991 and
the 1995 versions, gave the people of Hong Kong no reason to con-
clude that the government was compromising, at the eleventh
hour, the rule of law.139 Rather, the Court bill would give the Hong
Kong people a stronger local legislative foundation for the legal
continuity that the framework legal arrangements for the reversion
promised them. Attorney General Mathews argued that the bill to
implement the 1991 deal was fully "consistent with the Joint Decla-
ration and the Basic Law." 140 Although "some members of the le-
gal profession," including many of the territory's leading liberal
politicians, doubted this conclusion, Mathews stressed that it was
"supported by a number of authoritative independent opinions." 141
135 Courting the Right Bill, S. CHINA MORNING Posr, Apr. 2, 1995, at 13.
136 Stacy Mosher, Court of Contention, FARE. ECON REV., Dec. 19, 1991, at 10.
137 A Court To Safeguard Hong Kong, supra note 134.
138 Chris Yeung et al., Fight Not Over, Says Martin Lee, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 27, 1995, at 1.
139 For an example of colonial authorities' opposition to, and exasperation
with, such arguments, see, for example, Maggie Farley, Britain's Governor Chris
Patten: Unmade in Hong Kong, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at A4 (citing Patten's state-
ment that with "[o]ne deal with China and suddenly, Martin Lee and others are
saying, 'It's all over, the game is up.'").
140 Courting the Right Bill, supra note 135, at 13.
141 Id.
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In London, the Foreign Office took the same position with respect
to the 1995 bill.142 In the same vein, Patten assured Hong Kongers
that the legislation to implement the 1995 accord provided for "a
court that will, subject to the Basic Law, have precisely the same
function and jurisdiction as the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council" in London, which served as Hong Kong's highest court
under colonial rule.143 Government accounts stressed that the bill's
provision excluding acts of state such as defense and foreign affairs
from the Court's purview exactly tracked the language of the Joint
Declaration and the Basic Law. Legco critics' claims that the legis-
lation took away something the people of Hong Kong otherwise
would have enjoyed were, the Attorney General charged, "bizarre
in the extreme, ... wholly irresponsible, ... totally misleading and
very damaging to confidence of Hong Kong's future."144 The limi-
tation on the number of foreign judges, this line of argument con-
tinued, was consistent with the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
and thus not a cause for new worries among the people. In those
legal texts, the Attorney General explained, the references to for-
eign "judges" easily meant one judge at a time and, the provisions
permitting foreign judges to be invited "as required" did not mean
"as it [i.e., the Court] requires." 145
The question of the people's views about the date of the Court's
142 See, e.g., Chattaway, supra note 134. Compare Court of Final Appeal Ordi-
nance (1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 207 (1996), with Basic Law, supra note 21, arts.
80-96, and Joint Declaration, supra note 39, art. 3(3), annex I, § III.
143 Simon Holberton, Hong Kong Law Under Chinese Law: The Interface Between
Basic and Common Law, FIN. TIMES, June 12, 1995, at 3. Governor Patten's qualify-
ing phrase "subject to the Basic Law" troubled liberal and democratic politicians
who viewed it as a possible sign of acquiescence in China's efforts to restrict the
Court's jurisdiction and thereby undermine the rule of law. As these critics saw it,
the "acts of state" provisions in the C.F.A. bill and the Basic Law and the provi-
sion in the Basic Law that assigned interpretive power to the N.P.C. threatened to
leave the Court with too little power. Patten's qualifying phrase suggested that
Patten was accepting that arrangement. Elsewhere, however, Patten was less
equivocal and stated that he would never support "the establishment of a court
which failed to continue the jurisdictional role of the Privy Council." Frank
Ching, Patten Accord: A Mixed Blessing, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 29, 1995, at 36; see
also Danny Gittings, Leaks Reveal Real Deception, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 10,
1997, at 10 (describing Patten's disclosure that he believed the inclusion of the
"acts of state" exception was a mistake by the British).
144 A-G Rejects Attack on Rule of Law, supra note 34, at 5.
145 Kevin Hamlin, Law: Agreeing with Whatever Peking Wants, INDEPENDENT
(London), Dec. 20, 1991, at 16. Mathews' argument about the number of judges
drew additional support from a much-noted ambiguity in the Chinese text, in
which the relevant term "faguan" translates equally well as "judge" and "judges."
See Basic Law, supra note 21, art. 82.
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establishment was trickier for proponents of the C.F.A. deals.
When the 1991 deal still held the prospect of setting up the Court
well in advance of reversion, Hong Kong government officials
stressed that this early establishment should and would appeal to
the territory's residents. The Attorney General, the Chief Secre-
tary, and others emphatically stated the government's position that
implementing the 1991 agreement and setting up a C.F.A. before
1997 was "in the best interests of the people of Hong Kong."
146
When China backed away from the 1991 accord in the months be-
fore the second deal, Patten warned of the consequences of Hong
Kong and Macao Affairs Office Director Lu Ping's suggestion that
judges appointed to a Court established under an ordinance belat-
edly implementing the first agreement might not be allowed to
remain on the S.A.R.'s highest bench. The Governor cautioned that
these remarks, which he saw as inconsistent with a meaningful
pre-reversion establishment of the Court, would create confusion
among the people of Hong Kong and undermine their confidence
in the territory's rule of law. 147 If the court were not set up before
1997, an official government statement similarly warned, there
would be a "judicial vacuum" at the time of reversion and "public
... confidence in Hong Kong's legal system" would be "seriously
undermined."148
When the 1995 accord decisively eliminated the possibility that
the Court could be set up with P.R.C. consent before reversion,
Hong Kong government proponents of legislation to implement
the new deal had to offer different arguments for why the people
would or should find an immediately post-reversion establishment
date appealing. The principal claim was that the Hong Kong peo-
ple did or must recognize that failing to implement the deal would
leave important matters dangerously unsettled. Attorney General
Mathews explained that "[tlhe alternative of rejecting the bill
[would] leave the establishment of the Court of Final Appeal to the
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region after 1 July 1997, creat-
146 Courting the Right Bill, supra note 135, at 13 (quoting the Attorney General);
see also R.J.F. Hoare, Bill Does Not Contravene Joint Declaration, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 19, 1994, at 20 (presenting similar comments from the Director of Ad-
ministration of the Government Secretariat R.J.F. Hoare, a frequent spokesman for
the government's position on the C.F.A. bills); Louis Won & Lok Wong, From Poli-
ticians: Outrage, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 10, 1995, at 3 (quoting the Attorney
General and Chief Secretary).
147 See Fung Wai-kong, Court Row Threatens Rule of Law -Patten, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Dec. 12, 1994, at 1.
148 Louise do Rosario, No Appeal, FARE. ECON. REV., May 18, 1995, at 22.
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ing damaging and unnecessary uncertainty about the eventual
form of the Court of Final Appeal."149 Chief Secretary Anson Chan
warned that supporting the symbolic "no confidence" motion,
which Legco democrats introduced to demonstrate their opposi-
tion to the 1995 C.F.A. bill, would shake foreign investors' confi-
dence in the territory, leaving "the ordinary men and women of
Hong Kong [to] suffer." 150 On the other hand, Chan argued, pass-
ing the 1995 bill would eliminate the "uncertainty about the estab-
lishment of the Court" that had plagued people in Hong Kong for
"too long" and had had "a damaging effect on confidence in the
judicial system." 151 As the U.K.'s Foreign Office phrased argu-
ment, Legco's acceptance of the 1995 Court deal would allow "this
matter [to be] cleared up for the sake of all the people of Hong
Kong."152
These arguments from government sources in Hong Kong and
London were primarily efforts to persuade a public that the C.F.A.
bills' proponents recognized was not favorably disposed to the
Court deals. Raising the specter of the damage to Hong Kong's so-
ciety, economy and hallowed rule of law that would attend the
proposed legislation's rejection was a tactic that sought to pressure,
not merely to describe, the public. More subtly, the proponents'
repeated invocation of the people's "interests" - rather than the
people's "will" or "preferences" -suggested that the aim was to
persuade the people to act and think in ways that departed from
their immediate inclinations. Nonetheless, British and colonial au-
149 HK Governor Leads Chorus of Calls To Pass Court Bill, supra note 134; see also
Diane Stormont, Hong Kong Legislators Set To Back Court Bill, Reuters, July 26, 1995
(quoting Mathews' description of the consequences of not accepting the 1995 bill
as "continuing uncertainty, continuing anxiety, continuing doubt and consequent
loss of confidence"), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File. The uncer-
tainty that attended the absence of establishing the C.F.A., a senior Hong Kong
government official explained, had "been a source of great concern to the people
of Hong Kong." R.J.F. Hoare, Passing Bill in Best Interests of HK, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, July 1, 1995, at 16 (presenting a letter from the Director of Admini-
stration of the Government Secretariat).
150 Chris Yeung & No Kwai-yan, Governor Survives Vote, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 13, 1995, at 1; see also Fanny Wong, Reaction to Censure Reflects Concern,
S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Feb. 19, 1997, at 14 (quoting Patten's criticism of Martin
Lee for spreading misleading messages about Hong Kong by speaking ill of the
1995 C.F.A. agreement). Governor Patten asked rhetorically "What good can it
possibly do to shake people's confidence in Hong Kong?" Id.
151 Yeung et al., supra note 138, at 1; see also A Court To Safeguard Hong Kong,
supra note 134 (quoting Patten that the 1995 "agreement avoids ... further uncer-
tainties for Hong Kong people").
152 Chattaway, supra note 134.
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thorities did not concede that the C.F.A. deals ran seriously afoul
of popular preferences. Their arguments concerning the proposed
legislation's efficacy in maintaining the rule of law proceeded from
the premise that the people in fact were deeply attached to that
rule of law. Further, the robust belief in popular rationality that
ran through the public comments of senior colonial government of-
ficials suggested that they believed the people would ultimately
bring their preferences into line with their interests.
Moreover, outwardly at least, officials of the British and Hong
Kong governments at times expressed considerable confidence that
the Hong Kong people already shared their views on the Court
deals, or would do so after minimal explanation. A senior British
negotiator opined that "people will agree we have done the right
thing" once they "look at the alternatives" of leaving decisions on
the Court's formation to be made after 1997 or acting unilaterally
to establish a Court that would likely not survive the transition.153
Similarly, Patten commented on Legco's passage of the 1995 C.F.A.
bill: "I am sure it will be welcomed by the whole community... as
a vote of confidence in Hong Kong's future." Patten also pointed
to an early poll showing "three to one support" for the 1995
agreement as a basis for his conviction that "most people in Hong
Kong believe[d]" that the deal was "a good one."15 4
Hong Kong's most prominent pro-democracy politicians main-
tained that the British and colonial authorities thoroughly mischar-
acterized the choices facing the people of Hong Kong and the peo-
ple's probable attitudes toward the situation. They too accepted
that there were close connections between arrangements for the
S.A.R.'s highest court and the preservation of the rule of law, but
they argued that the relationship was not the one that proponents
of the C.F.A. legislation asserted. Democratic Party leaders
charged that the Court deal the British pushed through in 1995
spelled the "downfall of the rule of law in Hong Kong," and was a
"calculated condemnation of the Hong Kong people to the grim-
mest possible future." 15 5 They asserted that the Court deal bar-
153 Louise do Rosario, A Court Too Far, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 22, 1995, at 20.
154 Diane Stormont, HK Legislators Pass Final Appeal Court Bill, Reuters, July
26, 1995, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; A Court To Safeguard Hong
Kong, supra note 134; see also, Hoare, supra note 149, at 16 (presenting a senior co-
lonial government official's comment that "the people of Hong Kong" had given
the 1995 C.F.A. deal "a warm welcome").
155 Yeung & No, supra note 150, at 1 (quoting Legco member Cheung Man-
kwong).
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gained away the rule of law, "Hong Kong's most prized posses-
sion."156 In the wake of the 1995 C.F.A. bill's passage, Martin Lee
argued, "[I]t seems that hope is lost-not by Hong Kong people,
who know only too well the value of our rule of law and way of
life-but by the British Government and Governor Christopher
Patten, who have now compromised irretrievably what would
have been their greatest legacy to Hong Kong." 157 For Lee's Legco
colleague Emily Lau, the colonial master had asked the "Hong
Kong people" not to "look a gift-horse in the mouth" when it pre-
sented them with a deal that "compromised" their "interests."
15 8
More specifically, these liberal legislators and politicians ar-
gued that Britain had "actually agreed with the Chinese Govern-
ment to extend" the act of state exception to the Court's jurisdiction
"to cover things which we know nothing about at the moment."159
The common law, which was at the core of Hong Kong's rule of
law, thereby would be converted from "the common law as we
know it to a common law with Chinese characteristics," 160 in viola-
tion of the Joint Declaration's pledge that the existing common law
would "survive the transfer of sovereignty."161 Under this ar-
rangement, the argument continued, "Hong Kong people will
never be able to challenge the Government" after 1997,162 and the
"public would not be protected by the rule of law" that the people
cherished and upon which they depended.163
From the perspective of Hong Kong's leading liberal politi-
cians, the 1995 deal's postponement of the Court's establishment
date, coupled with the retention of the 1991 accord's limit on for-
eign judges, posed equally serious threats to the rule of law that
the people desired. To a degree, the colonial authorities had as-
sessed correctly the need to implement the 1991 agreement. Set-
ting up the C.F.A. before reversion would heed a "clear call" from
156 Lee, Selling an Unconsulted Future Hong Kong in America, supra note 67; see
also do Rosario, supra note 153, at 20 (quoting Martin Lee).
157 Lee, supra note 102, at 19.
158 Emily Lau, Testing Time for Political Players, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
24, 1995, at 18.
159 Won & Wong, supra note 146, at 3.
160 Id.
161 A-G Rejects Attack on Rule of Law, supra note 34, at 5.
162 In a State of Legal Confusion, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 17, 1995, at 17.
163 Clauses Raise Worries on Human Rights After '97, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 27, 1995, at 5.
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the Hong Kong public, 64 and was "desperately need[ed] ... to pre-
serve" the people's freedoms.165 If China would not agree, the
Hong Kong government's unilateral establishment of the C.F.A.
before 1997 was the necessary and appropriate course.166
According to this line of argument, failure to have the Court up
and running before reversion, an outcome mandated by the 1995
agreement, would leave Hong Kong with a Court staffed by judges
who had attained their positions only after political screening and
selection by China or its lackeys in the undemocratic and unlawful
Provisional Legislature. Pro-democracy independent legislator,
lawyer, and columnist Margaret Ng concluded that this arrange-
ment would remove the last "built-in safeguard of the independ-
ence of the Judiciary" and of the rule of law.167 It was, in Ng's
view, the final absurdity of the transition awaiting Hong Kong's
public.168
Leading pro-democracy politicians and legislators also rejected
British and colonial authorities' arguments that the people of Hong
Kong should and would welcome the 1995 Court bill because it
would reduce uncertainty. It was "not true that any Court of Final
Appeal which is certain to survive 1997 is better than uncertainty,"
argued one prominent Legco member. 69 Legco members from the
political parties with the strongest popular support in Hong Kong
similarly concluded that "remov[ing] the uncertainty about our le-
gal system.., at the cost of the rule of law itself" was not compati-
ble with their constituents' interests or wishes, and accordingly
opposed the 1995 bill.170
164 Louise do Rosario, Cold Shoulder, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 1, 1995, at 24-25
(quoting the spokesperson for independent, liberal Legco member Christine Loh).
165 Martin C.M. Lee, Enter the Dragon, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 26, 1994, at A27.
166 See Lee, Selling an Unconsulted Future Hong Kong in America, supra note 67.
167 Ng supra note 42, at 21.
168 See id.; Lee, Selling an Unconsulted Future Hong Kong in America, supra note
67.
169 Margaret Ng, Undermining the Right to Legal Redress, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, June 20, 1995 at 21.
170 Martin Lee, The Courtship of Mr. Hoare, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 27, 1995, at
4. For support for the proposition that the parties were attuned to their constitu-
ents' preferences on this issue, opponents of the bill could point to public opinion
surveys suggesting extremely low expectations of the Court system that would be
provided under the Sino-British accords. Even in 1993, when the 1991 deal was
still considered possible, a poll found that more than half of the territory's resi-
dents thought it would not be possible to sue successfully the government after
July 1, 1997, and nearly half thought it would not be possible to sue successfully
mainland companies after 1997. See Jacqueline Leong, A Few Points of Law for
20041 1575
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
From this perspective, the fact that Legco passed the 1995
C.F.A. legislation said little about the people's preferences. After
all, Legco had rejected a slightly more appealing bill in 1991. In
addition, the government rushed the 1995 bill through before the
1995 elections could bring more democrats into the chamber, and
the government had presented the 1995 bill to Legco as a fait ac-
compli not open for debate or revision.'71 Moreover, although Mar-
tin Lee failed to win passage of a no-confidence motion against the
governor for supporting the 1995 C.F.A. legislation, he asserted
that he had nonetheless succeeded "in showing Hong Kong people
how Mr. Patten had betrayed the rule of law."172 He pledged that
the Democratic Party would "continue to fight for a real Court of
Final Appeal and the preservation of the rule of law" and "to see to
it that Governor Patten and the British Government are judged in
the court of public opinion." 173
On the whole, liberal and pro-democracy legislators' and poli-
ticians' arguments about popular attitudes toward the C.F.A. often
assumed or asserted significant existing popular opposition to the
Court deals, or at least to what liberal critics claimed the C.F.A.
bills portended for the rule of law. Nonetheless, there seemed to
be significant limits to their confidence that the Hong Kong people
were already solidly on their side. Many of the foregoing analyses
of the C.F.A. arrangements' flaws emphasized the people's "inter-
ests," with only occasional invocations of the people's existing
preferences. That feature often made the critics' arguments, like
those of their opponents in the British and colonial governments,
sound more like efforts to persuade the people and less like de-
scriptions of established popular views, with implicit cautions
about the costs of disregarding them.
The somewhat crusading, even quixotic, tone of Lee's com-
ments in the wake of the failed no-confidence motion further sug-
gests some recognition in liberal and democratic quarters that
popular support for their position on the Court deals was shaky
and that persuading the people to back the critics' positions would
be difficult. Compared to the individual rights issues at stake in
the controversy over the Bill of Rights and the principles of democ-
racy at issue in the conflict over electoral reform, the C.F.A. contro-
Hong Kong, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 8, 1993, at 11.
171 See, e.g., Ching, supra note 143, at 36.
172 Yeung & No, supra note 150, at 1.
173 Lee, supra note 102, at 19.
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versy raised less immediate and emotional concerns. The court
that the C.F.A. was supposed to "replace," the Privy Council in
London, doubtless seemed a remote legal institution compared to
recently enacted local rights legislation and the territory's highly
visible and recently invigorated legislature. Moreover, for all the
evident popular embrace of the rule of law, there was relatively lit-
tle love for the heavily expatriate, procedurally prolix, and pre-
dominantly English language-based judiciary that democrats and
liberals said was at risk.174 In any event, the alliance of the P.R.C.
and the British authorities in favor of the C.F.A. bill surely ap-
peared formidable, perhaps even futile to oppose.
Faced with such obstacles to securing firm popular support,
liberal and democratic leaders in the territory sought to link the
Court issue not only to popular rule-of-law concerns but also to
other values that they thought were appealing to the Hong Kong
people. Arguments reflecting this strategy also produced addition-
al points of conflict with the British and colonial government au-
thorities in the battle over popular attitudes toward the Court bills.
Liberal and pro-democracy political leaders asserted that, contrary
to claims from the colonial administration and London, the Sino-
British deals concerning the C.F.A. compromised the Joint Declara-
tion and the Basic Law and thus portended a broader betrayal of
legal promises that the people held dear. Legco opponents of the
1991 bill argued that the dispute over foreign judges was not just
about the number of foreign judges that the Joint Declaration or the
Basic Law required, or even about whether the provision on the
Court's composition fatally undercut the special ability of politi-
cally insulated foreign judges to protect the rule of law that the
people valued. Beyond these important issues, the controversy
was also about the broader integrity of the S.A.R.'s framework le-
gal arrangements which, if breached with respect to the Court,
would unravel further and lead to the Hong Kong people's loss of
many other rights and freedoms through Sino-British collusion.175
In the view of prominent pro-democracy politician and journal-
ist Emily Lau, the "C.F.A. saga" was "symptomatic of political de-
velopments in Hong Kong in general" in which "Chinese pro-
nouncements which are in breach of the Joint Declaration and the
174 See, e.g., Ming K. Chan, The Imperfect Legacy, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 133,
135-40 (1997); "Dickensian" System Adds to Frustration, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 28, 1994, at 6; Leong, supra note 170, at 5.
175 See, e.g., Mosher, supra note 136, at 10.
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Basic Law" were routinely accepted and "the interests of the Hong
Kong people" were regularly "compromised." 176 With the 1995
deal implemented, Martin Lee opined, the Hong Kong people had
reason to, and did, fear a final two years of British rule marked by
repeated sacrifices of their interests on the altar of Sino-British co-
operation.177 More specifically, this line of argument asserted that
the "act of state" provisions that the proponents of the C.F.A. deals
sought to dismiss as innocuous threatened the rights and liberties
of the territory's citizens. Martin Lee asserted that the failure to
circumscribe these "political" exceptions to the Court's jurisdiction
raised the prospect that "Hong Kong people" would be "treated
the same way" as their compatriots in China-a frightening and
troubling prospect for a people who, in the controversies sur-
rounding the Bill of Rights, showed that they were "extremely con-
cerned over any deprivation of individual liberties." 178
Liberal and democratic opponents of the C.F.A. bill argued that
the Court arrangement also imperiled the move toward democracy
and autonomy that the territory's citizens prized. Patten's submis-
sion of the two, especially the first, C.F.A. bills to Legco could be
cast as a step forward for democracy in the colony, giving the peo-
ple's representatives a voice in the resolution of the Court issue.
179
There was also some force to Solicitor General Daniel Fung's point
that an insistence on more than one foreign judge on the C.F.A.
suggested an insulting lack of confidence in Hong Kongers' abili-
ties to staff their own legal institutions. 80 Nonetheless, some pro-
democracy politicians and legislators viewed such factors as count-
ing for little in light of a C.F.A. deal-making process that "made a
mockery" of Legco's law- making powers,'8 ' and confined "all de-
cisions" to "secret Sino-British negotiations" that went on "above
Hong Kong people's heads" 182 and "treated the people of Hong
176 Lau, supra note 158, at 18.
177 See Lee, supra note 102, at 19.
178 Linda Choy, We Fear Losing Rule of Law, Martin Lee Tells U.S. Bar, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Aug. 10, 1995, at 4; see also Clauses Raise Worries on Human Rights
After 1997, supra note 163, at 5 (stating Martin Lee's concern that the C.F.A. might
not be able to hear cases such as the arrest of a Hong Kong member of a local or-
ganization supporting democracy movements on the mainland).
179 See Stacy Mosher, Right of Rejection, FAR E. EcON. REV., Oct. 31, 1991, at 13.
180 See Stacy Mosher, Local Justice, FAR E. ECON REV., Oct. 10, 1991, at 11-12.
181 Stormont, supra note 149.
182 Stephen Vines, Patten Shrugs Off Motion of No Confidence, INDEPENDENT
(London), June 23, 1995, at 15.
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Kong with contempt."183 From this perspective, the prospects for
the Court going forward into the S.A.R. period were equally bleak:
the Court's delayed, post-reversion establishment meant that the
democratically chosen representatives of the people would have no
say in the selection of the first C.F.A. judges.184 Instead, the un-
democratic Provisional Legislature would confirm their nomina-
tions. More fundamentally, and especially troubling given the
prospect of weak S.A.R. institutions, the Basic Law provisions con-
ferring significant and seemingly "judicial" interpretive power on
the N.P.C. foretold that "the voice of the people in Hong Kong
would be excluded or ignored" on vital questions about how Hong
Kong would be governed. 185
Liberal and pro-democracy political leaders' assertion of links
between the C.F.A. question and issues of rights and democracy,
like their more narrowly focused arguments stressing the connec-
tions between the terms of the Court's creation and the preserva-
tion of the rule of law, also blended normative arguments rooted in
a liberal-democratic vision of law and legality with arguments ad-
dressed to the people's positions on the concrete legal and institu-
tional questions of the Court's composition, powers, and estab-
lishment. Officials of the British and Hong Kong governments did
the same thing in pursuit of an opposite result. Both the colonial
authorities and their antagonists among Legco members and local
political leaders asserted that their positions on the proposed
C.F.A. arrangement and its implications for other politically
charged, rule-of-law-related issues were right, as well as actually
or prospectively popular.
Although their shared normative principles were, thus, close to
the surface in such arguments, the intramural rift among adherents
to the broadly liberal democratic perspective persisted with respect
to the concrete legal and institutional questions at issue. Thus, for
example, Attorney General Mathews argued that the government
should establish a Court in keeping with the 1991 accord even if
China had offered no guarantees of continuity, for it was "clearly
right, and clearly in the best interests of Hong Kong" and the Hong
183 Stormont, supra note 149.
184 See Ng, supra note 42, at 17; No Kwai-yan, Fears Raised of Mouthpiece Risk to
Judges, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 28, 1996, at 6 (describing the views of leading
liberal lawyer Gladys Li).
185 Louise do Rosario, Papa Don't Preach, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 26, 1995, at
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Kong people to do so.186 Local liberals and democratic politicians
countered that they hoped that Britain would forego choosing
"what is expedient" over "what is right" and would establish a
Court with the powers and personnel that liberal critics of the Sino-
British C.F.A. deals thought were necessary and proper.187 Martin
Lee warned that Democrats would "not allow the British govern-
ment to betray Hong Kong people" by acquiescing in the kind of
practically and normatively inadequate Court deal that the colonial
government and London were pushing the Hong Kong people to
accept. 8
8
2.2.4. The Chief Executive: (Un)democratic Selection, Substan-
tive Positions, and "Representing Hong Kong"
Although the split was less acrimonious and dramatic than in
the context of the conflict over the Court of Final Appeal, British
and colonial officials and liberal and democratic politicians in
Hong Kong also differed over the views that the Hong Kong peo-
ple held or should hold concerning the selection of the first Chief
Executive for the S.A.R. Legislators from the Democratic Party,
their pro-democracy independent colleagues, and liberal commen-
tators attacked the selection process and its outcome as undemo-
cratic and unpopular. These critics pointed out that official Chi-
nese sources had made clear that China would not tolerate any
surprises in the process and would insist on a candidate acceptable
to Beijing. 89 They stressed that China had summarily dismissed
the idea of selecting the Chief Executive by universal suffrage in
Hong Kong, which some Legco democrats had urged. 90 Com-
186 Courting the Right Bill, supra note 135, at 13.
187 See id. (quoting a liberal solicitor); Lee, supra note 165, at A27.
188 Yeung et al., supra note 138, at 1.
189 See, e.g., Bruce Gilley, Playing Favourites, FAR E. ECON. REv., Feb. 8, 1996, at
22-23 [hereinafter Gilley, Playing Favourites] (describing the secretive search proc-
ess for candidates conducted under the auspices of Xinhua's Hong Kong branch,
and quoting pro-China and China-connected business leaders' comments that
China's preferences would weigh heavily in the Chief Executive's selection);
Bruce Gilley, The Common Touch, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 21, 1996, at 34 [hereinaf-
ter Gilley, The Common Touch] (quoting P.R.C. Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Of-
fice Deputy Director Wang Fengchao's statement that "[t]here will not be any
more major tremors" in the Chief Executive selection process, and describing Bei-
jing's role in rejecting potential candidates).
190 See, e.g., Emily Lau, Fight for Universal Suffrage Continues, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Feb. 5, 1996, at 18 (presenting the comments of the pro-democracy
legislator).
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mentators routinely noted that pro-China politicians dominated
the Selection Committee that chose a nominee for appointment as
Chief Executive by the Central People's Government in Beijing. In
addition, these commentators also noted, the Selection Commit-
tee's nominal choice was from among a handful of candidates on a
short-list that P.R.C. officials had developed.191 Hong Kong liberals
saw further evidence of the closed and predetermined nature of the
selection process in the event that Hong Kongers perceived to be
the determinative public signal of Tung Chee-hwa's selection for
the post. By singling out Tung for the first handshake among a
delegation of Hong Kongers in Beijing, Chinese Party chief Jiang
Zemin was, in pro-democracy legislator Emily Lau's words, "using
his body language to tell us all to shut up" months before the Se-
lection Committee was to vote.192
According to the liberal critics, attempts by China, its Hong
Kong allies, and others to portray the process as democratic and
reflective of the views of the Hong Kong people were unconvinc-
ing and even preposterous. One columnist asserted that "no one in
Hong Kong today believes that Hong Kong people will be able to
choose their chief executive." 193 In Emily Lau's assessment, efforts
to portray a genuinely contested race were "a slap in the face to the
people of Hong Kong, who kn[e~w full well that they [would] have
no say over the choice of Chief Executive." 194 When the Selection
Committee met to choose Tung, it was, Lau added, a sham election
in which the people of Hong Kong had been "denied the right to
self-determination and democracy." 195
The liberal critics' claim that the people were unhappy with the
selection process found some support in a variety of indicators of
popular preference. The group of nominees considered by the Se-
lection Committee conspicuously omitted Chief Secretary Anson
Chan, who routinely finished ahead of all others in surveys of pub-
lic opinion, but who had an apparently disqualifying history of
191 See, e.g, Frank Ching, Split in Beijing over Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Apr. 13, 1995, at 34; Gilley, The Common Touch, supra note 189, at 34; Emily Lau,
What Racefor Chief Executive?, WALL ST. J. (Europe), Sept. 12, 1996, at 6.
192 Gilley, Playing Favourites, supra note 189, at 34.
193 Frank Ching, China Interfering in Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 28,
1995 & Jan. 4, 1996, at 31.
194 Lau, supra note 191.
195 Choo, supra note 119, at 3 (quoting Emily Lau). A no-confidence motion
offered against the new Chief Executive-designate was supported by most Legco
liberals but fell short of a majority. See id.
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spats with Beijing and especially strong ties to the British colonial
administration.196 Moreover, public opinion polls found consider-
able popular dissatisfaction with the process used to choose the
S.A.R.'s first leader. 97 Still, even ardent democrats recognized that
widespread disaffection did not automatically generate meaningful
popular pressure to correct or ameliorate perceived deficiencies or
their consequences. Generally, liberal critics' frequent assertions
that the Chief Executive selection process was undemocratic and
excluded the people seemed meant to rouse the people to anger,
not merely to reflect their established discontent. Seemingly con-
ceding that existing public sentiment might provide inadequate
support for the liberals' and democrats' positions, Emily Lau stated
that the people of Hong Kong "may be too smart to fall for" so
"blatant [a] ploy" as Beijing's claim to provide democracy, but they
still needed to "learn that they have to assert themselves if they
want to have some say over their destiny."198
Although they shared liberal and pro-democracy politicans'
conclusion that a highly undemocratic method for selecting the
Chief Executive would run afoul of popular interests and prefer-
ences in Hong Kong, the territory's departing colonial masters had
no desire to pursue an agenda of persuading the people to offer
more assertive opposition to the process and its outcome. Com-
pared to Legco liberals and democrats, British authorities struck a
less confrontational stance and presented a more modest account
of the people's desires and the requirements of an adequate selec-
tion process. The Hong Kong government had pledged early on to
cooperate with a Chief Executive-designate to be chosen under the
framework set forth in the Basic Law.199 Indeed, Patten had urged
an early selection of an occupant for the post in order to permit a
smoother and more orderly transition and resolution of legal and
other issues of concern to Hong Kongers.200 Moreover, a colonial
196 For reports of some of the many polls showing Anson Chan easily out-
distancing the field of actual and potential candidates, see, for example, Lo Tak-
shing Seeks To Govern in Hong Kong, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1996; The Trials of Martyr
Lee, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 27, 1996, at 5.
197 See, e.g., Rule of Law, Autonomy Top Post-'97 List, Survey Shows, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 28, 1996, at 5 (finding one-third of respondents saying that
the selection process was fair and an equal share saying it was unfair).
198 Lau, supra note 191.
199 For a restatement of that position on the eve of the selection, see The Policy
Address, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 3, 1996, at 4, providing a text of Governor
Patten's final annual policy address.
200 See Gilley, supra note 116.
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administration that could not claim a democratic mandate from
Hong Kongers for its top officials was in a poor position to do
more than to press temperately the notion that the selection proc-
ess should not disregard democratic norms and the views of the
people. Patten expressed "hope that the process of selection," con-
ducted under the framework China had put in place, would be "as
open, fair, and broadly based as possible." Patten explained that a
process that fell short of this standard would lead many to "won-
der with some justice what all the fuss has been about," and would
leave Hong Kong with a Chief Executive who likely would lack
public credibility, popular support, and the loyalty of the Hong
Kong people. Such a result, the governor cautioned, would be nei-
ther well-received in Hong Kong nor sensible for Beijing.201
Recognizing that they had little hope of altering the selection
process or affecting its outcome, Hong Kong liberals and pro-
democracy politicians focused on how the people might view Tung
Chee-hwa's use of the office. They sought to rally popular senti-
ments that would press Tung Chee-hwa to pursue policies that lib-
erals and democrats saw as acceptable. They argued that Tung's
embrace of the P.R.C.'s positions on the key legal-institutional is-
sues of the endgame was making Hong Kong people worried and
disaffected and leaving Tung without vital popular support. Spe-
cifically, Emily Lau argued that the process that yielded Tung's
appointment had "left Hong Kong people feeling powerless and
alienated" and "with the sagging feeling that Hong Kong's free
lifestyle and the rule of law will be undermined after China takes
over." 202 Adherents to this line of argument asserted that Tung's
early actions as Chief Executive-designate were convincing the
people that the "sagging feeling " was well-founded. They
claimed that Tung's support for cutting back the Bill of Rights and
overturning late colonial amendments to civil and political liberties
legislation abruptly ended Tung's "honeymoon period with the
Hong Kong people" and showed him to be a "mouthpiece of Pe-
king."203 One liberal commentary concerning the same issue main-
tained that Tung was "ignoring the wishes of the general public"
when he endorsed proposals to roll back changes to the Public Or-
201 Fung Wai-kong, Patten Pushes Open Selection, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
29, 1996, at 4.
202 Lau, supra note 191.
203 Lau, supra note 53; see also Ng, supra note 42, at 17 (noting a decline in
Tung Chee-hwa's popularity).
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der and Societies Ordinances.2 4 Other liberal and democratic poli-
ticians and commentators added that Tung's endorsement of the
Provisional Legislature also severely undercut his standing with
the people.
205
These critics of the Chief Executive-designate's early use of his
future office noted visible indications of public sentiment. One
prominent commentator pointed to the storm of criticism that at-
tended Tung's censure of Martin Lee for attacking Tung's views on
individual rights and the legislature. The commentator suggested
that this showed that Tung had failed to perceive "people's under-
lying fears about the future" and therefore "may have underesti-
mated the public reaction to his remarks."206 Polls and conven-
tional wisdom indicated that the values critics claimed Tung was
endangering ranked extremely high on Hong Kong people's lists of
what they wanted the Chief Executive to help preserve.2 7 Liberals
and democrats were quick to point out that Tung's popularity did
sink noticeably in the wake of his pronouncements on controver-
sial legal issues of the endgame, and to assert that a "silent major-
ity" of Hong Kongers might be more critical of Tung than his rela-
tively strong approval ratings seemed to suggest.
20 8
Prominent liberal and pro-democracy politicians and like-
minded commentators pressed Tung not to pursue ill-conceived
and unpopular positions on key legal and institutional questions.
They urged him to represent the interests of the Hong Kong people
and to act as if he were the properly elected leader of the territory's
citizens. Thus, Martin Lee called on Tung "to change the unhappy
fate that awaits Hong Kong" and to press China to reconsider its
decision to disband a legislature that enjoyed popular support and
204 Sharon Cheung & Angela Li, Protestors Tell Tung To Make Public Apology, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 5,1997, at 6.
205 See, e.g., Linda Choy, Hong Kong Backs Shadow Body, Says Tung, S. CHINA
MORNING POsT, Dec. 22, 1996, at 1; Peter Humphrey, Hong Kong Hit by Handover
Quarrels, Reuters, Feb. 13, 1997 (describing criticisms of Tung by Martin Lee and
the Democratic Party), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Ng, supra
note 42, at 17.
206 Fanny Wong, Reaction to Censure Reflects Concern, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Feb. 19, 1997, at 14.
207 See Rule of Law, Autonomy Top Post-97 List, Survey Shows, supra note 197
(showing that 90% of respondents identified judicial independence and Hong
Kong's autonomy as top priorities and 87% cited freedom of speech and expres-
sion).
208 See, e.g., Ng, supra note 42; Popularity of Future HK Leader Hits New Low -
Poll, Reuters, Apr. 13, 1997, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Wong,
supra note 61, at 14, at 17.
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had been popularly elected. 209 Emily Lau argued that "[i]nstead
of" accepting the Chief Executive's "following the Chinese gov-
ernment's pronouncements rigidly" on the Bill of Rights and other
legal matters, "Hong Kong people expect Mr. Tung to look at such
proposals objectively and then to urge Peking to respect local pub-
lic opinion." 210 Commenting before Tung's formal selection, pro-
democracy, independent legislator Christine Loh stressed that the
Chief Executive had to appear "unequivocally to be acting in Hong
Kong's interest." Loh explained that this required being account-
able to the people of Hong Kong as well as to Beijing, and "tak[ing]
the territory's side if need be" to preserve the elected legislature
and to protect against the watering down of the Bill of Rights,
which enshrined the freedoms that "the public treasures." 211 With
such arguments, the territory's leading liberal and pro-democracy
politicians again seemed to seek to do more than to tap existing
popular opinion to support their position on the legal-institutional
issue immediately at hand. By linking aspects of the Chief Execu-
tive question with the fate of other rule-of-law-related values that
seemed to have strong popular appeal, they sought also to culti-
vate strong backing among the people that their positions on the
Chief Executive question, more narrowly defined, might not oth-
erwise attract.
Committed to working with the incoming Chief Executive to
achieve an orderly transfer of governmental authority and appar-
ently disinclined to engage in another fruitless confrontation with
the P.R.C. over legal and institutional issues, British and colonial
officials took a much less forceful and expansive line than the terri-
tory's pro-democracy politicians. For example, following the
N.P.C.'s vote to reject portions of the Bill of Rights and other
rights-protecting legal changes of the 1990s, Patten did not move
immediately to portray Tung's acceptance of the outcome as a po-
tentially decisive indication of the character of Tung or his office.
Rather, Patten urged Tung to consult openly with the people be-
fore introducing new local legislation on civil and political liber-
ties.212 Similarly, on the eve of a visit to the territory, British For-
eign Secretary Rifkind was markedly cautious and sympathetic to
209 Humphrey, supra note 205.
210 Lau, supra note 53.
211 Christine Loh, Local Interests Must Take Priority, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Aug. 12, 1996, at 18.
212 See Fung Wai-kong, Patten Fears for Freedom, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb.
25, 1997, at 4.
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Tung's predicament, noting that Tung's handling of the contro-
versy surrounding the rights laws controversy was "bound to be a
very difficult and controversial task" that would make it "difficult"
for Tung to "please all of the people."213 Rifkind hoped that Tung's
consultation with Beijing "could reduce the damage caused by the
repealing of these ordinances."
21 4
At least implicitly, the arguments from both wings of the di-
vided liberal-democratic camp also intermingled claims about
what was right and just with claims about what was actually or
prospectively popular. When Hong Kong's most ardently liberal
and pro-democracy politicians focused many of their initial criti-
cisms of the Chief Executive selection process on issues of democ-
ratic legitimacy, and when they linked their arguments concerning
the early use of the office-to-be with the normatively charged con-
flicts over the fate of the Bill of Rights, democratic reforms for
Legco and more diffuse notions of representative government, they
were making the Chief Executive issue a part of the broader debate
about what a just and proper legal and institutional order required.
While this feature was more prominent, and at times explicit, in the
analyses and assertions of legislators, activists and commentators
who were highly critical of the selection process and its aftermath,
it was also present in the arguments of British and colonial offi-
cials. In accepting or defending the selection process and its re-
sults, the governments in Hong Kong and in London were hardly
prepared to dispute that norms of democracy, liberty, and auton-
omy were, in some form, right for Hong Kong and important to
Hong Kongers. They and their critics in Legco and among Hong
Kong's liberal political circles openly parted company only with
respect to the narrower and more concrete questions of what ar-
rangements relating to the office of Chief Executive were required
by those normative principles, backed by extant or plausibly
emerging popular demand, and permitted by transitional Hong
Kong's circumstances.
2.3. The Hong Kong People and the China and pro-China Hong Kong
Vision of the Rule of Law
During the 1990s, Chinese officials and pro-China elements in
Hong Kong accepted that the rule of law was important to the
213 Greg Torode & Duncan Hughes, Qian Sticks to His Guns in Final Meeting
with Rifkind, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Feb. 15, 1997, at 1.
214 Id.
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people of Hong Kong. Official Chinese and pro-China statements
assured the Hong Kong people that the S.A.R. would provide a
rule of law adequate for the citizenry of the territory. China re-
peatedly stressed, especially in response to charges that some
P.R.C. moves imperiled vital legal and institutional arrangements,
that Hong Kong's rule of law would survive the territory's rever-
sion to Chinese rule. For example, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs
Office Director Lu Ping explained that the Chinese government
was well-prepared to effect a smooth transition in Hong Kong's
rule-of-law system, one that would keep Hong Kong's laws "en-
tirely different" from those of the mainland.215 Similarly, Prime
Minister Li Peng declared that the territory's rule of law would
remain unchanged after July 1, 1997.216
While top official P.R.C. sources rarely went much further,
some pro-China Hong Kong sources more openly expressed an
appreciation of the rule of law's importance to the people of Hong
Kong. For example, Cheng Kai-nam, a leader of the Democratic
Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong ("D.A.B."), said that the
rule of law was a vital part of what would "bring about a better
tomorrow" for Hong Kong.217 D.A.B. leader Tsang Yok-sing, an of-
ten-quoted source for pro-China views, commented that "[t]he im-
portance of upholding the rule of law [in Hong Kong] cannot be
over-emphasized." 218
Chinese officials and their allies in Hong Kong did not promise
the same rule of law, however, that Hong Kong's liberal or pro-
democracy politicians, or its colonial masters, asserted that the
people of Hong Kong wanted or needed. China and its closest
supporters in the territory did not accept that a rule of law for
Hong Kong had to satisfy substantively liberal notions of a just and
good legal order, or could disregard the limits that the Basic Law
imposed. Rather, they envisioned the rule of law as a set of spe-
cific arrangements that the Chinese sovereign and its delegate, the
S.A.R. government, would provide through proper exercises of
discretionary sovereign authority, prudentially taking into account
the preferences and interests of the Hong Kong people.
Many of the key provisions of the Basic Law embodied this
215 See Lu Ping Reiterates China's Policy on Hong Kong, Xinhua, June 18, 1996,
available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
216 See id.
217 Cheng Kai-nam, Need for Confidence, WINDOw, Sept. 27, 1996, at 16.
218 Tsang Yok-sing, Prophets of Doom Shooting HK in Foot, S. CHINA MORNING
PosT, Feb. 11, 1997, at 14.
2004] 1587
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
positivist conception. The promised continuity in Hong Kong's
rule of law was to be provided to the Hong Kong people primarily
by implementation of the Basic Law's undertakings to maintain
Hong Kong's prior laws (including the common law) and judicial
system, preserve Hong Kong's capitalist system, permit the exten-
sion of the territory's separate membership in international legal
regimes, continue protection of the rights enshrined in the princi-
pal United Nations human rights covenants (which were applica-
ble to colonial Hong Kong), and accord the territory a high degree
of autonomy in legislative, executive, and judicial affairs (and thus
the capacity to preserve legal continuity).21
9
Comments from pro-China sources reflected a similarly posi-
tivist perspective on Hong Kong's post-reversion legal order.
D.A.B. leader Cheng Kai-nam explained that it was the Basic Law
that would provide the necessary "protective talisman for [the]
Hong Kong people against any injustice." 220 Cheng's colleague
Tsang Yok-sing asserted that the task China and the S.A.R. gov-
ernment-in-waiting faced in answering doubts about the rule of
law was primarily "to convince people that the Basic Law [would]
be fully implemented."221 Such comments suggested little interest
in, or tolerance for, appeals to fixed principles of justice or sover-
eign obligation as measures of the propriety of specific legal or in-
stitutional arrangements for the S.A.R.
Especially at moments of heightened tension between China
and British authorities or Hong Kong democracy activists, official
Chinese statements hedged even on a commitment to a narrowly
positivist vision, and suggested that a relatively robust rule of law
might not be important to the people of Hong Kong. This ten-
dency was especially pronounced in the comments of senior Bei-
jing leaders with portfolios not limited to Hong Kong. For exam-
ple, Chinese Politburo Standing Committee member Li Ruihuan
pointedly refused to attribute Hong Kong's success to features the
219 See, e.g., Basic Law, supra note 21, arts. 8, 160 (concerning laws previously
in force); id. art. 81 (concerning the maintenance of the judicial system); id. arts.
150-52 (concerning the U.N. human rights covenants); id. art. 5 (concerning the
maintenance of the capitalist system); id. art. 2 (concerning the high degree of
autonomy); Joint Declaration, supra note 39, art. 3; see also id. annex I, §§ I, II, III,
VI, XI, XIII (concerning the high degree of autonomy, the maintenance of laws
previously in force, the preservation of the judicial system, the capitalist system,
international legal relations, and the applicability of standards set forth in the
U.N. human rights covenants).
220 Cheng, supra note 217, at 16.
221 Tsang, supra note 218, at 14.
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British had provided to the colony, including Hong Kong's rule of
law. Indeed, Li argued that the British did not even "govern them-
selves very well" at home.m Party chief Jiang Zemin said more
explicitly that the rule of law had little to do with Hong Kong's ac-
complishments. 223 Li and Jiang asserted that the key to the terri-
tory's success lay instead in the ability and energy of the Hong
Kong people, which presumably could survive in the absence of
many of the elements of the late colonial rule-of-law regime. 224 The
D.A.B.'s Secretary General was more restrained in his analysis, but
he nonetheless deemed the "special quality of the Hong Kong peo-
ple" to be more important than the concededly significant rule of
law in accounting for Hong Kong's remarkable prosperity and vi-
tality.225
Suggesting a broadly similar skepticism about the need to pre-
serve Hong Kong's prior rule of law, the pro-China press provided
extensive and highly favorable coverage when China's choice for
Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa, embraced a version of the "Asian
values" theme in sketching his vision of Hong Kong's future.
226
Against the background of Singaporean senior leader Lee Kuan
Yew's long-standing critique of Western-style rights-centered le-
gality and after the Bangkok Declaration's more formal articulation
of an Eastern challenge to allegedly Western human rights norms,
"Asian values" had become a code word for the rejection of many
of the principles underpinning the rule-of-law regime that Hong
Kong's liberal and pro-democracy camp claimed Hong Kongers
needed and wanted. 227 In rejecting Western criticisms and con-
cerns, Tung seemed to be working within this framework when he
commented, "We are going to find our own way forward, but it
may not be the way you like." 228 Adopting this line of analysis, a
leading pro-Beijing newspaper in the territory quoted Tung's
statements extensively and endorsed the view that a legal order in
line with Hong Kong's unique and substantially Chinese culture
222 Text of Li Ruihuan's Remarks to Hong Kong and Macao Representatives to the
Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, WEN WEI PO, Mar. 14, 1995, at B5.
223 See Frank Ching Danger Signals for Hong Kong, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 17,
1996, at 36.
224 See id.; Text of Li Ruihuan's Remarks to Hong Kong and Macao Representatives
to the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, supra note 222, at B5.
225 Cheng, supra note 217, at 16.
226 See Philip Stephens, One System Fits All, FIN. TIMEs, Jan. 31,1997, at 14.
227 See id.
m Id.
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and values would be in accord with the true preferences of the
Hong Kong people and would assure the territory's continued sta-
bility and prosperity. In both respects, this argument claimed,
Tung's version of legality would be superior to the uncritical per-
petuation of a colonial order.229
Confidence that the people would accept a species of legality
that was less than what liberals wanted and was compatible with
what China would countenance seems to have been high with re-
spect to the major concrete legal and institutional issues of transi-
tional Hong Kong's endgame. In these areas, China and its Hong
Kong supporters argued, the colonial government and liberal poli-
ticians were trying to introduce changes that not only exceeded
what China had authorized or would accept, but also went beyond
what the people of Hong Kong had previously enjoyed and could
be presumed to want or require. China's sense that, despite recent
changes, Hong Kong's citizens remained economic creatures who
would accept any system that continued to generate prosperity
likely reinforced such views.230
2.3.1. The Bill of Rights and the People's Values and Interests
When the Bill of Rights Ordinance emerged to the agenda of
Hong Kong politics, China and its allies made few public attempts
to assert or to build opposition to the proposed Ordinance among
the citizenry of Hong Kong. The colonial government, backed by
Parliament, appeared committed to adopting a Bill of Rights.
Popular distrust and dislike of the Beijing leadership were at peak
levels in the wake of the Tiananmen Incident. The institutional
mechanisms for nurturing and mobilizing mass public opinion be-
yond a core of loyal activists in Hong Kong were in an even
weaker state on the pro-China left than they were on the govern-
ment's and pro-democracy politicians' side.231 China thus tended
229 See Tung Chee-hwa Clarifies Seven Points of Misunderstanding, Stressed Hong
Kong SAR Will Make Laws on Its Own, TA KuNG PAo, Feb. 5, 1997, at A12 (present-
ing the Chief Executive-designate's description of Hong Kong as a "mature com-
munity" that could "choose values suitable to itself" and "need not copy" the
West). For a contrary view from an independent legislator who frequently sides
with the Democrats, see Christine Loh, The Rights Stuff, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 8,
1993, at 15 (arguing that indigenous Asian human rights movements refute the
claims from the P.R.C. that human rights are "foreign" or "Western" concepts).
230 See Gilley, supra note 59, at 16.
231 See, e.g., Gilley, supra note 24, at 72, 76 (describing belated moves to estab-
lish a united front group to win over younger Hong Kongers who have little ex-
perience or trust in the mainland); Emily Lau, Peking's Tune, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
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to content itself with clear signals of its views to sympathizers and
warnings to prospective antagonists, via statements of Beijing's
opposition to the Ordinance and its intention to overturn legal
changes that it considered to be in conflict with the Basic Law's re-
quirements. 232 Beyond this, a few pro-China members of Legco
cautioned that the proposed Ordinance was not adequately under-
stood by the Hong Kong people and would provoke an undesir-
able and ultimately unpopular confrontation with China.
233 Offi-
cial P.R.C. sources later derided the colonial government for
having ignored considerable opposition in Hong Kong at the time
of the Ordinance's enactment.
234
As 1997 drew nearer, China clarified its plans to reverse some
key Bill of Rights provisions and amendments to the Societies and
Public Order Ordinances, which previously had imposed restrict-
ions on political activities and organization. At the same time, the
P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies developed more elaborate argu-
ments concerning support among the people of Hong Kong for
Chinese and pro-China positions on the threatened rights legisla-
tion.
One principal argument simply asserted that the masses had no
great or deep-seated love for the laws in question. Proponents of
this argument could point to a variety of indicators suggesting that
such a claim was plausible. As early as 1991, popular enthusiasm
for the human rights agenda had begun to wane in the wake of
China's opposition to the Bill of Rights and other legislation.235 In
1994, three courses on human rights at Hong Kong's top university
had to be dropped due to low enrollment.236 At times, liberal de-
Aug. 23, 1990, at 22 (describing the struggles of fledgling pro-China parties
founded in response to new pro-democracy groupings); Stacy Mosher, Liberal
Landslide, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 12, 1991, at 19 (describing the rout of pro-China
candidates in elections for Legco held a few months after the enactment of the Bill
of Rights).
232 See, e.g., Zhang Junsheng Stresses PWC Opinion on Bill of Rights Reasonable
and Legitimate, WEN WEI PO, Oct. 21, 1995, at Al (describing the Chinese Foreign
Ministry's "solemn statement" in 1991 expressing China's disagreement with the
colonial government's action and stating that China reserved the right to take cor-
rective action in the future).
233 See Emily Lau, Better Late than Never, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 12, 1990, at 16.
234 See Linda Choy, Qian Maps Out Legality of Power, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 10, 1997, at 1 (quoting Vice Premier Qian Qichen).
235 See Stacy Mosher, Selective Suffrage, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 29, 1991, at 17
(quoting human rights activist Ho Hei-wah).
236 See Linda Choy, Courses on Human Rights Dropped Due to Student Apathy, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, June 27, 1994, at 3.
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fenders of the Bill of Rights and other legislation had to scramble,
claiming support from a "silent majority" 237 or desperately urging
people to defend their rights.
China and pro-China sources argued further that apparent
popular support for the Bill of Rights and other civil liberties laws
was the product of the colonial authorities and others having
duped the Hong Kong people. Specifically, the pro-China news-
paper Ta Kung Pao explained, "Some people ... affected by Chris
Patten ... wrongly think" that repealing amendments to the Socie-
ties Ordinance and Public Order Ordinance will affect residents'
freedom or that post-reversion legal limits on subversive "advoca-
cy" would place freedom of speech under siege.238 More generally,
proponents of this line of argument asserted that the government
and sympathetic media had misled the Hong Kong people into
holding unfounded fears that their liberties were in danger, and of-
fering ill-considered support for positions on the Bill of Rights and
related matters that departed from the people's true beliefs, as well
as their interests.239
As the attacks on Patten and others for misleading and confus-
ing the people underscored, China and its allies perceived that
there was considerable, albeit misplaced, support for the Bill of
Rights Ordinance and related legal reforms. Their arguments thus
sought to pressure the people to accept pro-China positions, not
just to proclaim their existing preferences and to bring those pref-
erences to bear in the conflict over rights laws. Even seemingly de-
scriptive statements about popular attitudes had some of this char-
237 See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
23 Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are Good, TA KUNG
PAO, Jan 24, 1997, at A2; see also If the British Side Knew This Would Happen, It Should
Not Have Done It in the Beginning, supra note 50, at A2 (asserting that the Prepara-
tory Committee proposal urging the N.P.C. Standing Committee to "restore old
laws" was a "deliberate act taken to mislead the public"); Tung Chee-hwa's Remarks
Are Beneficial to Hong Kong's Prosperity, WEN WEI Po, Feb. 14, 1997, at A4 (deriding
British Foreign Secretary Rifkind's remarks "accus[ing] the S.A.R. of repealing the
Bill of Rights Ordinance" as "aimed at maliciously misleading the public" into
thinking that "there are no more civil rights in Hong Kong"); Why Does Chris
Patten Advocate "Freedom of Advocacy?," TA KUNG PAO, Oct. 22, 1996, at A2 (stating
that "because Patten has continued to mislead the people ... some people have
misgivings" about questions of freedom of speech in post-reversion Hong Kong).
239 See, e.g., Andy Ho, Jitters over the Media, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 3,
1995, at 19 (describing the remarks of Hong Kong Xinhua Deputy Director Zhang
Junsheng); Sun Chengbin, Behind the Banner of "Human Rights," Xinhua, Oct. 27,
1995 (commenting on the storm over Hong Kong's Bill of Rights), available at
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Chris Yeung, The War over Sir Ti Liang's Words,
S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Nov. 18, 1995, at 17.
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acter. When official Chinese sources and Hong Kong sources with
strong China ties claimed that the people were not strongly at-
tached to late colonial rights legislation or that the people would
abandon their current attachments after a little reflection on their
deeper values and interests, the expected and intended effect was
to erode existing popular support for those laws. By sending clear
signals of China's displeasure with the existing laws and its inten-
tion to demand changes to them, such statements seemed designed
to achieve acquiescence from a populace that was thought to be re-
luctant to seek confrontation with China, especially when there
seemed to be little hope of altering outcomes. Other arguments
from China and Hong Kong's pro-China elements more transpar-
ently aimed to pressure and persuade the people, often by portray-
ing the impact that revising, or failing to revise, rights laws would
have on the realization of other values that the Hong Kong people
held dear.
Thus, China and pro-China sources tried to appeal to the as-
sumed popular desire for order and stability. They argued that
leaving some of the eleventh-hour colonial amendments in place
was a formula for chaos. The Societies Ordinance and Public Or-
der Ordinance that the British sought to impose on the S.A.R.
would make it "difficult to maintain the social order and social
stability."240 Reversing the recent changes would be beneficial in
"guaranteeing the freedoms of the majority of the people" of Hong
Kong.241 Left unrevised, the Bill of Rights Ordinance would not
"guarantee Hong Kong people's rights ... but rather [would] dis-
rupt Hong Kong's social stability." 242 Its "arbitrary application"
would pose "a direct threat to ... the security of the Hong Kong
people."243 Indeed, on this view, the Bill of Rights' attempt at su-
per-legislative entrenchment of vague individual rights was "crip-
pling Hong Kong's existing legal system" and threatened to create
a safe haven for criminals who would be free to disrupt the safe
240 Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are Good, supra note
238, at A2.
241 Id.
242 Zhang Junsheng Stresses PWC Opinion of Bill of Rights Reasonable and Legiti-
mate, supra note 232, at Al; see also Fanny Wong, No Way for China To Win Hearts
and Minds, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 1, 1995, at 14 (noting similar comments
from a visiting delegation of P.R.C. legal experts in Hong Kong).
243 Hong Kong Newspaper Says Bill of Rights Disturbs Legal System, WEN WEI PO,
Nov. 11, 1995, at A2, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 21,
1995, available at, LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
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and peaceful society that the people of Hong Kong valued.244
China and its allies supplemented this effort to play on the
people's fear of disorder with an attempt to play the nationalism
card. In its favorable reporting on the Chief Executive-designate's
views and in its own comments, the pro-China Hong Kong press
argued that the Societies Ordinance, as amended by the colonial
authorities, would permit Hong Kong political organizations to be-
come the agents of foreign forces.245 Official Chinese sources also
attacked the Bill of Rights by asserting that it would "open room
for the activities of international anti-China forces and the agents of
the British side after 1997."246 These were potentially powerful ap-
peals in light of the considerable anti-colonial sentiments and well-
ing sense of national pride that had taken hold among Hong Kon-
gers, including those who generally distrusted the P.R.C. As
independent legislator and prominent columnist Margaret Ng ob-
served, "[E]voking the Chinese identification" in Hong Kong was
"a great political weapon." It was possible, Ng elaborated, to stifle
"reasonable discussion" and audible dissent in Hong Kong by re-
casting issues in a patriotically provocative form. Thus, a question
such as, "Would you like to have the P.R.C. govern Hong Kong?"
yielded answers more appealing to China and its supporters once
the inquiry was rephrased as, "Should China have sovereignty
over Hong Kong?" 247
Seeking to appeal to other aspects of Hong Kongers' emer-
gent sense of identity, pro-China voices in Hong Kong asserted
that the rights laws China favored would better reflect the "shared
values" of the people of Hong Kong. 248 The pro-China press
244 See Zhang Junsheng Stresses PWC Opinion of Bill of Rights Reasonable and Le-
gitimate, supra note 232, at Al; see also Hong Kong Newspaper Says Bill of Rights Dis-
turbs Legal System, supra note 243, at A2 (stating that many people feared that the
Bill of Rights would "totally destroy" Hong Kong's legal and judicial systems); So
Lai-fun & Connie Law, Right Bill Aids "Bad Guys," S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov.
8, 1993, at 1 (quoting Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office chief Lu Ping's criti-
cism of the side effects of the Bill of Rights).
245 See Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are Good, supra note
238, at A2.
246 Gilley, supra note 56, at 36.
247 Margaret Ng, Cultural Pride of the Hong Kong Chinese, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 25, 1983.
248 See HK's New Chief Spells Out What Is Needed To Move Forward, STRAITS
TIMES (Singapore), Dec. 24, 1996, at 20; see also Balancing Act over First Big Decision,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 17, 1997, at 17 (noting Tung's description of "trust,
love and respect for our family and our elders; integrity, honesty and loyalty to-
wards all; commitment to education; a belief in order and stability; an emphasis
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quoted, and endorsed, Tung Chee-hwa's description of a markedly
Confucian-sounding set of Hong Kong values that had developed
from a unique mix of Chinese and Western influences.2 49 Rolling
back excessively liberal provisions in late colonial legislation, pro-
China commentaries on Tung's remarks continued, would allow
Hong Kong to achieve "the right balance" between the rights of the
individual and the "interests of the entire community," 2 0 and a set
of laws better suited to the Hong Kong people.
Finally, in seeking to shape popular attitudes toward the Bill of
Rights and related legal issues, proponents of China's position also
turned to the basic positivist principles that underlay the China
and pro-China side's approach to the legal and institutional ques-
tions of the endgame. According to this line of argument, the posi-
tivist guarantees of citizens' liberties that P.R.C. and S.A.R. laws
would provide would be enough for the territory's residents, even
if there was considerable popular support in Hong Kong for the
substance of the Bill of Rights and other legislation that was slated
for reversal. As a leading pro-China daily phrased the argument,
the "'[f]reedoms of [the] Hong Kong people' would not be re-
stricted" by planned legislative changes, for an elaborate frame-
work of substantively similar laws would be in place.251 Article 39
of the Basic Law and parallel undertakings in the Joint Declaration
provided that the laws of the S.A.R. would retain the state's legal
obligation to protect the rights set forth in the principal U.N. hu-
man rights covenants-the very same set of rights that the Bill of
Rights Ordinance's substantive sections incorporated. 25 2 Indeed,
on obligations to the community rather than rights of the individual; a preference
for consultation rather than open confrontation" as shared Hong Kong values).
249 See id. (providing excerpts of Tung's speech); see also Tung Chee-hwa Clari-
fies Seven Points of Misunderstanding, Stressed Hong Kong SAR Will Make Laws on Its
Own, supra note 229, at A12 (quoting Tung Chee-hwa stating that "Hong Kong
people know how to learn from the advantages of China and the West" and that
Hong Kong was "nurtured" by both Chinese and Western cultures).
250 Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are Good, supra note
238, at A2.
251 Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are Good, supra note
238, at A2; see also Jiang Enzhu Says Hong Kong SAR's Future Laws All Must Accord
with the Basic Law, WEN WEI PO, Oct. 19, 1995.
252 See Basic Law, supra note 21, art. 39; Joint Declaration, supra note 39, art.
3(5), annex I, § XIII; Sun, supra note 239 (asserting that the Basic Law provided
adequate human rights protection for the Hong Kong people); Xinhua Official Says
that Human Rights Commission Unacceptable to Chinese Side, TA KUNG PAO, May 26,
1994, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, May 27, 1994 (arguing that
a human rights comnmission was unnecessary and inappropriate for Hong Kong
because the Basic Law already would provide adequate human rights protection
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these sources noted, the Basic Law also specified additional
rights.253 In its laudatory coverage of Tung Chee-hwa's explana-
tion of the S.A.R. government's agenda on rights issues, the pro-
China Hong Kong press reported that these P.R.C.-provided laws,
"stipulate[] that residents enjoy very extensive freedom," "fully
guarantee[] human rights" for the territory's inhabitants, and re-
flect the Chinese government's "great respect for human rights in
Hong Kong."254
In the end, pro-China sources added, there also would be ade-
quate, positivist mechanisms to ensure that Hong Kongers' prefer-
ences were considered. Once the N.P.C. eliminated a narrow range
of provisions that violated the Basic Law, the S.A.R. government-
a government of Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong-would
use legislative and executive processes consistent with the Basic
Law to determine the content of post-1997 Hong Kong laws gov-
erning individual rights and civil and political liberties.255 Inevita-
bly lurking beneath the surface of this last line of argument for per-
suading the people on the issue of rights laws was the less
accommodating core of the China and pro-China perspective:
Whether or not these claims about positivist guarantees persuaded
the people, such guarantees were the only species of legal promise
the people were going to get.
2.3.2. The Patten Reforms, the Provisional Legislature, and the
Popularity of Stability
Faced with the colonial government's moves to accelerate de-
mocratic constitutional reform in Hong Kong, China and its allies
in the territory responded with attempts to find and to foster popu-
lar support for their opposition to the reformers' agenda. Their
methods for asserting and creating enthusiasm among the people
paralleled their approach to the question of popular attitudes to-
for the Hong Kong people), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
253 See Basic Law, supra note 21, arts. 24-42.
254 Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup are Good, supra note 238,
at A2; see also Linda Choy & Chris Yeung, Tight Police Controls on Protests, Ban on
Political Group's Foreign Links 'Necessary for Social Order,' S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Jan. 24, 1997, at 1 (quoting Tung Chee-hwa as stating that the proposed changes to
the Bill of Rights were only "technical in nature").
255 See, e.g., If the British Side Knew This Would Happen, It Should Not Have Done
It in the Beginning, supra note 50, at A2; Chris Yeung & Linda Choy, Preliminary
Working Committee Adamant on Body to Run Territory, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Dec.
7, 1994, at 1.
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ward the Bill of Rights and related issues. Their strategy also mir-
rored and sought to counter each of the main elements in the ef-
forts of the colonial government and Hong Kong "pro-democracy"
politicians to claim and to cultivate popular backing on democratic
reforms.
With the memory of Tiananmen still fresh in the minds of the
territory's residents, the P.R.C. and its allies made relatively lim-
ited public moves to claim a popular mandate for their opposition
to rapid democratization at the beginning of the 1990s. Before
Patten began to pursue in earnest his plans to reshape the electoral
laws for the territory's representative bodies, China and pro-China
voices in the colony remarked on the declining attendance at pro-
democracy rallies, 25 6 sang the praises of the newly-adopted Basic
Law (including its provisions concerning elections), and opined
that the people of Hong Kong wanted only moderate reform to
impose modest checks and balances on a government that they
were content to see run by bureaucrats who proficiently pursued
stability and prosperity. 257
Once the Patten reforms were squarely on the political agenda,
however, official Chinese and pro-China arguments about the atti-
tudes of the Hong Kong people became more aggressive and
elaborate. They claimed that the Patten proposals lacked popular
support and that the people of Hong Kong embraced or at least ac-
cepted China's alternative arrangements. A leading pro-China
newspaper asserted that "[t]he British side now suddenly wants to
practice its 'democratization' programme" because it faced a de-
clining and near-desperate "situation in Hong Kong [that] has
gradually developed in favor of the Chinese side."258 According to
the pro-China view, Patten planned to "wage 'a public opinion
war'... to force China to change the Basic Law" to make it com-
patible with his plans for constitutional reform.259 While the terri-
tory's new self-styled "democrats" might well back the Governor,
their efforts would be to no avail. Patten and his allies would be
256 See, e.g., Emily Lau, Backroom Betrayal, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 1, 1990, at
14-15 (noting a pro-China commentary's assertion of poor attendance at pro-
democracy rallies).
257 See id.; Mosher, supra note 235, at 17 (citing political analyst Lau Siu-kai on
the electoral law reforms for the 1991 elections and his belief that they were com-
patible with popular preferences).
258 Ta Ko, Why Is the British Side 'Playing Rough' in the Games?, WEN WEI PO,
Nov. 1, 1992, at 11.
259 A Policy Speech Unfavorable to Convergence, WEN WEI PO, Oct. 8, 1992, at 1.
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unable to overcome "the growing discontent of the residents with
the extremist opinions and actions of a small number of people"
who supported such moves. 260 Official and pro-China media
added that "people from all walks of life" were "criticizing," 261 and
"the masses of Hong Kong residents" were "resist[ing] and op-
pos[ing]," the Patten proposals shortly after their announcement.
262
"Outwardly," this line of argument continued, "Patten is trying to
get more democracy for Hong Kong people, but, actually, his ill in-
tent is obvious and known to all."
263
As the P.R.C. and its most reliable supporters in the territory
saw it, the enactment of the Governor's constitutional reform pack-
age was not convincing evidence of popular support. The Legco
vote passing the Patten's proposals by a "slender majority," Vice
Premier, Foreign Minister, and Preliminary Working Committee
Chairman Qian Qichen contended, did not reflect the will of the
majority of the Hong Kong people; to claim that it did was, simply,
"a lie." 264 To the contrary, the more modest and gradual democra-
tization that China had proposed in the bilateral talks on the Patten
proposals "reflected the general wishes of the people of Hong
Kong" and the fruits of China's consultations with Hong Kong
people during the negotiations.265 In the same vein, China and its
allies claimed a popular mandate for the entity that China created
in response to the Patten reforms and authorized to help lay the
groundwork for replacing the Legco elected under the Patten re-
forms with a Provisional Legislature. They argued that the P.W.C.
had "secured the approval, trust and support of many Hong Kong
people [by] increasing communication with Hong Kong people"
260 Id.
261 Mr. Patten's Choice, TA KUNG PAO, Oct. 18, 1992, at 2.
262 Xinhua's Zhou Nan Reaffirms Stance on Hong Kong, New China News
Agency, Domestic Serv., Mar. 18, 1993, transcribed in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Mar. 22, 1993 (quoting Xinhua Hong Kong Director Zhou Nan), avail-
able at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
263 A Political Gamble that Contravenes the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law, WEN WEI Po, Nov. 8, 1992 (quoting N.P.C. Standing Committee mem-
ber Wu Dakun).
264 Linda Choy, Support for Reform 'a Lie', S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 8,
1994, at 1.
265 Text of Chinese Statement on the Breakdown of Sino-British Talks on Hong
Kong, Reuters, Mar. 2, 1994, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; see also
Li Hsiao-ping, Lu Ping Says Hong Kong People Have Full Say in the Political System
Issue, WEN WEI PO, May 6, 1993, at 12 (discussing the Hong Kong and Macao Af-
fairs Office Director's description of the channels for collecting popular input
from the Hong Kong people amid Sino-British negotiations on political reform).
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and "pool[ing] the wisdom of the masses." 266
Official China and pro-China Hong Kong sources further as-
serted that the Hong Kong people supported the decision to set up
a Provisional Legislature. At the body's first meeting, several
months before reversion, Xinhua Hong Kong Director and Pre-
paratory Committee Vice Chairman Zhou Nan told the members of
the legislature-in-waiting, "The broad ranks of Hong Kong people
have placed their trust and hopes in you." 2 67 "[S]upport from the
majority" of the people of Hong Kong, Zhou had explained earlier,
was a key source of the Provisional Legislature's authority.268 Al-
though such claims of popular enthusiasm might be open to doubt,
the pro-China press insisted that the Hong Kong people had at
least acquiesced in the outcome on the eve of the interim body's
creation: "[Tihe great majority of residents have expressed their
understanding and acceptance of the establishment of the Provi-
sional Legislature. Even those who were opposed to it have
changed their position one after another and are willing to accept
the reality of establishing the Provisional Legislature."269 Other of-
ficial Chinese and Hong Kong pro-China sources added that the
Hong Kong people would spurn opponents of the Provisional Leg-
islature,270 who would be "hard-pressed to face the people after
1997."271
266 Fruitful Initial Preparatory Work, RENMIN RIBAo, Dec. 9, 1995, at 5; see also
Agreement on Court of Final Appeal Embodies Results of Preliminary Working Commit-
tee Work, WEN WEI PO, June 10, 1995, at A2 (asserting that "more and more ...
Hong Kong people" had "acknowledged" the "fruitful results" the P.W.C. had
attained and the "important role" it would exercise in the transition).
267 Text of Zhou Nan's Speech to First Meeting of Provisional Legislature, TA KUNG
PAO, Jan. 26,1997, at A2.
268 Frank Zhang, Rita Fan Elected President of Hong Kong's Provisional Legisla-
ture, Agence France Presse, Jan. 25, 1997, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi
File.
269 A Statement from the British Side Cannot Bar the Provisional Legislative Coun-
cil, TA KUNG PAO, Dec. 21, 1996, at A2; see also Linda Choy, Hong Kong Backs
Shadow Body, Says Tung, S. CHINA MORNING POsT, Dec. 22, 1996, at 1 (describing
Chief Executive-designate Tung Chee-hwa's assertion that the Provisional Legis-
lature was "accepted and supported" by the people of Hong Kong); Unreasonable
Demand Is Justifiably Rejected, WEN WEI PO, June 13, 1997, at A4 (asserting that
Hong Kong residents accepted and supported the establishment of the Provisional
Legislature and citing a poll finding that half of the 40% of respondents who did
not find the Provisional Legislature acceptable at first had changed their minds).
270 See Gilley, supra note 112, at 31-32 (presenting Wen Wei Po comments on
Martin Lee).
271 Gilley, supra note 38, at 14-15 (quoting a statement from the P.R.C. State
Council).
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China, with its allies and sympathizers in Hong Kong, found
substantial indications of support for these outwardly confident
assessments of popular opinion regarding democratization, the
Patten reforms, and the Provisional Legislature. Official Chinese
sources pointed to the apparent weakness of popular support for
democratization. They cited a dismal turnout of less than one-half
of the registered electorate and less than one-quarter of potential
voters in the Legco elections that were held less than a year before
Patten tabled his reform proposals.272 These sources argued that,
with so few citizens participating, the democrats' victory did not
represent the "main trend of Hong Kong public opinion" which
likely included a disproportionately non-voting majority more
sympathetic to China's views. 273 As China and its Hong Kong
supporters saw it, similar patterns of voter participation in the 1995
Legco elections suggested the same conclusions, as did public
opinion polls that found relatively few citizens believed that Patten
had the Hong Kong people's interests at heart when he pursued
electoral law reforms.
274
Despite their failure to deliver winning margins for pro-China
candidates in Legco's most broadly elected constituencies, leftist
organizations, along with a variety of conservative groups that
were willing to cooperate with Beijing, provided a considerable
pro-China base in the battle over popular attitudes toward democ-
ratization and the legislature. The Hong Kong Federation of Trade
Unions dominated organized labor and had been one of the terri-
tory's more formidable mass political institutions since well before
the colonial government instituted democratic reforms.275 Backed
by Beijing and committed to participating in the elections man-
dated by late colonial electoral reforms, the pro-China Democratic
Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong emerged as the terri-
272 See Chen Chien-ping, Lu Ping Stresses Basic Law Cannot Be Amended Before
1997, WEN WEI PO, Oct. 9, 1991; Mosher, supra note 81, at 19-20 (discussing P.R.C.
comments on low voter turnout); Mosher, supra note 235, at 16 (commenting on
low voter registration rates).
273 Chen, supra note 272.
274 See, e.g., Battle for Hong Kong Opinion, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 6, 1993
(describing opinion polls); do Rosario, Sharp Distinction, supra note 112, at 28-29;
do Rosario, supra note 106, at 16 (concerning voter participation); Lau, supra note
111 (noting the low registration rate, particularly 37% in functional constituencies
that formed the crux of the Sino-British dispute over the Patten reforms of elec-
toral laws for Legco).
275 See, e.g., Louise do Rosario, Between Two Stools, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 14,
1995, at 26-27 (describing the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions).
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tory's third most popular party.276 Xinhua Hong Kong Director
Zhou Nan claimed a still broader network of supportive organiza-
tions, saying that "[a] few hundred influential organizations from
the industrial and commercial circles and labour circles, as well as
people's organizations, political organizations and public figures"
sided with China in the disputes over the Patten reforms.
277
China and its Hong Kong allies also found visible indications
of popular support for the Provisional Legislature. They pointed
to "the fact that people of various circles have signed up for the
election of the Provisional Legislature," and to the rise in opinion
poll ratings for the body upon selection of its members.278 They
also deemed significant a long-term decline in Patten's popularity
ratings that accompanied his protracted conflict with China over
political reform legislation.
279
It was hard, however, even for the most ardent supporters of
Beijing's line to ignore signs that the colonial government's and
Hong Kong democrats' agenda for legal and constitutional reforms
appealed to the public. A prominent N.P.C. member, for example,
was reduced to a defensive argument acknowledging the force of
democratic sentiments in Hong Kong while urging patience in
pursuing democratic change: "As is known to all, China has con-
sistently favored developing democracy in Hong Kong. However,
people with even a glimmer of political knowledge know that a
democratic political system cannot be developed overnight [and]
should proceed from Hong Kong's actual reality." 280
With election results, public opinion polls, and public demon-
strations offering little evidence of firm or fervent mass backing for
276 See id.; Peter Lim, China Plans To Gather its Supporters To Form Provisional
Legislature, Agence France Presse, Apr. 8, 1996, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allasi File.
277 Xinhua's Zhou Nan Reaffirms Chinese Stance on Hong Kong, Xinhua Domestic
Service, Mar. 18, 1993, transcribed in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 22,
1993, at Al, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
278 A Statement from the British Side Cannot Bar the Provisional Legislative Coun-
cil, supra note 269, at A2; Bruce Gilley, Tung Sets the Course, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan.
9, 1997, at 22 (describing a poll showing a decline from a 46% to a 25% opposition
to the Provisional Legislature and a rise in support to 37%).
279 See id.; Louise do Rosario, Down but Not Out, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 27,
1995, at 27 (describing a fall in Patten's popularity from a nearly two-thirds favor-
able rating in July 1992 to a 54% favorable rating three years later, according to
surveys conducted by the impartial Ming Pao newspaper).
280 A Political Gamble that Contravenes the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law, supra note 263 (quoting N.P.C. Standing Committee member Wu Da-
kun).
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their positions on the Patten reforms, the Provisional Legislature
and related matters, China and pro-China voices in Hong Kong
advanced arguments that went beyond straightforward assertions
that existing popular opinion weighed heavily in favor of the out-
comes Beijing preferred. China and its allies sought to discount the
significance of the popularity their opponents' positions enjoyed.
They argued that it reflected their antagonists' ability to deploy
unparallelled resources to manipulate the Hong Kong people and
Hong Kong's political and legislative processes. The pro-China
press contended that the British had deceived the people and won
ill-founded support by claiming that Patten's political reform pack-
age conformed to the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law, and a series
of Sino-British agreements. 281 These sources charged that Patten's
argument that elections under his rules were essential to the rule of
law and to the prevention of corruption in Hong Kong was an
"exaggeration to scare people" into supporting the British plan.282
The pro-China indictment added that the colonial authorities
had not been content to rely on such tactics of deception, but had
also rigged the outcome so that they would win despite a lack of
popular support. Pro-China sources claimed that the British side
"let Patten draw up his package while leaving the Hong Kong
people in the dark, then let the colonialist-manipulated Legco pass
the package." 283 The colonial authorities then made ample use of
their "unique techniques in forcing implementation of the Patten
package and selectively exaggerating certain 'opinions' against
convergence with the Basic Law." 284 In addition, official Chinese
and pro-China sources charged that the elections held under the
Patten rules were unfair, unreasonable, disorderly, and the subject
of "many complaints."285 In China's view, the 1995 polling could
281 See Douglas Hurd Threatens To Push Unilaterally for Constitutional Reform,
WEN WEI PO, Oct. 3, 1993, at 2; see also Noise in Policy Address, TA KUNG PAO, Oct.
13, 1995, at A2 (charging Patten with "deceiv[ing] the people of Hong Kong on
constitutional issues" by a variety of means, including his assertion that the 1995
elections represented the fulfillment of the Joint Declaration and were in confor-
mity with the Basic Law).
282 Comment on Chris Patten's "Theory of Infiltration of Corruption," TA KUNG
PAO, Oct. 27, 1993, at 2.
283 The Three-Tiered Structure Must Be Reorganized in 1997, WEN WEI Po, Dec.
28, 1993, at 2.
284 Commenting on the British Cabinet Meeting, WEN WEI Po, Nov. 11, 1993, at 2.
285 No Kwai-yan and Simon Beck, Legco Poll Not Will of the People, China Says,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 20, 1995, at 6.
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not be said to "truly reflect[] the will of the Hong Kong people." 286
The China and pro-China side also argued that popular sup-
port for their positions and confidence in their promises, although
possibly weak, would strengthen over time. For example, when
Patten first outlined his reforms, the pro-China paper Wen Wei Po
explained, "Maybe some Hong Kong people cannot see the harm
of this practice for the time being, but, as time goes by, most Hong
Kong people will see through its nature and make a cool-headed
judgment and a correct choice."287 Similarly, pro-China elements
in Hong Kong maintained that while the idea of a Provisional Leg-
islature initially might have enjoyed only limited backing from the
ordinary people of Hong Kong, its creation and operation would
boost popular confidence in the arrangement.288
As these arguments showed, the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong
agents and allies appreciated that it was important to build new
backing, and not just assert existing support among the people for
their positions on democratic reform and the legislature. They thus
sought to convince the Hong Kong people to accept the decision to
reject the Patten reforms and to "render great support to the ...
Provisional Legislature in discharging [its] responsibilities." 289 To
a degree, the China and pro-China camp's nominally descriptive
arguments also advanced the project of persuading the people. As
was true in the debates over the Bill of Rights, official P.R.C. and
pro-China Hong Kong statements that condemned the colonial
government's constitutional reform package, underscored China's
determination to reverse its effects, or praised Hong Kong groups
that opposed extensive democratic changes, also sent clear and po-
tentially effective signals to a populace that presumably would fear
the possible adverse consequences, and foresee the likely futility,
of active support for late colonial democratic reforms.
286 Andrew Higgins, The Vanishing Trick, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 19, 1995,
at 17.
287 Just Keep a Watch over Mr. Chris Patten's Performance, WEN WEI PO, Oct. 21,
1992, at 2.
288 See, e.g., Fan Summarizes Work of Provisional Legislature as "Essential," MING
PAO, Feb. 13, 1997, at A6 (quoting Provisional Legislature President Rita Fan); cf.
The 'Resolution' Shatters British Illusions, WEN WEI Po, Sept. 1, 1994, at A2 (describ-
ing the N.P.C. Standing Committee's formal decision to reject bodies selected un-
der the electoral laws as reformed by Patten and to authorize the Preparatory
Committee to establish an interim legislature as moves that "will encourage the
people of Hong Kong to cooperate with and support the Preparatory Commit-
tee").
289 Zhou Nan Urges Support for Tung, S. CHINA MORNING PoST, Feb. 18, 1997, at
4 (quoting Xinhua Hong Kong chief Zhou Nan).
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In P.R.C. and pro-China arguments that more obviously sought
to create popular backing or acquiescence, a principal tactic was to
link acceptance of the China and pro-China views on democratiza-
tion and the legislature to the preservation of prosperity and stabil-
ity that everyone thought the people of Hong Kong held dear. The
pro-China press declared, in sweeping terms, "Hong Kong people
who are born and grow up on this land all wish to maintain pros-
perity and stability in Hong Kong forever." 290 Similarly, Hong
Kong and Macao Affairs Office head Lu Ping proclaimed that most
of the Hong Kong people wanted stability, prosperity, and close
cooperation with the central authorities in Beijing.291 In the same
vein, Xinhua Hong Kong chief Zhou Nan asserted that the people
wanted "stability, prosperity, [and] cooperation" with China.
292
Patten's reforms, according to this line of argument, put these
popular aims profoundly at risk. Elaborating the argument, Zhou
added that "[tihe great masses of Hong Kong compatriots" did not
want Hong Kong to become "a center for political struggle."
293
Such a development "would ruin Hong Kong's stability and pros-
perity" 294 and preclude a smooth transition from colony to S.A.R.
China and pro-China sources also argued more explicitly that
the Patten reforms would hurt Hong Kongers' interests and frus-
trate their hopes. They asserted that the Basic Law and the P.R.C.'s
proposals during the Sino-British negotiations over Patten's politi-
cal reform plan were adequate to assure the popular package of
stability, prosperity, convergence with the Basic Law, and avoid-
ance of political conflict. 295 They argued that Patten's reforms
would threaten to unravel this arrangement. Patten's political re-
form program, Zhou Nan asserted, "undermined Hong Kong's
stability and prosperity and damaged the vital interests of Hong
290 Mr. Patten's Choice, supra note 261.
291 See Chen, supra note 272.
292 Xinhua's Zhou Nan Reaffirms Stance on Hong Kong, supra note 262.
293 Gilley, supra note 112, at 31-32; Diane Stormont, China Envoy Paints Rosy
Picture of Post-1997 Hong Kong, Reuters, Apr. 12, 1996, available at LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File.
294 Gilley, supra note 112, at 31-32.
295 See, e.g., What the Legislators Said, supra note 87 (quoting a pro-China Legco
member's comments during a debate on Patten reforms that the Basic Law and
not "Patten's fantasy" was the route to stability). The Text of Chinese Statement on
Breakdown of Sino-British Talks on Hong Kong, supra note 265, described Chinese
proposals as "designed to facilitate a smooth transition" and to "ensure [Hong
Kong] residents a happy and peaceful life" and as "conducive to convergence
with the Basic Law" and "the general wishes of the Hong Kong people." Id.
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Kong residents." 296 Chinese Premier Li Peng derided Patten's pro-
posed electoral reform legislation as an effort "to create disorder
and impede the smooth transfer of power." 297 The pro-China press
warned that Patten's Joint Declaration-breaching and Basic Law-
violating reforms entailed "using Hong Kong people's interests as
pawns" and increasing "uncertainty and instability."298 This line of
argument added that the people of Hong Kong, not Patten, would
suffer the consequences of the Governor's irresponsible games.
Patten would "simply go away after June 30, 1997 and the chaotic
situation stirred up by him" would have to be "cleared up by the
people of Hong Kong." 299 The "silent majority [of Hong Kong
people] who seek nothing more than to get on with their lives"
would be like "the innocent children" who inevitably "suffer
most" in a "broken family." 300
After the Patten reforms became law, China and its Hong Kong
allies continued their efforts to build popular support for their po-
sitions by linking the laws and policies they opposed to outcomes
inconsistent with the people's interests in, and yearnings for, stabil-
ity and prosperity. In the campaign preceding the 1995 Legco elec-
tions, pro-China voices cautioned voters that the democrats were
"trouble-makers" who would fail to work for the interests of the
public and a smooth transition and thus would do Hong Kong no
good.301 After the elections, a leader of the pro-China D.A.B.
darkly warned that pro-democracy candidates' victories were a re-
sult that the Hong Kong people would "have to pay" for by having
a legislature incapable of communicating with China and thus un-
296 Xinhua's Zhou Nan Reaffirms Stance on Hong Kong, supra note 277; cf. Noise
in Policy Address, supra note 281 (presenting the pro-China Hong Kong press' simi-
lar criticism of Patten in a commentary on the Governor's 1995 annual policy ad-
dress).
297 Jonathan Karp, Through Train Slows Down, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 25,
1993, at 12.
298 Just Keep a Watch over Mr. Chris Patten's Performance, supra note 287, at 2.
299 Li Dahong, How Long Can the 'Last Governor' Hold Out?, LIAOWANG, Feb.
28, 1994, at 48-49 (presenting the quasi-official Beijing publication's comments on
Patten's electoral reform legislation).
300 Legco Members Stress that Patten's Actions Hurt Ordinary Hong Kong Citizens,
New China News Agency, Beijing, Feb. 24, 1994, reprinted in BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, Feb. 26, 1994 (quoting Legco member Elsie Tu), available at
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
301 See Louise do Rosario, Thorn in the Side, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 20, 1995, at
28 (quoting Xinhua Hong Kong Deputy Director Wang Rudeng); do Rosario, su-
pra note 275, at 26 (citing D.A.B. leader Cheung Kai-nam's comments to Wen Wei
Po).
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able to serve the people's interest in a smooth transition.302
The controversy over the Provisional Legislature brought forth
similar arguments. The pro-China camp charged that the democ-
rats' attacks on the Provisional Legislature "opposed China and
brought disorder to Hong Kong" [fanhua luangang].303 In the same
vein, a pro-China newspaper warned that Governor Patten's
statement that any laws passed by the Provisional Legislature
"would inevitably be vulnerable to subsequent legal challenge in
the courts" was tantamount to "encouraging some people to op-
pose the laws enacted by the Provisional Legislature" and "aim[ed]
to undermine Hong Kong's future social stability."
30 4
China and its Hong Kong allies had reason to be confident that
their arguments, explicitly linking their opponents' laws and poli-
cies to harms to Hong Kong's interests and Hong Kongers' true
preferences, would achieve some of their intended effect on public
opinion in the territory. The Hong Kong people could be expected
to understand that China and its Hong Kong allies and agents were
capable of causing many of the adverse political and economic de-
velopments that P.R.C. and pro-China arguments predicted would
follow from support for democratic reforms. Moreover, China and
pro-China statements frequently stressed, the derailing of the
through train for the 1995 Legco and the establishment of the Pro-
visional Legislature were simply an undeniable and intractable
"reality" of transitional Hong Kong's legal and political order that
the colonial administration, liberal politicians, and ordinary Hong
Kongers would do well to accept.
305
This array of "scare tactics" and appeals to material interest did
not, however, exhaust the China and pro-China side's strategy of
linking support for its preferred positions to the preservation or
advancement of other values thought to be embraced by the Hong
Kong people. Chinese authorities and their most reliable backers
in Hong Kong also sought to cultivate popular support by appeal-
302 See Higgins, supra note 288, at 17.
303 Gilley, supra note 112, at 31.
304 Provisional Legislature Must Be Set Up as Scheduled, TA KuNG PAO, Oct. 8,
1996, at A2.
305 See, e.g., A Statement from the British Side Cannot Bar the Provisional Legisla-
tive Council, supra note 269, at A2; Lawrence Chung, China, Britain Trade Verbal
Broadsides as Votes Cast for Hong Kong Assembly, Agence France Presse, Dec. 21,
1996 (quoting Qian Qichen's statement that "[r]egrettably, Britain lacks the cour-
age to face [the] reality" that the Provisional Legislature must be accepted), avail-
able at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
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ing to a loose notion of Chinese nationalism that could be expected
to resonate with the Hong Kong people. P.R.C. and pro-China
sources thus attacked the Patten reforms as attempts to make Hong
Kong a "base for subversion."306 They condemned Hong Kong
democrats for seeking foreign backing to oppose moves to derail
the "through train."307 They also criticized Hong Kong democrats
for wanting to ape Western institutions without paying attention to
Hong Kong's ways and interests.308 The people could be expected
to distance themselves from such activities, if they believed the
charges, and to perceive another signal of China's strong opposi-
tion to the liberals' and democrats' agenda, even if they rejected
the charges as false.
Finally, the China and pro-China side's strategy targeting the
people in the battle over democratic reform and the fate of the leg-
islature included another, more complex dimension. This line of
argument partly accepted that democracy appealed to the Hong
Kong people, and sought to construe the idea of sufficient democ-
racy for Hong Kong in a manner compatible with the positivist and
nationalist vision of domestic sovereignty over Hong Kong that
formed the core of the official Chinese and pro-Chinese Hong
Kong perspective.
A degree of accommodation to popular preferences for repre-
sentative democracy was implicit in the official P.R.C. and pro-
China assault on the legislative decisions and elections that the co-
lonial adminstration oversaw in the early and middle 1990s. By
arguing to the Hong Kong people that the particular procedures
306 Tai Ming Cheung, Glacial Thaw, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 22, 1993, at 13
(quoting pro-China think-tank head Shiu Sin-por). See also, Be Vigilant Against In-
stigating Political Confrontation, TA KUNG PAO, July 10, 1996, at A2 (charging that
Patten wanted S.A.R. government institutions "to be trusted by the United King-
dom and [to] work for extending British rule").
307 See, e.g., Gilley, supra note 38, at 31-32 (noting pro-China press condemna-
tion of Martin Lee's trip to North America to seek foreign support for his agenda
on the Provisional Legislature and other matters); Attempts To Foster "Pro-British
Force" Will Have "Unfavorable" Consequences, TA KUNG PAO, May 31, 1992, translated
in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 1, 1992 (criticizing U.D.H.K. for seek-
ing support of British people to press China to amend the Basic Law to accommo-
date democratic electoral reform), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; cf.
Tung Chee-hwa's Remarks are Beneficial to Hong Kong's Prosperity, supra note 238, at
A4 (presenting Tung Chee-hwa's similar criticism of Martin Lee's trip to Europe).
308 See, e.g., Catherine Ng et al., Final Verdict on Legco, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 25, 1996, at 1 (quoting Qian Qichen); Simon Holberton, Populism at War
with Political Correctness, FIN. TIMES (London), Dec. 18, 1993, at 9 (quoting a Xinhua
commentary).
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the colonial authorities adopted were unfair or unrepresentative,
China and its allies, at least implicitly, conceded that the Hong
Kong people wanted democratic elections and an active legislature.
Accommodation of local democratic values was more nearly ex-
plicit in Chinese and pro-China arguments that the institutions and
processes that the P.R.C. directly and indirectly created for transi-
tional Hong Kong were democratically legitimate and adequately
representative. Broadly, China and its Hong Kong allies asserted
that China had followed a principle of "facing and relying on the
Hong Kong people" throughout the protracted struggles over de-
mocratic reforms and the Provisional Legislature.309 The territory's
pro-China press dismissed the colonial government's and pro-
democracy politicians' charge that China did "not trust[] the Hong
Kong people," saying that the falsity of the accusation was "per-
fectly obvious and could not be denied by anyone."
310
More specifically, China and its Hong Kong allies pointed to
the P.W.C., the P.C., and more informal P.R.C.-established meth-
ods for "solicit[ing] opinions of the local people," "listening to
opinions from all social circles," and "relying on the Hong Kong
people." 311 Official China and pro-China sources argued that these
mechanisms demonstrated China's sincere commitment to "ad-
vanc[ing] Hong Kong's democratic progress" and were sufficient
to give the Hong Kong people a "full say" in establishing S.A.R.
law-making institutions.312 According to this line of argument, the
selection of the Provisional Legislature had similar virtues. Qian
Qichen explained that the Selection Committee chose the legisla-
ture through a "just, fair and open ballot."313 The Selection Com-
mittee, a prominent pro-China Hong Kong politician pointed out,
was composed entirely of Hong Kong people and had "many can-
didates" from which to choose.314 The Provisional Legislature it-
self, Qian added, was representative of the Hong Kong people in
309 Be Vigilant Against Instigating Political Confrontation, supra note 306, at A2.
310 Id.
311 China Welcomes Election of First Chief Executive, Xinhua, Dec. 11, 1996, avail-
able at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
312 Id.; see Fruitful Initial Preparatory Work, supra note 266, at 5; see also Li, supra
note 265, at 12 (describing Lu Ping's belief that Hong Kong people had "a full say
in important issues, such as Hong Kong's future").
313 Sharma, supra note 116.
314 Saki Ouchi, Democrats Concerned over Basic Law Interpretation, DAILY
YOMIuRI, Jan. 1, 1997, at 7 (quoting Tsang Yok Sing).
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that its members came from "all walks of life."315
A few prominent pro-China voices in Hong Kong, including
D.A.B. leader and Provisional Legislature member Tsang Yok-sing
and prominent social scientist and Preparatory Committee member
Lau Siu-kai, went further in accepting the apparent popular prefer-
ence for representative democracy, and in seeking to articulate a
democratic claim to popular support for pro-China positions. They
argued that the Provisional Legislature's legitimacy stemmed, in
part, from the fact that more than half of its members were mem-
bers of the Legco elected in 1995, and thus had won the endorse-
ment of the Hong Kong people who formed the relevant elector-
ates.316 They further argued that the Hong Kong people had no
reason to fear that the Provisional Legislature would be democrati-
cally unresponsive, as most of its members would want to run for
reelection to the first full-term S.A.R. legislature in 1998.317 After
the last colonial Legco was clearly doomed, but before the final de-
cision to establish a Provisional Legislature, the D.A.B.'s Tsang had
even suggested fresh elections before July 1, 1997 to give the first
S.A.R. law-making body a solid electoral pedigree (even though he
accepted that the new ballotting might produce yet another legisla-
ture with a large block of democrats).318
Beneath these sometimes divergent moves on the pro-China
side to accommodate popular preferences and pressures for de-
mocratization, there remained a firm insistence on the positivist
principles that were central to the vision of law that the P.R.C. and
its Hong Kong allies shared. The institutions and processes that
China and pro-China sources claimed were sufficient to satisfy
Hong Kongers' democratic demands, and any legal and institu-
tional arrangements that China would provide or tolerate for Hong
Kong, had to be rooted in positivist grants by the Chinese sover-
eign and could not compromise the requisites of Chinese sover-
eignty. In Chinese Vice Premier Wu Xueqian's most blunt formu-
lation, only the P.R.C. government, as the repository of sovereign
authority over all Chinese citizens including those in Hong Kong,
315 Sharma, supra note 116 (quoting Qian Qichen).
316 See Sharma, supra note 124.
317 See Ouchi, supra note 311; Yeung & Choy, supra note 96, at 1.
318 See Gilley, supra note 38, at 14-15 (describing Tsang's recognition of the
likelihood of the democrats' victory in fair elections); Lee, supra note 102, at 19
(describing Tsang's proposal for fresh elections); Tai Ming Cheung, Common Front,
FAR E. EcoN. REV., Dec. 17, 1992, at 19 (describing Tsang's acceptance of the need
to defer to the majority view if it supported Patten reforms).
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could speak for the people of Hong Kong during "the transition
period." 319 Questions regarding the institutions and forms of de-
mocracy for Hong Kong were, on this view, ultimately for China
itself to decide, or for China to delegate the decision to the S.A.R.
government or the Hong Kong people. 320 Official sources ex-
plained that the P.R.C. endorsed the development of democracy in
Hong Kong in accordance with the P.R.C.'s chosen principle of
"gradual and orderly progress" proceeding from Hong Kong's "re-
ality," which included the attitudes and values of the Hong Kong
people.321
More specifically, pro-China sources stressed that the Provi-
sional Legislature derived its legitimacy primarily from the author-
izing enactments of the N.P.C. and the P.C., as well as the support
of the Hong Kong people.322 Most broadly, the P.R.C. position was
that the policy of "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong" [gangren
zhigang], and its implementation through S.A.R. laws and institu-
tions, reflected China's sovereign choices. The policy doubtless
had greater popular appeal than the alternative of more centralized
control over Hong Kong, but its popularity was significant primar-
ily as a factor in the sovereign's prudential calculations concerning
which policy to choose. Moreover, China required that those
"Hong Kong people" who were to rule Hong Kong had to be ones
who "loved China and loved Hong Kong" [aiguo aigang] and thus
could be trusted not to undermine China's sovereignty over the
territory.
323
319 Philip Bowring & Emily Lau, Turning Up the Heat, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb.
14, 1991, at 23.
320 See, e.g., Stacy Mosher, Basic Flaw, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 11, 1992, at 18
(arguing, on the eve of Patten's arrival, that China believed that China, not Britain,
could grant the people of Hong Kong greater democracy); Tung Chee-hwa Clarifies
Seven Points of Misunderstanding, Stressed Hong Kong SAR Will Make Laws on Its
Own, supra note 229, at A12 (discussing the Chief Executive-designate's comments
that the S.A.R. would make its own laws under the arrangement provided by the
Basic Law); Chris Yeung, Lu Puts the Case for His Hong Kong, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, June 8, 1996, at 17 (describing Lu Ping's explanation that the Chinese gov-
ernment is committed to giving Hong Kong its autonomy after the end of British
rule); see also Gilley, supra note 38, at 14-15 (describing proportional representa-
tion, as opposed to single-member districts, as a structure China might adopt for
S.A.R. legislative elections).
321 A Political Gamble that Contravenes the Sino-British Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law, supra note 263.
322 See Zhang, supra note 268.
323 See Fruitful Initial Preparatory Work, supra note 266, at 5 ("It should be
pointed out that patriots should constitute the bulk of those 'Hong Kong people
participating in administering Hong Kong."); Higgins, supra note 288, at 17 (not-
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In sum, many of the China and pro-China side's arguments
endorsed some accommodation of the Hong Kong people's democ-
ratic preferences and interests, and they often seemed carefully
phrased to appeal to local pride and sentiment. Nonetheless, they
also revealed the limits to accommodation that the P.R.C.'s and its
allies' core conception of law and sovereignty imposed in the bat-
tles over the people's attitudes toward democratic reform and
Hong Kong's legislature.
2.3.3. The Court of Final Appeal: Of Alternatives, Baselines, and
Popular Concerns
China and its Hong Kong allies made only modest visible ef-
forts to develop or demonstrate broad public support for the initial
Sino-British agreement on the Court of Final Appeal, reached in
1991. To be sure, P.R.C. sources expressed discomfort with
Patten's submitting the deal's fate to a vote in Legco. China and its
allies worried that Patten had thereby made implementation of the
Court deal dependent on the whims of a body hostile to China, and
had assigned Legco a role that undercut established principles of
executive-led government that the S.A.R. was slated to inherit.324
The kind of arguments that P.R.C. officials and pro-China leaders
in the territory stressed in connection with the 1995 accord, how-
ever, were not as prominent in the early 1990s. Hong Kong resi-
dents' still-fresh memories of the Tiananmen Incident presumably
suggested that it might be counterproductive to launch an open,
full-scale official P.R.C. or pro-Chinese effort to promote a C.F.A.
arrangement that liberals derided as undermining the rule of law
and endangering the liberties of Hong Kong citizens. Additionally,
especially in the days before the political reform row had revealed
a newly feisty Legco, Chinese officials perhaps were confident that
the colonial government's commitment to implementing the ar-
rangement to which the British government had agreed would be
enough to secure passage of the necessary local legislation.
ing Ta Kung Pao's resurrection of the Deng quotation); Chris Yeung, For the Love of
Hong Kong, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 15, 1997, at 15 (similarly noting Tung
Chee-hwa's embrace of the aiguo aigang standard).
324 See Li Haiting, "Basic Law" Essentially Ensures Democracy for Hong Kong
People, Xinhua, Jan. 9, 1994, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Mosher,
supra note 136, at 10; Chris Yeung & Fannie Wong, When the Lights Go Out at Legco,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 15, 1994, at 21 (describing a broader pro-China con-
cern with the erosion of executive-led government and heralding the prospect of
its restoration).
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When the second C.F.A. accord was on the agenda, China and
its supporters in the territory made more forceful and extended ef-
forts to claim or to create public support or acquiescence, although
less than they did in the context of the conflicts over political re-
form and the Bill of Rights, where the British authorities were more
adversaries than allies. A principal purveyor of P.R.C. orthodoxy
in the Hong Kong press asserted that the signing of the 1995
agreement "merit[ed] the Hong Kong people's feeling pleased."
325
The "small handful of politicians" who sought to undermine the
accord were engaged in acts that "r[a]n counter to the principle of
Hong Kong people running Hong Kong," and the pro-China press
expressed confidence that the Hong Kong people were "com-
pletely capable" of distinguishing between such people and the
supporters of the deal who "genuinely represent[ed] the interests
of the Hong Kong people."
326
From the P.R.C. and pro-China perspective, popular support
for the 1995 deal was to be expected, in part because the accord
mandated a court that would satisfy the apparent wishes and as-
suaged the apparent worries of the Hong Kong people concerning
their post-reversion judiciary. In the words of Zhao Jihua, head of
the Chinese delegation to the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group
("J.L.G.") that reached the agreement, the 1995 deal was "good
news" for "the Hong Kong public" which was "concerned about
the question of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal and about
Hong Kong's future rule of law." 327 A P.R.C. Foreign Ministry
spokesman explained that the C.F.A. agreement would help ensure
that Hong Kong enjoyed "an independent and complete judicial
system." 328 A leading pro-China paper in Hong Kong asserted that
the renewed Sino-British cooperation, in which the 1995 Court ac-
cord played a central part, would assure Hong Kong's smooth re-
version, the preservation of the territory's stability and prosperity,
and the full realization of the principles of "'one country two sys-
tems,"' "'Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong,'" and "'a high de-
gree of autonomy.'" These were "wishes of most Hong Kong peo-
325 Agreement on Court of Final Appeal Embodies Results of Preliminary Working
Committee Work, supra note 266.
326 Id.; cf. Lu Ping Says It's Not China's Fault that the Court of Final Appeal Issue
Is Not Yet Resolved, MING PAO, Mar. 26, 1995.
327 Zhao Jihua Speech on Signing of Court of Final Appeal Agreement, WEN WEI
PO, June 10, 1995, at A2.
328 China Hopes Court Deal Will Boost Sino-British Ties, Agence France Presse,
June 13, 1995, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
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ple" that China hoped to see realized under a policy of trying "to
please the Hong Kong people."
329
The China and pro-China side's confidence that the terms of
the 1995 Court deal enjoyed popular support was limited, how-
ever. In their arguments about the attractions for the Hong Kong
people of a Court in keeping with the accord, China and its Hong
Kong allies frequently mixed claims about the people's "interests"
with assertions about their established preferences. This at least
suggested doubt about whether the people's wishes were already
in line with their asserted interests. Other arguments more
strongly suggested that the Court accords' proponents perceived a
need to build, and not simply to identify, popular support for the
deal. In this vein, official Chinese and pro-China sources at-
tempted to draw connections between the Court accord and
broader issues of concern to the people of Hong Kong. They ar-
gued that, even if the C.F.A. arrangement was not all that some in
Hong Kong had hoped for, the structure it prescribed would be a
step forward for values embraced by Hong Kong residents, includ-
ing many who did not ordinarily endorse much of the P.R.C.'s
agenda. More specifically, according to this line of argument, the
Court deal would advance democracy and autonomy.
P.R.C. sources stressed that with the establishment of a Court
of Final Appeal in keeping with the 1995 agreement, Hong Kong
would enjoy, for the first time in its history, the power of final ad-
judication. A court consisting primarily of Hong Kong people
would sit in Hong Kong to exercise the highest judicial power over
the territory. 330 A leading pro-China newspaper boasted that, in
contrast to Hong Kong's departing colonial masters, China was
confident that "the Hong Kong people" were "entirely capable" of
setting up an adequate Court. 331 On this view, the C.F.A. deal
"created the conditions for the Hong Kong people to participate in
Hong Kong affairs before 1997 and also laid a solid foundation for
the Hong Kong people to administer Hong Kong after 1997."332 A
329 Paper on Renewed Sino-British Cooperation on Handover, TA KUNG PAO, July
1, 1995, at A2, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 7, 1995, avail-
able at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; see also Full Text of Remarks by Ambassador
Zhao Jihua, Chinese Joint Liaison Group Team Leader, supra note 325.
330 See Full Text of Remarks by Ambassador Zhao Jihua, Chinese Joint Liaison
Group Team Leader, supra note 325.
331 Agreement on Court of Final Appeal Embodies Results of Preliminary Working
Committee Work, supra 266.
332 Id.
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Court composed predominantly of Hong Kong judges, approved
by a Provisional Legislature of Hong Kong members representing
Hong Kong people was "conducive to the practice of Hong Kong's
being ruled by Hong Kong people." 333
For those who might not be persuaded by such effusive and
expansive claims, pro-P.R.C. sources pointed to more modest and
less immediately rule-of-law-related virtues of the C.F.A. accord
that could be expected to hold some appeal for the people of Hong
Kong. A Legco member from the D.A.B. argued that the 1995 ac-
cord was a good arrangement because it would allow the Hong
Kong people to have a clear picture of the Court before China's re-
sumption of sovereignty. Potentially disruptive uncertainty would
be reduced. 334 Other pro-China sources added that the break-
through in Sino-British cooperation that the Court accord heralded
was also a harbinger of progress on a number of concrete bilateral
issues the resolution of which would be welcomed by Hong
Kong's citizens as an additional reduction in transition-related un-
certainty. 335 Such accomplishments, proponents of this line of ar-
gument understood, were important to the territory's economy
and thus would be likely to appeal to ordinary Hong Kongers'
sense of their material interests.336
Although some of the arguments that China and its allies made
concerning the people's actual or prospective views on the C.F.A.
at times parallelled the arguments from British and colonial gov-
ernment proponents of the Court accords, the P.R.C. and pro-
333 Id.; see also Basic Law, supra note 21, art. 90; A Statement from the British Side
Cannot Bar the Provisional Legislative Council, supra note 269; Chinese FM Denies
Hong Kong's Selection Committee Is a Fix, Agence France Presse, Nov. 15, 1996 (con-
cerning the Provisional Legislature's role), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Al-
lasi File.
334 See Won & Wong, supra note 146.
335 See, e.g., Agreement on Court of Final Appeal Embodies Results of Preliminary
Working Committee Work, supra note 266, at A2 (arguing that the accord merited
"Hong Kong people's feeling pleased" largely because it portended additional
Sino-British cooperation on various issues); Hong Kong: Paper on Renewed Sino-
British Cooperation on Handover, supra note 327 (linking the C.F.A. accord with
broader Sino-British cooperation and satisfaction of the Hong Kong people's
wishes); Jonathan Sprague, Top Hong Kong Official Meets Chinese Leaders, Reuters,
July 4, 1995 (attributing an upswing in Hong Kong popular attitudes toward
China to the breakthrough on the C.F.A. deal), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allasi File.
336 The economically vital new airport project, a victim of repeated snags at
the Joint Liaison Group ("J.L.G."), was one important area that would benefit
from improved bilateral cooperation.
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China arguments nonetheless proceeded from different premises
and were intertwined with a line of argument that turned to differ-
ent fundamental principles. Similar to the arguments they ad-
vanced in the conflicts over popular attitudes toward other legal
issues of the endgame, the P.R.C. and pro-China side's arguments
about the people's views and the Court of Final Appeal insisted
that a Court arrangement for the S.A.R. be consistent with China's
and the pro-China camp's basic positivist concept of domestic le-
gality, as well as sufficiently appealing to secure acceptance from
the people of Hong Kong.
Thus, the "special arrangements" for the establishment of the
C.F.A. that would surely please the people of Hong Kong were,
J.L.G. team leader Zhao reminded Hong Kongers, arrangements
that China had agreed to make "precisely on account of the deci-
sion of the Chinese government to allow the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region to enjoy a high degree of autonomy, includ-
ing [the] power of final adjudication." 337 Similarly, the 1995 ac-
cord's requirement that the Provisional Legislature confirm the
first C.F.A. judges was both an advance for broadly democratic
values popular in Hong Kong and a corrollary to the principle that
the judges would derive their power from the legislative body that
derived its authority from positive sovereign enactments of the
P.R.C.338 Finally, a pro-China Legco member explained that the
fundamental protection of the popularly prized common-law rule
of law under the Court deal was the Basic Law's provision that the
N.P.C. Standing Committee would take common law practices
fully into account when it exercised its power to determine
whether cases raising potentially difficult political and structural
issues fell within the Court's jurisdiction.339
2.3.4. The Chief Executive: Democratic Advances, Local Values,
and Granted Powers
P.R.C. officials and China's allies and agents in Hong Kong
claimed and sought popular support for, or acquiescence in, the
Chief Executive selection process initially by defending the process
337 Full Text of Remarks by Ambassador Zhao Jihua, Chinese Joint Liaison Group
Team Leader, supra note 325.
338 See, e.g., A Statement from the British Side Cannot Bar the Provisional Legisla-
tive Council, supra note 269; Agreement on Court of Final Appeal Embodies Results of
Preliminary Working Committee Work, supra note 266; Chinese FM Denies Hong
Kong's Selection Committee Is a Fix, supra note 333.
339 See Yeung et al., supra note 138 (quoting Tam Yiu-cheng).
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as one that provided ample means for reflecting the will of the
Hong Kong people and that fit reasonably well with popular pref-
erences for democratic processes. Thus, the Chinese Foreign Min-
istry and the official Chinese press asserted that the process for se-
lecting a candidate was democratic, fair, and open.340 In his speech
to the initial session of the Selection Committee that was to nomi-
nate the Chief Executive for formal appointment by the Central
People's Government in Beijing, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in-
sisted that the members of the committee were free to make their
"own decision about selecting the candidates" and should "ignore
the rumours that the candidates were handpicked from the top."341
More boldly still, D.A.B. leader Tsang Yok-sing commented that
letting Beijing make the final choice would "be very unpopular in
Hong Kong" and therefore ill-advised.342
The P.R.C. and its Hong Kong supporters sought to present the
selection process as one that, as a matter of principle and in prac-
tice, took into account the preferences of the Hong Kong people.
The Chinese position emphasized that the Selection Committee
that voted overwhelmingly for Tung Chee-hwa was drawn from a
broad spectrum of Hong Kong society.343 Lu Ping commented two
years before Tung's selection that the person chosen for the post
would have to enjoy "prestige among HongKongers [sic]." 344 Qian
3o See, e.g., China Says Britain Duty-Bound To Support New HK Chief, Agence
France Presse, Dec. 12, 1996 (quoting a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman),
available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; China Welcomes Election of First Chief
Executive, supra note 306; cf. Full Text of Questions and Answers at Tung Chee-hwa's
News Conference for Chinese, Foreign Reporters in Beijing, WEN WEI Po, Dec. 20, 1996
(reporting similar comments from Tung Chee-hwa).
341 Chinese FM Denies Hong Kong's Selection Committee Is a Fix, supra note 333.
342 Straw Poll: Who Will Make the Best Chief Executive?, FAR E. ECON. REV., Feb.
8, 1996, at 28.
343 The position was, to a degree, enshrined in framework legal documents
for the S.A.R. See Basic Law, supra note 21, art. 45 (providing the framework for
the selection of the Chief Executive); id. annex I (providing for the election of the
Chief Executive by a "broadly representative election committee" of 800 members,
"appointed by the Central People's Government" and drawn in equal shares from
"industrial, commercial and financial sectors," "the professions," "labour, social
services, religious and other sectors," members of the legislature, representatives
of district organizations, Hong Kong deputies to the N.P.C., and representatives
of Hong Kong members of the principal P.R.C. united front organization); N.P.C.
Decision, supra note 21, §§ 3-4 (providing for a Selection Committee of 400, drawn
equally from among the same four sectors described in Annex I to the Basic Law,
to nominate a candidate for appointment by the Central People's Government to
serve as the S.A.R.'s first Chief Executive).
344 Mary Kwang, Who Will Be the One To Lead HK Come 1997?, STRArrs TIMES
(Singapore), July 24, 1994, at 8.
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Qichen and Jiang Zemin stressed that candidates for the position
should face the people and should be leaders whom the people of
Hong Kong could trust.345 In the run-up to the Selection Commit-
tee's balloting, the candidates had clearly been made to understand
that they were to campaign among the public, listening to their
views and soliciting their support.346
Moreover, P.R.C. and Hong Kong pro-China sources reminded
the territory's residents that the Chief Executive Selection process
was much more democratic-and thus more immediately reflec-
tive of Hong Kong people's preferences -than the process of ap-
pointing colonial governors from London that it replaced. The
body that picked the nominee for Chief Executive was, Qian
Qichen argued, "chosen by the people of Hong Kong for the first
time."347 As never before, Hong Kong's people had been consulted
in the selection of the territory's top official. On this view, the se-
lection of the first Chief Executive-designate marked the beginning
of "the true development of democracy for Hong Kong" and the
laying of "a foundation for the establishment of a democratic sys-
tem" in Hong Kong.34
In addition, China and pro-China sources asserted that a popu-
larly accepted process had yielded a genuinely popular choice. As
the official Chinese press described it, "the smooth election of the
candidate for Chief Executive demonstrates that the type of de-
mocracy adopted in Hong Kong according to the one country, two
systems principle and the Basic Law" had won "approval by the
Hong Kong people." 349 According to P.R.C. officials, Tung had
won a landslide victory "thanks to the support of the Hong Kong
people"; his victory was a reflection of the wishes of "the majority
of Hong Kong compatriots." 350 Providing some evidence to sup-
port such claims, public opinion polls found high initial approval
345 See Chris Yeung & Fung Wai-kong, Peter Woo: We Must Feel Safe and Free,
S. CHINA MORNING PoST, Oct. 9, 1996, at 6.
346 See, e.g., id.; China Welcomes Election of First Chief Executive, supra note 308
(praising the three candidates for having "showed their dedication to Hong
Kong," and for having "worked hard to increase mutual understanding with peo-
ple in the various sectors of the region").
347 Chinese FM Denies Hong Kong's Selection Committee Is a Fix, supra note 333.
3w Id.; see China Welcomes Election of First Chief Executive, supra note 310; cf.
China Says Britain Duty-Bound To Support New HK Chief, supra note 340 (reporting
similar comments from Tung Chee-hwa).
349 China Welcomes Election of First Chief Executive, supra note 311.
350 China Says Britain Duty-Bound To Support New HK Chief, supra note 340;
China Welcomes Election of First Chief Executive, supra note 311.
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ratings for Tung, and generally liberal commentators noted the di-
lemma that Hong Kong's pro-democracy politicians faced in taking
on a Chief Executive-designate who had won something of a popu-
lar endorsement and was seeking to build bridges to groups that
had not initially supported him.
351
Nonetheless, official Chinese and unofficial pro-China com-
mentary could not completely dismiss or ignore the indications of
popular disaffection, particularly once Chief Executive-designate
Tung began to press pro-China positions on the key legal and insti-
tutional questions of the endgame. China and its Hong Kong sup-
porters accordingly advanced arguments that conceded that they
faced some unfavorable popular attitudes, tried to minimize the
significance of those negative views, and sought to persuade the
people to accept the non-negotiable aspects of the arrangement.
Thus, the newly anointed Chief Executive-designate stated that he
would work to overcome weaknesses in his popularity, 352 but not,
he stressed, to the extent of becoming a slave to transient popular
opinion or at the expense of "the long-term and overall interest of
Hong Kong." 3 3 Concerning one of the specific positions on contro-
versial issues that undermined his popularity, Tung was confident
that the Hong Kong people would be sensible and accept the Pro-
visional Legislature and his use of the Chief Executive's office to
cooperate with and support the new body.354 The official voice of
Beijing in the territory, Hong Kong Xinhua chief Zhou Nan re-
minded Hong Kongers that the "Hong Kong people should render
great support" both to the Provisional Legislature and to the Chief
Executive. 355
Chinese and pro-China arguments that sought to persuade the
people to be "sensible" and to offer "great support" to the new
Chief Executive and his S.A.R. government often drew connections
between those goals and the advancement or preservation of other
values that seemed to have a secure hold on the Hong Kong peo-
351 See, e.g., Fung Wai-kong, The Dilemma Awaiting the Democrats, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 14, 1996, at 21; Chris Yeung, The Obligations of Office, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 14, 1996, at 21.
352 See, e.g., Yeung, supra note 349 (describing Tung's efforts to build trust and
support in a community that had had no opportunity to vote for him).
353 Chris Yeung & Linda Choy, Livelihood Top HK Concern, Claims Tung, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Mar. 1, 1997, at 1 (quoting Tung's comments).
354 See Full Text of Questions and Answers at Tung Chee-hwa's News Conference
for Chinese, Foreign Reporters in Beijing, supra note 340.
355 Zhou Urges Support for Tung, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 18, 1997, at 4.
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ple. In their appeals to local senses of pride and political compe-
tence, the P.R.C. and pro-China arguments emphasizing the de-
mocratic and autonomy-accepting virtues of the Chief Executive
selection process were partly in this vein. The controversy sur-
rounding Tung's endorsement of China's position on the Bill of
Rights and civil liberties provided a major occasion for a more fo-
cused version of this line of argument. Where critics among Hong
Kong's liberal and democratic politicians charged capitulation to
China and betrayal of the will and interests of the Hong Kong peo-
ple, P.R.C. and pro-China backers of Tung's stance depicted a
Chief Executive-designate using his office to defend and promote
Hong Kongers' values. As portrayed in laudatory coverage in the
territory's pro-China press, Tung's position on the Bill of Rights
and related laws was in step with the partly Chinese and non-
Western values of the people of Hong Kong.35 6
Seen from this perspective, it was the liberals and democrats
who showed a lack of confidence in Hong Kongers' abilities to rule
themselves and harmed Hong Kongers' interests by speaking ill of
Hong Kong's incoming regime and new laws to foreigners. Tung
won great praise in Hong Kong's pro-China press for saying that
"Hong Kong people must respect their nation and the dignity of
the SAR government" 357- a quality that liberal critics of Tung ap-
parently lacked. Extending the argument, Tung criticized Martin
Lee and others for "go[ing] abroad to blacken the name of Hong
Kong, [for inciting] foreigners to come to Hong Kong and tell us,
the Hong Kong people, what to do"358 and for failing to "sit down
and talk about family matters in our own home." 359 Pro-China
commentaries argued that, in making such comments and in urg-
ing liberal and pro-democracy politicians not to besmirch Hong
Kong, Tung was fulfilling his responsibility to protect the interests
of the Hong Kong people.360
356 See, e.g., Tung Chee-hwa's Remarks Are Beneficial to Hong Kong's Prosperity,
supra note 238, at A4; Tung in a Legal Tangle, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 25, 1997,
at 17 (connecting Tung's arguments about Hong Kong people's values with reac-
tion to his position on the Bill of Rights and related reforms).
357 Tung Chee-hwa's Remarks Are Beneficial to Hong Kong's Prosperity, supra note
238, at A4.
358 Humphrey, supra note 204; see also Martin Lee Humbles Himself in the United
States, TA KUNG PAO, Apr. 17, 1997, at A4 (criticizing Martin Lee for having "im-
plored" U.S. politicians to "meddle in Hong Kong's affairs" and to help prevent
amendments to the Societies and Public Order ordinances).
359 Yeung, supra note 323, at 15.
360 See Tung Chee-hwa's Remarks Are Beneficial to Hong Kong's Prosperity, supra
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As these defenders of Tung's positions saw it, liberal critics'
charges that Tung sold out Hong Kong's interests to China's pref-
erences asserted contradictions where none existed. Pro-China
sources explained that China and the people of Hong Kong had
compatible interests and that Tung was merely showing that he
possessed a key qualification for the office of Chief Executive: the
ability to bridge gaps in understanding between the people of the
S.A.R. and the leadership in Beijing.361
China and its closest Hong Kong supporters in the battle over
ordinary Hong Kongers' opinions did not preach infinitely flexible
accommodation of the preferences, or even the interests, of the
Hong Kong people with respect to the Chief Executive issue. As
with the other issues of the endgame, the Chinese and pro-China
position here too assumed that an answer to the key legal and in-
stitutional questions that would be adequate for the Hong Kong
people also could be compatible with China's conception of law
and sovereignty. An insistence on positivist principle was never
far from the surface of P.R.C. and pro-China Hong Kong argu-
ments concerning the Chief Executive controversy. Although pre-
sented in ways that sought to reflect or to inculcate favorable atti-
tudes among the Hong Kong people, the Chief Executive selection
process, its outcome, and the powers of the office remained the
products of Chinese sovereign action.
As the framework documents and official and unofficial com-
ments made clear to people in Hong Kong, China and its allies re-
garded the office of Chief Executive and the Selection Committee
as creatures of P.R.C. statutes. The staffing of the Selection Com-
mittee and the appointment of the Chief Executive-designate were
the actions of P.R.C. or P.R.C.-established bodies. The underlying
policies of according Hong Kong some form of democracy (in the
Chief Executive Selection process and more generally), and of hav-
ing Hong Kong people rule Hong Kong (whether as Chief Execu-
tive or in lesser offices) were discretionary choices and grants of
note 238; Humphrey, supra note 205; Yeung, supra note 323, at 15.
361 See Full Text of Questions and Answers at Tung Chee-hwa's News Conference
for Chinese, Foreign Reporters in Beijing, supra note 340 (quoting Tung's statement
that "[wie must remember that Hong Kong's long term interests are consistent
with China's" and "all Hong Kong people, regardless of their viewpoints, should
be united" and "reach a consensus on cooperation"); Kwang, supra note 344, at 8
(quoting comments of a member of the political sub-group of the Preliminary
Working Committee who noted that many Hong Kong inhabitants had "a mental
block about China" and that the Chief Executive needed to be able to promote
mutual understanding between Hong Kong and China).
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authority from the P.R.C.
3 62
3. RULE-OF-LAW VALUES (II) - THE BATTLE OVER HONG KONG'S
BUSINESS COMMUNITY
3.1. The Business Community and Prosperity
In addition to their struggles to win over the Hong Kong peo-
ple, the principal parties to the political wrangling over Hong
Kong's future laws and institutions also fought over a narrower
and more elite segment of Hong Kong society: the business com-
munity. Here, too, each side sought to claim that its preferred so-
lutions to the issues of the endgame coincided with what the target
group wanted, needed, or could be convinced to demand. The
business community, particularly Hong Kong's major local firms
and multinational enterprises with a substantial presence in the
territory, received special attention in the contest to shape the
S.A.R.'s order for an important, if obvious, reason: the confidence
and support of the business community, which had been so vital to
the territory's past economic success, looked to be the key to future
prosperity as well.
3.1.1. Business and the Politics and Government of an
"Economic" City
The relatively elite business community arguably has had a
more dominant role in Hong Kong than have business communi-
362 See Basic Law, supra note 21, pmbl. (stating that the Basic Law is a statute
enacted by the P.R.C.'s National People's Congress); id. arts. 43-51 (providing for
the existence, powers, criteria of eligibility, and method of selection and appoint-
ment of the Chief Executive); id. art. 68, annex II (providing for the constitution of
the legislature by elections); id. annex I (providing the method for selection of the
Chief Executive); Joint Declaration, supra note 39, annex I, pmbl., annex I, § II
(elaborating "the basic policies of the People's Republic of China regarding Hong
Kong," including those of "establish[ing] the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region," providing a "government and legislature composed of local inhabit-
ants," and selecting the chief executive through election or consultation and the
legislature by elections); id. § 3(4) (providing that "[t]he Government of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China declares that the basic policies of the Peoples Republic of China
regarding Hong Kong" include that "[tihe Chief Executive will be appointed by the
Central People's Government on the basis of the results of elections or consultations"
in Hong Kong and that the government "will be composed of local inhabitants")
(emphases added); N.P.C. Decision, supra note 21 (providing for the nomination of
the first Chief Executive by a Selection Committee chosen by a Preparatory Com-
mittee established by the N.P.C.); see also supra notes 353-55 and accompanying
text (suggesting the limits to accommodation of popular preferences).
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ties in most other countries. The business community has been es-
pecially central to the territory's economic life. For decades pre-
ceding the end of colonial rule, Hong Kong's government followed
a policy of "positive non-interventionism." 363 Regulation of busi-
ness activities and international trade was minimal, mostly limited
to helping provide the certainty and transparency on which mar-
kets depend. 364 Until the recent establishment of the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority, there had not been a distinct public entity
that performed many of the major functions of a central bank. A
handful of elite banks have issued the territory's currency. 365 Hong
Kong also has had nothing resembling the elaborate state indus-
trial policies that have characterized other East Asian "tiger"
economies. 366 Affirmative government involvement in the econ-
omy concentrated on general support for business activities (in-
vestments in housing, infrastructure, and trade promotion), rather
than company- or industry-specific subsidies, state ownership of
productive enterprises, or protectionism.367
"Business" seemed to dominate the life of the territory so thor-
oughly that the practices and norms of commerce and the business
community did much to define the Hong Kong "systems" that the
legal arrangements for the transition pledged to preserve. This is
likely a reflection of Hong Kong's success in creating wealth and
its failure in fostering alternatives to business as the central ele-
ment of Hong Kong society. The territory's rapid rise as a major
regional and global economic hub-a home base for several busi-
ness empires, host to branches of the largest international firms, the
world's eighth largest trading entity, and an economy with per
capita incomes rivaling those in the industrialized West -naturally
made the territory's leading business elites a focal point of Hong
363 See generally STEPHAN HAGGARD, PATHWAYS FROM THE PERIPHERY 151-57
(1990) (discussing "positive non-interventionism.") "Positive non-
intervetionism," although coined by Philip Haddon-Cave, who served as Hong
Kong Financial Secretary from 1971 to 1981, nonetheless captures a general policy
that pre-dated and survived his tenure. See id. at 151.
364 See MINERS, supra note 6, at 47-49 (discussing Hong Kong's ideology of
minimal interference in economic activity).
365 On monetary policy, financial regulation, and the Hong Kong Monetary
Authority, see, for example, Lui Yu-hon, Banking, Monetary Affairs and Develop-
ments of Financial Markets, in FROM COLONY TO SAR: HONG KONG'S CHALLENGES
AHEAD, supra note 6, at 151-75.
366 See HAGGARD, supra note 363; MINERS, supra note 6.
367 See supra note 366.
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Kong's identity.368
At the same time, a population made up largely of immigrants
with a relatively weak sense of a distinct local cultural identity and
a colonial system of government that precluded development of a
strong local political leadership meant that economic elites would
have few rivals. Tycoons (in addition to the governor and the
ubiquitous movie stars) were late colonial Hong Kong's leading ce-
lebrities. Business leaders were also the principal figures in Hong
Kong politics for much of the colony's recent history. Prominent
businesspeople and senior members of a pro-business civil service
whose ethos was anti-regulatory filled the Executive Council and
the Legislative Council -especially prior to the electoral reforms of
the 1990s. 369 True political parties formed and brought to the fore
many more leaders drawn from the ranks of the territory's law-
yers, teachers, journalists, unionists, and academics only in the af-
termath of Tiananmen and with the introduction of broad-based
elections for Legco. 370 Thus, at the beginning of Hong Kong's end-
game, a top Chinese official could credibly characterize Hong
Kong as an "economic" rather than a "political" city.
3 71
Not surprisingly, the parties to the political clash over Hong
368 See, e.g., HONG KONG GOVT INFO. SERVICES, supra note 3, at 47-58, 79-81;
Tang, Hong Kong in Transition: Globalization Versus Nationalization, in THE
CHALLENGES OF HONG KONG'S REINTEGRATION WITH CHINA, supra note 7; deLisle,
supra note 27, at 72-73, 75-76.
369 See generally MINERS, supra note 6, at 114-20 (discussing Hong Kong's pro-
business functional constituency electoral system and stating that "nowhere else
except in Hong Kong is the largest block of seats in the legislature set aside to se-
cure special representation for the richest and most privileged sectors of the
community"); IAN ScoTr, POLITICAL CHANGE AND THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY IN
HONG KONG (1989); Stacy Mosher, The Governor's Men, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 3,
1991, at 11 (discussing the appointment of conservative, establishment figures to
Hong Kong's Legislative Council); Stacy Mosher, Out of the Club, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Nov. 7, 1991, at 12 (describing the appointment of conservative members to
the Executive Council); Mosher, supra note 235, at 17 (noting that Hong Kong's
electoral system reserves two-thirds of the seats in the legislature to "well-en-
trenched" interests).
370 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 17; Sonny S.H. Lo, Legislative Cliques, Political Par-
ties, Political Groupings and Electoral System, in FROM COLONY TO SAR: HONG KONG'S
CHALLENGES AHEAD, supra note 6, at 51-70; So, supra note 17.
371 See Louise do Rosario, Future Shock, FARE. ECON. REV., May 19, 1994, at 24
(quoting Lu Ping, director of the State Council's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs
Office, as saying "'Hong Kong has always been an economic city, never a political
city"'); Stormont, supra note 293 (quoting Xinhua Hong Kong director Zhou Nan
affirming Lu Ping's point); see generally LAU & KUAN, supra note 1, at 63-118 (de-
scribing economic and political attitudes and the relatively low levels of engage-
ment with political issues).
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Kong's future saw the business community's actions and reactions
as crucial to the fate of any proposed answers to the legal and insti-
tutional questions of Hong Kong's transition to Chinese rule. Tell-
ingly, business concerns caused Britain to raise the issue of Hong
Kong's post-1997 status more than a decade and a half earlier:
with the colonial government unwilling to grant developers leases
extending beyond the expiration of the New Territories' ninety-
nine-year lease, business interests grew nervous about making in-
vestments that would require more than fifteen years to recoup. 372
A shared sense that business interests were important and had to
be accommodated was also evident in the aftermath of Hong Kong
Governor MacLehose's and Deng Xiaoping's first formal discus-
sion of the reversion issue in 1979: the one element of Deng's re-
sponse made immediately public was his message to members of
Hong Kong's business community that they should "set their
hearts at ease." 373
This solicitude for business interests reflected a recognition on
both sides of the principal political divide in pre-reversion Hong
Kong that the business community could make the territory wither
if business elites found the legal and institutional arrangements for
the transition unacceptable. Although "losing the people" might
raise the prospect of a flight of political refugees or a harsh political
crackdown, significant capital flight and a severe economic slow-
down could be equally devastating to the territory's stability and
prosperity. In addition, there was reason to think that a fall in
seemingly high, but potentially volatile, business confidence pre-
sented a more credible threat to Hong Kong's future than did a ru-
inous rise of popular discontent.
By the 1990s, a considerable share of Hong Kong's most promi-
nent firms had re-registered in offshore locations that would be
372 Under the 1898 Convention of Peking, China granted Britain a ninety-nine
year lease on the New Territories, includes more than 90% of Hong Kong's cur-
rent territory. The government's policy on leases was economically important be-
cause nearly all land in the territory is held as long-term leases from the govern-
ment. By the 1980s, most of the open land available for major development
projects was in the New Territories. However, projects in the more densely de-
veloped and smaller areas that Great Britain claimed to have a legal right to oc-
cupy in perpetuity (under the treaties ceding Hong Kong Island and Kowloon)
were implicated as well because the British authorities had long pursued a policy
of treating the ceded territories and the leased New Territories as part of a single
integrated colony.
373 On this early phase of the negotiations, see, for example, ROBERT
COTrRELL, THE END OF HONG KONG 58-64 (1993); PERCY CRADoCK, EXPERIENCES OF
CHINA 161-68 (1994); ScoTr, supra note 369, at 167.
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be immune from the dangers of legal decay in Hong Kong. Anec-
dotal evidence and common sense indicated that local individuals
and firms with large liquid assets had made contingency plans to
move funds - and their business operations - safely out of Hong
Kong in the event of a crisis.374 The same was true of international
companies in Hong Kong, which comprise a large and important
segment of the business community. With a long list of competing
locations eager to lure away international capital and regional or
global headquarters, a realistic exit option was in place for most of
Hong Kong's key economic elites.
375
Recognizing that legal and institutional arrangements that
promised to provide the requisites of continued prosperity were
crucial to convince business elites not to exercise their flight option,
the colonial authorities and Beijing gave business leaders promi-
nent roles in the process of crafting Hong Kong's post-reversion
order. Business interests continued occupy the lion's share of the
seats in Exco (the only Hong Kong entity formally briefed about
the progress of the talks leading to the Joint Declaration) and
Legco, and to enjoy other reliable channels of influence with the co-
lonial government through chambers of commerce and industry
groups.376 Leading figures in Hong Kong's business community
also engaged in frequent informal discussions with Chinese leaders
and were appointed to all the formal bodies established to make
arrangements for the S.A.R., including the Basic Law Drafting and
Consultative Committees, the Preliminary Working Committee,
the Preparatory Committee, and the Selection Committee for the
S.A.R.'s first Chief Executive. 377 The business-heavy Selection
374 See Carol Kennedy, Can Two Hongs Get It Right?, DIRECTOR, Feb. 1996, at
34-40 (quoting Jardines former director Nigel Rich); Michael Steinberger, Pact on
HK's Legal System Has Not Put Fears to Rest, Bus. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1995, at 8.
Fearing how Hong Kong take-over and merger laws might be used against it
after 1997, Jardines delisted on the Hong Kong stock exchange after its request for
a formal exemption was denied. See Hong Kong: Business Community Maintaining
Optimism Despite Uncertainty About Its Future Post 1997, EUROMONEY SUPPLEMENT,
July 16, 1991 (describing Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank's restructuring under a
UK holding company in 1991); Ian K. Perkin, Primary Listing Is Now London, Says
Jardines, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 8, 1991.
375 See Bruce Gilley, Just in Case ... , FAR E. ECON REV., Aug. 8, 1996, at 53;
Henny Sender, Politics, Not Profits, FAR E. ECON REV., Dec. 17, 1992, at 20; Gary
Silverman, The Price of Success, FAR E. ECON REV., July 6, 1995, at 54; Michael
Steinberger, Companies Ring-Fence Assets in Hong Kong Twilight Raid, TIMES (Lon-
don), Aug. 4, 1995.
376 See MINERS, supra note 6, at 114-20.
377 See Chan, Democracy Derailed in the Hong Kong Basic Law, in THE HONG
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Committee proceeded to nominate prominent businessman Tung
Chee-hwa as the initial occupant of the S.A.R.'s top post and to
elect many business and pro-business candidates to the Provisional
Legislature.
Providing these opportunities for business to make its de-
mands and preferences heard was but one front in a political battle
to claim and cultivate the loyalty of business interests. All major
parties in the political battle over Hong Kong's future order recog-
nized that a prosperity-sustaining solution for the problems of
Hong Kong's transition required a rule of law satisfactory to the
territory's business interests. Accordingly, the key political players
undertook extensive efforts to characterize, influence, and predict
this key group's preferences and requirements in ways that were
compatible with the divergent conceptions of the rule of law and
institutions that China, the colonial authorities, and emergent
Hong Kong politicians of all stripes saw as desirable, or at least
minimally acceptable. This battle over the elite business commu-
nity, like the broadly similar struggle over the people, was a central
feature of the endgame politics of shaping Hong Kong's legal and
institutional order beyond reversion.
3.1.2. Variety and Fragmentation in Hong Kong's Business
Community
The elite business community that formed the focus of this con-
flict was itself quite diverse. Its Hong Kong-based components in-
cluded venerable hongs founded in the days of the opium trade and
often led by their founding families or fellow expatriates. 378 The
business community also included conglomerates and far-flung
holding companies dominated by Hong Kong Chinese tycoons.379
KONG BASIc LAW: BLUEPRINT FOR STABILITY AND PROSPERITY UNDER CHINESE
SOVEREIGNTY? 3-35. More than half of the Hong Kong slots on the Preparatory
Committee, which was established in 1996 to handle critical transition-related
tasks, went to business leaders, as did half the seats on the committee that nomi-
nated and elected the S.A.R.'s first chief executive. See N.P.C. Decision, supra note
21; Bruce Gilley, Down to Brass Tacks, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 25, 1996, at 14-15.
378 See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 374, at 34-40 (describing the management of
Swire and Jardines); Henny Sender, Fixed Assets, FAR E. ECON. REV., July 8, 1993, at
22 (contrasting the different image and style of Hong Kong's leading hongs Jardine
Matheson and Swire Pacific).
379 See Garth Alexander, Hong Kong's Top Taipans Get Ready for Takeover, TIMES
(London), Oct. 3, 1993, § 3, at 8 (noting the change in leadership at some large
Hong Kong firms from British to Hong Kong Chinese management in preparation
for the hand-over); Hutchison Whampoa Sets New $2bn HK Benchmark, EUROWEEK,
July 15, 1997, at 1, 14 (describing Li Ka-shing's Hutchison Whampoa as Hong
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Ethnic Chinese leaders of Hong Kong business included heads of
well-established companies and fast-rising entrepreneurs. 380 This
"Chinese" segment of the elite business sector took in some scions
of pre-revolutionary Shanghai's leading commercial families, oth-
ers who were more purely Hong Kongese or Cantonese, and a
handful who had struck roots in the diaspora of "overseas Chi-
nese" in Southeast Asia.381 Some of the Chinese establishment's
members had been educated in the United States or Britain while
others followed the more insular mode of the traditional taipan.
382
The business community's fully "foreign" or "international" seg-
ment included leading firms from around the world, most notably
Kong's second largest company, measured by capitalization, and as one of Hong
Kong's most diversified business groups with interests in many sectors and coun-
tries); Jake Lloyd Smith, Mixed Reaction to HSI Reshuffle, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 18, 1997, Business, at 1 (similarly describing Li Ka-shing's business empire);
see generally Who's Who in Hong Kong - Tycoons at a Glance, Reuters, May 15, 1997,
available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
380 See, e.g., Owen Hughes, Who's Woo, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 27,
1994, Magazine, at 21 (describing Peter Woo, who succeeded his father-in-law, Sir
Y.K. Pao, as chairman of the giant Wharf and Wheelock groups); John Ridding,
People: Hong Kong Telecomm Chief in Focus, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 15, 1996, at 9
(describing Linus Cheung, the first ethnic Chinese head of Hong Kong's monop-
oly telecommunications service provider); Nick Rufford, Hong Kong Tycoon Refuses
To Kowtow, SUNDAY TIMES (London) Mar. 24, 1996, (describing former clothing en-
trepreneur and Apple Daily and Next Magazine publisher Jimmy Lai as a "former
street urchin" and "self-made millionaire"); Thumbnail Sketches of Potential Hong
Kong Leaders, Reuters, Nov. 16, 1996, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File;
Who's Who in Hong Kong -Tycoons at a Glance, supra note 379 (noting Linus
Cheung's modest beginnings as a goldsmith's apprentice and his rise at Cathay
Pacific, Hong Kong's principal airline).
381 See Asia, Profile: The Private Life of Robert Kuok, Reuters, Feb. 19, 1997 (de-
scribing the business empire, in Hong Kong and elsewhere of Malaysian-born
ethnic Chinese tycoon Robert Kuok), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File;
Lee Han Shih, A Tale of Two Tycoons: Kuok, Khoo Set To Expand Media Groups, Bus.
TIMES (Singapore), Feb. 24, 1996, at 6 (describing Robert Kuok's role in the media
business in Hong Kong and China); Melinda Liu, Revenge of the Refugees,
NEWSWEEK, May 19, 1997, at 36 (describing Run Run Shaw, Tung Chee-hwa's fa-
ther and other Shanghainese who became members of Hong Kong's business
elite); Who's Who in Hong Kong -Tycoons at a Glance, supra note 379 (describing
Linus Cheung as of Hong Kong origin); Sondra WuDunn, Ho in Strategic Mainland
Investment, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 31, 1993, at 1 (describing the business
ventures of Hong Kong-born casino magnate Stanley Ho).
382 See Edward A. Gargan, A Master Builder for Asia's Future, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
17, 1994, at D1 (describing Princeton-educated property developer Gordon Wu);
Barry Porter, Hong Kongers with the Midas Touch, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 23,
1994, Review, at 4 (describing Li Ka-shing as having only a high school education
and Walter Kwok as one of three brothers educated at British Universities who
inherited their father's business empire).
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those from the United States, Great Britain and Japan.383
The territory's major companies also varied in their key reve-
nue sources. By the late 1980s, some were heavily dependent on
investments in China, while others relied significantly on Hong
Kong sources of income. Still others used Hong Kong primarily as
a base for regional or global operations. 384 Key companies were
also concentrated in significantly different economic sectors. These
ranged from relatively low-tech manufacturing, based in thou-
sands of factories in China's Guangdong province, to cutting-edge
financial and investment services for capital flowing to and from
all corners of the world.38 5 In between, Hong Kong's traditionally
preeminent activity as a hub of international trade in manufac-
tured goods remained a major line of business for some of the terri-
tory's leading firms. A more recent mainstay of the economy,
namely property and infrastructure development both in the terri-
tory and in China, was at least equally important for many of the
business community's key players.
The visible political leanings of Hong Kong's business elites
ranged widely as well. At one extreme stood the unabashedly lib-
eral and democratic commitments of one-time clothing entrepre-
neur and Next Magazine and Apple Daily publisher Jimmy Lai.386 A
bit closer to the center was former head of the General Chamber of
w See, e.g., Tang, supra note 7, at 184; Gilley, supra note 375, at 53.
384 See Hutchison Whampoa Sets New $2bn HK Benchmark, supra note 379 (de-
scribing Li Ka-shing's Hutchison Whampoa as one of Hong Kong's most diversi-
fied business groups with interests in many sectors and countries); Kennedy, su-
pra note 376 (describing Swire's continuing focus on regional business and
Jardines' quest to become an Asian-based multinational corporation); Gargan, su-
pra note 384 (describing the dependence of Gordon Wu's Hopewell Holdings on
massive infrastructure projects in mainland China); Barry Porter, Sino To Make Its
Debut in Infrastructure with Port Venture in Dalian, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug.
30, 1996, at 1 (describing Robert Ng's Sino-Land's recent move outside of its tradi-
tional specialty, property development in Hong Kong); Porter, supra note 384 (de-
scribing Sino-Land as a Hong Kong property development company).
385 See supra note 384; see also Tang, supra note 28, at 125-27 (describing the
shift of Hong Kong manufacturing to Guangdong and possible responses to it);
Hughes, supra note 380 (describing Sir Y.K. Pao's shipping-based Wharf and
Wheelock companies); Liu, supra note 381 (describing Tung Chee-hwa's family
shipping firm); John Ridding, HK Manufacturers Seek a Higher Profile, FIN. TIMES
(London), Mar. 14, 1997, at 3 (quoting heads of manufacturing-based companies
as favoring industrial policies to support revival of manufacturing in Hong Kong).
The financial services sector is one of Hong Kong's largest and fastest growing,
and includes many internationally prominent institutions such as the Hong Kong
and Shanghai Bank and the Bank of East Asia. See generally HONG KONG GOVT
INFO. SERVICES, supra note 3, at 51-52, 70-92; Lui, supra note 365.
386 See Rufford, supra note 380.
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Commerce and Legco member Jimmy McGregor, whose support
for political reform made him the target of a successful campaign
by pro-China firms to secure his ouster, despite McGregor's having
urged moderation and compromise in disputes over democratiza-
tion and arrangements for the judiciary.3 7 At the other extreme
were the relentlessly bullish and strongly "pro-China" views (as
the press routinely labeled them) of real estate developer David
Chu.
388
Many of the territory's leading tycoons and its most prominent
businessmen-politicians occupied shifting positions between these
poles. Their political commitments often seemed simply to track
their current assessments of what would be best for their busi-
nesses. For the territory's Western-based business elites, positions
on the issues of the transition presumably reflected additional con-
siderations. These factors included the pressure of political views
(whether their own or those of their customers, shareholders, or
governments) rooted in their home countries, and a sense that as
expatriates they were not proper players in the territory's political
struggles.389 As well-connected or state-owned P.R.C.-based com-
panies became major participants in the Hong Kong economy, the
political views of the Hong Kong business community became
more varied and complex. Mainland firms emerged as a shadowy
but important group, at times inclined or required to hew to a
"pro-China" line.390 While purely P.R.C. companies were often
implicitly excluded from the focus of the endgame's political con-
387 See Bitter Battle for the Business Seat, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 13, 1991
(describing McGregor's generally liberal leanings and quoting his moderate view
that "we must minimise the possibilities of confrontation and maximise the op-
portunities for consensus").
388 See, e.g., Andrew Neil, Hong Kong Surprise, VANITY FAIR, Mar. 1997, at 165-
66.
389 See infra sections 3.2 and 3.3; deLisle & Lane, supra note 21 (citing several
examples of views expressed by indigenous and expatriate business elites); cf.
Timothy A. Gelatt and Diane F. Orentlicher, Public Law, Private Actors: The Impact
of Human Rights on Business Investors in China, 14 J. INT'L L. Bus. 66 (1993) (discuss-
ing how political and legal pressures at home have affected Westem multination-
als' approaches to investment in China and other countries with poor human
rights records).
390 See Bruce Gilley, Great Leap Southward, FAR E. ECON. REv., Nov. 23, 1995, at
60 (discussing China's rumored issuance of a directive to Chinese firms in Hong
Kong to increase purchases of businesses and real estate as a means of shoring up
economic health and confidence in Hong Kong and smoothing the transition to
Chinese rule); see also Henny Sender, Cash Dispenser, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 22,
1992, at 26 (describing P.R.C. entities as increasingly powerful presences in Hong
Kong's economy).
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flict over "business," mainland firms' acquisition of substantial in-
terests in major Hong Kong companies made the former's posi-
tions relevant even in a struggle that focused on a "business com-
munity" defined more narrowly to include only "Hong Kong" or
"multinational" firms and their local leaders. 39'
Such considerable variety in the interests and views of leaders
of "the business community" helps to explain why both pro-China
and liberal forces were able to find comforting evidence and claim
victories in the political battle over the rule-of-law values and legal
and institutional preferences of Hong Kong's business elite. Basic
differences in political orientation, economic-sectoral and geo-
graphic concentration, cultural background, and even nationality
were likely to produce fault lines dividing the business community
along several dimensions, including: inclinations to support any
particular position on key rule-of-law-related questions, abilities to
exercise an exit option in the event of a "bad" answer to those
questions, and capacities to survive and thrive under any particu-
lar version of the "rule of law" that emerged for post-reversion
Hong Kong.
Despite this diversity and apparent potential for division in the
territory's business circles, the major participants in the battle over
business cast their arguments and claims predominantly in terms
of an undifferentiated "business community." The only significant
exceptions to this pattern were occasional arguments that focused
specifically on the territory's international business community.
That the P.R.C., the British and colonial governments and Hong
Kong political leaders and activists made so little public effort to
target smaller segments of the business world or to secure the
backing of particular sectors of the elite business community -
even as they turned to threats and blandishments aimed at the
business community as a whole -underscores the peculiar political
character of the efforts to assert or enlist business backing in the
endgame struggle to shape future Hong Kong laws and institu-
tions. For the principal participants in that struggle, the basic clash
of visions of law and sovereignty drove and defined the battles
over the business constituency, even to the near exclusion of the
ordinary politics of building seemingly promising coalitions.
391 See Gilley, supra note 390, at 60; Sender, supra note 390, at 26.
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3.2. Business and the British, and Hong Kong Liberal-Democratic
Vision of the Rule of Law
During the last years before reversion, British colonial authori-
ties and Hong Kong's pro-democracy and liberal political leaders
claimed that Hong Kong's business community did or must sup-
port the rule of law, in large part because it was vital to prosperity.
Hong Kong's Financial Secretary Donald Tsang asserted that "the
rule of law is absolutely important, ... [a] pillar[] underpinning
Hong Kong's success, and the nature of ... Hong Kong-style capi-
talism."392 Speaking to a business audience, Governor Patten simi-
larly argued that "the rule of law is not an optional extra .... It is
what makes Hong Kong different, it is what makes Hong Kong
successful.., without it, a lot of you would not be here."
393
On this view, the decline of the rule of law would spell eco-
nomic disaster for Hong Kong and bring harm to the members of
its business community. Martin Lee warned the business commu-
nity that if Hong Kong's rule of law suffered "erosion," "business
[would] no longer be conducted freely and fairly," and "the health
of the economic development in Hong Kong" would be in jeop-
ardy.394 Patten cautioned that if "[ylou take away the rule of law,"
major international firms doing business in Hong Kong would "be
off to Taipei or Seoul or Tokyo." 39 5 More broadly, colonial officials'
and liberal politicians' frequent assertions that a failure to secure
the rule of law for post-reversion Hong Kong would leave the peo-
ple worried, disaffected and restive were addressed, in significant
part, to a business community that would presumably understand
that deleterious economic effects would follow from social instabil-
ity or an exodus of human capital.
The officials and politicians who made these arguments envi-
sioned a business-supported and business-supporting rule of law
of a particular type, although they differed over several crucial
questions of legal and institutional detail. They adopted the posi-
tion that a legal order sufficient to satisfy the wants and needs of
392 "We Just Cannot Go Back," EUROMONEY, Sept. 1996, at 84. Tsang listed
"freedom of the press, freedom from corruption in public service, the rule of law
and a level playing-field" as the "four pillars." Id.
393 Chris Yeung & Genevieve Ku, Patten Tells Businessmen To Stand Up for
Autonomy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 11, 1996, at 1.
394 Martin Lee, Hong Kong: One Country, No System?, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Dec. 14, 1989, at 27.
395 H.D.S. Greenway, Borrowed Time, BOSTON GLOBE, June 20, 1993, Magazine,
at 24 (quoting Governor Patten).
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Hong Kong business would have to include clear rules for eco-
nomic behavior, administered and interpreted by fair and neutral
judicial and executive officers, and subject to amendment by insti-
tutions that made and changed the laws in open, reasoned and
regularized ways. As was apparent in the battles over the Hong
Kong people's attitudes toward the rule of law, some of the terri-
tory's most ardent pro-democracy leaders claimed that these
minimum conditions of legality needed to be undergirded by de-
mocratic and locally accountable government institutions. This
perspective, including some of the variations within it, was re-
flected in the general comments that Patten, Tsang, Lee and others
made concerning the business community's values and interests
and the rule of law. It was also consistent with the arguments that
they and other British and Hong Kong officials and liberal and pro-
democracy politicians deployed in their struggles to claim or cap-
ture the allegiance of the Hong Kong people. This consistency was
perhaps politically and tactically necessary, given the impossibility
of achieving an acoustical separation between arguments nomi-
nally addressed to "the people" and to "the business community."
The parallels between the arguments that these key political
players pressed with respect to the people and with respect to
business also had more principled underpinnings, however, in the
liberal-democratic and natural-law-like conception of domestic le-
gal authority that British and colonial officials and many of the ter-
ritory's leading legislators and politicians broadly shared. At a
general level, this conception of legality and sovereignty did not,
and perhaps could not, differentiate sharply between what was
right and necessary for a rule of law for different groups in Hong
Kong. More subtle questions of what a liberal-democratic perspec-
tive, and the Hong Kong business community, might require of a
rule of law-and intramural disagreements among the perspec-
tive's adherents over such issues- emerged in the endgame battles
over business attitudes toward the major concrete questions of
laws and institutions for the S.A.R.
3.2.1. The Bill of Rights and the Value of Civil Liberties
In enacting the Bill of Rights Ordinance and amending other
Hong Kong laws to enhance protection of civil and political liber-
ties, the colonial government and liberal Hong Kong politicians
were able to gain support from business elites in the wake of the
Tiananmen Incident. They pointed to what the brutal repression of
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the 1989 democracy movement in the mainland seemed to portend
for post-1997 Hong Kong, and to the public outrage and fear that
the events in Beijing had triggered in the territory. The Hong Kong
government and political leaders supporting a Bill of Rights thus
raised the specter of a prosperity-undermining loss of confidence
and stability unless the government took dramatic action. With the
public deeply worried about the future and with some prominent
business leaders having expressed support for the Chinese student
demonstrators, significant segments of the indigenous business
elite initially backed the enactment of more robust and liberal civil
and political rights laws for Hong Kong.396 In an especially strik-
ing instance of business support for rights-protecting legal reforms,
business and pro-business members of the Basic Law Consultative
Committee proposed changes to the Basic Law to restrict Beijing's
power to declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong, clarify the
scope of acts of state that were to be beyond the S.A.R. courts' do-
main, entrench international covenants on human rights in the Ba-
sic Law, and give Basic Law provisions a status in P.R.C. law com-
parable to the provisions of China's state constitution.
397
In light of the public reaction in Western capitals to the events
at Tiananmen, the colonial government and Hong Kong's liberal
activists also could rely on the support or acquiescence of the terri-
tory's international business community as they pursued reforms
in Hong Kong's laws that imposed illiberal restrictions on civil and
political rights. Ultimately, the Bill of Rights Ordinance passed
Legco without significant business opposition.398 After the enact-
ment of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, proponents of a liberal legal
regime for civil liberties worked to cultivate business support
throughout the early and middle 1990s. They did so primarily by
linking the Bill of Rights, and other legal reforms that they deemed
essential for a just and adequate rule of law, to the advancement or
preservation of the business community's assumed interests, espe-
cially its material interests. For example, prominent barrister and,
396 See, e.g., Lau, supra note 16, at 18 (noting generally pro-business Legco and
Exco members' and business leaders' heightened support for greater democratic
reforms).
397 See Hong Kong: Group's Plan Tackles Flaws in Basic Law, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sept. 6, 1989.
398 Indeed, some segments of the business community appear to have reacted
negatively to China's initial opposition to the Bill of Rights, seeing in it a possible
threat to the vital independence of commercial law after 1997. See Hong Kong:
Business Community Maintaining Optimism Despite Uncertainty About Its Future Post
1997, supra note 374.
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later, Solicitor General Daniel Fung argued that business should
welcome the Bill of Rights, not fear it as a "pinko-liberal docu-
ment." 399 The Bill of Rights, Fung explained, provided new ways
for the territory's avowedly pro-market business community to
challenge government regulation.400
More generally, Hong Kong government officials and pro-
democracy politicians argued that some of the rights protected by
the controversial Bill of Rights and other liberal amendments to
prior laws were in business' interest and that business should rec-
ognize this feature. Martin Lee asserted that freedom of the press
and freedom of information were "things that the business com-
munity knows they need." 401 The protection of these freedoms,
Lee added, was necessary for the preservation of "legal integrity"
upon which the protection of contracts and property also de-
pended. 402 Governor Patten similarly claimed that there was a
clear "relationship between ... a free press, and the rule of law and
Hong Kong's prosperity" that some people in the business com-
munity would fail to recognize at their peril.403 Articulating the
claimed connection more fully, Hong Kong liberals argued that,
without the kind of protection the Bill of Rights provided for "po-
litical" freedoms such as free expression, business could not have
confidence in the reliability and completeness of economically
relevant information that was vital to commerce and investment. 404
Perhaps perceiving that purely economic arguments for the Bill
of Rights and civil liberties laws seemed to fail to convince the ter-
399 See Gareth Hewett, Hong Kong: Bill of Rights Poses Risks for "Uneducated"
Businesses, S. CHINA MORNING POsT, Nov. 12, 1991.
400 See id.
401 For Many Corporate Chiefs, 1997 Cannot Come Soon Enough, ASIAWEEK, Dec.
7, 1994, at 23.
402 Id.; see also Clarence Tsui, HK Politicians Urged To Avoid "Damaging" Talk,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 30, 1997, at 4 (quoting Martin Lee's comment that,
"[i]f you are a businessman, you need precise and reliable economic informa-
tion").
403 Greenway, supra note 395, at 14. Comments from the business community
offered some support for this position. See Louis Lucas, Hong Kong Hopes for a
Calm Voyage, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1995, at 441-66 (quoting Hong Kong Stock Ex-
change Chairman Edgar Cheng Wai-kin's statement that "Hong Kong's role as a
regional centre for raising foreign capital" requires "making sure there is freedom
of flow of information and also the rule of law" after 1997).
404 See Hong Kong's Lee Defies Colony's Future Leader, Reuters, Feb. 19, 1997
(quoting Martin Lee), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Duncan
Hughes, HK's Prosperity Dependent of Free Data Flow, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May
30, 1997, Business, at 2.
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ritory's business elites, colonial government officials and liberal
politicians sought to appeal to business leaders' non-economic
preferences as well. Specifically, they invoked views, assertedly
prevalent in the business community, that were consistent with the
requisites of the liberal-democratic rule of law that they embraced.
Faced with apparently low levels of support for his agenda in the
business community, Patten argued:
There is hardly a well-off businessman in Hong Kong who
doesn't want, for himself, the insurance of being able to live
in a free society .... So I can't believe that those business-
men don't understand the relationship between the rule of
law, between the values of pluralism, and being able to live
a decent life.
40 5
Martin Lee similarly asserted that, "[b]usiness people all cher-
ish their freedom more than anything else" and, therefore, could
hardly welcome a situation in which "[flreedom will no longer be
protected by law."40 6
When the P.R.C. became more shrill and intransigent in its
threats to strike key provisions in the Bill of Rights and reverse
amendments to colonial legislation that previously had restricted
freedom of association and public demonstrations, British authori-
ties and Hong Kong liberals reiterated and extended their grim
predictions about what the absence of such robust legal protections
could mean for business and for Hong Kong. Many of the dire
warnings from Martin Lee and other liberal politicians came in the
wake of P.R.C.-appointed transitional bodies' and P.R.C. state or-
gans' formal endorsements of illiberal changes to Hong Kong's
rights laws.407 More broadly, the British position was that any sig-
nificant rolling back of the Bill of Rights or other key rights legisla-
tion would cast doubt on the P.R.C.'s legal and political commit-
ments to Hong Kong and thereby "put[] at risk the confidence on
which Hong Kong's prosperity is based." 408 Focusing specifically
405 Graham Hutchings, "Tango Dancer" Patten Stamps on China's Toes, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Feb. 8, 1996, at 10.
406 Belinda Goldsmith, Hong Kong Party Leader Warns of Confidence Fall,
Reuters, Feb. 13, 1997, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
407 See supra Section 2.2.1; infra notes 412-14 and accompanying text.
408 Chris Yeung, UK Pledges Help for More than 50 Years, S. CHINA MORNING
PosT, Mar. 21, 1997, at 6.
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on one incident, Governor Patten called the Preparatory Commit-
tee's recommendations to overturn late colonial reforms of rights
laws "very disturbing," another instance of "legal arguments hast-
ily thrown together, policies made up as we go along,"4 9 and a
move that threatened to create a "terrible legal muddle."410 Such
legal sloppiness and uncertainty could hardly be welcomed by a
business community that depended on a transparent and predict-
able legal order. After local business leaders attacked Patten for
criticizing their lack of support for the endangered rights laws,
British Prime Minister John Major backed Patten's efforts to some
extent. With modest success, the Prime Minister pressured leading
business groups in the territory to voice public support for human
rights and the rule of law.41 ' Major warned that if the business
community failed to do as he urged and thus acquiesced in the un-
dermining of the rule of law, the outcome would not be in the best
interest of Hong Kong and its business community.412
British and Hong Kong defenders of the Bill of Rights and re-
lated law reforms also sought to enlist the support of the territory's
international business community, where liberal-democratic no-
tions of legality were thought to have a strong hold. Speaking to a
forum in Singapore (a principal alternative site for businesses wary
of Hong Kong's legal future), British Foreign Secretary Rifkind
publicly condemned actions to repeal portions of the Bill of
Rights.413 Martin Lee, on a European tour, urged Western inves-
tors to be alert to threats to freedom of the press and other en-
croachments upon civil rights that could plague post-1997 Hong
Kong.414 He called on foreign business executives to "ask their
presidents, prime ministers and chancellors to insist that China
keeps its promises and maintains a free Hong Kong." 4 5 Those
heads of government, Lee presumably hoped, would request or re-
409 Keith B. Richburg, Chinese Approve Cutbacks in Hong Kong Civil Liberties,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 3, 1997, at 4.
410 Quak Hiang Whai, Hong Kong: Tung Defends Plans by Beijing To Amend HK
Laws, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Jan. 24, 1997, at 6.
411 See Louis Won, Business Leaders Take Up Major's Call, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, May 25, 1996, at 6.
412 See id.
413 See Greg Torode & Duncan Hughes, Qian Sticks to his Guns in Final Meeting
with Rikind, S. CHINA MORNING POsT, Feb. 15, 1997, at 1.
414 See Tung Chee-Hwa's Remarks Are Beneficial to Hong Kong's Prosperity, supra
note 238, at A4.
415 C.K. Lau, Why Martin Won't Keep His Mouth Shut, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Feb. 16, 1997, at 11.
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quire business elites from their countries with interests in Hong
Kong and China to behave in a manner compatible with the pres-
ervation of Hong Kongers' rights.
In addressing the Hong Kong business community's interna-
tional segment, colonial officials and liberal politicians again em-
phasized the impact that a rollback of rights laws could have on
the immediate interests of the business sector. Martin Lee warned
that a lack of pressure on the P.R.C. to fulfil its pledge to preserve
Hong Kong's rights-protecting legal order could hurt foreign busi-
nesses directly. As evidence, Lee noted that China's lack of regard
for "individual freedoms" had already led to the kidnapping of
foreign passport-holding, Hong Kong-based executives. 416 More
generally, Hong Kong Financial Secretary Donald Tsang, who re-
tained his post after the reversion despite having confronted Tung
Chee-hwa over Tung's pro-China stance on rights issues, warned
that international investors would pull out of Hong Kong if China
failed to provide a more convincing case for the need to repeal or
modify civil liberties legislation.417
Finally, the arguments that Hong Kong government officials
and the territory's leading liberal politicians made concerning
popular attitudes toward the Bill of Rights Ordinance and civil lib-
erties carried a strong message for the business community. When
British and colonial officials, Legco democrats and liberal commen-
tators asserted that the people were so attached to their rights that
a substantial roll-back would trigger deep disaffection or consider-
able disorder, they were also warning, and seeking to convince, the
Hong Kong business community that moves to revise portions of
the Bill of Rights, the Societies and Public Order Ordinances, and
other laws would endanger crucial preconditions for Hong Kong
business' continued success. The point appeared to register with
some of the most politically involved leaders in the business com-
munity. Business-linked members of Legco and Exco had sup-
ported the initial enactment of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, and
few of them were willing to abandon it completely in later years.
Businessman-politician, Legco member, and leader of the pro-
business Liberal Party, Allen Lee stated in 1995, "Beijing will have
to back off" from its proposals to strip the Bill of Rights once Chi-
416 See Hong Kong, The Future According to Martin Lee, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1996,
at 82, 82.
417 See Amy Chew, HK's Tsang Blasts "Meddling" by China, Bus. TIMES (Malay-
sia), Jan. 29, 1997, at 82; see also Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, Hong Kong Leader Backs
Rights Plan, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 24, 1997, at A2.
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nese authorities are made to "understand how the common people
here have accepted the Bill of Rights. There is a perception that it
protects them from government abuses."418 Lee maintained this
view despite China's increasingly clear and inflexible determina-
tion to overturn parts of the civil and political liberties-expanding
legislation of the 1990s, including the controversial amendments to
the Societies and Public Order Ordinances.
419
Although some in the territory's indigenous and international
business circles worried that a hard line from Beijing on civil and
political rights in Hong Kong could be very bad for the local econ-
omy, and mainstream Hong Kong business leaders sometimes en-
dorsed parts of the colonial government's rights agenda, attempts
to cultivate such sentiments faced an inhospitable reception from a
business community increasingly looking past July 1, 1997.420
When Chief Executive-designate Tung Chee-hwa initiated his pre-
sumably Beijing-endorsed support for legislative reversals in the
name of prosperity, stability, and suitability to Hong Kong's char-
acter and circumstances, the liberal-democratic task became even
more daunting. At least on the surface, Hong Kong's business
community had not been persuaded that it needed, or that it
would be worthwhile to support, the preservation of a legal rights
regime that adherents to a liberal-democratic perspective claimed
was essential both to a just legal order for Hong Kong, and to a
rule of law that would be adequate for Hong Kong's business
community.
3.2.2. Legco and Democratization: Of Interests and Obligations
Claiming and cultivating business support for democracy-
extending constitutional change was arguably an even more com-
plicated and difficult project. This was particularly evident for the
more radically reformist proposals backed by some of the terri-
tory's pro-democracy politicians, but it was also true for the more
limited Patten proposals. For the Governor, his subordinates, and
his sometimes reluctant allies among Legco's democrats, the basic
418 Gilley, supra note 56, at 36.
419 See Richburg, supra note 409, at 4 (quoting Allen Lee who stated, "I could
not find anything that contradicts the Basic Law" in the legislation the Prepara-
tory Committee recommended overturning).
420 See, e.g., Paul Majendie, Investors Say HK Good Bet - China Wants It To Suc-
ceed, Reuters, Jan. 30, 1997 ("There are very good reasons for believing the Chinese
will do nothing to upset the apple cart."), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi
File; see also Won, supra note 413, at 6.
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strategy was to link the programs that introduced just and neces-
sary changes in the institutions of representative government with
the preservation or augmentation of prosperity and other ends that
Hong Kong's business community could be assumed to value.
Shortly after presenting the outline of his plan, Patten argued that
"greater democracy helps to make communities more prosper-
ous." 421 Although favoring more extensive democratic change than
the Governor proposed, Martin Lee made the same general point,
noting that "virtually every economically advanced nation ... has
recognised [sic] that prosperity and democracy are not mutually
antagonistic but are, in truth, inseparable." 422
Addressing her audience's concerns in more detail, Hong Kong
Chief Secretary Anson Chan assured business leaders that Patten's
electoral reforms would "in no way weaken [the Hong Kong gov-
ernment's] commitment to maintaining Hong Kong's attraction as
the outstanding business location in this region. Indeed, by
strengthening our representative institutions, they can only en-
hance investors' confidence .. ".."423 Chan also asserted that the
governor's proposals would not produce a Legco that would
change the Hong Kong government's traditional emphases on low
taxes, limited government spending, and the territory's economic
well-being.424 The Governor offered further reassurance and prom-
ised to build a bridge between business and the democratic politi-
cians whose views worried business. Patten declared that he did
not see "any reason why a successful businessman should be terri-
fied of democratically elected politicians . ."425 Noting that those
politicians "have got to understand the business agenda," Patten
added that Hong Kong's business community could rest assured
that an empowered Hong Kong electorate, "a community which
represents better than any other the triumph of market economy,"
would not "vote in large numbers for politicians who work in the
opposite direction."426
Martin Lee made similar arguments in support of democratiza-
tion generally and the Legco democrats' proposals for democratic
421 Frank Ching, Cleared for Action, FARE. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at 20.
422 Martin Lee, Tide of Democracy, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 26, 1992, at 31.
423 Chan Says Companies Should Not Fear Legco Bill, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Mar. 11, 1994, at 2.
424 See id.
425 Connie Law, Governor Bids To Bridge Gap, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 4,
1994, at 3.
426 Id.
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reforms more sweeping than Patten's plan. Lee explained that he
and the Democratic Party had made democratic and accountable
government their top priority precisely because it undergirded the
rule of law, which was "vital to Hong Kong not only because it
protects individual rights, but because it safeguards Hong Kong's
free-market system by guaranteeing the protection of contracts and
property necessary to continue our economic success."427 Lee fur-
ther argued that the free flow of information that business required
was dependent upon the existence of democratically accountable
institutions to make and oversee the enforcement of appropriate
laws.428
Pro-democracy politicians and colonial officials cautioned that,
if the business community stood in the way of democratic changes,
it would be hurting itself, as well as Hong Kong more generally. If
Hong Kong did not have "fair" and "credible" elections, Patten
warned, it would be impossible to "maintain the rule of law," fight
corruption, and maintain Hong Kong's prosperity.429 Martin Lee
echoed these concerns, arguing that "without democratic and ac-
countable government, we will never be able to maintain the rule
of law, and without the rule of law, Hongkong [sic] will experience
a surge in [P.R.C.-stylel corruption and guanxi [, reliance on per-
sonal connections, which] ... would threaten the free competition
that is the very foundation of our business success." 430 Opposition
to moderate electoral reforms, Patten asserted, could harm busi-
ness interests by fostering social unrest. "[T]he business commu-
nity," he said, "needed to consider" whether it was "more destabi-
lizing to try to accommodate, in a modest way, people's political
and democratic aspirations or to block them off."431
After China made clear its inalterable rejection of the Patten re-
forms, and thus increased pressure on the territory's business elites
not to support the Governor's plan, proponents of democratic re-
427 Lee, supra note 32, at 11.
428 See For Many Corporate Chiefs, 1997 Cannot Come Soon Enough, supra note
403, at 23; see also Martin Lee, supra note 396, at 27 (arguing that a democratic sys-
tem of government is necessary to assure that the rule of law will survive and
therefore that business will still be conducted "freely," "fairly," and not through
"under the table arrangements").
429 Patten made these remarks in his 1993 state-of-the-territory address. See
Frank Ching, Confrontation in Hongkong, FAR E. ECON. REV., Oct. 21, 1993, at 33;
Comment on Chris Patten's 'Theory of the Infiltration of Corruption,' supra note 284, at
2.
430 Lee, supra note 422, at 31.
431 Interview with Chris Patten, FARE. ECON. REV., Oct. 22, 1992, at 22.
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forms continued to assert that the reforms would serve the busi-
ness community's material interests. The tone grew more grim,
however, and the arguments played more heavily on the business
community's fears, especially by linking the rejection of democratic
reform to the prospect of social unrest and instability. Patten
warned that "billionaires whose principal concern is that they
should go on being billionaires" risked, in their role as China's
principal advisers on Hong Kong, exacerbating Chinese officials'
dangerous "lack of understanding about what makes Hong Kong
tick."432 In the same spirit, pro-democracy independent legislator
Emily Lau commented after the 1995 Legco elections, "I wish those
tycoons whom Beijing likes to talk to so much... would speak out
for what Hong Kong really wants." 433 The tycoons' failure to do so
was "bad for business and bad for prosperity" as well as bad for
the people of Hong Kong.434 On this view, if the territory's busi-
ness elites insisted on telling the central authorities in Beijing that
neither they nor the Hong Kong people needed or wanted democ-
ratic reform, the Chinese leadership might well believe them and
deny Hong Kong the kind of electoral laws and constitutional or-
der that Hong Kongers ardently demanded and that Hong Kong
business ultimately needed.
The colonial administration and Hong Kong's leading pro-
democracy politicians continued this line of argument in address-
ing China's plan to replace the Legco elected under the Patten re-
forms with an appointed Provisional Legislature. For business to
treat the derailment of the "through train" for Legco as a minor,
containable incident would be folly, Patten argued, because "once
you start to unpick the rule of law and all the things that are asso-
ciated with it, you start to find that the jumper is turning rapidly
into a ball of wool." 435 Patten later commented that bowing to
business pressures to compromise with China on political reform,
and to accept a less democratic Legco that China might allow to
survive the transition, would have been a recipe for "pretty good
432 Hutchings, supra note 405, at 10.
433 Andrew Higgins, The Vanishing Trick, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 19, 1995,
at 17.
434 Id.
435 The China Prism, supra note 115, at 16 (interviewing Governor Patten); see
also Fair Polls Seen as "Vital for the Future," S. CHINA MORNING POsT, June 30, 1994,
at 6 (quoting Hong Kong Chief Secretary Anson Chan saying that electoral ar-
rangements "which are less than open and fair, strike at the very roots of the rule
of law on which the whole fabric of this ... successful community depends").
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chaos," something Hong Kong's business community surely
would not have welcomed. 436 Pro-democracy Legco members
warned Hong Kong business leaders that China's plan to replace
the existing Legco with the interim body would undermine the ter-
ritory's "business environment" and the rule of law, which was
"the bedrock of Hong Kong's success.
" 437
Hong Kong government sources also addressed the impact of
the prospective establishment of the Provisional Legislature on
Hong Kong's vital links to the global economy, seeking to tap the
business community's fear of massive capital flight and to claim
support in the territory's international business circles. Patten cau-
tioned that China's lawless selection of a docile body could give
Hong Kong "the reputation that the rule of law was under threat,"
which would prompt "the international business community [to]
move its cash elsewhere .. .. *"438 Chief Secretary Anson Chan of-
fered a similar, if more mild, warning when she noted, "[a]s re-
gards our legislature, there are clear concerns and much will de-
pend on China's action[s]" during the final year before reversion,
and "[i]t goes without saying that a legitimate and truly represen-
tative legislature will do much to give confidence to ... interna-
tional investors."
439
A final strand in the colonial authorities' and pro-democracy
politicians' strategy to persuade the business community argued
that business leaders who undermined democratic reform were be-
traying Hong Kong and democratic principles that were morally
obligatory and that were dear to Hong Kongers. In this vein,
Patten argued that Hong Kong's tycoons had a "social responsi-
bility" to stand up for Hong Kong, and urged business to "under-
stand it would not be in Hong Kong's interest to sell out the Joint
Declaration [including its provision promising democratic gov-
ernment] as a way of securing a quiet life." 440 Patten denounced
436 Bruce Gilley, Standing Pat, FARE. ECON. REV., May 30, 1996, at 16.
437 Angela Li & Vivian Lee, Business Lobby Under Fire for Patten Letter, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, May 23, 1996, at 6.
438 Maggie Farley, Ditching the Colonial Past, SUNDAY TIMES (London), Feb. 6,
1994 (quoting Patten's statement to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee). Patten added that "it would not take very long" for the international
business community to move its assets. Id.
439 'Business as Usual' Post-1997, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 1, 1996, at 1.
440 Gilley, supra note 436, at 16; see also Simon Holberton, Hong Kong Reforms
Upset Business Community, FIN. TIMES, July 2, 1994 (quoting Patten's statement that
"[wie have got.., to get business to understand it would not be in Hong Kong's
interest to sell out the Joint Declaration").
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the business leaders who, as members of the Preparatory Commit-
tee, supported the establishment of the Provisional Legislature for
"sign[ing] up to arrangements whose sole intention is to choke off
the voice of those who represent the majority of public opinion."441
Similarly, Martin Lee charged that for a businessman to oppose
Patten's reforms was "to display an appalling lack of faith in the
people of Hongkong [sic] who have made their success possi-
ble." 442 Such arguments sometimes implied the familiar threat that
reversing democratization would trigger popular discontent and
disaffection that would bring material harm to business, but their
principal and immediate focus was a set of normative principles
that were central to the liberal-democratic vision of a rule of law
for Hong Kong, and that proponents of reform thought business
should be ashamed to betray.
Whether focusing on the business community's assertedly un-
derperceived material stake in a democratically grounded rule of
law, or appealing to the business community's sense that it might
owe something to Hong Kongers who had made business elites
rich, the varied arguments from the proponents of democratic re-
form sought primarily to persuade a business community whose
established preferences could not be counted upon to produce
support for Patten's or the Legco democrats' agenda. Working
from a concededly weak base, efforts to enlist or elicit business
support for democratic reforms of any sort drew decreasingly en-
thusiastic responses during the final years preceding Hong Kong's
reversion. The Tiananmen Incident and the public reaction to it in
Hong Kong had produced business support for electoral reform.443
Partly to forestall more sweeping reforms of the sort that Patten
and democratic politicians later advocated, leading business fig-
ures, pro-business organizations, and business-based or business-
supporting members of Exco and Legco endorsed plans to make a
substantial portion of Legco's seats directly elected.444 In addition,
441 Mary Kwang, Rift Between Patten, Businessmen Likely To Continue Till HK
Handover, STRArTS TIMES (Singapore), May 29, 1996, at 28.
442 Lee, supra note 422, at 31.
443 See, e.g., Emily Lau, Out of Apathy, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 1, 1989 at 18
(discussing the political awakening of Hong Kong through demonstration re-
sponding to the mainland democracy movement and its suppression); Lau, supra
note 16, at 18 (discussing legislators' and business leaders' reactions to the pro-
democracy student protests in Hong Kong).
444 See, e.g., Emily Lau, Red Herring, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 14, 1989, at 26
(describing conservative and business support for making a substantial portion of
Legco's seats directly elected by 1997).
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business interests organized political parties to contest the elections
held under the Patten and pre-Patten reforms, running on plat-
forms that embraced the principle of democratic elections. 445 One
leading businessman-politician commented after Patten had tabled
his reform package but before the 1995 Legco balloting yielded a
landslide for democrats, that Patten "quite rightly [felt] a mandate
should come from some form of representation" and that members
of the business community "should run for elections" if they "want
to make [their] views known." 446 Expatriate executives from some
of Hong Kong's most venerable business institutions were more
openly enthusiastic, and in some cases, they fully endorsed
Patten's proposals.447 One businessman-politician from their ranks
declared that "the mainspring of our prosperity and stability re-
mains rooted in the rule of law.., and a legislature safeguarded by
its accountability to the population." 448
Patten and Legco democrats were not able to make much use of
this early acquiescence and fragmentary support from the business
community in their protracted battle to enact electoral and consti-
tutional reform and to preserve a relatively democratically elected
Legco's hope to become the first S.A.R. legislature. Visible backing
from business soon waned because of a variety of factors. China
445 See id.; see also, e.g., do Rosario, supra note 91, at 20 (describing the support
of the Conservative Resource Center, a pro-business quasi-party, and, later, the
Liberal Party, the territory's principal pro-business political party, for modest ex-
pansion of the franchise); Emily Lau, Peking's Tune, FAR E. ECON. REV., Aug. 23,
1990, at 22 (describing the formation of pro-business political groups); Bellette
Lee, Political Flag for Business, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 23, 1990 (discussing
the platform of the Liberal Democratic Federation of Hong Kong); Theresa Poole,
Patten Faces Pro-China Alliance, INDEPENDENT (London), Jan. 20, 1993, at 11 (dis-
cussing business attitudes opposing Patten's reforms as "confrontational" to-
wards China).
446 James Tien, HK Can Survive Under One Country, One System, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 2, 1993, at 11 (expressing the views of General Chamber of
Commerce General Committee member and former Legco member James Tien);
see also Emily Lau, Political Shell Game, FAR E. ECON. REV., April 5, 1990, at 25 (re-
porting a statement by leading Hong Kong tycoon Li Ka-shing that businessmen
must take part in politics).
447 See Huang Chen-ya, Jardines Salvo is HK Wake-Up Call, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Dec. 20, 1992; see also Catherine Ong, No Slowing Down for this Tough 'Last
Taipan', Bus. TIMES, July 1, 1994, at 17 (quoting out-going Hutchison Whampoa
chief Simon Murray as sharing Patten's belief that democratic reform is necessary
to preserve Hong Kong's rule of law, and thus the difference between Hong Kong
and Guangdong); Doreen Cheung, Purves Calls for Open and Fair Polls, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 5, 1993, at 2 (quoting Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank chief Sir
William Purves).
448 Bitter Battle for the Business Seat, supra note 387 (quoting Jimmy McGregor).
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was willing to stall progress on lucrative and essential long-term
infrastructure projects in the territory,449 and to cast doubt on the
fate of government contracts extending through and beyond
1997,450 in order to press for the results it wanted in the row over
political reform. These moves raised considerably the perceived
costs to business of supporting Patten's proposals for democratic
change. China's rhetorical and financial assault on Jardine Mathe-
son, one of the most prominent corporate supporters of the re-
forms, underscored the fact that China could impose more direct
and individualized costs on business that dared to back Patten's
program.45' Caught between China's intractable opposition to re-
forms and local pressure to back democratization, many in the
business community, including some who accepted democracy in
principle, came to believe that the British colonial authorities had
put them in a difficult position by a sudden and belated concern
with democracy that smacked of hypocrisy.45 2 The resulting re-
sentment did not help reform proponents' cause among Hong
Kong business elites.
Several additional developments diminished the influence of
pro-political reform voices within the business community. These
changes included a continuing indigenization of the executive
ranks of leading Hong Kong companies, a growing circumspection
among some expatriate business leaders about foreigners' partici-
pation in the process of constitutional development for a post-
colonial Hong Kong, the striking success of pro-China "united
front" tactics in capturing the principal organs formally represent-
ing business interests in Hong Kong's corporatist politics, and the
creeping impact of P.R.C. entities' buying major stakes in promi-
449 See Emily Lau, Terminal Delay, FAR E. EcON. REV., Mar. 21, 1991, at 11;
Stacy Mosher, Creeping Intervention, FARE. ECON. REV., July 18, 1991, at 10.
450 See China Accused of Threatening Rule of Law, Reuters, Dec. 23, 1992, available
at LEXIS, Allasi Library, Asiapc File; Liu Shih-hsin, Lu Ping Talks with VisitingTex-
tile Delegation from Hong Kong, WEN WEI PO, Dec. 1, 1992, at 2 (explaining that con-
tracts extending beyond 1997 must be "discussed" with the P.R.C. or else parties
will lack "legal protection"); Tai Ming Cheung, Push Came to Shove, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Dec. 10, 1992, at 8.
451 See Chen Chien-ping, Quoting Out of Context and Misleading the Public, WEN
WEI PO, Dec. 7, 1992, at 2; Chen Chien-ping, China and Britain Should Still Cooperate
on Other Issues, WEN WEI Po, May 14, 1994, at A3; Tai Ming Cheung, Silent Night,
FARE. ECON. REV., Jan. 7, 1993, at 9.
452 See, e.g., Nigel Page, Hong Kong's Alternative Voice, INT'L FIN. L. REV., May
1994, at 48 (quoting banker and Legco member David Li describing his views as
typical of the financial community).
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nent Hong Kong companies. 453 Moreover, the electoral triumphs
of Hong Kong's democratic parties and pro-democracy independ-
ents increased business' fears that advancing political reform
meant inviting unchecked social spending and other policies that
would be costly and unpalatable to business interests.
454
Faced with such strong indications of a lack of support in the
business community, Hong Kong government offcials and pro-
democracy politicians sometimes asserted that appearances were
misleading, and that their programs for democratic reforms in fact
enjoyed the backing of the business community. They argued that
the seeming lack of support from the business community was dis-
ingenuous, and that the business community's silence or apparent
opposition was the product of Chinese threats of economic retalia-
tion.455 More often, they acknowledged that business' apparent at-
titudes were perhaps genuine, but benighted and dangerous.
Thus, one prominent pro-democracy politician lamented that busi-
453 See Bitter Battle for the Business Seat, supra note 387; Timothy Charlton,
Legco Reforms Create Problems, Says Fung, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 4, 1994, at
1; do Rosario, supra note 91, at 22 (quoting Jardines' director and Legco member
explaining that his abstention in the Legco vote on democratic reform is appropri-
ate because "the scales should be tipped by people whose home has been and will
be Hong Kong for generations to come"); Fung Wai-kong & Linda Choy, Chamber
Spurns McGregor in Poll for Committee, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 27, 1994, at 1;
Simon Holberton, China Tries To Win Control of HK Chamber, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 2,
1993, at 3; Mary Kwang, Pro-China Lobby Out of the Backseat, STRAITS TIMES (Singa-
pore), May 9, 1993, at 14; Catherine Ong, No Slowing Down for this Tough "Last Tai-
pan," Bus. TIMES, July 1, 1994, at 17 (describing Simon Murray's departure from Li
Ka-shing's Hutchinson Whampoa); Chris Yeung & Connie Law, China Hits Patten
for Deal with Jardines, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 14, 1994, at 1 (describing a
Jardines Matheson officer and Legco member's abstention that led to the defeat of
the pro-business Liberal Party's more modestly democratizing alternative to
Patten reforms).
454 See do Rosario, supra note 91, at 20 (noting business representatives' worry
that, if elected, pro-democracy politicians would press for expensive government
spending packages); do Rosario, supra note 301, at 28 (noting criticisms of Democ-
rats for raising populist expectations of tax cuts and welfare spending); Increasing
Tax in Disguised Form, and Shifting Misfortune to the Special Administrative Region,
WEN WEI Po, Dec. 17, 1993, at 2; Jonathan Karp, Man in the Middle, FAR E. ECON.
REV., Oct. 13, 1994, at 16 (noting Deputy Director of Hong Kong and Macao Af-
fairs Office Wang Fengchao's cautions about the burden that excessive welfarism
would cause); Jonathan Karp, Money Talks, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 17, 1994, at 18
[hereinafter Karp, Money Talks] (quoting a Bank of China economist warning
about "generous social spending"); William McGurn, Diminishing Returns, FAR E.
ECON. REV., June 13, 1996, at 63 (noting that Joint Liaison Group Chinese team
leader Chen Zuo'er likened the "increases in spending to a ... racing car spun out
of control"); Yeung & Wong, supra note 326, at 21.
455 See For Many Corporate Chiefs, 1997 Cannot Come Soon Enough, supra note
403, at 22 (quoting Martin Lee); Lee, supra note 49.
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ness leaders had taken the short-sighted and mistaken view that
"so long as they can establish good connections with Chinese offi-
cials, their profits are guaranteed." 456 Similarly, Governor Patten
regretted that "some people in the business community who
should know better ... underestimate the importance of the rule of
law"457 and a credible legislature to Hong Kong's prosperity.
On either of these relatively pessimistic accounts of the busi-
ness community's subjective views, the advocates of democratic re-
form faced a difficult task of persuading business elites to change
their positions. They had to make business recognize, or act on its
recognition, that "[w]hat business needs above all, in the long
term, is the certainty of the rule of law -of laws democratically en-
acted and rooted in the community." 458 From the liberal-
democratic perspective that colonial officials and pro-democracy
politicians in Hong Kong shared, these elements that business
needed were also features that a just and adequate rule of law for
Hong Kong entailed. Although their comments about business at-
titudes and actions sometimes sounded resigned or desperate, the
proponents of democratic reform consistently tried to convince,
scare, and bargain with business elites to get them to do what was
both right and self-interested. Thus, for example, Patten followed
up his vitriolic attack on business leaders, for betraying Hong
Kong's democracy with their endorsement of the Provisional Leg-
islature, with an offer to retract his remarks if Hong Kong's busi-
nessmen spoke up for democracy and human rights in Hong
Kong.459
3.2.3. The Court of Final Appeal and the Requisites of Confidence
The controversy over the Sino-British accords on the Court of
Final Appeal, and legislation to implement them triggered a public
split among adherents to a generally "liberal" or "pro-democracy"
perspective on the rule of law for Hong Kong. The schism over the
Court was deeper than the disagreements within the pro-reform
camp that marked the debates concerning business attitudes to-
ward the Patten reforms and Legco democrats' more sweepingly
democratic alternatives. On the Court issue, colonial officials and
456 Lee, supra note 396.
457 Greenway, supra note 397, at 24.
458 Interview with Chris Patten, FAR E. ECON. REV., supra note 433, at 22.
459 See Mary Kwang, Rift Between Patten, Businessmen Likely to Continue Till HK
Handover, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), May 29, 1996, at 28.
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prominent politicians engaged in a sometimes bitter struggle over
the business community's stance on a proposed Court arrange-
ment that Hong Kong government officials claimed was sufficient
to secure an adequate rule of law for the territory, and that liberals
in Legco and elsewhere denounced as a betrayal of Hong Kong's
rule of law.
Beginning in 1991 and again in 1995, Hong Kong government
officials faced a delicate and difficult task. They had to sell Hong
Kong's business community on controversial C.F.A. arrangements
while defending those arrangements against serious doubts about
their compatibility with rule-of-law values that the colonial au-
thorities claimed to support and that business might consider im-
portant. The principal strategy was to capitalize on the Hong Kong
business community's considerable satisfaction with the existing
legal and judicial systems. Thus, Hong Kong government propo-
nents of the Court accords argued that the C.F.A. bills would ade-
quately preserve the established system of independent courts and
a common-law order protecting and advancing business interests
in a post-1997 system, as promised in the Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law. 460 In a broad formulation of this line of argument, Chief
Secretary Anson Chan characterized the 1995 bill as one that "en-
sures continuity of the rule of law in Hong Kong through the tran-
sition and will safeguard public and international confidence in
Hong Kong," which was routinely acknowledged to be vital to
Hong Kong's prosperity.461
During the attempts to pass the second bill, government offi-
cials added a less positive argument. Proponents of the 1995 legis-
lation emphasized that the arrangements adopted in the second
Court deal at least had induced China to drop plans to create a
new quasi-judicial body, directly controlled by the P.R.C., to re-
view C.F.A. decisions on a variety of potentially politically sensi-
tive issues.462 Proponents of the second accord assumed that this
aspect of the deal would appeal to a business community that was
460 See generally Ching, supra note 37, at 173, 189-91 (discussing the politics of
the 1991 Sino-British accord on the C.F.A. and its reception in Hong Kong).
461 Yeung et al., supra note 138, at 1; see also Mathews Strikes at Opposition, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, June 15, 1995, at 6 (noting similar comments from the At-
torney General).
462 See, e.g., Hong Kong Court, FIN. TIMEs, June 12, 1995, at 19 (arguing that the
P.R.C. dropped plans to establish a review tribunal that would override C.F.A.
decisions because the P.R.C. feared that the proposal threatened business confi-
dence).
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thought to view P.R.C.-style legality as vastly inferior to Hong
Kong's existing system, and that thus would welcome a promise
not to establish an entity potentially so corrosive of Hong Kong's
judicial autonomy.
463
In addition to arguments focusing on the asserted substantive
merits of the proposed arrangement, proponents of the Court deals
consistently stressed the structural importance to business of hav-
ing some resolution in place before reversion. Colonial govern-
ment officials sought to elicit business support by addressing the
business community's aversion to legal and institutional uncer-
tainty. They argued that the 1991 deal offered the prospect of set-
tling the matter of the Court's form and powers early, and would
permit the establishment of the Court well before July 1, 1997. This
would give the Court time to gain experience, establish a record,
and develop precedents in advance of reversion-all virtues that
business could appreciate.464 In May 1995, on the eve of the second
Sino-British deal concerning the Court, Attorney General Mathews
was still urging support for an arrangement that he expected
would permit the establishment of a Court by mid-1996 to avoid a
"judicial vacuum" that would "seriously undermine[]" economi-
cally vital "international confidence in Hong Kong's legal sys-
tem."465 Uncertainty about the Court was, Mathews argued, "al-
ready having a damaging effect on confidence in Hong Kong,"
prompting businesses to draw up commercial contracts "with
clauses aimed at avoiding resort to Hong Kong courts."466 It was
"clearly harmful to Hong Kong's reputation as a commercial and
financial services center" that "investors [were] showing [such] a
lack of confidence in [Hong Kong's] judicial system."467 Even at
463 At the very least, no one had laid the political groundwork to make a post-
verdict review mechanism seem acceptable (or at least inevitable to Hong Kong's
business community). Although it was broadly similar in according P.R.C. insti-
tutions a role in the interpretation of Hong Kong law, such a proposal stood in
considerable contrast to the rather carefully crafted and long-standing provisions
in the Basic Law concerning the power of the N.P.C., its Standing Committee, and
the Central People's Government to amend, interpret, and implement the Basic
Law.
464 See, e.g., Mosher, supra note 136, at 10 (indicating the British desire to es-
tablish a court in 1993 so that it would be operating smoothly prior to reversion);
Mosher, supra note 179, at 13 (mentioning the considerable desirability to organize
the court promptly to establish its international reputation).
465 do Rosario, supra note 148, at 22.
466 Courting the Right Bill, supra note 135, at 13.
467 Id.
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this late date, Mathews argued, legislation implementing the 1991
deal and setting up the court "as soon as possible" was imperative,
for it would bring a pre-reversion end to the devastating "[u]ncer-
tainty over when and on what basis [this] crucial symbol and em-
bodiment of the rule of law" 468 would be established.
Hong Kong government officials could not invoke some of
these advantages in their quest for business support for the 1995
deal, however. Their arguments had to rest on the perils that
would befall business if the deal were rejected and a Court accept-
able to China could not be established as of July 1, 1997. Propo-
nents of the 1995 Court bill thus stressed the more modest certainty
that the legislation would provide: the Court's powers and com-
position, no worse than in the 1991 deal, would be clearly set forth
and accepted many months before the reversion, and the business
community therefore would not have to bear the risks or endure
the continued uncertainty that would attend having to rely on uni-
lateral P.R.C. legislation or post-reversion S.A.R. legislation to es-
tablish the C.F.A. and define its powers. In a somewhat disingenu-
ous characterization of the British authorities' preferred option,
Governor Patten articulated this line of argument: "[T]he choice
we have is either we don't have a court before 1997, or we set up a
court [unilaterally] which is changed or thrown out in 1997, or we
give [Legco] the opportunity of determining the nature of the court
which will begin to operate on July 1, 1997" by approving the
C.F.A. bill.469 Stating the government's argument for the 1995 bill,
Anson Chan maintained that the proposed legislation made "abso-
lutely certain" that there would be a "proper" court in place at re-
version, and would immediately end the "uncertainty about the es-
tablishment of the C.F.A." that had gone on "for too long" and had
had "a damaging effect on confidence." 470
Pro-democracy legislators and prominent liberal voices in
Hong Kong rejected the government's arguments that a C.F.A. set
up in accordance with either of the Sino-British accords would be a
"proper" Court, as judged by a broadly liberal-democratic notion
468 Id.
469 Yojana Sharma, Britain Agrees To Deal with China on New Court for Hong
Kong, DAILY TELEGRAPH, June 9, 1995, at 12; see also Patten Deal with China Aims To
Save Doomed Legislature, ASIAN POL. NEWS, July 17, 1995 (explaining the political
stances taken on the 1995 deal). The British had made similar arguments that re-
jecting the 1991 accord would allow China to set up whatever C.F.A. it sought af-
ter 1997. See Ching, supra note 37, at 190.
470 Yeung et al., supra note 138, at 1.
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of the rule of law, or an adequate Court, as measured against the
needs and wants of Hong Kong's business community. Backed by
the Hong Kong Bar Association, which represented the territory's
barristers, and, initially, by the Hong Kong Law Society, which
represented the colony's solicitors, Legco liberals and democrats
worked to discern and develop opposition to the C.F.A. bills in the
business community. They argued that the planned arrangements
for the C.F.A. eviscerated the court-dependent and common law-
based rule of law upon which Hong Kong business depended, and
that, by abandoning the Joint Declaration's and Basic Law's
pledges of legal continuity, the Court deals also portended a
broader unravelling of much that business valued.471 (Indeed,
Legco Democrats and some pro-democracy independents consid-
ered the shortcomings of the 1995 bill to be so serious that they
both voted against the bill and pressed, albeit unsuccessfully, for a
symbolic Legco vote of no-confidence in the Patten government.)
More specifically, Martin Lee argued that the failure to estab-
lish an adequate, rule-of-law-protecting Court would produce a
judicial system that Hong Kong's business community would
surely find uncongenial. In Lee's dark scenario, disputes between
Hong Kong and Chinese companies would be adjudicated by
S.A.R. judges who would be "subject to constant pressure" by the
Chinese government and the Communist Party and unable to
make "an independent and fair judgment." 472 The Court deals'
narrow restrictions on the number of foreign judges with interna-
tional reputations and foreign passports suggested that such prob-
lems could extend to the judiciary's highest levels. Lee and others
argued that the business community had equally good reason to
fear, and to oppose, the provisions in the C.F.A. deals and imple-
menting legislation that denied the Court jurisdiction over "acts of
state" and failed to define clearly the scope of those acts of state. In
the eyes of the Court accords' critics, these provisions raised the
prospect that Hong Kong courts would not be open to Hong Kong
companies and individuals seeking judicial relief from adverse ac-
tions by S.A.R. officials or breaches of contract by Chinese state-
471 See, e.g., Won & Wong, supra note 146, at 3 (quoting Legco member Emily
Lau stating that the deal "undermine[s] the Joint Declaration"); Chris Yeung & No
Kwai-yan, Governor Survives Vote, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 13, 1995, at 1
(quoting Democratic Party Legco member Cheung Man-kwong stating that the
C.F.A. deal signalled the "downfall of the rule of law in Hong Kong").
472 Lee, supra note 396; see also, Hong Kong, The Future According to Martin Lee,
supra note 418, at 82, 82; Lee, supra note 32, at 11.
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owned corporations. 473 Similarly, while China's decision to forego
creating a new P.R.C. entity to review C.F.A. judgments was to be
welcomed, Hong Kong liberals and democrats concluded that
China's having contemplated establishing the body at all was an
ominous signal to the business community and others that only a
weak and docile Hong Kong Court might be acceptable to China.474
Like the arguments that sought to claim and to cultivate busi-
ness support for the Bill of Rights and democratic reforms, Legco
democrats' and liberals' arguments that the arrangements contem-
plated in the C.F.A. deals would fail to satisfy the business com-
munity's requirements attracted initial support from the business
community that declined over time. The 1991 bill failed in Legco,
in part because pro-business members voted against it, and some
business leaders had publicly expressed concerns about the bill
that parallelled Legco Democrats' arguments against the legisla-
tion.475 By the time the Hong Kong government presented the 1995
deal, however, the balance appeared to have shifted. Some pro-
business politicians and foreign officials who claimed to under-
stand the views of the territory's international business community
continued to argue against parts of the Court bill.476 Most politi-
cally influential voices from the territory's business community,
473 See, e.g., Gilley, supra note 24, at 72, 74; Hong Kong, The Future According to
Martin Lee, supra note 416, at 82, 82 (discussing Lee's fears and hopes for the terri-
tory's legal and judicial future).
474 See do Rosario, supra note 148, at 22.
475 See, e.g., Mosher, supra note 136, at 10 (discussing Legco's rejection of the
1991 deal); Page, supra note 454, at 48 (quoting prominent banker, Basic Law
Drafting Committee, and Legco member David Li, who stated that a failure to re-
solve the court issue threatened "[t]he judiciary's independence" which "is vital to
Hong Kong's continued prosperity" but who appeared unwilling to endorse the
1991 accord); A Rosy Future for Hong Kong's Legal System?, LLOYD'S LIST, Dec. 11,
1992 (presenting similar views from members of the international business com-
munity); see also do Rosario, supra note 153, at 20 (describing Legco democrats'
and pro-business members' combining to defeat the 1991 bill); Mary Kwang, HK
Govt Faces Tough Fight on Appeal Court Bill, STRArrS TIMES (Singapore), June 10,
1995, at 17 (noting that the business community sided with liberal politicians' ob-
jections to a the late starting date for the Court of Final Appeal).
476 See, e.g., China's Chill Wind, FAR E. ECON. REV., May 18, 1995, at 5 (noting
that the U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong thought that the restriction on the
number of foreign judges and the possibility of a post-verdict remedial mecha-
nism controlled by China would threaten a dilution of the rule of law that would
"certainly drive away" foreign investors); Kwang, supra note 477, at 17; Won &
Wong, supra note 146, at 3 (describing splits among Legco members from the gen-
erally pro-business Liberal Party over whether to support the 1995 bill, given the
restrictions on foreign judges' serving and the late establishment date for the
Court).
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however, supported the legislation to implement the second Sino-
British accord on the Court. British and colonial government ar-
guments about the perils of a second rejection appeared to have
swayed or silenced local and international business interests. At-
torney General Mathews could confidently proclaim that the busi-
ness community in Hong Kong and abroad gave the 1995 accord a
warm welcome. 477 In the end, the legislation passed Legco, with
most of the members from the pro-business Liberal Party voting
for it, and without triggering an outcry from any major sentiment
of the territory's business community.47
8
Even so, opponents of the C.F.A. accords still argued that ap-
parent acquiescence did not represent the true views of business. 479
According to some of Hong Kong's leading liberal and pro-
democracy politicians, the business community in fact recognized
its need for a Court that exceeded what the Sino-British deals
would provide, and a Court that more nearly approached Hong
Kong liberals' and democrats' conception of the requisites of an
adequate rule of law and a just legal order. They argued that, in
the face of the combined pressure of the territory's present and fu-
ture masters, business had only outwardly succumbed to calls to
support the 1995 bill. There was, on this view, little reason to think
that the level of business distress over the 1991 bill had rapidly dis-
sipated and been replaced by genuine support for a 1995 bill that
was, after all, identical to the 1991 bill in several respects, and less
477 See Mathews Strikes at Opposition, S. CHINA MORNING POST, June 15, 1995, at
6 (describing the relief of international and local business at the achievement of a
Court deal, and the other deals it made possible); Politics of a New Era,
EUROMONEY, Sept. 1995, at 449; Stephen Vines, Beijing, London Sign Agreement on
HK Court of Final Appeal, Bus. TIMES, June 10, 1995, at 3.
478 See Yeung et al., supra note 138, at 1, (describing the Legco alignment on
the C.F.A. Bill); Won & Wong, supra note 146, at 3; Chris Yeung & Linda Choy,
Issue "Back to Square One," S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 4, 1995, at 1 (noting lib-
eral Legco member and G.C.C. head Jimmy McGregor's switch from opposing the
1991 bill to supporting the 1995 bill).
Patten, while critical of business' stance on other issues, praised the territory's
business community for being very helpful in securing a deal on the Court. See
Hutchings, supra note 407, at 10; Chris Yeung & Genevieve Ku, Patten Tells Busi-
nessmen To Stand Up for Autonomy, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct. 11, 1996, at 1; see
also Rule of Law Uncertain, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 2, 1994, at 20 (describing
the prospect that the parties would fail to achieve and implement a C.F.A. agree-
ment before reversion as risking the creation of a "legal vacuum" that "could seri-
ously damage investment in the territory"-a prospect that should prompt "busi-
nessmen ... [to] do their utmost to convince [P.R.C.] officials of the folly of
undermining Hong Kong's judicial system, however temporarily").
479 See, e.g., Yeung & No, supra note 150, at 1; Steinberger, supra note 377, at 8.
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favorable than the earlier legislation on the crucial question of the
Court's establishment date. The visible splits among pro-business
legislators over the 1995 bill provided further support for this line
of argument.
Liberal and democratic critics of the Court deals also pointed to
less "political" and, perhaps, more reliable indicators suggesting
that business held pessimistic views of the second Court deal and
continued to demand, albeit not very visibly, a more robust rule of
law. Thus, Martin Lee asked rhetorically, of the firms that had
shifted their corporate domiciles to other countries for fear of Hong
Kong's rule of law, "How many companies which left are coming
back now that we have such a good Court of Final Appeal agree-
ment?" 480 He could also have asked how many more of Hong
Kong's local and foreign firms were ready and able to take flight if
the Court deal proved to be as bad as he and like-minded politi-
cians claimed and feared.
3.2.4. The Chief Executive: From Process to Substance
Like the debates over the C.F.A. bills, the controversy sur-
rounding the selection of the S.A.R.'s first Chief Executive brought
another visible split between Hong Kong's British colonial authori-
ties and its most ardently pro-democracy politicians. While each
group insisted that the Chief Executive selection process and its
outcome had to be compatible with the broad notions of account-
able government and the rule of law that they shared, they differed
over what those principles required in this context. Accordingly,
British and Hong Kong governments, on one side, and the Legco
democrats and liberals, on the other side, made quite different ar-
guments about what Hong Kong's business community should
think about the Chief Executive question.
Pro-democracy critics of the selection process primarily sought
to secure business support by arguing that the selection process
and its outcome threatened the business community's immediate
material interests. They argued that Beijing had so thoroughly or-
chestrated Tung Chee-hwa's undemocratic selection that it would
be very difficult for him to protect the interests of Hong Kong
business (or of anyone else in Hong Kong) in the face of pressure
or neglect from Beijing. From this perspective, Tung's moral debt
to the territory's new masters, for having bailed out his family's
480 Steinberger, supra note 375.
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troubled shipping business, further weakened the Chief Executive-
designate's ability to stand up for Hong Kong and its business
community's needs. With critics of the process having accepted
the inevitability of Tung's selection long before his formal nomina-
tion or appointment, Hong Kong liberals' and democrats' argu-
ments to the business community did not seek to affect the out-
come. They attempted instead to rally business to push Tung to
defend Hong Kong's interests generally, including the preservation
of Hong Kong's promised autonomy from prosperity-threatening
interference from Beijing.
Hong Kong's colonial authorities had to craft a more complex
strategy to pursue business support for the closed and preordained
Chief Executive selection process and its outcome, without at the
same time compromising the Hong Kong government's enhanced
commitment to liberal-democratic norms in the struggles over
rights legislation, democratic reform and the legal and institutional
issues of the endgame more generally. Crafting an appropriate
and effective approach to business was an especially difficult and
delicate task for a colonial government that had pledged early on
to cooperate with the Chief Executive-designate, and that arguably
had an even shakier claim than Tung to a democratic or electoral
mandate to rule Hong Kong. Within the constraints that these po-
sitions imposed, Hong Kong government officials sought to por-
tray Tung as appealing to business because of his ties to estab-
lished government institutions and public policies of late colonial
Hong Kong.481 Patten and others stressed the importance to the
business community of Tung's experience in Exco and his retention
of Anson Chan, Donald Tsang, and other key civil servants in sen-
ior offices.482
In their proponents' view, these arguments served, perhaps
primarily, to emphasize an important symbolic thread of continu-
ity with what the colonial authorites saw as the just, legitimate,
and accountable institutions and rule of law regime of the past that
had served business interests well. These arguments, however, also
made a more narrow and direct appeal to the interests of their
business audience. They emphasized to the Hong Kong business
community the reassuring and appealing prospects of continuity in
481 See Bruce Gilley, Henry... Who?, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 9. 1997, at 82.
482 See Linda Choy & Angela Li, Chan Congratulates Friend Tung, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Nov. 19, 1996, at 6; Fung Wai-kong, Governor and Tung Set to Meet
on Monday, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Dec. 21, 1996, at 1; John Ridding & Louise
Lucas, Tung to Keep Top HK Officials, FIN. TIMEs, Feb. 21 1997, at 8.
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economic policy and the predictability of familiar faces and experi-
enced hands in government.
On the Chief Executive selection issue, as on the other major
legal-institutional issues of the endgame, arguments in favor of
relatively robust liberal and democratic reform initially struck a
chord with the territory's business elites, but resonated much more
weakly with that vital audience as the date of Hong Kong's rever-
sion drew near. During the protracted speculation over who might
seek the post and have a realistic chance of winning it, leading fig-
ures in the territory's business community at times appeared to
echo Hong Kong's democratic politicians. Some openly worried
that selecting one of their own to the post would raise the prospect
of a merger of political and economic power that could generate
serious conflicts of interest and threaten to upset Hong Kong's
much-praised (if not always present) "level playing field." Many
among the colony's business elite voiced support for distinctly
non-business candidates drawn from institutions closely associated
with the territory's rule-of-law establishment, including top civil
servant Anson Chan and Chief Justice Yang Ti-liang.
483
By the time of Tung's appointment and certainly by the date of
his formal selection, however, expressions of support for the choice
had replaced such expressions of concern among the territory's
business leaders. The business community appeared to accept not
only the process that chose Tung, but also many of the policies that
Tung said he intended to pursue (including roll-backs of rights and
civil liberties legislation and close cooperation with the Provisional
Legislature).
Faced with such developments, the Hong Kong politicians who
had long criticized the Chief Executive selection process, and the
colonial government that had long accepted the arrangement, tried
to convince business to support a moderate use of the office by
Tung, one that would not undermine features of late colonial Hong
Kong's laws, institutions, and nascent reforms that adherents to a
broadly liberal-democratic vision of legality considered vital to a
483 See, e.g., Frank Ching, Tung: A Reluctant Candidate, FAR E. ECON. REV., July
25, 1996, at 40 (discussing business groups' concerns about Tung's ties to power-
ful tycoon Li Ka-shing); Angela Li, Businessman Expresses Doubts over British Links,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Nov. 9, 1996, at 6 (describing a business leader's concerns
over Tung's ties to the powerful Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and noting some
business leaders' support for Yang's candidacy); Straw Poll: Who Will Make the Best
Chief Executive?, supra note 342, at 28 (presenting views of several business leaders
on appropriate Chief Executive candidates).
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rule of law for Hong Kong that satisfied both the demands of a just
and proper order and the real needs of the business community. 48 4
They did not pursue this agenda principally through arguments
that narrowly addressed the Chief Executive question. Rather,
they relied on their arguments about why business should not
support a reversal of Bill of Rights provisions and an overturning
of civil liberties legislation, and why business should not be an ac-
complice to the Provisional Legislature's betrayals of Hong Kong's
interests and recent legal and constitutional accomplishments. 485
3.3. Business and the China and "Pro-China" Hong Kong Vision of
the Rule of Law
During the several years leading up to Hong Kong's return to
Chinese rule, official Chinese statements and "pro-China" indi-
viduals and organizations in Hong Kong, accepted the idea that
business wanted and needed the rule of law to survive in post-
reversion Hong Kong. Official Chinese and Hong Kong pro-China
comments repeatedly stressed to business audiences that Hong
Kong's legal system and its prior laws generally, and its business-
related laws and policies specifically, would remain in tact after the
establishment of the S.A.R., just as China had promised in the Joint
Declaration, the Basic Law, and elsewhere.48 6
China, these sources assured the business community, knew
better than to undermine the essential legal and institutional ele-
ments of Hong Kong's economic success. Politburo Standing
Committee member Li Ruihuan compared Hong Kong to a price-
less yixing teapot which would lose its value if scrubbed too hard
in an effort to clean it.487 A senior Chinese official reportedly as-
484 See, e.g., Ng, supra note 42; Emily Lau, Letter to Hong Kong (Hong Kong ra-
dio broadcast, Dec. 15, 1996), transcribed in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Dec. 18, 1996, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
485 See supra Sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2; see also Gilley, supra note 59, at 15 (describing
liberal arguments against and business worries about Tung's policies).
486 See Basic Law, supra note 21, arts. 8, 85, 160 (providing for continuity in
the laws and the legal system and autonomy of local legal institutions); Joint Dec-
laration, supra note 39, § 3(3), annex I, art. II; Basic Law, supra note 21, arts. 5, 105-
19 (providing for the preservation of Hong Kong's capitalist economic system and
continuity and autonomy in Hong Kong's property rights, fiscal, monetary, finan-
cial, and foreign trade regimes); Joint Declaration, supra note 39, § 3(5)-(10), annex
I, arts. V-VII; see also, Hsieh Ming, "The Death of Hong Kong"? To Hell with "For-
tune"!, TA KUNG PAO, June 15, 1995, at A9 (refuting a Fortune magazine article
foreseeing the decline of Hong Kong after "everything" changes in 1997).
487 See Text of Li Ruihuan's Remarks to Hong Kong and Macao Representatives to
the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, supra note 222, Mar. 14, 1995, at
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sured a prominent Hong Kong businessman that China would not
repeat the economically harmful mistake it had made in Macau of
becoming "far too involved"488 in local affairs.4 9 Hong Kong and
Macau Affairs Office Director Lu Ping assured the territory's Gen-
eral Chamber of Commerce that "a prosperous Hong Kong means
a prosperous China" and that China would accordingly do what
was necessary to preserve Hong Kong's economic health.490 More
specifically, senior Foreign Ministry and other Chinese officials,
along with pro-China voices in the territory, frequently reassured
international business leaders that foreign business interests would
continue to be protected by Hong Kong's prior laws after 1997.491
In promising a rule-of-law system adequate to satisfy the needs
and wants of the territory's business elites, China and its Hong
Kong allies contemplated a set of rule-of-law values, coordinate
laws, and institutions that were quite different from those which
colonial authorities and Hong Kong's liberal and democratic politi-
cians claimed were necessary to satisfy and sustain the business
community. At the very least, constructing an S.A.R. legal order
acceptable to business could not impose such extensive restrictions
on China's sovereign discretion or derive its authority from institu-
tions or procedures so insulated from legitimate control by the cen-
tral Chinese government that it threatened to exceed the limits de-
manded by the generally positivist vision of domestic legal
authority that China and its political agents and allies in Hong
Kong shared.
China and its allies in the territory envisioned that a set of laws
and institutions acceptable to Hong Kong's business community
would stop short of testing these limits. To varying degrees and at
different times, they suggested that the maintenance of prosperity
in Hong Kong, and the confidence of the business sector on which
prosperity depended, required only a fairly modest rule of law.
B5.
488 Gilley, supra note 24, at 72 (quoting a prominent local businessman's ac-
count of a discussion with a senior Chinese official).
489 See id.
490 Lau, supra note 449, at 11.
491 See, e.g., Chinese Foreign Minister: Foreign Interests in Hong Kong To Be Pro-
tected by Law, WEN WEI Po, July 24, 1996, at A12, translated in BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, July 25, 1996 (quoting Foreign Minister Qian Qichen), available
at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; HK's New Chief Spells Out Mhat Is Needed To
Move Forward, STRAITs TIMES (Singapore), Dec. 24, 1996, at 20 (citing Tung Chee-
hwa's statement that "[wie must particularly reaffirm to our international friends
the integrity of our legal framework" and the "level playing field" it provides).
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The notion of a sufficient rule of law for business sometimes could
sound very crabbed, especially when articulated by some members
of the top echelons of the leadership in Beijing or at moments of
particularly tense relations between the P.R.C. and British or Hong
Kong officials and politicians. Chinese leader Jiang Zemin stressed
that "Hong Kong's prosperity in the past cannot be attributed ...
to an independent judiciary and a free system of the press." 492 An
editorial in the resolutely pro-China newspaper Wen Wei Po, amid
some of the sharpest conflicts over Patten's constitutional reforms,
commented that China's growing economic prowess, and not the
careful preservation or extension of the colonial legal and institu-
tional order, was "the fundamental guarantee for Hong Kong's
smooth transition and continued prosperity."493
Further, some China and pro-China sources hinted that the
specter of a somewhat "politicized" allocation of business oppor-
tunities under Chinese rule would not be fatal to business confi-
dence in Hong Kong. Indeed, official Chinese sources charged that
the British authorities had already introduced political considera-
tions into economic dealings with the territory's businesses during
the transition and, in doing so, had merely extended a long-
standing pattern of cozy relationships between the colonial gov-
ernment and its favored companies, often ones with British roots or
ties.
49 4
The China and pro-China camp's apparent confidence that
business would ultimately accept a rule-of-law regime that was
also acceptable to China likely stemmed in part from the state-
ments and actions of much of the territory's indigenous and inter-
national business elites. Aside from a few brief downturns, these
elites had kept Hong Kong's securities markets and bond ratings
buoyant throughout the transition. Many of the business commu-
492 Ching, supra note 223, at 36 (quoting remarks of Jiang Zemin); cf. Zhu
Rongji Meets Hong Kong Delegation, Xinhua, Jan. 17, 1996 (reporting senior Chinese
official's comments that Hong Kong's success depeded greatly on Hong Kong's
links to the mainland's economic development), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allasi File.
493 Preparation Means Success; No Preparation Means Failure, WEN WEI Po, Dec.
12, 1993, at 2.
494 See, e.g., Ma Ling, Lu Ping Talks About Three Issues, Criticizes British Side for
Lacking Sincerity in Cooperation, TA KUNG PAO, Jan. 18, 1994, at 2 (reporting Lu
Ping's view that the British used colonial governmental powers to advance British
business interests); Yeung & Law, supra note 453, at 1 (discussing Xinhua Hong
Kong's accusation that the colonial government granted business favors based on
political considerations).
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nity's most audible voices routinely and loudly expressed confi-
dence in Hong Kong's future prosperity. The broader business
community continued to invest, in what critics derided as a lawless
mainland China. In making and managing many of those invest-
ments through their offices in Hong Kong, members of the terri-
tory's elite business community also made China-linked ventures,
and the legal and political risks they entailed, an increasingly cen-
tral part of their business in Hong Kong.
495
Except for occasional intemperate comments and despite a pos-
sible belief that Hong Kong business might not demand a very
strong rule of law, China and Hong Kong's pro-China forces usu-
ally remained fairly circumspect in their discussions of business at-
titudes and the rule of law. Through comments directed at the ter-
ritory's business community, and through repeated invocations of
relevant provisions in the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration, they
regularly offered reassurances that legal protections for investors
would survive the transition. They also argued that controversial
legal changes planned for post-reversion Hong Kong posed no
threat to the rule of law that business needed and wanted. As
China and its allies saw it, those changes primarily would be mere
reversals of prosperity-threatening, Basic Law- violating and Joint
Declaration-breaching innovations that Hong Kong's colonial mas-
ters had irresponsibly introduced on the eve of their departure.
Still, the version of legality that China and its Hong Kong sup-
porters articulated in their public statements and in their interpre-
tations of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law did not imply
that the S.A.R. would provide a legal order that was as liberal and
robust as Hong Kong had enjoyed during the 1980s or before. Al-
though cautiously expressed, the China and pro-China view re-
mained fully consistent with pursuing a retrenchment not only
from late colonial innovations, but also from Hong Kong's more
modestly liberal and democratic pre-Tiananmen Incident baseline
495 See, e.g., Gilley, supra note 24, at 72 (outlining China's business involve-
ment in Hong Kong prior to July 1, 1997); Hong Kong's Experiences in Investing in
the Hinterland, TA KUNG PAO, Nov. 24, 1994, at 9 (quoting Li Ka-shing); Jonathan
Sprague, S&P Says H.K. Credit Safe Amidst Sino-British Rows, Reuters, Feb. 13, 1995
File (noting Standard and Poor's upgrade of Hong Kong's currency rating), avail-
able at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi; The Shadow over Hong Kong, EcoNOMIsT, Apr.
3, 1993, at 37 (noting the rise in the stock market following what some saw as a
threat of increased Chinese government intervention); U.S. Businesses Confident on
Hong Kong and China, Reuters, Nov. 23, 1995 (noting U.S. business confidence in
Hong Kong's future after the territory's reversion to China), available at LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
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of laws and institutions.
While Chinese officials and Hong Kong's pro-China elements
thus shared the view that business would support or accept an ar-
rangment that China could provide in an exercise of its discretion-
ary sovereign authoirty over the territory, and that China would be
willing to accept as consistent with the requirements of preserving
China's sovereignty, the controus of that legal order did not
emerge fully in general discussions of a rule of law for Hong Kong.
They took clearer shape, amid occasional splits and shifts in the
"China camp's" positions, in the endgame battles over business at-
titudes toward the concrete legal and institutional arrangements
for the S.A.R.
3.3.1. The Bill of Rights, the Reversal of Late Colonial Laws, and
the Requisites of Order
Although China clearly objected to the enactment of Hong
Kong's Bill of Rights Ordinance, the leadership in Beijing appears
to have recognized that there was little chance of preventing the
colonial government's adoption of the Ordinance in the wake of
Hong Kong's reaction to the Tiananmen demonstrations of 1989
and China's violent suppression of them. China initially made lit-
tle overt effort to point out or draw forth business support for its
position on the Bill of Rights or other reforms to liberties-restricting
colonial laws. Early on, official P.R.C. statements did little more
than put the business community and everyone else on notice of
China's displeasure and its reserved right to review and repeal any
legislation it deemed incompatible with the Basic Law.496 The Chi-
nese authorities thus reiterated the basic positivist point that,
whatever portion of the newly enacted liberties Hong Kong's busi-
ness community and ordinary citizens would retain after rever-
sion, they would possess such legal rights as the product of direct
or delegated exercises of the P.R.C.'s sovereign power.
Later in the 1990s, China and pro-China elements in Hong
Kong began to work harder to garner business support on rights-
related issues. China and its Hong Kong allies pointed out the
dangers that business would face if the S.A.R. were to leave in
place liberal changes to laws governing political associations, ral-
496 See, e.g., Zhang Junsheng Stresses PWC Opinion of Bill of Rights Is Reasonable
and Legitimate, supra note 232, at Al (noting the Chinese Foreign Ministry state-
ment issued at the time of the introduction of the Bill of Rights legislation in
Legco).
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lies and free speech, and sections of the Bill of Rights allowing
courts aggressively to interpret or strike down rights-limiting laws.
They further argued that the colonial government's eleventh-hour
changes in Hong Kong's laws risked, in Lu Ping's phrase, trans-
forming Hong Kong from an "economic city," where business had
flourished, into a "political city" beset by social unrest and declin-
ing prosperity.497 Chinese and pro-China sources cautioned that
the colonial government's supposedly liberty-protecting reforms to
the Societies and Public Order Ordinances would protect law-
breakers and hinder the S.A.R. government's ability to provide the
social order that the business community wanted and needed.498
Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office Director Lu Ping and the
glowing coverage in the pro-China press of Chief Executive-
designate Tung's early comments on rights issues asserted that re-
versing late colonial changes to the Public Order and Societies Or-
dinances would not abolish the rights that enjoyed undeniable
popularity in Hong Kong or produce popular discontent and un-
rest that would threaten business interests. The changes that the
P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies favored would merely help to rees-
tablish a proper balance between individual rights and society's in-
terest in order499- something that business elites sensitive to both
rights and economic issues could surely appreciate. P.R.C. sources
and commentaries in Hong Kong's pro-China press (frequently
quoting Tung) insisted that the changes were relatively modest
and did not portend a general rejection of human rights, which
were amply protected under the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law,
and Hong Kong laws that would survive the transition.500 Further,
Xinhua Hong Kong Branch Deputy Director Zhang Junsheng sug-
gested that the planned moves to eliminate late colonial legal
changes implied no threat to any rule of law valued by Hong Kong
497 See Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are Good, supra note
238, at A2; Be Vigilant Against Instigating Political Confrontation, supra note 306, at
A2.
498 See Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are Good, supra note
238; Be Vigilant Against Instigating Political Confrontation, supra note 306, at A2.
499 See Lu Ping Stresses Partial Abrogation of Some Ordinances Amended by British
Hong Kong Government Is Intended To Maintain Hong Kong's Prosperity and Stability,
WEN WEI PO, Jan. 26, 1997, at All.
500 See, e.g., Ray Bashford, Core Confidence Edges Out Doubt, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Feb. 23, 1997, at 2 (noting positive market performance after the N.P.C. deci-
sion to reject several rights laws); Quak Hiang Whai, Tung Defends Plans by Beijing
To Amend HK Laws, Bus. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1997, at 6 (quoting Tung Chee-hwa's
statement that Beijing's plan to repeal laws would enhance social order).
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business elites. Rather, just as China had argued in opposing the
enactment of the Bill of Rights Ordinance in 1991, these changes
would only correct the colonial authorities' moves to "introduce a
law overriding the Basic Law and other Hong Kong laws" and to
"cripple Hong Kong's existing legal system."50'
China and pro-China sources urged the business community
not to take seriously the colonial government's and Hong Kong
liberals' alarming predictions about the consequences of changing
rights laws that had been adopted or amended during the 1990s.
Contrary to the arguments Governor Patten, Martin Lee and others
pressed, the impending repeal of late colonial legislation was no
threat to Hong Kong's prosperity. Rather, the pro-China newspa-
per Wen Wei Po editorialized, the real risk to Hong Kong business
was the possibility that foreign investment and trade might fall in
response to the fantastical horror stories about the consequences of
altering rights laws that British and colonial officials and Hong
Kong politicians were spreading abroad.50 2 P.R.C. sources and
China's allies in Hong Kong also suggested that the apparent pub-
lic support for the laws facing repeal was not a reason for business
to oppose moderate retrenchments that would otherwise be ac-
ceptable or appealing to business leaders. They asserted that any
popular support for the doomed laws was merely the transient and
shallowly-rooted product of a propaganda apparatus controlled by
the colonial authorities.5 03
Whether they simply captured underlying business attitudes,
or persuaded business to adopt China's position on late colonial
rights laws, or convinced business that its best option was to ac-
quiesce in the P.R.C. and pro-China camp's agenda, these argu-
ments provoked little audible opposition in the business commu-
nity and won considerable support. In contrast to the relatively
muted business voices supporting the Bill of Rights and related
legislation on the eve of reversion, many of the pro-China business
leaders in the territory picked up some of the central points of the
arguments favoring retrenchment and asserted that the P.R.C. and
pro-China perspective resonated with business' views. Developer
and P.W.C. and P.C. member David Chu proclaimed that the re-
501 Zhang Junsheng Stresses PWC Opinion of Bill of Rights Is Reasonable and Le-
gitimate, supra note 232, at Al.
502 See Tung Chee-hwa's Remarks Are Beneficial to Hong Kong's Prosperity, supra
note 238, at A4.
503 See id.; Tung Chee-hwa Says that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are Good, supra
note 238, at A2.
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laxation of restrictions on civil liberties and other "things ... done
in the name of freedom and democracy" had deleterious "side-
effects" to which the government had paid too little attention.504
Moreover, Chu suggested that the China side's argument about the
impropriety of major last-minute moves to liberalize Hong Kong
law was something his fellow participants in commerce should
appreciate: "You don't want the current owner making drastic
changes after you've already signed the deed." 505
If the broader business community did not share Chu's views,
it likely understood the message from China and its closest Hong
Kong allies: China and the S.A.R. government would exercise leg-
islative authority over Hong Kong to roll back some late colonial
legal changes, with relatively little regard for the modest opposi-
tion - or support - that such moves might engender in Hong Kong
business circles. Chu's analogy to a real estate transaction also
suggested at least an intuitive understanding in the business com-
munity of a more fundamental feature of the P.R.C. and pro-China
approach to the controversy over Hong Kong rights laws. For
China and its closest supporters and agents in Hong Kong, the con-
tent of rights legislation, like many of the terms of a real estate con-
tract, was a matter of choice and discretion, not the reflection of
fundamental truths or the implementation of fixed substantive
norms.
3.3.2. The Legislature, the Patten Reforms, and the Costs of
Opposition
Like their arguments concerning the Bill of Rights and civil lib-
erties, the arguments that China and its supporters deployed to in-
duce business to oppose Patten's electoral reform package and to
support China's decision to replace Legco with a Provisional Legis-
lature sought to appeal to the narrow self-interest of the territory's
business elites and their ability to calculate costs and benefits. On
these issues of democratization and the legislature, intramural and
temporal variations within the China and pro-China camp over the
details of how to address the business community were somewhat
more visible than they were in the debates over rolling back rights
legislation. Various official Chinese and pro-China Hong Kong
504 For Many Corporate Chiefs, 1997 Cannot Come Soon Enough, supra note 401,
at 22, 22.
505 Maggie Farley, Wary of China, Text Publishers Stop the Presses, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 16, 1994, at A5.
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sources disagreed mildly or changed their opinions slightly about
the established or instillable views and values of the business
community and their implications for the degree of democratic
change that the P.R.C. and the S.A.R. governments, as the wielders
of sovereign power, would be prudent to accept in order to insure
a smooth transition, a prosperous and stable Hong Kong, and the
preservation of China's ultimate sovereign power and discretion.
Official P.R.C. spokespeople and China's closest compatriots in
Hong Kong warned that, much like the late colonial changes to
civil and political liberties legislation, Patten's reforms to the elec-
toral laws would result in economically harmful social instability.
The pro-P.R.C. newspaper Ta Kung Pao cautioned that the Gover-
nor's plans would "jeopardize prosperity and stability " 506 and
would harm the economic interests of foreign and domestic inves-
tors. Surely, the territory's business leaders would not welcome
such a result. Moreover, the pro-China press asserted that some of
the predicted "turbulence" had already materialized and had
weakened the economy in the immediate aftermath of Patten's
proposals, even before those proposals had become law or been
implemented.5 07 Lu Ping underscored the point, asserting that the
Chinese side would never cause chaos harmful to Hong Kong,
while the British side's political reform proposals already had.
50 8
China and pro-China sources argued further that the broad-
ened franchise that Patten planned to introduce threatened to pro-
duce a Legco dominated by politicians hostile to business interests.
Official Chinese commentaries asserted that Patten's expansion
and restructuring of functional constituencies to give nearly all
working Hong Kongers a vote in those constituencies (in addition
to their votes in universal suffrage geographic constituencies) con-
stituted a devastating attack on a system of representation that had
"ensure[d] business and financial sectors and those organizations
and professionals that play a special role in Hong Kong will be
represented in the Legislative Council."509 Simply stated, these
P.R.C. and pro-China voices argued to business leaders that Patten
was trying to silence the business elites' prominent voice in the ter-
506 Mr. Patten's Choice, supra note 261, at 2.
507 See Deng's Remarks Have Practical Significance, and Those Who Label Them
'Outdated' Are Making a Big Mistake, WEN WEI PO, Sept. 27, 1993.
508 See Liu, supra note 450, at 2.
509 Text of Chinese Statement on the Breakdown of Sino-British Talks on Hong
Kong, supra note 265 (stating the Chinese position on the reasons for the stalemate
in Sino-British talks on constitutional and electoral reform in Hong Kong).
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ritory's government.
Moreover, Chinese spokesmen and prominent pro-China
voices in Hong Kong argued, Patten's moves would assure that
anti-business voices would grow louder and more influential in the
halls of Hong Kong government. They charged that, under
Patten's electoral regime, in the place of reliably pro-business rep-
resentatives, the voters comprising the expanded electorate were
sure to place "a lot of radicals in the legislature." l 0 P.R.C. and pro-
China Hong Kong sources warned that the new Legco members
sure to be chosen under Patten's rules would join with Patten's
government to pursue laws and policies that were anathema to
Hong Kong's pro-free-market and anti-regulatory business com-
munity. In particular, criticisms of the Patten reforms stressed that
the colonial administration-Legco democrat government would
engage in excessive social spending that not only would require
raising taxes, but also would sap Hong Kong's vital and formida-
ble work ethic. 511 A leader of the territory's leading pro-China
party opined that the business community was quite worried
about this possibility.512
In addition to these arguments addressing the assumed preex-
isting material interests of the business elite, China took a number
of steps to structure the incentives facing business. China thus de-
layed progress on the airport and infrastructure projects that busi-
ness saw as vital to the territory's continued prosperity (as well as
a source of lucrative contracts for some of Hong Kong's biggest
companies). China was clear that it did so largely in response to
the British authorities' intransigence on political reform. 513 Guo
510 do Rosario, supra note 91, at 20; see also Yeung & Wong, supra note 324, at
21 (quoting Shiu Sin-por, head of a pro-China think tank, stating that business
would welcome a more "balanced" legislature).
511 See, Karp, Money Talks, supra note 454, at 18 (quoting Bank of China
economist Xu Yongfu, that government's social spending plans threatened to sap
Hong Kong's "spirit of diligence" and would create "a welfare society"); see also
do Rosario, supra note 301, at 29 (citing business fears that Democratic Party pro-
posals could "harm Hong Kong's free-market spirit").
512 See do Rosario, supra note 91, at 20; see also For Many Corporate Chiefs, 1997
Cannot Come Soon Enough, supra note 401, at 22 (quoting business leader Vincent
Lo's statement that business had serious concerns regarding social spending).
513 See, e.g., Louise do Rosario, Incoming Fire, FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 16, 1993,
at 20 (describing political reform issues and infrastructure projects mixing politics
and economics at J.L.G. sessions); Stacy Mosher, Straight Talk, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
July 2, 1992, at 19 (describing the entanglement of the airport issue with Chinese
objections to pre-Patten political reform plans of British side); Tai Ming Cheung,
Glacial Thaw, FAR E. ECON REV., July 22, 1993, at 13 (discussing the progress on air-
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Fengmin, of the Chinese delegation to the Sino-British Joint Liasion
Group, explained the policy and its grounding in P.R.C.-style posi-
tivist legal principles. Wen Wei Po paraphrased Guo's comments:
China, is very clear on its position on Christopher Patten's
move to table his so-called constitutional reform package to
Legco. Although the J.L.G. has its own agenda and issues,
these are all conducted on the basis of the Joint Declaration
and the Basic Law. J.L.G. work will of course be affected if
this basis is undermined [by the adoption of reform pro-
posals that failed to conform to the Basic Law and Joint
Declaration.] 14
Although Chinese and pro-China arguments generally ad-
dressed the business community as a rather undifferentiated
whole, China's actions specifically targeted Hong Kong firms back-
ing the Patten proposals for more particularized retaliation, and
warned British companies that they could see their interests and
prospects in Hong Kong and China suffer if the colonial govern-
ment did not back down on political reform.51 5 Raising the stakes
further, Chinese officials indicated that reversion-straddling gov-
ernment contracts might require approval from China, essentially
as a proxy for the S.A.R. post-reversion government.5 16 Amid some
of the sharpest conflicts over the political reform issue, Chinese
Vice Premier Zhu Rongji even threatened that Patten's failure to
compromise might leave China free to disregard the Joint Declara-
tion, thus removing a crucial, positive law underpinning of the le-
port issue and on electoral reforms at bilateral talks); James Tien, Hong Kong Can
Survive Under One Country, One System, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 2, 1993, at
11 (criticizing China's postponement of infrastructure projects in opposition to
Patten's reforms).
514 Yu Chi-ping & Tai Pao-erh, Joint Liaison Group Meeting Ends with Agreeing
on Next Session, WEN WEI Po, Dec. 10, 1993, at 11.
515 See Huang Chen-ya, Jardine's Salvo Is HK's Wake-Up Call, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 20, 1992; Li, supra note 299, Feb. 28, 1994, at 48-49 (asserting
that "a considerable number of British-invested financial groups had found that
their London background had become a 'burden' in China trade"); Nick Rufford,
Patten Worries the Money Men, SUNDAY TIMES (London), July 3, 1994; Tai Ming
Cheung, Frontal Assault, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 1, 1993, at 10 (describing the
comments of P.R.C. Minister of Foreign Trade Li Lanqing); Yeung & Law, supra
note 453, at 1.
516 See Tai, supra note 451, at 8.
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gal order on which business depended.5 17
The calculus that China expected Hong Kong business to un-
dertake was surely clear to the territory's business elites. Business
leaders with interests in Hong Kong, or even in China, that were
supporting Patten's or Hong Kong democrats' agenda could ex-
pect, individually or collectively, to pay a heavy economic price.
Still, Chinese officials, especially those directly involved in the
handling of Hong Kong affairs, typically stopped well short of Zhu
Rongji's threats and sometimes retreated from aggressive positions
that seemed to be shaking business confidence. They tried to reas-
sure business that China's resort to such hard-ball tactics in oppos-
ing changes to constitutional and electoral law should not be inter-
preted as indicating a willingness or inclinaton to undermine the
core commercial legal order that the Chinese side recognized busi-
ness required. Thus, Lu Ping explained that the problem with con-
tracts that extended through and beyond 1997 did not include
"non-governmental contracts," and that China hoped that govern-
mental contracts "will extend beyond 1997, and that the people
concerned will be able to set their minds at rest."518 Lu added,
"[Als we constantly declare, we protect and support various types
of private capital ... in Hong Kong." 519 An official Chinese state-
ment similarly pledged that "China would take a positive attitude
in examining and approving" the problematic contracts.5 20 Indeed,
Lu Ping explained, China demanded that government contracts ex-
tending beyond 1997 "must be discussed with the Chinese gov-
ernment" precisely because that was necessary to provide parties
to those contracts with "legal protection."5 21
China and its Hong Kong agents and supporters also suggested
to the business community that the apparent popularity of democ-
ratic reform in the territory was no reason to side with the Patten
program.522 They argued that what seemed like genuine popular
sentiment in favor of the governor's agenda was really the result of
517 See Tai Ming Cheung, Embattled Governor, FAR E. ECON. REV., Nov. 26,
1992, at 10.
518 Liu, supra note 450, at 2; see also Tai, supra note 450, at 9 (quoting an official
Chinese statement that "the Chinese Government reiterated that investments in
Hongkong [sic] by private capital from both Chinese and foreign sources remain
welcome").
519 Liu, supra note 450, at 2.
520 Tai, supra note 45o, at 9.
521 Liu, supra note 450, at 2.
522 See Just Keep a Watch over Mr. Chris Patten's Performance, supra note 287.
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Patten temporarily duping many people into believing that his re-
forms were not harmful.5 23 Once the people learned the truth
about how dangrous the Patten reforms were (or how futile sup-
porting them would be), ordinary Hong Kongers would not re-
spond to a rolling back of those reforms by wreaking havoc on
Hong Kong's economy. Moreover, Chinese and pro-China soucres
added that the implementation of reformed electoral laws pro-
duced rather unimpressive voter turnouts despite the propaganda
blitz that the colonial government was uniquely positioned to de-
liver on their behalf.524
China and pro-China commentaries further assured business
that, to the extent that "democracy" was genuinely popular, oppo-
sition to the Patten plan was still a sensible position, because reject-
ing Patten did not mean rejecting democracy. According to this
line of argument, adequate democracy for Hong Kong would be
provided, in proper positivist fashion, under arrangements that
China had endorsed and helped to create, including the Basic Law
which provided the essential framework for the smooth and or-
derly development of democracy. P.R.C. and pro-China sources
stressed that this democracy would be far more extensive than
what the British colonial authorities had heretofore provided in a
century and a half of ruling Hong Kong, and not far short of the
modest proposals that leading business figures and pro-business
members of Legco and Exco had backed in the wake of the Tianan-
men Incident.525 If mere words were not enough to convince the
business community that China and its allies would accept democ-
racy sufficient to satisfy the business community's demands or to
assuage the business community's fears about the consequences of
unsatisfied popular demands, there were actions as well. As tan-
gible evidence of their tolerance for the degree and form of democ-
racy that the business community required, China and pro-China
voices in Hong Kong could point to pro-China parties' full partici-
523 See id. (asserting that Patten ignores the Basic Law and attempts to dupe
the Hong Kong people).
524 See Chen, supra note 272; do Rosario, Sharp Distinction, supra note 112, at
29; do Rosario, supra note 106, at 16; Gilley, supra note 24, at 72.
525 See Lau, supra note 256, at 14-15, supra note 445, at 26-27. Xinhua Hong
Kong Deputy Director Zhang Junsheng argued that the controversy over the
Patten electoral reforms was not about "democracy or the pace of democracy";
rather, it was about whether the British would live up to their agreement to make
the last colonial Legco one that complied with the conditions for becoming the
S.A.R.'s first legislature under the Basic Law. See H.D.S. Greenway, Hong Kong
Chief Defends Reform Moves, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 1993, at 19.
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pation in the final colonial era elections, and to pro-China Legco
members' frequent support for laws and policies that the business
community favored.
526
By pressuring and persuading the business community to back
China's positions, or by emboldening business leaders to express
their pre-existing opposition to Patten's reforms, these arguments
and actions from official Chinese sources and Hong Kong's pro-
China circles seemed to acheive some of their aims.5 27 Shortly after
Patten proposed his reforms, many business leaders began a sus-
tained call for their withdrawal or rejection by Legco.528 One expa-
triate executive urged Patten to "forget about democracy for the
time being" and return the focus to Hong Kong's "fundamental
law" of furthering the territory's economic prosperity.5 29 Bankers
Trust Managing Director William Overholt warned that pressing
forward with the reforms could give China a sense of "moral and
legal right to destroy the rule of law, democracy and autonomy
which we all want for Hong Kong."5 30 Among the Hong Kong
Chinese business elite, businessman and politician James Tien in-
veighed against Patten's attempts to "redefine all the grey areas" in
the Basic Law in an effort to find a legal basis for his reforms.
531
Vincent Lo, chairman of the Business and Professionals Federation
526 See, e.g., do Rosario, supra note 275, at 26-27 (discussing Chinese support
for political candidates); Louise do Rosario, Board Game, FAR E. ECON. REV., Sept. 8,
1994, at 18-19 (noting China's encouragement of pro-China candidates); do Ros-
ario, supra note 301, at 28 (noting China's and pro-China press' support for the
D.A.B.); see also Tai, supra note 318, at 20 (quoting D.A.B.'s Tsang Yok-sing's
statement that his party would have to defer to majority support for Patten's re-
forms if such support were shown to exist).
527 Compare Martin C.M. Lee, Beijing's Tiananmen Mentality Augurs Ill for Hong
Kong, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 23, 1994 (arguing that business had been pressured
and cowed into adopting a "pro-China" line), with Chris Yeung & Fung Wai-kong,
Liberals Look To Take Lead in Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 1, 1994, at 25 (ar-
guing that business interests were already very much opposed to Patten's reforms
and, indeed, lobbied Beijing to support business' opposition).
528 See Edward Mortimer, Divide and Rule: Businessmen Lean Towards Beijing,
but the People Favour Patten, FIN. TIMEs, Mar. 17, 1993, at 16; Rufford, supra note
517; Xinhua's Zhou Nan Reaffirms Chinese Stance on Hong Kong, supra note 277 ("A
few hundred influential organizations from the industrial and commercial circles
... issued statements opposing the Hong Kong British authorities' political reform
programme.").
529 HK Must Speak with One Voice, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Nov. 1, 1992, at 10
(quoting Sir Gordon Macwhinnie, former chairman of the Hong Kong Jockey
Club).
530 Louise do Rosario, Democracy's Pros and Cons, FAR E. ECON. REV., Mar. 24,
1994, at 24.
531 Tien, supra note 446, at 11.
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("B.P.F.") and of a major real estate and property development
firm, argued that "democracy is important, but it is not the only
goal. A smooth transition is more important." 32
Hong Kong's pro-China press praised the B.P.F. view and other
endorsements of "convergence" between Hong Kong's pre-1997
political development and the initial S.A.R. order that China and
its allies favored as "pragmatic" rejections of the Patten proposals,
and as indicative of "a profound understanding" of the requisites
of Hong Kong's political stability and the economic prosperity that
political stability made possible.5 33 A P.R.C. commentary smugly
noted that it was hardly surprising that "British business circles,
which always set great store by business interests, are dissatisfied
with Patten."534 Presumably, non-British firms with substantial in-
terests in the territory were no more supportive of Patten's re-
forms, but were not as well positioned to make their views matter
with Hong Kong's colonial rulers.
China and its Hong Kong allies found further evidence of busi-
ness support for their positions on political reform at the points
where buisness and politics were most closely entwined. Business
and pro-business officeholders in Hong Kong took a position simi-
lar to that of many vocally pro-China members of the group they
represented. Several of the business leaders in the cabinet-like
Exco failed to defend the Patten package, and one, the chairman of
the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, called for its defeat.535
Liberal Party and other pro-business members of Legco joined pro-
China representatives in a nearly successful effort to vote down the
bill Patten tabled.5 36
Once the through train for Legco had been decisively derailed
532 Tai, supra note 517, at 10.
533 The Strong Points of Business and Professional Circles Are Precisely the Weak-
nesses of Chris Patten, WEN WEI PO, Nov. 11, 1992, at 2.
534 Li, supra note 299, at 48-49 (recounting criticisms of Patten in the British
press).
535 See Andy Ho, Why Patten's Exco Might Still Come to the Party, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 21, 1994, at 17.
536 See Mary Kwang, What Victory?, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore) July 2, 1994, at
4; Lu Ping Interview on Need for Urgency in Dealing with Hong Kong's Transition
(China Central Television broadcast, July 5, 1994), transcribed in BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts, July 8, 1994 (quoting the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office
Director's statement that "[a]lthough Patten's constitutional reform packages was
passed today, there [were] quite a few negative votes ... [showing] that there is a
substantial dissenting voice in the British Hong Kong Legco"), available at LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Tai, supra note 104, at 8; Yeung & Fung, supra note 527,
at 25.
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by China's determination to dissolve the body selected in the elec-
tions held under the Patten reforms, China and its Hong Kong al-
lies argued that the business community should and would wel-
come the Provisional Legislature that would replace Legco.
"Business will find it a blessing to have a [Provisional L]egislature
which is supportive of the [S.A.R.] administration," is not dominat-
ed by the Democrats, and which is able to "provide a breathing
space and a relatively stable government," said the head of the pro-
China One Country Two Systems Economic Research Institute.
537
China's and its Hong Kong allies' assurances that the new legisla-
ture would have the requisite pro-business and pro-China leanings
took tangible form with the selection of members of the Provisonal
Legislature and the powerful S.A.R. cabinet. A generous share of
the seats in both organs went to politically reliable members of the
territory's business elite.538
The China and pro-China arguments to the business communi-
ty also emphasized more structural features of the planned Provi-
sional Legislature arrangement. The replacement of Lego by the
interim body was heralded as a return to the traditions of "execu-
tive-led" government that had served business so well and that
Patten, on the China and pro-China side's reading, had under-
mined when he expanded Legco's role in government by submit-
ting the first C.F.A. bill, the electoral law reforms and other impor-
tant matters for the formerly docile body's unfettered
consideration.
With the dissolution of the 1995 Legco irrevocably decided, the
new legislature's early establishment and readiness to begin work
by July 1, 1997 would avoid the dreaded "legislative vacuum" and
assure the "normal operation" of the S.A.R. government, all of
which the China and pro-China camp expected the business com-
munity, with its aversion to uncertainty, to value.539 The Provi-
sional Legislature's controversial consideration of new legislation
before Hong Kong's reversion date was, China and its Hong Kong
allies asserted, merely a method of serving this goal, not a depar-
ture from the commitment to a positivistically valid, N.P.C.-
authorized, and Basic Law-abiding arrangement for a transitional
legislative body.
537 Yeung & Wong, supra note 324, at 21 (quoting Shiu Sin-por).
538 See Rhonda Lam Wan & Rodger Lee, Team a "Reward"for Pro-China Politi-
cians, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 25, 1997, at 3.
539 See Provisional Legislature Must Be Set Up as Scheduled, supra note 304, at A2.
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On the question of the Provisional Legislature, as in the contro-
versy over the Patten reforms, prominent business voices ex-
pressed assent to the views China and its allies were promoting.
David Chu again embraced the P.R.C.'s positions, arguing that the
"legal vacuum" that would exist "[i]f we did not have a provi-
sional body ... would be a far greater threat to business confi-
dence" than any of the concerns or conflicts attending its crea-
tion.54 0 The president of the American Chamber of Commerce in
Hong Kong declared that the Provisional Legislature was accept-
able to U.S. businesses in the territory, whose leaders were confi-
dent that China would not tamper with the key legal requisites of
Hong Kong's thriving capitalist system.541 Hong Kong's General
Chamber of Commerce urged the governor to cede the legislative
initiative to S.A.R. bodies-in-waiting, calling on Patten to limit
himself, during the last months of British rule, to "essential legisla-
tion for the immediate good government of Hong Kong and en-
hancing the transition process to Chinese sovereignty." 42 Devel-
oper and B.P.F. head Vincent Lo looked forward to the
reestablishment of a "much more balanced political structure" that
would retrench the expanded role Patten gave to Legco.543
To the extent that these expressed business views were not
genuine or representative of the broader business community,
China and its Hong Kong associates indicated that any reluctance
among business elites to accept the Provisional Legislature would
not alter the result. China and pro-China sources sought to cow, if
not to convince, business circles by signalling that opposition to the
arrangement would be at best futile; it could at worst create risks
of instability, unpredictability, and harm to the economy. Qian
Qichen and Lu Ping stated the point most succinctly: "the rice was
cooked" -that is, Hong Kong's sovereign had made its choice and
duly authorized the Preparatory Committee to create a Provisional
Legislature, and everyone in Hong Kong simply would have to ac-
54o Gilley, supra note 38, at 14.
541 See Hong Kong's Dwindling Hopes for Democracy, Bus. WK., May 11, 1992, at
57; Vivian Lee, US Investors Shun Debate, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 21, 1996, at
6.
542 Simon Pritchard, Chamber's Nervousness a Worrisome Pointer, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Oct. 2, 1996, at 12; see also Louis Won, The Lines Are Drawn over
Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 24, 1996, at 23 (quoting James Tien, urging
Patten to "accept reality" and allow senior Hong Kong government officials to co-
operate with the Provisional Legislature).
543 For Many Corporate Chiefs, 1997 Cannot Come Soon Enough, supra note 401,
at 22.
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cept that.544
3.3.3. The Court of Final Appeal: Of Pragmatism and
Predictability
Attempts to assert or acquire business support for China's posi-
tion on the Court of Final Appeal question broadly resembled
those made to solicit the business community's backing on other
key legal and institutional issues of the endgame, although there
were some subtle differences. With the colonial government
pledged to support the Court deals and with the Hong Kong busi-
ness community initially recalcitrant, China and pro-China Hong
Kong elements' arguments concerning the C.F.A. deal, and legisla-
tion to implement it, tended to be simpler, sparer, and more often
made by official P.R.C. sources in this context than in the contro-
versies over rights laws and democratic reforms.
China left the job of implementing the 1991 Court deal very
much to the British. That approach failed when Hong Kong's co-
lonial rulers allowed Legco to kill the legislation that would im-
plement the accord, with Legco members who represented or had
strong ties to the business community forming part of the majority.
Once a second accord was reached, China and its allies undertook
more visible and aggressive efforts to claim and to cultivate sup-
port from a business community that apparently feared that the
C.F.A. accords' restrictions on the Court's jurisdiction and the
composition of the bench threatened the security of the rule of law
and an independent judiciary.5
45
In pushing for acceptance of the second Court deal, China and
its Hong Kong allies told the business community that its concerns
were simply misplaced. Zhao Jihua, the leader of China's delega-
tion to the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group that crafted the 1995
C.F.A. accord, asserted that the arrangement would assure Hong
Kong "an independent and complete judicial system."546 On this
544 See Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's News Conference (China Central Televi-
sion broadcast, Mar. 11, 1996), transcribed in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,
Mar. 11, 1996 (quoting Foreign Minister and Vice Premier Qian Qichen), available
at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; David Chipp, China Says No Room for More
Talk on Hong Kong Handover, Reuters, Apr. 29, 1996, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Li-
brary, Allasi File.
545 See Mosher, supra note 179, at 13.
546 Zhao Jihua Speech on Signing of Court of Final Appeal Agreement, WEN WE
PO, June 10, 1995, at A2; cf. China Hopes Court Deal Will Boost Sino-British Ties, supra
note 328 (noting that the cooperation between Britain and China in establishing
the C.F.A. should ease cooperation on other transition related issues).
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view, a C.F.A. established in conformity with the agreement would
be fully consistent with the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration,
and the promises made therein that the Hong Kong laws and legal
institutions important to business would survive the territory's
transition from British colony to Chinese Special Administrative
Region. Lu Ping maintained that, despite what the C.F.A. deal's
opponents claimed, the accord did not preclude the Court from in-
cluding more than one judge from the pool of expatriate common-
law jurists in whom business seemed to place such trust.5 47 China
and pro-China sources asserted that the proposed C.F.A.'s jurisdic-
tional limits (including the much-discussed "act of state" exclu-
sion) gave business no reason to fear that commercial disputes in-
volving public entities or Chinese state-owned enterprises would
become non-justiciable in Hong Kong courts. Addressing one as-
pect of this concern, a pro-China Legco member explained that the
Basic Law assured that the N.P.C. Standing Committee would con-
sider fully common law practices and standards when it decided
whether a case would be within the C.F.A.'s jurisdiction.5 48
Facing again the likely opposition of some generally pro-
business members of Legco who had helped to defeat the 1991 bill,
and lingering fears in the business community that the 1995 Court
deal threatened the rule of law,549 Chinese officials and spokes-
persons sought to focus the attention of the territory's business
elite on the undesirable consequences for business of rejecting the
1995 deal. If China and its allies failed to persuade the business
community that the proposed C.F.A. would fully satisfy business'
wishes for a rule-of-law-supporting Court, the P.R.C. and its
friends in Hong Kong still could assert other connections between
acceptance of the C.F.A. deal and the tangible interests of the terri-
tory's business community. Thus, Lu Ping noted how the pro-
tracted wrangling over the Court deal had made the business
community nervous about the risk of a "legal vacuum" that would
occur if July 1, 1997 passed without a new Court being estab-
lished.550 The 1995 C.F.A. legislation offered an easy and early end
to that troubling prospect (even though it was no longer possible to
set up the Court before the handover),SS The claim, echoing an
547 See do Rosario, supra note 164, at 26.
548 See Yeung et al., supra note 138, at 1.
549 See do Rosario, supra note 153, at 20; Kwang, supra note 477, at 17.
550 See do Rosario, supra note 164, at 26.
551 See id.; see also Zhao Jihua Speech on Signing of Court of Final Appeal Agree-
ment, supra note 327, at A2.
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argument that had been made on behalf of the 1991 legislation, was
that the proposed Court law at least would save the Hong Kong
economy from the dangerous uncertainty that would accompany
easily revocable, unilateral action by the colonial government to es-
tablish a Court, or no action at all.
Accepting the 1995 Court accord and its implementing legisla-
tion meant that China at least would not exercise its legislative dis-
cretion to establish a new reviewing body that would stand above
the C.F.A. and outside Hong Kong, and would surely threaten a
more serious departure from the prior judicial and legal system
that business found so appealing. As Beijing appears to have as-
sessed the situation, the end of appeals to Britain's Privy Council
and the vesting of powers to interpret and amend the Basic Law -
and thus to override Hong Kong law - in organs of the central
Chinese government might be troubling to business. These con-
cerns, however, were surely less troubling than the same arrange-
ments plus the heretofore undiscussed and more immediately ju-
diciary-displacing mechanism that the Chinese side floated in the
1995 negotiations over the C.F.A.552 Moreover, in the politics of
the endgame as China had structured them, the China and pro-
China side had made clear to the territory's business community
that acquiescing in the Court deal also would lead to more rapid
progress on issues of immediate material interest to business, in-
cluding infrastructure development projects that Hong Kong busi-
ness circles clearly wanted to see move forward.
553
On the C.F.A. question, as with rights legislation and democ-
ratic reforms for the legislature, the positions that China and its al-
lies in the territory set forth (in this case with considerable support
from the Hong Kong government) achieved some of the desired
results. Much of the business community expressed relief, al-
though perhaps little more, that the 1995 deal promised to provide
badly needed certainty, and, on that basis, strongly supported the
1995 bill's passage. 554 Some, although not all, of the generally pro-
552 In a speech surely welcomed by the China side, Chief Justice and later
Chief Executive candidate Sir Ti-liang Yang argued to a business summit that
"[p]essimism is our greatest enemy .... A sound legal and judicial infrastructure
is in place. ... [W]e have every reason to anticipate the continuation of a legal
and judicial system which has served us well." Duncan Hughes, Protection 'Ade-
quate,' S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 5, 1995, at 1.
553 See Hong Kong Court, supra note 462, at 19; Politics of a New Era, supra note
477, at 449-51. Tellingly, a long-standing impasse over the airport deal was re-
solved in the J.L.G. within three weeks after the 1995 C.F.A. deal. See id.
554 See, e.g., do Rosario, supra note 153, at 20 (recognizing that the C.F.A. ac-
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business members of Legco voted to approve the legislation. With
Hong Kong's economy continuing to thrive and business confi-
dence in the territory's economic future soaring, China and its
strongest supporters in the territory seemed to have ample reason
to discount the significance of what their adversaries saw as por-
tents of doom, including many prominent Hong Kong companies'
registration, relisting, or taking options on office space in jurisdic-
tions where the Privy Council in London would retain ultimate
appellate jurisdiction beyond 1997. 55 If such moves by the busi-
ness community were, as pro-China sources and some members of
the business community claimed, merely "cheap insurance" that
firms did not expect to need, or even to be able to use, then there
were indeed strong signs that Hong Kong's business community
accepted both the substantive terms of the C.F.A. arrangement, and
the underlying principle that a P.R.C.-provided institutional ar-
rangement, presented as the product of an exercise of China's posi-
tivist sovereignty, could provide a rule of law adequate for the
business community. For China and its allies, the implicit claim
and hope was that hard-nosed and pragmatic business leaders
were not prepared to flee Hong Kong because of minor unpalat-
able changes in the legal system, or because of a commitment to the
abstract legal and political principles that animated Hong Kong
liberals' and democrats' arguments about the Court.
3.3.4. Selecting and "Selling" the Chief Executive
As they had done with respect to the other key legal and insti-
tutional issues of the endgame, Chinese officials and their allies in
the territory sought to assert and to build support in Hong Kong's
cord will unfreeze Sino-British relations and restart cooperation on transition mat-
ters, such as those relating to business and nationality questions); Hong Kong
Court, supra note 462 (positing that the C.F.A. deal resolves an issue that had been
threatening to undermine business confidence during the transition to Chinese
rule); Kwang, supra note 475, at 17 (noting the business community's support of
the deal but desire for the court to begin operation sooner); Michael Steinberger,
Pact on HK's Legal System Has Not Put Fears to Rest, Bus. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 1995, at 8
(noting that the business community's enthusiasm for the Court accord is tem-
pered by concern for the legal system's future); Stephen Vines, Beijing, London
Sign Agreement on HK Court of Final Appeal, Bus. TiMEs, June 10, 1995, at 3 (describ-
ing the General Chamber of Commerce and Federation of Industries' belief that
the agreement avoids the possibility of a "legal vacuum"); Won & Wong, supra
note 146, at 3 (noting that the agreement would end the uncertainty surrounding
the rule of law).
555 See, e.g., Steinberger, supra note 554 (citing views discounting the signifi-
cance of shifts in registration and listing sites by Hong Kong companies).
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business community for their position on issues concerning the se-
lection of the S.A.R.'s first Chief Executive. In this context, how-
ever, arguments familiar in substance were presented in forms that
were not very elaborate or sustained. With the Chief Executive se-
lection process confined to the last months before reversion and
tightly controlled by Chinese authorities and the arrangements
mandated by the Basic Law and other N.P.C. enactments, there
seemed to be fewer occasions to craft an extended appeal to the
business community. China and its allies may also have seen rela-
tively little need for such efforts, given the British authorities' gen-
eral acceptance of China's positions, Hong Kong liberals' focus on
other issues (such as the Provisional Legislature and the fate of the
Bill of Rights), and the business community's spontaneous support
or cowed compliance on the Chief Executive issue, in the aftermath
of the extended battles over the other key issues of the period.
Still, elements of a strategy to find or to fashion support in the
business community were visible. To a significant degree, China
and its allies appeared to rely on the expectation that much of the
business community would welcome one of its own as the first
head of the territory's post-reversion government. In the most
highly visible manifestation of this assumption, Jiang Zemin an-
nounced to a delegation of Hong Kong business leaders in Beijing
early in 1996 that the first Chief Executive should be a businessper-
son. Jiang presumably chose that generally friendly occasion to ar-
ticulate that policy because he believed his immediate audience
would welcome the statement.55 6
To be sure, not all candidates for the post of Chief Executive
drawn from the ranks of business leaders would fare well with the
business community. China and its Hong Kong allies recognized
the difficulty.s7 They appear to have understood the fear in Hong
Kong business circles that, if the job went to one of the territory's
top tycoons with business interests concentrated in Hong Kong (or
perhaps in the mainland), it might lead to economically disruptive
self-dealing on a massive scale, tilting the "level playing field" that
the rule of law provided in Hong Kong.55 8 To make sure that such
556 See Gilley, Playing Favourites, supra note 189, at 23.
557 Maggie Farley, Tsang Yok-sing on the Role of Democracy, Communism in Chi-
nese Hong Kong, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1997, Section M, at 3 (noting D.A.B. leader
Tsang Yok-sing's criticism that a business leader serving as Chief Executive
would face inevitable conflicts of interest).
558 Legco member and business executive Henry Tang drew the link explic-
itly: "Favourtism in business is really a rule-of-law issue. These two things go
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concerns were taken into account, or more generally to make the
selection process more appealing to the elite business community,
China carefully consulted and included Hong Kong business elites
in the selection process at several levels. These mechanisms for
hearing, reassuring and perhaps winning over business leaders in-
cluded an informal screening committee run through Xinhua's
Hong Kong branch, meetings between members of the central
party and government leadership in Beijing and visiting delega-
tions of business leaders from the territory, and a prominent busi-
ness membership on the Selection Committee that formally nomi-
nated the first Chief Executive. At the very least, these
arrangements gave business elites a priority not accorded to the
territory's more ordinary citizens, and thus special reasons to hope
and expect that the person chosen for the office would be someone
who understood the wants and needs of the business community
concerning the rule of law and other vital issues.
5 59
China and pro-China sources further argued that, whatever
minor concerns Hong Kong's business community might have
about the selection process or its coutcome, the business commu-
nity should welcome the naming of a Chief Executive-designate
well in advance of July 1, 1997 because it would advance the inter-
ests and preferences of the business community in several ways.
They asserted that the early selection of an incumbent for the vital
post would reduce uncertainty and, with the promised cooperation
of the out-going regime, provide a smoother transition. More spe-
cifically, Chinese commentaries stressed the importance of having
the Chief Executive-designate appointed in time to participate in
the final months of colonial governance, including the preparation
of the 1997 budget.560 As on other key issues of the endgame, here
too prominent voices in the business community in the end
showed support for China's positions on a potentially controver-
hand in hand." Gilley, supra note 59, at 15; see also Li, supra note 485, at 6 (express-
ing concern regarding a "level playing field" for business if a leading business
figure became Chief Executive).
559 See Gilley, Playing Favourites, supra note 189, at 23. P.C. member and
prominent businessman Tsingtong Tsui noted the relative lack of attention to
popular preferences stating, "Ideally the candidate should also be the most ac-
ceptable to the Hong Kong people. But to be honest, I think that will be impossi-
ble." Id.
560 See, e.g., Gilley, Playing Favourites, supra note 189, at 23 (explaining that the
P.R.C.'s aim was to appoint a Chief Executive by the time preparation of the 1997
budget got under way); see also Ridding, supra note 562, at 2 (noting indications of
a rise in investors' confidence in Hong Kong's economy after Tung's selection).
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sial issue. The General Chamber of Commerce, for example, asked
Patten on the eve of his final policy address to seek prior consulta-
tion with the Chief Executive-designate before pursuing new legis-
lation. Business executive and legislator James Tien also urged
Patten "to make things easier for the chief executive"561 by involv-
ing him in government immediately. 562
Tung Chee-hwa's informal, but widely recognized, anointment
as the choice for Chief Executive-designate added new dimensions
to the P.R.C. and pro-China side's campaign to sell Hong Kong's
business community on the Chief Executive selection process and
its outcome. Tung possessed several of the qualities that, in the ab-
stract, China and its Hong Kong allies had expected the business
community to welcome in a Chief Executive. He was a sufficiently
prominent figure in business circles to have the respect of the busi-
ness elites whom he would have to govern-a potentially vital
condition to retaining a fair and law-governed business environ-
ment. On the other hand, Tung was not a dominant economic fig-
ure and his company's income came primarily from overseas ship-
ping rather than from local Hong Kong or mainland investments -
traits that would seem to lessen the opportunity and inclination for
the self-dealing and favortism that many business leaders feared.
In addition, Tung's experience as a member of Exco suggested an
understanding of, and a degree of commitment to, past laws and
policies that business favored. Tung's relative silence on the legal-
political controversies of the 1990s, despite his Exco membership
(with its attendant expectation of a degree of visible support for co-
lonial government policy), suggested that he would not roil the po-
litical waters in ways that would strain Hong Kong-Beijing rela-
tions and threaten business opportunities. Except for a possible
moral debt to Henry Fok (a pro-China businessman who had
helped to bail-out Tung's company) and to China (which had
helped to fund that rescue), and ties to Li Ka-shing (one of the ter-
ritory's most powerful magnates) that were close enough to make
some business figures uncomfortable, most of the territory's busi-
ness elite found no compelling grounds to oppose Tung's selection,
especially after China's commitment to his appointment became
clear.563
561 Pritchard, supra note 542, at 12.
562 See Bruce Gilley, Obstacle Course, FARE. ECON. REV., Dec. 19, 1996, at 19.
563 See Ching, supra note 483, at 40; Bruce Gilley, The Great Helmsman, FAR E.
ECON. REv., Dec. 19, 1996, at 18.
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China and its Hong Kong allies and agents-which on many
accounts now included Tung-worked to assure the business
community that Tung would preside over a congenial government
committed to a legal and institutional order that business would
find acceptable. Specifically, they stressed that the S.A.R. govern-
ment would be an "executive-led" government, with a business
leader and former Exco member at the head of the executive
branch, a cabinet stocked with leading pro-business figures, and
economically sensitive government departments led by hold-overs
from the previous business-friendly and rule-of-law-supporting
administration. 564 Amid great fanfare from the territory's pro-
China press, China's choice for Chief Executive quickly staked out
positions on key legal and policy issues that the business commu-
nity supported or had come to accept as inevitable. The effusive
coverage in the pro-China press stressed comments from Tung that
seemed, at best, especially designed to appeal to business, and, at
worst, to reiterate positions on controversial legal questions that
China and its allies, in other contexts, pressed business to accept: a
commitment to prosperity and stability, a pledge of continuity in
economic policy, and acceptance of the Provisional Legislature and
the roll-back of civil liberties legislation.565
Finally, the pro-China press's praise of Tung's stances on rights
legislation and the legislature pointed to a less accommodating
strand in China's and its Hong Kong allies' message to the busi-
ness community on the question of the Chief Executive. China was
not simply giving business interests preference in an assertedly
"democratic" selection process. As pro-China businessman,
P.W.C. and P.C. member David Chu noted, China's interests inevi-
tably weighed heavily in the selection of the Chief Executive. The
choice had to be someone Beijing knew and trusted. The business
564 See China Will Not Pressure Hong Kong Civil Servants To Declare Political
Stand, WEN WEI Po, Dec. 29, 1996, at A3, translated in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts, Dec. 31, 1996 (quoting Zhang Junsheng, deputy director of Xinhua's
Hong Kong office, that the civil service would not be politicized), available at
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Ching, supra note 483, at 40 (describing Tung's
background in Exco); Text of the Speech by Qian Qichen at the Closing Ceremony of the
Plenary Session of the Preliminary Working Committee on June 24, 1995, WEN WEI PO,
June 25, 1995, at A4.
565 See Full Text of Questions and Answers at Tung Chee-hwa's News Conference
for Chinese, Foreign Reporters in Beijing, supra note 340; Lu Ping Stresses Partial Abro-
gation of Some Ordinances Amended by British Hong Kong Government Is Intended To
Maintain Hong Kong's Prosperity and Stability, supra note 499, at All; John Ridding,
Hang Seng Sees Reduction in Risk, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 28, 1996, at 2; Tung Chee-hwa Says
that Proposals of Legal Subgroup Are Good, supra note 240, at A2.
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community clearly understood this point, as was reflected in the
nearly universal perception in Hong Kong that the public moment
of Tung's selection came in Ting's January 1996 handshake in Bei-
jing with Jiang Zemin.566 But comments like David Chu's, Tung's
initial post-selection presentation of his future administration's
stance on late colonial rights legislation, Tung's prior post as a vice
chairman of the Preparatory Committee, and the widely known
P.R.C.-orchestrated rescue of his family's shipping company in the
1980s all underscored the obvious point for business: business had
to expect and should welcome a figure with ties to Beijing.567
This was the same type of argument that Chinese officials and
their allies made to the business community in connection with
nearly all of the controversial legal and institutional issues that
arose during the endgame. Once again, the P.R.C. side held most
of the cards and sought to play a hand that would win sufficient
support or acquiescence among the business community for
China's preferred outcomes, without risking the minimal requisites
of China's positivist sovereignty and sovereign discretion with re-
spect to Hong Kong.
4. HONG KONG'S ENDGAME AND THE S.A.R.'s BEGINNING
The battles over "the Hong Kong people" and Hong Kong's
business community confirm what the more purely legal-political
struggles among the British authorities, the P.R.C. and Hong Kong
liberals, democrats and pro-China elements suggested. The main
participants' actions and strategies generally were consistent with
their pursuit of S.A.R. laws and institutions that reasonably ap-
peared to be both feasible under the circumstances and acceptable
in terms of their visions of sovereignty and domestic legality for
Hong Kong. Recognizing that they faced an endgame in the ge-
neric sense of the approach of Hong Kong's formal transition from
British colony to Chinese Special Administrative Region, these key
political participants both clung to their core visions, and turned to
address legal and institutional issues for which those visions
yielded no single, clearly mandatory answer and with respect to
which the views of increasingly politicized social constituencies
might therefore matter a great deal. Their arguments and ap-
proaches to the issues and to these constituencies were also
566 See Gilley, Playing Favourites, supra note 189, at 22; In the Running, FAR E.
ECON. REV., Feb. 8, 1996, at 27.
567 See In the Running, supra note 568.
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broadly consistent with perceptions that they faced an endgame in
any of three more specific senses. While evidence from the pre-
reversion struggles over the rule of law, specific laws and institu-
tions, and the views and values of the people and the business sec-
tor also appeared to be consistent with the conclusion that Hong
Kong in fact primarily faced any of the three versions of an end-
game identified in Endgame I, developments during the S.A.R.'s
first months suggest that the "end of the game / on-going games"
model best fits transitional Hong Kong.
4.1. Summing Up Hong Kong's Endgame
The approaches that the key political players took in the strug-
gles to shape concrete laws and institutions for the S.A.R. are, in
large part, intelligible as strategies in what the participants could
see, reasonably, as an endgame in the "colloquial" sense of a race
against the July 1, 1997 deadline to reach feasible deals that were
superior to a "no deal" option and that would be binding beyond
reversion. For the British and Hong Kong's liberal and pro-
democracy politicians, the legal and institutional arrangements
they pressed for during the pre-reversion endgame appeared supe-
rior to a "no deal" option in the context of a colloquial endgame.
From their liberal-democratic and broadly natural law-like per-
spective, the Bill of Rights and civil liberties laws and democratic
reforms to electoral laws were preferable to leaving such issues to
be settled by the P.R.C. or the post-reversion S.A.R., provided that
such pre-reversion arrangements could constitute, in effect, a deal
on which the S.A.R. and the P.R.C. would not renege. Some of
their arguments, and perhaps most clearly those less closely tied to
core normative principles, made sense as attempts to tap relatively
promising deterrents to "reneging" or "roll-backs." For example,
efforts to cast the rights laws as necessary to secure conformity
with the international human rights norms incorporated in the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law and as consistent with the es-
tablished roles of Hong Kong's courts and legislature, and efforts
to present the Patten reforms as compatible with the Basic Law and
the Joint Declaration, seemed crafted to increase the costs of defec-
tion for China and the S.A.R. Such arguments sought to make use
of the P.R.C.'s and its allies' repeated pledges to Hong Kong and
the world that the basic policies set forth in those framework legal
documents were sacrosanct.
Splits and shifts within the liberal-democratic camp may be
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equally comprehensible in terms of a colloquial endgame. For ex-
ample, while Hong Kong's liberal and pro-democracy politicians
apparently understood non-derogable principles of justice and
sovereign obligation to require arrangements for the Court of Final
Appeal and the Chief Executive that exceeded most feasible com-
promises, their strong opposition to the Court bills, and their sus-
tained criticism of the Chief Executive-designate's office as a nas-
cent P.R.C.-surrogate, suggested that they believed pre-reversion
"deals" could indeed structure post-reversion reality. Asserting
that the same set of liberal-democratic principles could tolerate
much more modest arrangements for the C.F.A. and the Chief Ex-
ecutive, the U.K. and colonial Hong Kong governments' arguments
for accepting the Sino-British accords on the Court and the Chief
Executive selection process and its outcome clearly were premised
on a claim that the deals thus struck would bind in a way that uni-
lateral action by Hong Kong's departing masters and doomed leg-
islature would not, and that such deals were therefore worth the
concessions the China and pro-China camp exacted. Alternatively,
the divisions within the liberal-democratic camp may have been
more matters of tactics and assessments of the relative dangers of
"holding out" and foregoing worthwhile deals and of "caving in"
and accepting too little.568
British, colonial government and liberal and pro-democracy
politicians' drives to claim and to cultivate popular and business
w Patten's later comments that he believed that accepting the act of state
provision in the C.F.A. deal was a mistake for Hong Kong arguably suggests that
the divisions in the liberal-democratic camp were at most tactical and perhaps not
even that, and that some on the British side regarded the U.K. and colonial gov-
ernment position as disingenuous. See Gittings, supra note 143, at 10; Danny Git-
tings, When Denial Is Deceptive, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 13, 1997, at 10. This
level of complexity and possible deception still seems exceptional, and should not
obscure areas of agreement, such as the British authorities' and liberal and democ-
ratic politicians' common distress at the first pre-reversion legislative actions of
the Provisional Legislature. See, e.g., Frank Zhang, China's Assembly for HK Makes
First Law-Making Move, Agence France Presse, Apr. 12, 1997 (quoting Emily Lau's
statement that "[tihis is a very, very sad day, a very black day for Hong Kong"
and "an act of complete lawlessness," and noting the U.K.'s and Patten's "vow[s]
to have nothing to do with" the body), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi
File. Complexity and fragmentation of another sort, however, should not be dis-
counted in this context. The fact that so many individuals and groups comprised
articulate segments of the liberal-democratic camp, and evidence from the au-
thors' interviews with numerous participants in the struggles of Hong Kong's
endgame strongly suggest that different actors may have perceived themselves
and Hong Kong to be facing different types of endgames. Similar factors support
the expectation that the same holds true for the China and pro-China side.
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support for their favored positions also make sense as colloquial
endgame tactics of mobilizing whatever political forces (or percep-
tions of potential political pressure) they could deploy to increase
the likelihood that the binding deals made at the last minute would
track as closely as possible their notions of legal and institutional
arrangements that were both viable in practice and acceptable in
principle. If their aim thus was an eleventh-hour, instrumental
"blitz" of real or credibly asserted pressure from key social con-
stituencies, the key political participants on the liberal-democratic
side acted sensibly when they made an eclectic combination of ar-
guments that appealed to normative first principles and to the ma-
terial interests and deep-seated fears of the people and the business
community. It was equally sensible for them to have eschewed the
pursuit of deals that might have been superior to a "no deal" op-
tion but that concededly fell short of the asserted minimal requi-
sites of a just and proper legal order, and the ordinary politics of
coalition building that was likely to produce such inadequate
deals.
The colloquial endgame scenario also provides a plausible in-
terpretation of what the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies and surro-
gates said and did. From the particular positivist perspective of
the China and pro-China camp, no principle precluded the China
camp's political and legislative commitment to provide arrange-
ments that the British or colonial governments or others in Hong
Kong found preferable to a "no deal" option, so long as the terms
did not alienate or fatally undermine the P.R.C.'s sovereign discre-
tion. The "deals" on the C.F.A. and on the Chief Executive (princi-
pally reflected in the Basic Law provisions governing the selection
process and in agreements with colonial authorities to collaborate
in a smooth transition) and, arguably, the unilaterally imposed but
pre-announced decisions to establish the Provisional Legislature
and to revise rights laws, could hold considerable appeal for the
China and pro-China camp if such pre-reversion comnmitments
credibly portended post-reversion constraints or their adversaries
that substantively similar P.R.C. or S.A.R. actions after July 1 might
not provide. That China and its allies pursued such deals and
made such pronouncements suggested that they expected that,
where the British authorities or Hong Kong leaders agreed (or even
where they only acquiesced), these pre-reversion "deals" and de-
crees could in fact weaken their potential antagonists' post-
reversion authority to press for more sweepingly liberal arrange-
ments, principally by denying them the legal and moral high-
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ground that they might otherwise claim.
Internal divisions and changes of position in the China and
pro-China camp on key legal and institutional issues also can be
understood in terms of a colloquial endgame scenario. They may
simply have reflected, for example, disagreements (especially be-
tween the central leadership and some of Hong Kong's leading
pro-China politicians) about how much accommodation of Hong
Kong liberal-democratic preferences was prudent, or changing as-
sessments of whether the other side was willing or able to offer
much, or to make promises with credible post-reversion effect, in
return for new commitments from China.
569
Chinese officials' and Hong Kong pro-China forces' efforts to
assert and to develop support or acquiescence among the people
and in the business community for their preferred outcomes are in-
telligible as an effort to blunt, undercut or counter the "blitz" of
pressure from social constituencies that the adherents to a rival vi-
sion and agenda sought to deploy in order to affect the course of a
possible final flurry of deal-making. If they were seeking to use
such pressure to steer colloquial endgame deal-making in a direc-
tion that was compatible with their notion of sovereignty and that
maximized their preferences for S.A.R. legal and institutional ar-
rangements, members of the P.R.C. and pro-China camp were act-
ing sensibly in using a mixture of appeals to popular and business
constituencies' material interests and fears of instability and uncer-
tainty, explanations of the asserted adequacy of P.R.C.-style posi-
tivist guarantees, and ultimate insistence on positivist principle
wherever it might diverge from popular and business preferences.
With the stakes as high and the end of the game as near as the col-
loquial endgame scenario posits, and with China and reliably pro-
P.R.C. Hong Kongers able to impose post-reversion arrangements
unilaterally, the pre-reversion turn to potentially persuasive if not
strongly vision-based arguments made sense, so long as such ar-
569 Tsang Yok-sing's comment that China could have accepted late colonial
amendments to civil and political liberties laws, but refused to do so because "the
positions of both sides had be[come] so entrenched," suggests one important in-
stance of divergent assessments in the China and pro-China camp. Farley, supra
note 557, at M3. Similarly, Tsang's willingness to contemplate a fresh round of
pre-reversion legislative elections stood in particularly stark contrast to argu-
ments from the pro-China press that the interim body's establishment and pre-
reversion legislative work were "necessary measures" and Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen's elaborate articulation of the positivist basis for the Provisional Legisla-
ture's creation. See, e.g., Unreasonable Demand Is Justifiably Rejected, supra note 269,
at A4; Choy, supra note 234, at 1 (quoting Qian Qichen).
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guments did not countenance a compromise of the perceived es-
sential requirements of the vision in pursuit of a marginally better
but still unacceptable deal.
Many of the arguments and much of the behavior of the central
players in pre-reversion Hong Kong's struggles over specific laws
and institutions for the S.A.R. also make sense as responses to par-
ticipants' reasonable perceptions that they faced an endgame in the
"technical" sense that the advent of a final round of their reitera-
tive dealings had removed deterrents to "defection" or "cheating"
that were vital preconditions to effective deal-making. For the Brit-
ish and for Hong Kong liberals and democrats, it quite plausibly
appeared that no reliable, enforceable deals were possible concern-
ing the specific legal and institutional issues at stake during a pro-
tracted technical endgame. With the U.K. preparing to cede gov-
ernmental power over Hong Kong, and the territory's liberal and
pro-democracy politicians facing exclusion from the S.A.R. admini-
stration and from the legislature for a year or more (during which
many crucial decisions concerning S.A.R. laws, institutions and the
rule of law were likely), members of the liberal-democratic camp
would have few endogenous means for enforcing any bargains
struck during the endgame. Britain could expect to have little
practical prospect of enforcing P.R.C. pledges as treaty rights un-
der the Joint Declaration. Consigned to the political sidelines, lib-
eral and pro-democracy politicians could expect to have little direct
influence in Hong Kong law and policy-making. Understanding
that the P.R.C. and the S.A.R. administrations would have much
less need for their cooperation or acquiescence in the aftermath of
reversion, the British authorities and the pro-democracy Legco
block also could anticipate that their potential bargaining partners
in a pre-reversion endgame would not be deterred from post-
reversion reneging by the prospect that cheating would make the
British and Hong Kong liberal and democratic politicians less will-
ing to bargain with them in future rounds.
Moreover, the colonial administration and liberals and democ-
rats in Legco arguably made no real deals with the P.R.C. or its
Hong Kong agents, just as the technical endgame model would
predict. The Bill of Rights, reforms to other rights laws, and the
Patten electoral reforms were adopted without the P.R.C.'s and
pro-China Hong Kong elements' cooperation and despite their op-
position. The arrangements for the Chief Executive and the C.F.A.
deal (once rejected by Legco) can plausibly be characterized as uni-
lateral P.R.C. impositions in which the Hong Kong and U.K. au-
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thorities nominally and incompletely acquiesced, with elements of
both arrangements rendered non-negotiable by their entrenchment
in the Basic Law that the N.P.C. enacted before the commencement
of the endgame.
Divisions in the broadly liberal-democratic camp also appear
consistent with its members' understanding that they faced a tech-
nical endgame. The British authorities' somewhat greater willing-
ness to compromise and to accommodate Chinese and pro-China
demands may have reflected their assessment that getting China
and its Hong Kong agents and allies to commit to deals that were
unenforceable "within" the terminated game still offered the best
hope of bringing political pressure to bear "outside" the game.
That is, having secured the C.F.A. deal and, perhaps, some more
diffuse P.R.C. and pro-P.R.C. pledges to develop democracy and
protect rights in the S.A.R., the British might have anticipated that
they would be in a stronger position to hold China and its support-
ers to account in informal fora of political opinion. Reneging by
the P.R.C. and the S.A.R. then would be more than a betrayal of
controversial principles of justice and the substantive moral obliga-
tions of a good sovereign; it could also harm the P.R.C.'s -and the
Hong Kong government's -jealously-guarded reputation for hon-
oring "international" legal commitments. On this reading, that the
British did not strike such deals more broadly, and on issues where
the Chinese side was more intransigent, merely underscores their
commitment to the minimal requirements of a proper legal order,
understood in liberal-democratic and natural law-like terms. Al-
ternatively, but equally consistent with a "technical endgame" in-
terpretation, the British may have recognized that they could not
wield or mobilize effective pressure after July 1, 1997, and they
thus struck some unenforceable deals and eschewed others in a
complex pattern that sought to maximize their ability to claim that
they both had been true to liberal and democratic values and had
achieved a reasonably good deal for their wards in Hong Kong.
In contrast, Hong Kong's most strongly liberal and democratic
politicians may have read the options in a technical endgame dif-
ferently, concluding that ideological purity and a more uncom-
promising insistence on strongly liberal-democratic outcomes
would allow them to claim the moral high-ground and to make
more simple and compelling arguments in the post-reversion era.
They might plausibly have concluded that this strategy (and the
strict rejection of conventional coalition-building appeals to seg-
ments of the major constituencies that it implied) would provide
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the most promising mechanism for cultivating and mobilizing ex-
ogenous political pressure after the end of the technical endgame.
While the "outside the game" or "post-game" political pressure
that the British and Hong Kong politicians might hope to deploy
after reversion could come in part from themselves and from the
international community, social constituencies in Hong Kong were
likely a more obvious source. Efforts by members of the broadly
liberal-democratic camp to find and to foster support among the
territory's people and its business community thus also are com-
prehensible as responses to the conditions of a technical endgame.
British and colonial authorities' and liberal and pro-democracy
politicians' resort to arguments that appealed, sometimes crassly,
to a wide array of popular and business interests and fears made
sense as tactics to construct and to rally social and economic forces
that might be able to generate significant political pressure, and to
impose substantial economic and political costs, on the P.R.C. or
S.A.R governments if they departed too sharply from what a lib-
eral-democratic perspective demanded of a legal and institutional
order for post-reversion Hong Kong. On this interpretation, splits
between the British and prominent Hong Kong politicians in the
battle over these key constituencies reflected different assessments
of what was politically possible or different judgments about what
their shared vision of law and sovereignty minimally required. For
example, the British perhaps regarded efforts to find popular and
business support for relatively modest deals or unilateral actions as
a way of formalizing standards that were likely to have popular
support and that, once formalized and despite their unenforceabil-
ity as "deals," might help to make up for the lack of enforcement
mechanisms. That is, they might become standards that Hong
Kong people and businesses would expect and demand that the
P.R.C. and the S.A.R. honor. In contrast and equally plausibly, lo-
cal politicians may have seen such tactics as risking the abandon-
ment of fundamental values in a sweeping accommodation of the
sometimes-suspect, and potentially malleable, existing preferences
of the people and business elites.
The P.R.C. and its closest supporters in Hong Kong also rea-
sonably could have perceived that they faced a technical endgame
and acted and argued in a manner consistent with such circum-
stances. Chinese and pro-China charges that the colonial govern-
ment was undertaking unilateral last-minute moves to erode gov-
ernment authority, social order and economic health, that the U.K.
was violating earlier bilateral accords on democratization and
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other matters and seeking insidiously to perpetuate its influence in
post-reversion Hong Kong, and that the ranks of liberal and de-
mocratic politicians included subversives who were determined to
harm Hong Kong, all suggested that the P.R.C. and its allies and
agents expected that their potential bargaining partners would de-
fect from any significant deals that might be struck during the
endgame. With the British authorities' departure from the territory
and the liberals' and democrats' exclusion from the legislature
imminent, the P.R.C. and the pro-China camp could plausibly con-
clude that there was little to deter the U.K. or local politicians from
defecting and trying to force reconsideration of supposedly settled
issues, and that the liberal-democratic camp had little to offer in re-
turn for any concessions or accommodations that the P.R.C. side
might be willing to make on the eve of its resumption of the exer-
cise of sovereign prerogatives over Hong Kong.
Further, the P.R.C.'s moves arguably fit the technical endgame
pattern of reaching no real deals with the British or with Hong
Kong's liberal and democratic leaders. Especially in the view of
the P.R.C. and its allies, the excision of portions of the Bill of Rights
and other civil liberties laws was ultimately a unilateral action by
the P.R.C., effected by the N.P.C. The decision to establish the
Provisional Legislature was equally not the result of any "deal."
Despite being formally the products of processes in which the U.K.,
the colonial government and Hong Kong politicians and legislators
played some role, the C.F.A. legislation and the Chief Executive se-
lection process and its outcome can be characterized quite credibly
as legal and institutional arrangements that the P.R.C., with back-
ing from the territory's pro-China forces, imposed on Hong Kong
by means of the enactment of the Basic Law before the endgame
and additional unilateral determinations during the endgame.
Signs of splits and shifts in the China and pro-China camp's
approaches to the legal and institutional issues of the endgame are
also compatible with the conclusion that the camp's members per-
ceived and faced an endgame in the technical sense. Especially for
the pro-China elements in Hong Kong who were relatively sensi-
tive to subtle changes in Hong Kong politics, and the P.R.C. offi-
cials who were most familiar with Hong Kong affairs and most di-
rectly responsible for them, it was plausible to conclude that a
fairly accommodating stance toward laws to protect civil and po-
litical liberties, laws providing for democratic elections and the like
was (at least at some points in the endgame) a sensible strategy
even if it was generally impossible to make enforceable deals em-
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bodying those arrangements. Getting the colonial government and
prominent Hong Kong politicians to accept such terms publicly (as
the British did with the C.F.A. and the Chief Executive), or at least
to acquiesce in them before reversion, promised to defuse post-
reversion criticism that otherwise might shake confidence in the
stability and substance of the S.A.R.'s laws and institutions. On
this view, even purely unilateral pre-reversion announcements of
relatively moderate and accommodating post-reversion legal and
institutional arrangements could constitute pre-commitments that
were credible enough to enhance relevant audiences' certainty and
confidence in Hong Kong's future. Such moves thus could appear
to be prudent exercises of China's sovereign discretion to shape the
political landscape of Hong Kong's endgame in favorable ways.
On the other hand, and particularly among central P.R.C. lead-
ers who might be less attuned to the evolving situation in Hong
Kong and might be more zealous in asserting sweeping notions of
China's sovereign discretion and in emphasizing China's role in
Hong Kong's success, adherents to a Chinese-style positivist per-
spective could have a very different, but equally intelligible, re-
sponse to the apparent circumstances of a technical endgame. See-
ing no prospect of striking deals that could bind the other side or
exact significant concessions (especially during the moments of
sharpest bilateral conflict), and fearing that unilateral commit-
ments by the China and pro-China side might have little credibility
with relevant audiences, members of the China and pro-China
camp could believe that there was little point in taking even mod-
est risks of alienating or undercutting sovereign discretion through
unenforceable deal-making or reputation-staking unilateral pro-
nouncements.
The approaches that the P.R.C. and its Hong Kong allies took in
the battles over the people and the business community also made
sense as technical endgame strategies for pursuing a legal and in-
stitutional order that satisfied the minimum requirements of their
primarily positivist vision and maximized the achievement of the
specific outcomes they sought. In such circumstances, it made
sense for official P.R.C. and unofficial pro-China forces to make
threats and appeals to social constituencies' immediate material in-
terests and their broader concerns with uncertainty and instability,
and to argue that the P.R.C.'s and the S.A.R.'s promised positivist
guarantees of rights, democracy and the rule of law were adequate
for business and the people and were all that business and the
people were going to get. Simply, where no desirable and credible
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deals were possible, this grab-bag of attempted persuasion and co-
ercion of social constituencies might substitute for enforceable
deals. It offered a promising route to cultivating and to mobilizing
social forces to provide political support for or acquiescence in le-
gal and institutional arrangements that would be more difficult
and costly to defend or impose in their absence, or if China and its
allies ceded the field of popular and business opinion to their lib-
eral and democratic antagonists. On this analysis, differences
within the pro-China camp over how much to accommodate and
how much to reject or disregard these key constituencies' views re-
flected a familiar and understandable set of disagreements about
what a positivist vision of law and sovereignty demanded, about
what the business community and the people of Hong Kong re-
quired, or about the relative risks and potential benefits of tactics
that placed different emphases on those two concerns.
During Hong Kong's endgame, British, P.R.C. and Hong Kong
political organizations and leaders also acted and argued in ways
that were consistent with a conclusion that they faced the end of
one game in a series of on-going games. That is, their approaches
also could be understood as responses to a situation in which
cheating and defection were less likely than in a technical end-
game, deals were less clearly reliable and enforceable than in a col-
loquial endgame, and players expected to have on-going dealings
but while playing changed roles, under altered rules and with dif-
ferently distributed resources. As the developments examined in
the next section of this Article confirm, participants on both sides
of the political divide in endgame-era Hong Kong could reasona-
bly expect that the post-reversion period would be marked by the
significant, but incomplete, continuity in actors, roles and issues
that characterize the third type of endgame.
As we argued in Endgame I, if the major political participants
plausibly perceived that they faced an "end of the game / on-going
games" type of endgame, patterns of argument and action that
would be sensible responses to either of the polar types of end-
game would be, almost a fortiori, intelligible as responses to the
third, intermediate type of endgame. Expecting to play a more
limited but continuing role in the aftermath of reversion, Hong
Kong liberals and democrats could sensibly pursue semi-
enforceable deals on key legal and institutional issues, but they
would not be willing to compromise very much because even
modest and uncertain reputational concerns could deter them from
making broad pre-reversion concessions from which they might
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find it imperative to defect, and which could thus imperil their
claim to the post-reversion moral and legal high-ground. The Brit-
ish authorities could engage in a similar calculus, but their expecta-
tion of a sharper decline in their post-reversion influence or their
genuinely more modest sense of what a liberal-democratic vision
required could be expected to push them, respectively, in the direc-
tion of a technical endgame or a colloquial endgame perspective,
and toward different answers to the legal and institutional ques-
tions of the endgame.
In such circumstances, British and colonial government au-
thorities' and liberal and pro-democracy politicians' approaches to
the battles over the people and the business community make
sense as strategies to cultivate and accumulate social constituency
assets that they could deploy in the endgame to seek favorable and
semi-reliable deals and in new "games" to press for the enforce-
ment of old deals and the creation of new ones beyond reversion.
Differences in the approaches that members of the broadly liberal-
democratic camp took in addressing the people and the business
community then could be understood as reflections of divergent
assessments of how valuable these "assets" would be and how fea-
sible it was to cultivate and accumulate them.
On the other side, the approaches of the P.R.C. and its Hong
Kong stalwarts can be understood in similar terms. This side's
broad, but not absolute, unwillingness to strike compromise deals
makes sense in the face of the complex factors at play in an end-
game of the third type: concern that a failure to perform an end-
game deal would make dealings with prior partners in new games
more difficult; perceptions that pre-endgame deals could offer a
modestly reliable mechanism for facilitating the establishment of
preferred laws and institutions, as well as pose a non-trivial threat
to impede the unilateral, post-endgame implementation of such ar-
rangements; and confidence that China and its allies could impose
adequate and acceptable legal and institutional solutions after re-
version in the absence of an acceptable and enforceable pre-
reversion deal.
Shifts and splits within the China and pro-China camp over
precisely what agenda to pursue on the concrete legal and institu-
tional questions of the endgame then appear to be the predictable
consequences of different assessments of what this complex envi-
ronment would portend for relatively purist or relatively accom-
modationist approaches. Finally, in the context of an intermediate
endgame, the P.R.C.'s and pro-China elements' sometimes-
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divergent approaches to claiming and cultivating popular and
business support look closely analogous to their liberal-democratic
antagonists' asset-cultivation strategy. While one might expect
that the shifts in role and power among key political actors would
make such social constituency assets less vital to the P.R.C. and its
allies than to the U.K. and Hong Kong liberals and democrats, such
differences would be ones of degree and not of kind in the context
of the ending of one game in a series of changing games among re-
peat players with potentially variable assets.
In whatever terms the principal political participants under-
stood the pre-reversion endgame, their most prominent leaders
made statements at the moment of Hong Kong's reversion that re-
stated long-held visions of sovereignty and legality and continued
familiar efforts to claim and cultivate support among the people (in
some cases quite explicitly) and among the business community
(although often only implicitly or indirectly). In his final speech as
governor on June 30, Christopher Patten asserted:
Our own nation's contribution here was to provide the scaf-
folding that enabled the people of Hong Kong to ascend.
The rule of law. Clean and light-handed government. The
values of a free society. The beginnings of representative
government and democratic accountability. Hong Kong's
values are decent values. They are universal values. They
are the values of the future in Asia as elsewhere, a future in
which the happiest and the richest communities, and the
most confident and the most stable, too, will be those that
best combine political liberty and economic freedom as we
do today.5 70
Democratic Party Chairman Martin Lee's "July 1 Declaration"
made similar, and equally familiar points:
Democracy has taken root and flourished here in Hong
Kong.... We ask our Chinese rulers to give Hong Kong
more democracy, not less, now that we are reunited with
our motherland .... [T]he Beijing leaders cannot win the
trust of the people of Hong Kong by rejecting a legislature
570 Christopher Patten, Farewell Remarks July 1, 1997), in Edward A. Gar-
gan, In a Former Colony, the Dawn Is Red, INT'L HERALD TRIB., July 1, 1997, at 1.
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elected by Hong Kong citizens ... ; or by rolling back indi-
vidual freedoms and our Bill of Rights; or by striking down
other laws that have the support of our people.... Elec-
tions have ensured stability in Hong Kong, they have pro-
tected our freedoms and underpinned our economic suc-
cess. In order to preserve the rule of law, we must not only
have an independent judiciary, but good laws. To have
good laws, we must have democratic elections to guarantee
that our legislature is accountable to us, the people.... We
believe that people everywhere share our love of freedom
and democracy and that these values will ultimately tri-
umph - not only in Hong Kong - but across Asia and the
world.... Freedom exercised to the full, and guaranteed by
the rule of law [are the source of Hong Kong's] lustre and
indeed its value to China and the world.
571
On the other side of the principal divide in the struggles to
shape a legal and institutional order for the S.A.R., top P.R.C. offi-
cials hewed closely to positivist principle and touched upon their
pre-reversion arguments concerning the people and the business
community. After reciting a list of rights and powers that the Basic
Law conferred upon Hong Kong and Hong Kongers, Chinese Pre-
mier Li Peng declared:
The Basic Law ... was formulated in accordance with the
Constitution of the People's Republic of China and by tak-
ing into full account the history and reality of Hong Kong.
A democratic system that is consistent with the provisions
of the Basic Law and suits Hong Kong's reality will surely
enjoy extensive rights and freedom unparalleled during co-
lonial rule. With the return of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong
compatriots have become the real masters of the land and
they are fully capable of creating an even better future by
giving full play to their wisdom and talent.5
72
571 Martin Lee, The July 1 Declaration (July 1, 1997), in We Pledge to Be the
Voice of the People, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 1, 1997, at 17.
572 Speech by Premier Li Peng at the Reception in Beijing Celebrating the Return of
Hong Kong to the Motherland, BEIJING REV., July 14-20, 1997, at 24, 24-25; see also
Speech by President Jiang Zemin at the Party Celebrating the Establishment of the Hong
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Sketching some of the details of that future, P.R.C. President
and Communist Party chief Jiang Zemin stated that "Hong Kong
will gradually develop its own democratic systems that will be
suited to itself and will maintain stability according to the Basic
Law." 573
In somewhat more detailed remarks stressing related themes,
Xinhua Hong Kong Deputy Director Zhang Junsheng asserted:
Together with the majority of Hong Kong people, we suc-
cessfully accomplished the preparation and organization of
the [S.A.R.], thus finally realizing the smooth transition.
The Chinese government's determination and sincerity for
firmly carrying out the policies of "one country, two sys-
tems," "Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong" and "a
high degree of autonomy" were fully reflected in the proc-
ess of preparing and organizing the [S.A.R.]. The principle
of "fairness, openness and impartiality" was implemented
and democracy brought into full play in course of setting
up the Selection Committee... and electing the Provisional
Legislat[ure] .... The implementation of the Basic Law will
surely offer an effective legal guarantee for carrying out the
"one country, two systems" policy [because] the Basic Law
accurately reflects the general principle of "one country,
two systems" and China's specific policies toward Hong
Kong[,] ... has a high legal status ... [, and is subject to
strict] procedures for revising [its provisions].574
Comments from a leading pro-China daily in Hong Kong were
in the same familiar China and pro-China spirit of positivism and
attention to issues relevant to popular and business attitudes and
reactions:
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China, BEIJING REV., July
14-20, 1997, at 16, 18; Speech by President Jiang Zemin at the Public Gathering to Cele-
brate Hong Kong's Return, BEIJING REV., July 14-20, 1997, at 27, 27-30 (providing the
text of President Jiang Zemin's speeches making points similar to Li Peng's).
573 Paul Harrington, Hong Kong's New Chinese Leaders Get Down to Work on
First Day, Agence France Presse, July 1, 1997 (quoting Jiang Zemin's speech on the
occasion of Hong Kong's reversion), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
574 Zhang Junsheng, Guarantee for Post-1997 Prosperity and Stability in Hong
Kong, BEIJING REV., July 14-20,1997, at 31, 31-32.
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The key to ensuring Hong Kong's stable transition lies in
implementing the guiding principle determined by Deng
Xiaoping and persisting in handling affairs in accordance
with the principle and spirit of the Basic Law of the Kong
Kong SAR. The key to maintaining Hong Kong's prosper-
ity and stability in the coming fifty years or more lies in
persistently implementing the Basic Law to the letter ...
The Basic Law legalizes the concept of "one country, two
systems." It was praised by Deng Xiaoping as a "creative
masterpiece." However, all great masterpieces are bound
to bring various interpretations. ... Therefore, it is neces-
sary to formulate various specific rules and regulations in
accordance with the principle of the fundamental laws....
The Basic Law was enacted in accordance with the guiding
principle of respecting history and reality, and its legisla-
tive spirit lies in seeking truth from facts .... If Hong Kong
people interpret the [Basic Law in this spirit], they will
reach unanimity .... This will enable them to jointly im-
plement and defend the Basic Law.575
In his first speech as Hong Kong's Chief Executive, Tung Chee-
hwa sketched a vision of the S.A.R.'s legal and institutional order
in terms that were compatible with China's positivist and sover-
eignty-protecting vision of legality, that built upon his earlier
comments which had been warmly praised in official Chinese and
pro-China press commentaries, and that seemed to seek at once to
coopt and to rebut liberal-democratic arguments. Tung stated:
Through a solemn act of law, the central people's govern-
ment has granted Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy,
unparalleled anywhere in the world. We value this em-
powerment, and we will exercise our powers prudently
and responsibly....
For the first time in history, we, the people of Hong Kong,
will be masters of our own destiny. The [S.A.R.] govern-
575 Implement Basic Law in a Practical Way, TA KUNG PAO, July 14, 1997, at A2
(discussing the Basic Law in the context of the early post-reversion controversy
over immigration, and, in part, paraphrasing remarks of Jiang Zemin and N.P.C.
Chairman Qiao Shi).
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ment is fully committed to preserving the Hong Kong way
of life, maintaining Hong Kong's free and open economic
system, upholding the Rule of Law, and building a more
democratic society.
Democracy is the hallmark of a new era for Hong Kong.
The [S.A.R.] government will resolutely move forward to a
more democratic form of government in accordance with
the provisions in the Basic Law. . . . The [S.A.R.] govern-
ment will adopt an open attitude and be accountable to the
public....
[W]e now have the opportunity to chart our own destiny.
Under 'one country, two systems,' we will move forward
with conviction, prudence and determination. We will
work together for a better future.
For a long time, Hong Kong has embraced the Eastern and
Western cultures. We will continue to encourage diversity
in our society, but we must also reaffirm and respect the
fine traditional Chinese values .... 576
While such statements suggest that the key established partici-
pants in the political struggle over the S.A.R.'s legal and institu-
tional order remained broadly consistent in their principled per-
spectives and in their social constituency-targeting strategies
throughout Hong Kong's endgame, the end of the endgame left a
good deal of uncertainty about what kind of endgame Hong Kong
had been facing, and about the prospective roles of emergent post-
reversion players such as the S.A.R. administration. Post-reversion
576 Speech by Chief Executive Tung Chee Hwa at the HKSAR Inauguration and
Swearing-In Ceremony, BEIJING REV., July 14-20, 1997, at 15, 15; A Future of Excellence
and Prosperity for All, BEIJING REV., July 14-20, 1997, at 20, 23 (presenting text of
speech by Tung at the party celebrating Hong Kong's reversion); Peter Lim, Chi-
nese Values Take Over in Hong Kong, Agence France Presse, July 1, 1997 (quoting
Tung), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
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developments promised, eventually, to dispel some of that uncer-
tainty.
4.2. The S.A.R.'s Beginning
Only a few months have passed since Hong Kong's formal re-
turn to Chinese rule. It is still too early to reach firm conclusions
concerning the law and politics of post-reversion Hong Kong and
what they reveal about the nature of transitional Hong Kong's
endgame and its implications for the rule of law. Nevertheless, le-
gal and institutional developments since July 1, and debates con-
cerning the propriety and popularity of those developments, sug-
gest a potentially telling mix of continuity and change. Most of the
key participants have remained on the scene, but much about the
scene they inhabit, and their places in it, is different. The issues of
the early post-reversion period in many respects have been the di-
rect descendants of the contentious issues of law and institutions of
the pre-reversion endgame, but they have also raised new ques-
tions and concerns. The arguments that the principal political
players have made in favor of their preferred resolution of those
issues, and in addressing the attitudes of the people and the busi-
ness community, have been broadly consistent with the arguments
of the early and middle 1990s, but not identical to them.
4.2.1. Players and Roles
All of the major actors in the pre-reversion political struggle to
shape Hong Kong's post-reversion laws and institutions have re-
mained on the stage, although their roles and influence have
changed considerably and in different ways. Predictably, Great
Britain has been pushed to the wings. With the U.K. no longer
claiming sovereignty or exercising governmental power over Hong
Kong, the formerly prominent British voice in the broadly liberal-
democratic camp has been subdued or silent on the details of Hong
Kong's legal and institutional affairs since July 1, 1997. Yet, the
former colonial ruler has been careful to assert that its final exit is
not imminent. Official British statements have consistently insisted
that London still has a supporting role to play in securing for Hong
Kong the requisites of a just and proper legal and political order.577
577 See, e.g., Hong Kong's New Chinese Leaders Get Down to Work on First Day,
Agence France Presse, July 1, 1997 (quoting Foreign Secretary Robin Cook's
statement that "[t]oday is not the end of Britain's long connection with Hong
Kong, but a new beginning," and that the U.K. "will walk with [the people of
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In what critics have taken as a reflection of the U.K.'s new impo-
tence, however, British officials have offered little criticism of the
S.A.R. government's controversial moves on election laws and
other issues.
578
The P.R.C.'s role has changed as well. In some ways, it has ex-
panded considerably. The departure of the British colonial au-
thorities and the dissolution of a highly critical Legislature have
removed key practical impediments to ensuring that the exercise of
governmental authority over Hong Kong is acceptable to the P.R.C.
In China's view, the coming into force of the Basic Law has estab-
lished new legal and legitimate avenues for central Chinese au-
thorities to exercise sovereign authority directly. For example, the
N.P.C. and its Standing Committee are now formally empowered
to revise the Basic Law (after consultation with the Basic Law
Committee) and to interpret the Basic Law. Hong Kong's Chief
Executive is now formally accountable to the Central People's
Government in Beijing (as well as to the S.A.R.), some of its legisla-
ture's enactments subject to invalidation by the N.P.C. Standing
Committee, and its Court of Final Appeal bound to seek and accept
the N.P.C. Standing Committee's interpretations of some key Basic
Law provisions.5 79 In the first hours of the S.A.R. era, the entry of
P.R.C. troops into Hong Kong and the P.R.C.-approved Provisional
Legislature's ratification of measures to implement P.R.C.-
mandated changes to Hong Kong law provided dramatic symbols
of China's expanded role.580
Hong Kong] through the 50 years for which terms of the handover remain in legal
force"), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Hong Kong Rebuts Urgings of
Former Sovereign, Agence France Presse, July 31, 1997 (quoting the British govern-
ment's semi-annual report to Parliament on the implementation of the Joint Dec-
laration, which stated that "[tihe government is determined to protect the corner-
stones of Hong Kong's success," including "the rule of law, an independent
judiciary, a level playing field, an honest, efficient and politically neutral civil ser-
vice ... and the free flow of information"), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Al-
lasi File; Chris Yeung, UK Pledges Help for More than 50 Years, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Mar. 21, 1997, at 6 (quoting Foreign Secretary Malcolm Rifkind's pledge that
"Britain's political and moral commitment to Hong Kong will ... last ... beyond
the 50 years of the Joint Declaration['s]" pledge to retain Hong Kong's "system"
unchanged).
578 See, e.g., Emily Lau, Masters Do Not Need to Pull the Strings, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Aug. 4, 1997, at 18 (criticizing Foreign Minister Derek Fatchett for
stating that the freedom accorded demonstrators during the S.A.R.'s first month
had given the British government "a great deal of reassurance," and that it was
"possible to have open and fair elections" in 1998).
579 See Basic Law, supra note 21, arts. 17, 43, 158, 159.
580 The principal vehicle for effecting the legislative changes in Hong Kong
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On the other hand, China's visible presence in the post-
reversion debate over S.A.R. laws and institutions also has shrunk
in key respects. Explicit exercises of China's sovereign authority,
or even a widespread perception of pervasive informal interven-
tion, on matters that are legally committed to the discretion of the
S.A.R. government, or that seem vital to Hong Kong's legal and in-
stitutional autonomy, now seem to pose an increased risk of trig-
gering international approbation or a ruinous fall in public and in-
vestor confidence in the territory's future. Perhaps reflecting this
concern, Chinese official and pro-China statements since July 1
have been especially careful to stress legal and policy restrictions
on P.R.C. state organs' meddling in the territory, and the official
and staunchly pro-China press has confined itself ever more nar-
rowly to praising the accomplishments of Tung Chee-hwa's gov-
ernment.581
Within Hong Kong, changes of role have been complex. De-
mocratic Party and liberal independent politicians and activists
remain a formidable force, leading public rallies critical of the gov-
ernment, making now-familiar arguments about the requisites of
democracy and the rule of law, and planning their campaigns for
the 1998 elections for the S.A.R. Legislature. On the other hand,
they have lost their former power and platform as the largest block
in an assertive legislature. No longer able to focus primarily on the
relatively easy targets of a foreign and insufficiently liberal and
was the Reunification Ordinance. See, e.g., Hong Kong Reunification Bill Passed,
New China News Agency, Domest. Serv., July 1, 1997, transcribed in BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts (describing the Provisional Legislature's unanimous
passage of the bill, at 3:55 a.m. on July 1, to ratify thirteen bills it had approved
prior to July 1, 1997), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
581 See, e.g., John Ridding, Hong Kong's Solid Start, FIN. TIMES (London), Sept.
8, 1997, at 22 (noting held-over government officials' praise of Ma Yuzhen, the
P.R.C. Foreign Ministry Representative in Hong Kong, for his low-key and coop-
erative role, and quoting new Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office Director Liao
Hui's description of himself as a "goalkeeper" who protects Hong Kong from
mainland interference); Speech by President Jiang Zemin at the Party Celebrating the
Establishment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic
of China, translated in BEIJING REV., July 14-20, 1997, at 16, 17 (setting forth Presi-
dent Jiang Zemin's pledge that "no central departments of localities [of the P.R.C.]
shall interfere or be allowed to interfere in the affairs administered by the S.A.R.
in accordance with the Basic Law"); Tsang Yok-sing, Uncertain Role for Lu Ping's
Old Office, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 2, 1997, at 18 (expressing expectation that
Liao Hui would abandon pre-reversion practice of Hong Kong and Macao Affairs
Office Director making "authoritative remarks about SAR affairs"); cf. Jonathan
Braude, It's Time for a Little Trust, Says Martin Lee, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 3,
1997, at 11 (noting Martin Lee's expression of surprise at the silence of Beijing and
the Hong Kong Xinhua branch during the first months of the S.A.R.).
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democratic colonial government, or an ideologically alien and reso-
lutely illiberal group of P.R.C. authorities, these critics have had in-
creasingly to turn their fire to the far more ambiguous target of a
fairly popular Hong Kong Chinese-led S.A.R. administration, and
to signs of relatively subtle P.R.C. influence on that administra-
tion.58
2
"Pro-China" forces in the territory have similarly remained im-
portant players while facing significant changes of role and con-
text. Most notably, the D.A.B.'s representation in the Provisional
Legislature and its expected share of the Legislature to be chosen in
1998 significantly exceed its small contingent in the last colonial
Legco. Yet, the return of Hong Kong to China has not been an
unmitigated boon for the territory's pre-eminent pro-China party.
The D.A.B. received a strikingly small share of the seats on the pro-
China Provisional Legislature, has sometimes been on the losing
side of key post-reversion votes in that body, and has been largely
excluded from a big business-dominated executive branch in the
S.A.R.'s executive-led government.
583
Finally, "pro-business" politicians' roles seem to have changed
substantially in the wake of Hong Kong's handover. In the pre-
reversion endgame, they had been Legco's swing vote without a
clearly developed legal and institutional vision, or the conduits for
582 See Chris Yeung, Chinese Rule Okay So Far, Says Martin Lee, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 6, 1997, at 6 (noting Martin Lee's mild comments about
S.A.R. governance so far, and expressions of concern that Hong Kong's new dicta-
torship may stop being so benign); Braude, supra note 581, at 11 (noting similar
comments from Martin Lee and quoting Lee's view that the advent of the S.A.R.
"at least has localized the fights" over Hong Kong's future and made them an in-
tra-Hong Kong affair); Linda Choy, Tung's Political Say Limited, Says Szeto Wah, S.
CHINA MORNING POsT, Aug. 18, 1997, at 4 (noting leading Democrat Szeto's view
that Tung likely had to toe China's line on any "political question"); Andy Ho,
End of the Honeymoon, S. CHINA MORNING PoST, July 15, 1997, at 21 (noting that lib-
erals' expulsion from the legislature shifted their focus to "protests outside the
institution" and efforts "to amplify public grievances and discontent in the run-
up" to 1998 elections).
583 See do Rosario, Stand Up and Be Counted, supra note 106, at 17 (reporting
that D.A.B. won six of sixty seats in the 1995 Legco elections); Bruce Gilley, Men
Who Matter, FAR E. ECON. REV., Apr. 3, 1997, at 20 (describing the dominance of
business elites on the Executive Council and in senior policy posts, and the
ground D.A.B. lost to less docile pro-China parties in appointments to the Provi-
sional Legislature); Chris Yeung, Keeping a Tight Rein on Legco, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 12, 1997, at 15 (describing one academic's argument that the plan for
S.A.R. governance was to limit the influence of both D.A.B. and the Democratic
Party in an effort to enhance the power and discretion of the Chief Executive, and
quoting D.A.B. leader Ma Lik's statement that D.A.B. would be happy to retain
the ten seats it had in the Provisional Legislature in the 1998 legislative elections).
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the business community's considerable influence with the colonial
government, or the most visible barometers of the attitudes of a
key constituency over which the more assertive players in the pub-
lic politics of pre-reversion Hong Kong fought. In the post-
reversion period, many of them - including Tung Chee-hwa - have
occupied the top positions of the executive-led government, as well
as a significant share of the seats in the Provisional Legislature.
Perhaps inevitably, their accession to these influential offices has
coincided with new pressures to articulate a legal and political vi-
sion for Hong Kong. For Tung and many of those around him, the
vision that began to take shape before reversion, and that has
emerged more fully since, is one that looks rather like a Singapore
model. Compared to pre-reversion Hong Kong, the S.A.R. order
that pro-business political leaders seem to envision has a more ex-
tensive industrial policy, a greater government role in housing and
other sectors, and weaker protection of civil liberties (often justi-
fied as appropriate to ensure the protection of social order and
harmony with local cultural values).584
4.2.2. Issues and Conflicts
Established participants' new or altered roles in post-reversion
Hong Kong have begun to take shape in the context of controver-
sies over general rule-of-law concerns, and specific legal and insti-
tutional questions, during the S.A.R.'s first months. Like the par-
ticipants themselves, the issues with which they have wrestled, so
far, appear to exhibit a mixture of continuity and contrast with
those of Hong Kong's pre-reversion endgame. The key political
players' arguments about those issues seem to reflect a broad con-
tinuation -although with possibly significant alteration-of the
pre-reversion endgame's patterns of a basic clash of visions of do-
mestic legal-political authority, substantial intramural disagree-
ments among adherents to each vision over specific legal and insti-
tutional arrangements, and a focus on how key social
584 See A Future of Excellence and Prosperity for All - Speech by Tung Chee Hwa,
First Chief Executive of the HKSAR, at the Celebration Party, reprinted in BEIJING REV.,
July 14-20, 1997, at 12-23 (briefly setting forth Tung's agenda for the S.A.R. gov-
ernment's policies and legislative program); supra note 576 and accompanying
text (discussing Tung's Asian values theme); see also deLisle & Lane, supra note 22,
at 35-36, 60-62, 67-68 (discussing a "Singapore model" of the rule of law for Hong
Kong); Chris Yeung, A Trade-Off with the Rule of Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July
19, 1997, at 17 (quoting pro-China academic and former P.C. member Lau Siu-
kai's analysis of the Tung administration's agenda as favoring business, and not
the middle and upper-middle classes or the poor).
2004] 1703
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.
constituencies might line up in the political battles over laws and
institutions for the Hong Kong S.A.R.
Strong assurances that Hong Kong's post-reversion rulers un-
derstand the importance to Hong Kong of the rule of law, and es-
pecially the rule of law for the economy, remain the order of the
day in official Hong Kong circles. Anson Chan, continuing in her
post as Hong Kong's top civil servant, has spoken of the rule of law
in terms that generally echo those of top officials in the colonial
government, describing it as "central to Hong Kong's economic
and social success," and a top priority of the S.A.R. administration
"from the Chief Executive downwards," "inextricably linked to our
democratic institutions," and a vital asset which "must be pro-
tected and preserved by all of us."5 85 In the same vein, Tung Chee-
hwa has commented that the "rule of law underpins our free mar-
ket, the work of our civil service and the quality of our commu-
nity" and "must be preserved by all means."
5 86
Despite such signs of continuity in the "Hong Kong govern-
ment" position, shifts in context and emphasis suggest that the
S.A.R. government officials' primary conception of the rule of law
departs from the liberal-democratic one endorsed by the colonial
authorities. It appears to have some of the features of the rule of
law that China and its Hong Kong allies appear to have endorsed
during the initial S.A.R. era, and that they strongly supported dur-
ing the pre-reversion endgame. The democratic institutions to
which Chan linked Hong Kong's post-reversion rule of law are less
sweepingly democratic than the ones Patten and pro-democracy
politicians envisioned in the early and middle 1990s. Indeed, they
approach the model the P.R.C. favored during the same period.
Chief Executive Tung's account of an adequate rule of law, like
that found in contemporary P.R.C. sources, often has seemed nar-
rowly economic and business-focused. 58 7 Moreover, S.A.R. offi-
585 Anson Chan in USA Defends Electoral Changes, Rule of Law, Hong Kong SAR
web site, Sept. 15, 1997, transcribed in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (quoting
Anson Chan), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Elections Called Step-
ping Stone to Universal Vote, New China News Agency, Sept. 15, 1997, transcribed in
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (quoting Anson Chan), available at LEXIS,
Asiapc Library Allasi File.
586 Chief Executive in USA Defends Electoral Changes as Move Towards More De-
mocracy, Hong Kong SAR web site, Sept. 10, 1997, transcribed in BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts (quoting Tung Chee-hwa), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library,
Allasi File; Linda Choy, Tung Pledge on Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 1, 1997,
at 1 (quoting Tung).
587 See Anson Chan in USA Defends Electoral Changes, Rule of Law, supra note
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cials' and pro-China sources' explanations of the guarantees of the
rule of law's survival typically have placed heavy emphasis on the
positivist guarantees provided by the Basic Law and other P.R.C.
legal commitments, and the P.R.C. interests and practices that sup-
port those commitments -all features central to pre-reversion
P.R.C. and pro-China arguments. 88
Liberal and pro-democracy politicians seem to have continued
to adhere to their pre-reversion vision of the rule of law, including
their view that an adequate rule of law must be grounded in robust
democratic institutions. Britain has at times offered muted support
for their positions. The explicit foci of liberal-democratic concerns,
however, have changed somewhat since the establishment of the
S.A.R. While liberals and democrats still have seen the P.R.C.'s
meddling and the Provisional Legislature's existence and activities
as significant threats to the rule of law and its democratic under-
pinnings, their post-reversion comments have placed unprece-
dented emphasis on the dangers of an executive-dominated gov-
ernment. Leading former Legco members have expressed their
worries that the rule of law will degenerate into rule by law, or
lawless personal rule. Several of them have argued that this un-
585 (presenting Anson Chan's account of democratic elections for post-reversion
S.A.R. legislatures); Chief Executive in USA Defends Electoral Changes as Move To-
wards More Democracy, supra note 586 (presenting Tung Chee-hwa's comments
drawing a connection between Hong Kong's rule of law and its financial auton-
omy and free market); Li Shangzhi, Zhao Wei & Wu Ming, Hong Kong Will Be
Even Better Tomorrow, New China News Agency, July 2, 1997, translated in BBC,
Summary of World Broadcasts (presenting official P.R.C. commentary stressing
the economic benefits provided by Hong Kong's "relatively complete legal and
supervision systems and adequate protection for economic activities"), available at
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
588 See Chief Executive in USA Defends Electoral Changes as Move Towards More
Democracy, supra note 586 (presenting Tung Chee-hwa's comments asserting that
the 'one country, two systems' approach was "China's idea" and "deeply in
China's interest"); Hong Kong Rebuts Urgings of Former Sovereign, supra note 577
(quoting Tung Chee-hwa's assertion that the S.A.R. government and the Central
People's Government were both committed to implementing fully the legal guar-
antees of Hong Kong's autonomy and to preserving the rule of law); Ridding, su-
pra note 581, at 22 (quoting Financial Secretary Donald Tsang's comment that
China has not interfered with or exerted pressure on him); Safeguard the Authority
of the Basic Law, TA KUNG PAO, July 5, 1997, at A2 (describing the Basic Law as a
"constitutional document" for Hong Kong which "embodies China's state will,"
"expresses China's state needs" and "stipulates that the central government will
implement the basic principles of 'one country, two systems' and 'Hong Kong
people ruling Hong Kong"); Tsang, supra note 581, at 18 (presenting D.A.B.
leader's assertion that the Basic Law "clearly defines the few areas ... which are
outside Hong Kong's autonomy" and with respect to which "the Central Gov-
ernment can take decisions").
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raveling of legality is likely to take place through the specific
mechanism of the emergence of a government in which the legisla-
ture and the courts are the docile agents of an overweening Chief
Executive, with the legislature willing to pass any legislation (in-
cluding laws with retroactive effect) favored by the Chief Executive
or China, and the courts willing (or required) to leave the protec-
tion of citizens' basic rights to the discretion of the executive.
58 9
In the general debates over the rule of law during the opening
months of the S.A.R. era, battles over the attitudes and allegiances
of the people and the business community appear to have contin-
ued as well. In asserting that the rule of law is alive and well, and
in arguing that business and popular confidence in the new regime
is high, Tung and other S.A.R. sources have extended a pre-
reversion strategy of claiming and cultivating support from these
key sectors for the version of the rule of law that the S.A.R. gov-
ernment and the P.R.C. are establishing for Hong Kong. On the
other side, prominent liberal and pro-democracy political leaders
have continued to seek popular and business community backing
for more critical and skeptical perspectives on the rule of law that
the S.A.R. has promised or seems likely to provide. At a general
level, they have argued that there are still reasons for the people to
be concerned about the longer term prospects for the rule of law,
and that it is still too early to tell whether Hong Kong's business
community will enjoy business as usual.
590
589 See Braude, supra note 581, at 11 (quoting Martin Lee's comments that he
is "still worried about the rule of law" and that some of his pre-reversion "fears
[about the fate of the rule of law] have materialized"); Lau, supra note 578, at 18
(charging that the S.A.R. government had been "high-handed" in its handling of
key legal issues, and had engaged in "excesses" that the Provisional Legislature
that the courts proved "incapable of checking"); Margaret Ng, Executive's Cloak of
Legality, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Aug. 22, 1997, at 19 (presenting pro-democracy
former Legco member's charge that the executive is "using the legislative process
to give its bare will the cloak of legality," and that this development marks the
"beginning of the rule by law, supplanting the rule of law," portends new barriers
to judicial redress, and signals a new and dangerous dependence on the benevo-
lence and generosity of the S.A.R. executive, which "must not be confused with
the protection of rights"); Margaret Ng, Setting a Precedent in Retrospect, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, June 27, 1997, at 23 (presenting pro-democracy former Legco
member's eve-of-reversion denunciation of the S.A.R. government for having "no
respect for the rule of law" and the legislature, as was reflected in the govern-
ment's "assum[ption] that what the executive pronounces is already law or as
good as law").
590 See, e.g., Braude, supra note 581, at 11 (noting Martin Lee's belief that peo-
ple are "more aware of their freedom" than before and thus perhaps more likely
to defend it against the significant threats to that freedom and the rule of law in
the S.A.R.); Chief Executive in USA Defends Electoral Changes as Move Towards More
[Vol. 25:41706
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/7
HONG KONG'S ENDGAME (II)
Liberals and democrats also have articulated more specific ar-
guments about the prospects for the rule of law in post-reversion
Hong Kong, and about the views of the people and the business
community, in the context of controversies over more concrete
laws and institutions that have marked the first months of the
S.A.R. era. S.A.R. government officials, Hong Kong's pro-China
circles, and, occasionally, Britain and China have done much the
same. The issues that have been the foci of their conflicts have
been closely connected, but not identical, to the four principal legal
and institutional questions of the pre-reversion endgame.
4.2.2.1. Laws Governing Rights and Civil Liberties
Laws regulating civil liberties, political activities and other
rights of Hong Kong residents have remained a focus of conflict in
the S.A.R.'s first months. Most controversially, the Reunification
Ordinance enacted legislation, which the Provisional Legislature
had approved before July 1, to reverse late colonial reforms to the
Public Order and Societies Ordinances and other rights-related
laws. The new legislation restored some pre-reform provisions
and authorized restrictions on expressive and associational free-
doms when government officials determined that an action or or-
ganization posed a danger to "national security" -a term that the
government construed broadly with respect to public demonstra-
tions in a set of administrative guidelines that it issued during its
first weeks in office.5 91
Democracy, supra note 586 (presenting Tung Chee-hwa's remarks asserting high
levels of confidence, and reasons for that confidence, in the business community,
and citing polling data indicating a 78% popular confidence rating); Karen Lowe,
Hong Kong Democracy Activist Derides Tung Chee-hwa's Election Law, Agence France
Presse, Sept. 12, 1997 (describing Emily Lau's view that it was still to early if busi-
ness would continue as usual in Hong Kong, given the prospect of rising corrup-
tion and political repression), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
591 See, e.g., Hong Kong S.A.R. Government Issues Administrative Guidelines on
'National Security,' TA KUNG PAO, July 19, 1997, at A2 (describing the S.A.R. gov-
ernment's guidelines interpreting "national security" exception in Public Order
Ordinance as permitting bans on demonstrations that are likely to disrupt public
order or immediately harm social stability, or that advocate splitting the P.R.C.,
including by granting independence to Taiwan or Tibet); Priority Task for S.A.R. Is
to Make a Success of its Work, TA KUNG PAo, June 16, 1997, at A2 (describing the
Provisional Legislature's pre-reversion approval of amendments to the Societies
and Public Order Ordinances); Provisional Legislature Hears Readings of Societies Bill,
New China News Agency, May 17, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (describing amendments to the Societies Ordinance that would permit
registration officers to deny an organization's request for registration or exemp-
tion from registration where necessary in the interests of national security, public
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While Hong Kong's colonial government had sharply de-
nounced plans to reverse and revise terminal colonial laws govern-
ing civil liberties and political rights, the S.A.R. government has
defended the changes, with reliable support from the pro-China
press but with very little public commentary from official P.R.C.
sources. Their arguments generally have been followed the China
and pro-China camp's approach to the Bill of Rights and related is-
sues during the final years before reversion. S.A.R. officials and
unofficial pro-China commentaries have argued for the validity of
the post-reversion rules on rights primarily in positivist terms: The
Provisional Legislature, which P.R.C. and pro-China sources have
long claimed to be a legitimate law-making body, duly enacted the
new laws by passing the Reunification Ordinance. On this view,
the Provisional Legislature's pre-reversion consideration and ap-
proval of the rights legislation was necessary because the bills oth-
erwise would not have been ready for enactment by means of the
Reunification Ordinance. Absent such action by the Provisional
Legislature, a dreaded "legal vacuum" would have occurred when
the Basic Law came into effect as Hong Kong's local constitution
and provisions of the Public Order and Societies Ordinances and
other colonial-era rights laws, which the N.P.C. Standing Commit-
tee had declared to be incompatible with the Basic Law and not to
be adopted as S.A.R. law, ceased to be law in Hong Kong. (On this
view, the Basic Law itself has remained the principal, and fully
adequate, positivist guarantee of Hong Kongers' civil and political
rights.) S.A.R. officials also argued for the national security guide-
lines in similarly positivist terms, as proper administrative inter-
pretations of the new legislation that did not, and in principle
could not, expand the grounds for restricting liberties beyond
those provided in the revised Public Order Ordinance.
592
safety, public order, protection of the rights of others, or because of applicant's
connections with a foreign political organization), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Li-
brary, Allasi File; Provisional Legislature Studies Public Order Bill, New China News
Agency, May 17, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (describ-
ing amendments to the Public Order Ordinance that would authorize prohibition
of public demonstration where necessary in the interests of national security, pub-
lic safety, public order, or protection of the rights or others), available at LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Xinhua Comments on Need for Provisional Legislative
Council, New China News Agency, June 30, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of
World Broadcasts (listing the thirteen bills, including amendments to the Societies
and Public Order Ordinances, examined by the Provisional Legislature before re-
version and slated for enactment into S.A.R. law by the Reunification Ordinance),
available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
592 See, e.g., Martin Lee Humbles Himself in the United States, TA KUNG PAO, Apr.
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These claims about the validity of the new laws and adminis-
trative guidelines doubtless have aimed, in part, at assuaging con-
cerns among the people and in the business community that legal
rights they valued were facing a broader erosion. Other arguments
from Hong Kong officials and established pro-China elements
(with occasional backing from official P.R.C. sources) have more
obviously sought to develop or assert popular or business support.
Parallelling arguments familiar from pre-reversion conflicts, they
have asserted that the adoption of the new rights laws followed an
adequate process of consultation with the Hong Kong people (in-
cluding, presumably, the especially heavily consulted business
community), and that the new laws enjoyed genuine support in
Hong Kong (except from those who had been duped by the British
or who still carried excessive fears rooted in the Tiananmen Inci-
dent).5 93 According to S.A.R., P.R.C. and pro-China commentary,
17, 1997, at A4 (arguing that imposing statutory "state security" limitations on po-
litical freedoms is within the discretionary power, and consistent with common
practices, of sovereign states); No Kwai-yan, Amendments to Changes in Rights Laws
to be Accepted, S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 18, 1997, at 2 (describing defense of
Provisional Legislature's pre-reversion action by Hong Kong colonial government
official seconded to the S.A.R. administration-in-waiting); Elsie Leung Oi-sie,
Freedom of Speech Alive and Well, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 19, 1997, at 21 (pre-
senting argument by S.A.R. Secretary for Justice that the national security guide-
lines "did not, and could not, give the police greater power than that set out in the
Public Order Ordinance"); Rational Balance Between Personal Rights and the Public
Interest, WEN WEI Po, Apr. 10, 1997, at A4 (describing the N.P.C. Standing Com-
mittee decision to reject late colonial amendments to Societies and Public Order
Ordinances as in accordance with article 160 of the Basic Law, and asserting that
the Provisional Legislature's pre-reversion consideration of new legislation on the
same matters was necessary to prevent a legislative vacuum); Reaching Common
Understanding Through Consultation, WEN WEI PO, May 2, 1997, at A2 (citing, in
discussion of revisions to the Public Order and Securities Ordinances, the Basic
Law as the key guarantee of civil liberties and social order in Hong Kong); Jona-
than Sprague, Future HK Government Blasted Over Freedom Curbs, Reuters, Apr. 10,
1997 (describing "legal vacuum" argument made by a source in Tung Chee-hwa's
office); Tsang Yok-sing, Basis for a Curb on Political Affiliations, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Apr. 15, 1997, at 20 (presenting D.A.B. leader's version of the "legal vac-
uum" argument).
593 See, e.g., HKSAR to Preserve People's Freedom: Tung Chee-hwa, New China
News Agency, Apr. 16, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts
(quoting favorably Tung's statement, "I hope the consultative exercise will bring
our community together to reach a broad consensus"), available at LEXIS, Asiapc
Library, Allasi File; C.K. Lau, Hollowness in Mr. Tung's Words, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, June 5, 1997, at 19 (describing Tung's call on Hong Kong people to "put
down the 'June 4 baggage'"); Li Huailin, HK People Support Amendment Proposals,
New China News Agency, Apr. 28, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (asserting that "many local associations have issued statements... to
express support" for the proposed amendments to rights laws), available at LEXIS,
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the new laws governing political liberties are suited to the needs
and distinct values of Hong Kong people, reflect a proper balance
between social and individual interests, and stand as a bulwark
against social instability and foreign influences that might threaten
state security -much as Tung, China and pro-China sources had
argued in debates over rights laws during the pre-reversion end-
game.594 Moreover, S.A.R. officials have frequently asserted, and
P.R.C. and pro-China sources have reported, that the new laws
have not changed prior policy or practice. Post-reversion events,
they have argued, have made clear that there was no reason for the
people to fear that their right to demonstrate would be curtailed, or
for the business community to worry that disorderly protests
might follow the moves to alter the rights laws.595
Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Martin Lee Humbles Himself, supra note 592, at A4 ("In
the view of most people, the direction and principles of the amendment proposals
are correct."); No, supra note 592, at 2 (reporting future S.A.R. official's description
of the proposed amendments to rights laws as "the fruits of consultation" that
"had already taken into account public opinion"); Rational Balance Between Personal
Rights and the Public Interest, supra note 592, at A4 (praising the Chief Executive-
designate's decision to pursue "broad consultation" with the public in crafting
legislation to amend the Public Order and Societies Ordinances as indicating "im-
portance" of "public opinion" to the S.A.R. government and as assuring that the
amendments "will have a solid foundation in public opinion"); Reaching Common
Understanding Through Consultation, supra note 592, at A2 (criticizing colonial au-
thorities and Hong Kong democrats for making misguided and alarmist claims
that the proposed reforms would significantly diminish Hong Kongers' rights);
Successful Consultation on Revision of Ordinances, TA KUNG PAO, Apr. 30, 1997, at A2
(asserting that the "majority of inhabitants" had participated in the consultation
process and "expressed their support," and "realized the need" for the amend-
ments to rights laws).
594 See, e.g., Silvia Cavallini, Hong Kong Clarifies Law on Banning of Protests,
L.A. TIMES, July 19, 1997, at A3 (describing comments from a senior S.A.R. official
that rights amendments were necessary because Hong Kong was small, open and
therefore "vulnerable to external forces"); New Changes Proposed to Two Hong Kong
Ordinances, New China News Agency, May 15, 1997, translated in BBC Summary
of World Broadcasts (describing the "three fundamental principles" underlying
proposed revisions to Public Order and Societies Ordinances as striking "a proper
balance between civil liberties and social order," upholding the Basic Law and the
application of the principal U.N. human rights covenants, and guarding against
"interference by foreign political forces"), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi
File; Successful Consultation on Revision of Ordinances, supra note 593, at A2 (assert-
ing that the Hong Kong people "are not willing to see Hong Kong become a po-
litical city in noisy disorder" and support changes to rights laws to prevent such
developments).
595 See, e.g., Anson Chan in USA Defends Electoral Changes, Rule of Law, supra
note 585 (presenting chief civil servant Anson Chan's statement that "Hong Kong
people continue to demonstrate, disagree, debate and argue" and that, "since the
handover, there have been some 150 demonstrations, and not a single arrest");
Ridding, supra note 581 (quoting Financial Secretary Donald Tsang's statement,
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Reflecting a similar pattern of broad continuity with the pre-
reversion era, prominent adherents to a liberal-democratic perspec-
tive have attacked the S.A.R.'s new rights laws and regulations,
largely on the natural law-like grounds that the new legislation is
incompatible with obligatory substantive norms. Emily Lau, Mar-
tin Lee, and Margaret Ng, respectively, denounced the new laws as
a threat to "important universal values" of "civil and political
rights," "a step backward for freedom" and basic rights, and a re-
flection of wilful blindness to the importance of criticism in an
open society.596 While British colonial authorities joined in the lib-
eral chorus of condemnation and concern when the specific plans
for post-reversion changes to rights laws became clear during the
final months before the handover, U.K. responses to the S.A.R.'s
enactment of the new laws have been much more restrained.
While continuing to criticize the retrenchments, British statements
have also sounded cautiously optimistic that the S.A.R. will pro-
vide adequate protection for civil and political rights that her maj-
esty's government still officially views as essential for a good and
adequate order in Hong Kong.
5 97
In the debates over rights laws after the handover, Hong Kong
liberals and democrats have also continued to address the attitudes
of the people and the business sector, and to rebut their adver-
saries' arguments about popular and business views. Democratic
Party leaders and other liberals, with some initial support from the
"We have an average of 20 demonstrations a week"); No Policy Change Towards
Demonstrations, New China News Agency, Oct. 4, 1997, translated in BBC Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts (quoting S.A.R. official's statement, "Peaceful demon-
strations have remained pretty much a way of life after 1st July"), available at
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
596 Lowe, supra note 590 (quoting Emily Lau); Liz Sly, Laws Okd to Restrict
Hong Kong Freedoms, CHICAGO TRIB., June 15, 1997, at 4 (quoting Martin Lee); Ng,
supra note 589, at 19.
597 Compare Edward A. Gargan, Hong Kong Residents Protest China's Plans to
Limit Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1997, at A15 (quoting colonial government
statement that "the existing provisions of the Societies Ordinance and the Public
Order Ordinance do not call for any changes"), and Li Hsuan-chu, Legislative Revi-
sion Consultation has Profound and Far-Reaching Significance, WEN WEI PO, Apr. 18,
1997, at A16 (criticizing Patten for asserting that planned revisions would deprive
Hong Kong people of their liberty), with Lau, supra note 578, at 18 (noting U.K.
Foreign Minister's view that first month of S.A.R. was reassuring because demon-
strations were allowed to occur), and Quinton Chan, Repeal "Won't Hurt Rights," S.
CHINA MORNING POST, July 5, 1997, at 6 (describing U.K. report to U.N. Human
Rights Committee declaring that S.A.R. amendments to the Bill of Rights Ordi-
nance would not have significant legal implications, but that amendments to laws
on civil liberties were "unnecessary and unjustifiable").
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departing colonial authorities, denounced popular consultation on
proposed rights legislation as "a fake." They have derided the new
laws as regressive, "chilling," and likely to allow the state to take
away the rights of the people through manipulation of the national
security provisions and other tactics.598 These critics conceded that
perhaps little had happened in the S.A.R.'s first weeks, especially
in areas of immediate concern to the business community. None-
theless, they have insisted, the threat is real. As liberals and de-
mocrats have seen it, the national security provisions hang like a
sword of Damocles over the heads of anyone who might question
the territory's new masters. All that has prevented the sword from
falling, with potentially ruinous consequences for Hong Kong, is
the discretion and uncertain benevolence of the Chief Executive, or
of P.R.C. leaders who can pressure the Chief Executive. 599 Accord-
ing to this line of analysis, the S.A.R. has thus failed to establish a
rule of law for rights that is sufficiently robust to offer much pro-
tection to the people or to the business community.
In attacking post-reversion changes to rights laws, some liberal
critics have turned to positivist styles of argument that were not
very prominent features of their pre-reversion approach. Thus, for
example, they have attacked revisions to the Bill of Rights, Public
Order and Societies Ordinances on the grounds that they are the
598 Many of these arguments emerged in connection with the Provisional
Legislature's pre-reversion consideration of the proposed legislation that the Re-
unification Ordinance was to enact. See, e.g., Sharon Cheung & No Kwai-yan,
Tung's Consultation Fake, Say Democrats, S. CHINA MORNING PosT, Apr. 19, 1997, at
6 (quoting Democratic Party vice chairman's statement that consultation was "a
fake" because senior Exco members declared that key principles in the proposed
bills were not open to change); Linda Choy & Chris Yeung, Bar Chairman Warning
on Defining New Laws, S. CHINA MORNING POsT, Apr. 23, 1997, at 6 (quoting Bar
Association chairperson's concern about consequences of Chief Executive's failure
to offer clear definition of "national security"); Li, supra note 597, at A16 (noting
Patten's accusations that there was not a "true consultation"); Margaret Ng, Threat
to Our Civil Rights, S.CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 11, 1997, at 23 (presenting former
Legco member's view that the proposed rights legislation is a "reversal" of the
policy of liberalization and pursues the "chilling" purpose of strengthening means
to monitor and control political organizations and activities); Chris Yeung & No
Kwai-yan, National Security Terms attacked by A-G, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr.
19, 1997 (reporting colonial government Attorney General's criticism of Tung's
assertion that there is no authoritative common law definition of national secu-
rity).
599 See, e.g., Braude, supra note 581, at 11 (quoting Martin Lee); Lau, supra note
578, at 18 (presenting comments of Emily Lau); Joice Pang, National Security "Knife
Hanging Over Us," S. CHINA MORNING POST, May 16, 1997, at 3 (quoting spokes-
man for the Alliance in Support of the Patriotic Democratic Movement in China, a
group labelled "subversive" by the P.R.C.).
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products of a legislature set up in violation of the Basic Law. Simi-
larly, they have charged that the S.A.R. government's national se-
curity guidelines fail to conform even to the minimal positivist
standard of legality that requires conformity with the underlying
statues.60
0
The post-reversion extension of pre-handover clashes over
amendments to late colonial rights laws has not been the only re-
cent major clash over rights-related laws in Hong Kong. Other
moves by the Provisional Legislature during the S.A.R.'s initial
weeks involved rights issues that were less closely connected to the
conflicts of the pre-reversion endgame. Covering matters of labor
and immigration law and raising questions about the legislative
process, these actions divided the principal Hong Kong players
along accustomed lines, and prompted them to make arguments
that adapted old themes to new issues. During the first days of the
S.A.R., Hong Kong's interim law-making body suspended the op-
eration of several laws that the last colonial Legco passed during
its final weeks, suspending their effect until the Provisional Legis-
lature could reconsider and revise them. The most controversial of
the affected laws addressed rights of collective bargaining and
other union-related issues.601 Hong Kong liberals, including sev-
eral members of the Legco that had passed the frozen laws, at-
tacked the Provisional Legislature's moves, often in terms familiar
from pre-reversion conflicts. They criticized the interim body's
undeliberative methods and its undemocratic spirit in overturning
the actions of the democratically legitimate former Legco and in
moving to restrict Hong Kongers' associational rights on yet an-
600 See Margaret Ng, We Don't Need Judge Pao Here, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Sept. 5, 1997, at 27 (arguing that the administrative guidelines "have grossly ex-
ceeded even the power set out in the [revised Public Order] Ordinance" and are
therefore "ultra vires and unlawful"); cf. Choy & Yeung, supra note 599, at 6 (quot-
ing Bar Association chairperson's concern about Chief Executive's failure to offer
clear definition of "national security").
601 The three labor-related ordinances that were "frozen" protected workers
against dismissal for participation in union activities, permitted unions to fund
political activities, and granted, to unions whose members comprise 15% of an
employer's employees, rights of consultation and rights to represent employees in
collective bargaining with the employer. The Labour Advisory Board later rec-
ommended repealing the first two laws. See, e.g., Sharon Cheung, Board Scraps
"Frozen" Labour Laws Passed by Former Legislative Council, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
Aug. 16, 1997, at 6; Legislators Freeze Four Laws Approved Before the Handover, New
China News Agency, July 18, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World Broad-
casts, available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Tsang Yok-sing, U-Turn Bad
for Labour Relations, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 22, 1997, at 16.
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other front. They added another argument that was more dis-
tinctly characteristic of the post-reversion period when they
warned that the legislature's hasty accession to the government's
request was a harbinger of an "executive hegemonism" that could
seriously erode Hong Kongers' rights by replacing the rule of law
with rule by personal will.602 While such arguments were to a sig-
nificant degree about basic rule-of-law principles, as the liberal-
democratic perspective understood them, they also sought to draw
forth support from a quiescent public that valued the rule of law, if
not from a business community that seemed likely to welcome the
substance of post-reversion labor laws that the freeze seemed to
foreshadow.
S.A.R. officials, the local pro-China press and official P.R.C.
sources defended the freeze. They answered liberals' charges by
asserting that the pre-reversion Legco's eleventh-hour passage of
the suspended legislation was certainly no less hasty, and was
much less responsible, than the Provisional Legislature's defensive
moves to prevent the legislation's going into effect. In part seeking
popular and business support for the Provisional Legislature's ac-
tion, these sources further argued that the suspended legislation
was incompatible with the interests of the people and the business
community in Hong Kong.603
602 Lau, supra note 578, at 18 (criticizing the "lightning speed" with which the
Provisional Legislature voted to suspend the labor laws and a law to extend the
Bill of Rights to cover private actions); Chris Yeung, A Trade Off with the Rule of
Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 19, 1997, at 17 (describing former Legco presi-
dent's charge of "executive hegemonism" and liberal Hong Kong Economic Jour-
nal's warning that the mentality of replacing law and rules by rule by man would
undermine the rule of law); cf. Philip Bowring, What's Changing in Hong Kong,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 27, 1997, at 8 (describing the Provisional Legislature as
acting as a "rubber stamp" when it "'froze' labor protection legislation... which
did not suit the fat cat groups who dominate" the legislature).
603 See, e.g., HK Legislators Pass Bill Freezing Some Pre-Handover Laws, New
China News Agency, July 17, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World Broad-
casts (quoting Tung Chee-hwa's criticism of the "reckless passage ... without full
consultation and detailed study" of laws which might "harm harmonious labor-
management relations"), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Hong Kong
PLC Operates Successfully, Paper Says, New China News Agency, July 22, 1997,
translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (describing Ta Kung Pao report
that the Provisional Legislature concluded that the labor laws "had been adopted
without careful study of their impact" and were "harm[ful] to the long-term inter-
ests of Hong Kong residents"), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; It Is
Absolutely Necessary to Freeze the Seven Bills, TA KUNG PAO, July 10, 1997, at A2 (as-
serting that "the purpose of the former Legco" in "hastily" passing the labor laws
was "to resist the Provisional Legislature and pose difficult questions for the
S.A.R. government rather than to fight for the rights and interests of workers,"
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Neither Hong Kong government officials nor the region's tradi-
tional "pro-China" elements offered unequivocal and undivided
support for this line of argument, however. Some of the pre-
reversion liberals who remained at high levels in the S.A.R. gov-
ernment appear to have parted company with their new bosses on
this issue, seeing a threat to the rule of law and the legal protection
of rights in the methods that the S.A.R.'s Chief Executive and legis-
lature had adopted. Also, the freezing of the labor laws seems to
have triggered an unusually sharp divide between the Tung ad-
ministration and its most reliable legislative supporters, on one
side, and Hong Kong's most prominent "pro-China" political party
and the generally pro-China trade union, on the other.
604
In another controversial move during the S.A.R.'s initial weeks,
the Provisional Legislature passed legislation to bar P.R.C. children
who had a right of abode in the S.A.R. (generally by virtue of hav-
ing parents resident in the Hong Kong) from entering the territory
until they obtained a government entry permit. The new require-
ment was made retroactive to July 1, thereby making some chil-
dren already in Hong Kong subject to forcible return to the
mainland to await entry permits.605 Prominent liberal politicians
derided the interim legislature's action on the immigration issue as
showing the same undue haste and undemocratic spirit that
and noting the freeze was necessary to prevent "long-term negative impact on so-
ciety" and to permit the government to "determine whether they conform with
the public interest"); Leung, supra note 592, at 21 (asserting that there is a "nice
irony" to liberals' criticism of the hastiness of the freeze, given the haste with
which the initial legislation had been passed).
604 See, e.g., Fung Wai-kong, Tung Rift Revealed by Freeze of Laws, S. CHINA
MORNING PosT, Aug. 11, 1997, at 4 (reporting comments of veteran legislator and
Provisional Legislature member that senior S.A.R. officials who had served in the
colonial government gave only "lukewarm" support to Tung's proposal to freeze
labor and other laws); HK Legislators Pass Bill Freezing Some Pre-Handover Laws, su-
pra note 603 (describing Tung's condemnation of the labor laws on the merits and
Anson Chan's more mild argument that suspension was necessary to permit care-
ful examination of the laws); Tsang, supra note 601, at 16 (noting that one-third of
the Provisional Legislature, including members of the D.A.B. and the Federation
of Trade Unions, had voted against the freeze). Reports of a Tung-D.A.B. split
over the issue seem plausible, and the D.A.B.'s stance intelligible, given that the
freeze and repeal of the late colonial labor laws is generally thought likely to
weaken organized labor, which has been a main cause and constituency for left-
leaning Hong Kong political organizations.
605 See Basic Law, supra note 21, art. 24 (providing that people with the "right
of abode" in the S.A.R. include "Chinese citizens born in Hong Kong" and
"[plersons of Chinese nationality born outside of Hong Kong" to specified catego-
ries of Hong Kong residents); Immigration (Amendment) (No. 5) Ordinance
(1997) (imposing entry restrictions).
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marked the freezing of terminal colonial labor laws. They also at-
tacked the Provisional Legislature for making the rights-stripping
legislation retroactive, and for seeking to solve a social problem by
denying the children the enjoyment of rights that the Basic Law
guaranteed. In an argument reminiscent of pre-reversion debates
over rights and surely designed to cultivate popular support, these
critics asserted that the flaws in the Provisional Legislature's ap-
proach to the question of the mainland children raised the specter
of a broader unravelling of legal rights guarantees and the rule of
law.
606
P.R.C. and pro-China sources, joined by the S.A.R. government,
defended the legislature's actions, primarily in positivist terms that
were broadly familiar from pre-reversion arguments. They in-
sisted that the restrictions adopted by the Provisional Legislature
did not take away rights of abode granted under the Basic Law and
were consistent with earlier mainland laws and administrative
practices for processing such children's applications to enter Hong
Kong. In addition, they sought to play an unusually strong popu-
lar opinion card, asserting credibly that most Hong Kong people
supported limits on the pace of an influx that could strain social
services and overburden public amenities.
607
606 See, e.g., Cliff Buddle, Clamp on Migrant Children "Abuse of Power," S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 19, 1997, at 3 (quoting former Exco member and lawyer's
charges that the immigration law amendments impermissibly sought to "correct[]
perceived social problems occasioned by permanent residents asserting their con-
stitutional right" and that making the effect retroactive to July 1 was a troubling
"legal fiction"); Democrats' Martin Lee Unhappy With Retrospective Immigration Law,
transcribed in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, July 10, 1997 (quoting Martin
Lee's comments that the immigration amendment bill was "a dangerous prece-
dent" and "contravened the Basic Law," and that its retrospective application
would "make it much worse, because under common law you just do not take
away ... acquired rights," such as the right of abode that the affected children ac-
quired at birth), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Ng, supra note 589,
at 19 (criticizing Provisional Legislature for passing the immigration legislation
within one day after gazetting and without prior consultation or significant
amendment).
607 See, e.g., Amendment of Immigration Bill Conforms to Basic Law, TA KUNG
PAO, July 9, 1997, at A2 (arguing that the children's assertion of their legal right of
abode cannot "become a pretext" for their "illegal action" of "crossing the border
illegally"); Andy Ho, End of the Honeymoon, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 15, 1997,
at 21 (noting independent surveys indicating 80% support in Hong Kong for im-
posing some restrictions on entry into Hong Kong of mainland children with right
of abode in Hong Kong); Implement Basic Law in Practical Way, TA KUNG PAO, July
14, 1997, at A2 (asserting that the permit requirements imposed by the immigra-
tion amendment were consistent with Basic Law, art. 22, which requires people
entering Hong Kong from other parts of China to "apply for approval," and argu-
ing that "Hong Kong people must understand that if we let a large number of
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2004] HONG KONG'S ENDGAME (II) 1717
4.2.2.2. The Provisional Legislature and the 1998 Elections
The legitimacy and legality of the Provisional Legislature have
remained divisive issues in post-reversion Hong Kong. During the
S.A.R.'s first weeks, an unsuccessful court challenge to the body's
constitutionality under the Basic Law formed a principal focus of
controversy. 6 8 Defending the Provisional Legislature in court and
in the broader public arena, the S.A.R. government and Hong
Kong's pro-China press have built upon the positivist arguments
that China and its allies had offered during pre-reversion debates
about the interim body's legitimacy. They have repeated and ex-
tended pre-reversion assertions that the Basic Law and several
N.P.C. Decisions provide ample legislative authorization for the es-
tablishment of the Provisional Legislature. On this analysis, the
Basic Law and the 1990 N.P.C. Decision concerning the formation
of the first S.A.R. legislature reserved to the P.R.C. the discretion to
mainland children come to Hong Kong all at once, Hong Kong cannot stand the
strains"); Leung, supra note 592, (presenting S.A.R. Secretary for Justice's defense
of retrospective effect of the immigration amendments as "necessary to ensure
that the same system of verification should apply to all who claim the relevant
right of abode"); Teng Yue, Exit Visas Granted as Usual to Mainland Children Born to
Hong Kong Residents, WEN WEI PO, July 17, 1997 (quoting Director of Public Secu-
rity Bureau's Exit and Entry Management Subbureau's account of established
laws and practice).
608 See HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David & Ors, 1997-2 HKC 315, 1997 HK
LEXIS 57 (Hong Kong Court of Appeal, July 22, 1997). In the words of one mem-
ber of the three-judge intermediate appellate court that decided the case, the
"momentous" question of the legality of the Provisional Legislature came before
the court in a "somewhat incidental way." Id. at *78. Indicted for a common law
criminal conspiracy offense during colonial rule, the defendants argued that they
could not be prosecuted because no proper and effective action had been taken to
preserve the indictment, to adopt as S.A.R. law the law under which they were
charged, or to establish the court which was trying them. They claimed that the
P.R.C., through the N.P.C. and its Standing Committee, had not taken necessary
affirmative steps to accomplish these three tasks, and that the Provisional Legisla-
ture's attempt to accomplish those tasks through the Reunification Ordinance
were ineffective because the Provisional Legislature itself was unlawful. In three
separate opinions, the judges of the Court of Appeal held that the Basic Law itself
accomplished the tasks in question. Addressing the legality of the Provisional
Legislature only in an alternative holding and in dicta, the judges all concluded
that the Provisional Legislature had been established through sovereign acts of
the P.R.C. (by the N.P.C. and its delegates), the validity (although not the exis-
tence) of which were beyond the jurisdiction of S.A.R. courts to review. Accord-
ingly, a challenge to the indictment and prosecution, based on the invalidity of the
Reunification Ordinance as the product of an unlawful legislature, must fail. To
varying degrees, the opinions went on to reject the defendants' arguments about
the Provisional Legislature on the merits, stating that the body's establishment did
not contravene, or require amendment of, the Basic Law.
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determine how the first legislature would be established. That
N.P.C. decision and a subsequent N.P.C. Standing Committee De-
cision authorized the Preparatory Committee to exercise that dis-
cretion and to do whatever was necessary to establish an effective
S.A.R. government. Decisions by the Preparatory Committee in
1996 then exercised this delegated authority to establish the Provi-
sional Legislature and to define its powers and functions. The
N.P.C. then removed any lingering doubt about the Provisional
Legislature's status as the product of China's sovereign acts when
the N.P.C. ratified the actions establishing the body in a March
1997 resolution approving the Preparatory Committee's work.
609
In addition, familiar claims about the importance of avoiding a
legislative "vacuum" became a piece of a more elaborate legal-
political argument that the doctrine of "necessity," and the broader
idea of preventing legal chaos, warranted upholding the validity of
the Provisional Legislature and its actions. From the perspective of
the S.A.R. officials who largely adopted the pre-reversion argu-
ments of the pro-China camp, the post-reversion context made
more immediate and tangible the dire consequences of concluding
that the enactments of the Provisional Legislature were not laws
for Hong Kong. In their view, finding for the defendants in the
case challenging the law-making body's legality raised the specter
of de facto legalization of post-reversion criminal acts and the re-
moval of vital - and popular - restrictions that post-reversion laws
imposed on mainland immigrants. Although the court declined to
decide the government's argument that the doctrine of necessity
required the court to find in the government's favor and preserve
legal and institutional continuity, the judges embraced another
609 See generally Ma, 1997 HK LEXIS 57, at *46-*48, *61-*62, *90-*92, *96 (de-
scribing Solicitor General's arguments for Provisional Legislature's legality); see
also Edward A. Gargan, Hong Kong Court Upholds China's Rule, N.Y. TIMES, July 30,
1997, at A10 (quoting Solicitor General Fung's description of the court's decision
as "unanimous" that the Provisional Legislature "is a valid, competent body"). In
the context of the Ma litigation, the point was somewhat narrower than extrajudi-
cial arguments about the Provisional Legislature's legality may seem to suggest.
The Solicitor General's argument and the court's analysis of the N.P.C. and P.C.
actions and the "legality" of the Provisional Legislature unfolded against the
background of a successful argument that the court did not have jurisdiction to
hear challenges to the validity of the N.P.C.'s decisions -or the P.C.'s decisions to
the extent that the P.C. exercised delegated sovereign power-where those chal-
lenges were based on the actions' incompatibility with the Basic Law or other
P.R.C. laws. The court thus stated that it limited its inquiry into the existence and
purported effect of those sovereign acts, which were matters that the court
claimed authority to review.
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broadly related and generally positivist argument that was accept-
able to the S.A.R. government and pro-China elements: Even if the
Provisional Legislature's establishment did not conform to the Ba-
sic Law's and the N.P.C.'s requirements for the first S.A.R. legisla-
ture, the interim body was still lawful, for it was not the first S.A.R.
legislature. Rather, it was a temporary legislative organ with lim-
ited powers that would serve until the first true S.A.R. legislature
could be elected in 1998.610
Having won its case in the courtroom, the S.A.R. government,
along with some pro-China members of the legislature, turned to
the issue of popular and business reactions. These sources asserted
that the laying to rest of doubts about the Provisional Legislature
610 See Ma, 1997 HK LEXIS 57, at *65, *98, *128 (refusing to rule on the govern-
ment's "necessity" arguments, but indicating acceptance of the government's ar-
gument that the creation of the Provisional Legislature was necessary to avoid a
legislative vacuum). The S.A.R. government's invocation of the doctrine of neces-
sity in the Ma need not have extended beyond the claim that the doctrine's im-
perative to avoid legal chaos required the continuation in force of the common
law if the Basic Law and the Reunification Ordinance were both held not to have
done so. That is, the court could have relied upon the doctrine to preserve the
common law of criminal conspiracy (and the common law more generally) with-
out holding that the doctrine supported recognition of an otherwise unlawful lo-
cal legislative body or the laws it passed, including the Reunification Ordinance.
Comments made outside of arguments to the court, and perhaps some in-court
arguments as well, however, made the broader assertion that "necessity" broadly
defined, or some kindred notion, required upholding the legality of the Provi-
sional Legislature itself. See, e.g., Charlotte Parsons, Court 'Must Accept' Body, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, July 23, 1997, at 1 (quoting Solicitor General Fung's com-
ment that the Provisional Legislature's legality must be upheld lest Hong Kong
slip into a legal vacuum and "a people or a society" be "sacrifice[d] ... under the
banner of the rule of law"); Charlotte Parsons, Solicitor General Admits Interim Body
Does Not Fulfil NPC Rules; Law "Had to be Broken," S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 25,
1997, at 1 (quoting Fung's argument to the court that a Provisional Legislature not
compatible with the N.P.C.-established requirements for the first S.A.R. legisla-
ture was necessary because establishing a Basic Law-conforming first Legisla-
ture -or amending the Basic Law - by July 1, 1997, "could not have been done as
a matter of law. It's not a question of short cuts. There was no easy way out."); Jim
Erickson & Law Siu-lan, Sovereignty and the Law, ASIAWEEK, Aug. 8, 1997, at 18
(noting government's arguments that a ruling for the defendants would have
overturned "traditional common law on everything from property rights to pro-
hibitions against bank robbery," as well as post-reversion statutes including the
one that authorized deportation of mainland children); cf. Excessive Political Tasks,
Inadequate Legal Backing, HsIN PAO, July 30, 1997, at 1 (finding merit in the conten-
tion by counsel for the Ma defendants that using the doctrine to support the legal-
ity of the Provisional Legislature would be dangerous). See also Ma, 1997 HK
LEXIS 57, at *60, *90-*91, *127-*128 (accepting government's argument that the
Provisional Legislature was not the first S.A.R. Legislature and thus not required
to satisfy the requirements for "election" and composition set forth in Basic Law,
art. 68, Annex II to the Basic Law, or the N.P.C. Decision of April 4, 1990).
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would, or at least should, receive a warm reception from the Hong
Kong people and Hong Kong's business community. Echoing pre-
reversion arguments for popular and business acceptance of the
Provisional Legislature and building upon in-court arguments
stressing the need to avoid legal chaos, they asserted that the
court's decision vindicated long-standing claims that the body was
legal, and thus eliminated uncertainty that had threatened to pro-
duce needless, unpopular, and economically dangerous instability
and losses of confidence in Hong Kong.
61'
Despite considerable continuity with pre-reversion patterns of
argument in favor of the Provisional Legislature, fissures within
the broadly "pro-China" camp seem to have grown deeper or more
evident, especially concerning issues of the temporary law-making
body's role. During the early months of the S.A.R., legislators, in-
cluding some from the D.A.B., have been increasingly vocal in in-
sisting that the interim legislature is not, and must not be, a "rub-
ber stamp" with narrowly limited powers -reportedly to the
consternation of the most ardently pro-China legislators and the
Tung administration. 612 Departing from the S.A.R. government's
611 See, e.g., Angela Li, Rita Fan Welcomes End to Uncertainty, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 30, 1997, at 6 (quoting Provisional Legislature President Rita
Fan's statement that the court "made very clear that the legality" of the Provi-
sional Legislature "is sound and strong and what we are now doing is legitimate,"
reporting D.A.B. Chairman and Provisional Legislature member Tsang Yok-sing's
view that the court's decision would "help the legal status" of the Provisional
Legislature," noting pro-China legislator Selina Chow's comment that the ruling
provided "certainty" to Hong Kong and the international business community,
and describing the response of the pro-business Liberal Party to the ruling as "en-
thusiastic"); Charlotte Parsons, Legislature Left Open to Attack, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 30, 1997, at 1 (quoting Anson Chan's and Tung Chee-hwa's comments
welcoming the verdict, and Chan's statement that the ruling "helps to clear up
some doubts" about the interim body's status); Frank Zhang, Court of Appeal Ap-
proves Hong Kong's Legislature, July 29, 1997, Agence France Presse, July 29, 1997
(noting stock market rise to record high as indicating apparent support for the rul-
ing in the business community), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
612 See, e.g., Provisional Legislature Will Never Serve as Rubber Stamp, SING TAO
JIH PAO, July 16, 1997, at A15 (quoting Provisional Legislature President Rita Fan's
assertion that the body has "the role of monitoring the government," "will never
serve as a rubber stamp," and has developed a parliamentary culture that has al-
ready achieved results); No Kwai-yan, Too Late to Put Back Genie of Chamber, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 8, 1997, at 4 (quoting D.A.B. vice chairman and legis-
lator Cheng Kai-nam's statement that Provisional Legislature's early votes
"should have alerted Tung Chee-hwa that he should not hold high hopes" that
the body would be "a rubber stamp" rather than "a counter-force," and noting
former Preparatory Committee member Lau Siu-kai's criticism that the Provi-
sional Legislature seemed to be exceeding its powers); Tsang, supra note 601 (not-
ing that one-third of the Provisional Legislature, including D.A.B. members, voted
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line on several points, the most prominent D.A.B. legislator has
both stressed the Provisional Legislature's room for discretionary
legislative choices, and expressed doubts about its popular, and
even its legal, legitimacy.613
Throughout these post-reversion debates concerning the Provi-
sional Legislature, official P.R.C. sources have remained relatively
quiet for any of several possible reasons, including: reluctance to
take sides openly in emerging disputes between a China-picked
and legally P.R.C.-accountable administration and "pro-China"
legislators; strong agreement with the S.A.R. government's princi-
pal arguments in the court case challenging the Provisional Legis-
lature; and prudential calculation that strong support from Beijing
for the side that was likely to win anyway would needlessly exac-
erbate fears of extensive P.R.C. intervention and weak S.A.R.
autonomy that the litigation and the broader political controversies
surrounding the Provisional Legislature were already provoking in
some quarters in Hong Kong.
On the other side of the fault line that has continued to divide
most key players in the politics and legal-institutional controver-
sies of transitional Hong Kong, liberals and democrats have ex-
tended their pre-reversion assaults on the Provisional Legislature
and their pre-reversion attempts to rally key social constituencies'
support for their positions, although the specific terms of their
criticisms have shifted somewhat to reflect the conditions of the
post-reversion period. Thus, prominent former members of Legco
have led denunciations of the Provisional Legislature for rubber-
stamping the rights-betraying and democracy-undermining pro-
posals of a dangerously unchecked and illiberal regime. These crit-
ics also have argued that the unseemly speed with which the legis-
lature enacted such measures has provided further evidence of an
undemocratic and high-handed executive-dominated government
that will leave the people, and the business community, with little
against the S.A.R. government's proposal to freeze late colonial amendments to
labor laws).
613 Electoral Law Faces Challenge by ADPL, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 23,
1997, at 6 (quoting Tsang Yok-sing's statement that, "[i]t's not so clear whether the
Preparatory Committee's decision [regarding the constituencies for the first S.A.R.
legislature elections] is legally binding" on the Provisional Legislature, in light of
the "spirit" of "leav[ing] more room" for the S.A.R. to make its own decisions); Li,
supra note 611, at 6 (reporting Tsang's view that the ruling in the Ma case would
"help the legal status" of the Provisional Legislature, but was "by no means a con-
clusive" result, and did not insulate the body from intervention and interference
by the N.P.C.).
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more than the good will of the Chief Executive to protect their
rights.6
14
The court ruling rejecting the challenge to Provisional Legisla-
ture's legality deepened liberals' and pro-democracy forces' con-
cerns, and failed to silence lines of argument rooted in the liberal-
democratic camp's pre-reversion positions. Acknowledging that
"the law" now was that the N.P.C. or its delegates could "make
sovereign acts which may not necessarily comply with the Basic
Law," the Chairman of the Hong Kong Bar Association went on to
criticize the ruling from a non- positivist perspective, saying that
"[t]he Basic Law must," as a normative and constitutional matter,
"bind the National People's Congress," and that the court's analy-
sis had erred in adopting a "backward-looking" focus on the lim-
ited powers of constitutional review wielded by colonial courts
rather than a more "forward-looking" focus on courts' appropriate
powers in a new constitutional system for Hong Kong. In the
wake of the ruling, Margaret Ng pointed to a still bleaker possibil-
ity in the court's apparent adoption of a concept of "unchallenge-
able acts of the sovereign." For Ng, such a doctrine portended a
nightmare of radical P.R.C.-style positivism that would accept
China's discretionary authority to set narrow limits on Hong
Kong's legislative autonomy and to render the local legislature,
and the S.A.R's supposed constitution, irrelevant.
615
Despite the unpositivist tone of many liberal reactions to the
decision in the Provisional Legislature case, the litigation also
pushed liberals and democracy advocates, and especially the law-
yers prominent among their leadership, to rely more heavily on
what are at base positivist arguments. Most simply, the suit chal-
614 See, e.g., Fanny Wong, Business as Usual but No Enthusiasm, S. CHINA
MORNING POsT, Aug. 31, 1997, at 11 (noting wide-spread perception, and criticism,
of the Provisional Legislature's unwillingness or inability to hold government ac-
countable or to resist its legislative proposals); see also supra notes 589, 602, 606
and accompanying text.
615 See Angela Li, Bar Chief Hits at "Backward-Looking" Example in Provisional
Legislature Case, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 13, 1997, at 6; Margaret Ng, Deci-
sion that Resonates, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 8, 1997, at 19 (arguing that the
court's reference to "an unchallengeable act of the sovereign" was "difficult to
understand," but might mean that "the NPC reserves an unlimited power to legis-
late for Hong Kong which it can exercise in any way and at any time it sees fit");
cf. Sharon Cheung, Lee Says No to New Legal Challenge, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
July 6, 1997, at 4 (quoting Martin Lee's comment, in the aftermath of court's dis-
missal of an earlier challenge to the legality of the Provisional Legislature, that
Democrats would have no "direct contact with" the Provisional Legislature "be-
cause we don't think it is a legal body").
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lenging the Provisional Legislature was fought, and had to be
fought, largely on the grounds that the body did not conform to
the Basic Law and related N.P.C. decisions. This claim, that the
Provisional Legislature failed under the very legal standards that
China had chosen to establish, was an argument that liberals and
democrats had adumbrated in pre-reversion conflicts, but it be-
came much more central to their position when the court challenge
became the principal focus of post-reversion conflicts over the Pro-
visional Legislature.616
In the controversies over the Provisional Legislature during the
S.A.R.'s early months, the U.K. has been much more restrained
than Hong Kong liberals in defending and advancing the norms
underlying the Patten reforms, which Britain continues to embrace
in principle. Although regarding the Provisional Legislature as of
"dubious legality" and "a step backwards on the freedoms enjoyed
in Hong Kong," the official British position has ultimately accepted
the body's existence. The U.K. government has urged the interim
law-making organ, rather mildly, to "confine itself to legislating
only on what is urgent and necessary," and to leave other issues to
be addressed by the first true S.A.R. Legislature that will be elected
in 1998.617
616 See, e.g., Ma, 1997 HK LEXIS 57, at *48-*51, *85-*89, *120-*122 (describing
defendants' counsel, and liberal lawyer, Gladys Li's arguments to the court: (1)
that the Provisional Legislature was, in fact, the first legislature of the S.A.R. and
therefore had to conform to the requirements imposed by article 68 of the Basic
Law and the Joint Declaration, which require that the legislature be constituted by
elections, and by Annex II to the Basic Law and the April 4, 1990, N.P.C. Decision
which prescribe the composition of the first S.A.R. Legislature; (2) that the March
14, 1997, N.P.C. Decision approving the Preparatory Committee's report on its ac-
tions establishing the Provisional Legislature did not, as a matter of Chinese law,
ratify the establishment, as the first S.A.R. legislature, of a body that failed to con-
form to these legal standards; (3) that the Basic Law needed to be, and had not
been, amended in accordance with the procedures set forth in article 158 of the
Basic Law in order to permit such a body to constitute a lawful first S.A.R. legisla-
ture); Ng, supra note 615, at 19 (presenting similar argument of Margaret Ng, for-
mer pro-democracy Legco member and Li's co-counsel in Ma); Excessive Political
Tasks, Inadequate Legal Backing, HsIN PAO, supra note 610, at 1 (criticizing the court
for not taking more seriously arguments that the Provisional Legislature's forma-
tion must conform to the procedures set forth in the Basic Law if the body is to be
lawful, and that the N.P.C.'s purported ratification of the decision to establish the
Provisional Legislature was an amendment to the Basic Law "not done according
to the procedures" required by the Basic Law).
617 See Hong Kong Rebuts Urgings of Former Sovereign, supra note 577 (quoting
semi-annual government report to Parliament on conditions in Hong Kong). The
British government's position is, ironically, akin to the argument calling for accep-
tance of "reality" that P.R.C. and pro-China sources urged during the final pre-
reversion conflicts over political reform, and is also reminiscent of pro-China
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The legal arrangements for the elections that will choose that
body have been a second principal focus of post-reversion conflict
over the legislature, democracy and the law. The government pro-
posed, and the Provisional Legislature passed, an electoral law for
the 1998 balloting that differs significantly from the law for the
1995 elections, which implemented the Patten reforms. Twenty
members will represent geographic constituencies, but the single-
member, first-past-the-post system will be replaced by a system of
fewer, multi-seat districts with members selected on the basis of
proportional representation (on the basis of ballots cast for party
slates, not individual candidates). Thirty members will represent
functional constituencies, but the eligible electorate will be roughly
one-tenth the size that it was in 1995. An election committee will
chose the remaining ten members. Instead of the panel of officials
elected to local office that formed the election committee in 1995,
however, the 1998 election committee will be an appointed, corpo-
ratist body similar in composition to the Selection Committee that
nominated the Chief Executive and named the members of the
Provisional Legislature. Candidates who hold foreign passports or
have rights of abode abroad, whom the Basic Law permits to oc-
cupy twelve seats in the legislature, will not be allowed to run in
the most broadly elected constituencies.
618
S.A.R. officials have defended this arrangement as sufficient to
produce "fair, open and honest" elections and a "credible legisla-
ture," and as compatible with "democracy," which is the "hallmark
of the new era."619 While these broad assertions echo both the co-
business leaders' urging Patten to restrict the scope of his administration's and
Legco's activities during the final months of colonial rule.
618 See Basic Law, supra note 21, Annex I (prescribing mix of geographic, func-
tional and election committee-chosen constituencies for first S.A.R. legislature);
Electoral Provisions (Amendment) Ordinance (1994) (enacting the Patten reforms
to govern the 1995 Legco elections); Electoral Provisions (Amendment) Ordinance
(1997) (enacting the arrangements for the 1998 Legco elections); Basic Law, supra
note 21, Annex II (prescribing the sectoral composition of the Selection Commit-
tee); id., art. 67 (providing that "permanent residents" of the S.A.R. who "are not
of Chinese nationality or who have the right of abode in foreign countries" may
be elected to the Legislature, "provided that the proportion of such members does
not exceed 20 percent of the total membership"); see also Chief Executive in USA De-
fends Electoral Changes as Move Towards More Democracy, supra note 586 (describing
Tung administration's proposed legislation to govern the 1998 Legco elections);
Linda Choy, Quinton Chan & No Kwai-yan, Anger at Guidelines for Legco Elections,
S. CHINA MORNING PosT, July 9, 1997, at 1 (describing Tung administration's pro-
posals and liberal responses).
619 Andy Ho, Risk-Free Elections, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 16, 1997, at 17
(quoting official government description); Peter Lim, "Chinese Values" Take Over in
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lonial government's and the pro-China camp's pre-reversion ar-
guments in favor of their conflicting positions on the legislature
and democratic reform, other elements in the S.A.R. government's
arguments for the new electoral law- as well as the content of that
legislation -have clear affinities with the China and pro-China per-
spective on pre-reversion issues, and have dove-tailed with post-
reversion arguments from pro-China elements in Hong Kong.
Perhaps most notably, a key defense of the new electoral arrange-
ments has been more broadly and aggressively positivist than
Patten's defensive assertion that the 1995 rules were compatible
with the Basic Law: There are many versions of democracy; Hong
Kong has chosen, and its legislature has lawfully enacted, a version
that best fits Hong Kong's current circumstances and that consti-
tutes a prudent, careful first step in the journey toward the system
of universal suffrage that the Basic Law mandates as an ultimate
goal.
620
In addition, other comments from government officials and
unofficial P.R.C. supporters in Hong Kong have blended venerable
"pro-China" arguments for the adequacy of an electoral law that
rejects the Patten reforms with arguments that have attempted to
bolster or assert popular and business backing for the less expan-
sively democratic arrangements that the new law will introduce.
For example, S.A.R. officials have claimed that a system of propor-
tional representation will yield a legislature that accurately reflects
Hong Kong, Agence France Presse, July 1, 1997 (quoting Tung Chee-hwa), available
at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Chris Yeung, Keeping a Tight Rein on Legco, S.
CHINA MORNING POST, July 12, 1997, at 15 (quoting Secretary for Constitutional
Affairs Nicholas Ng Wing-fui).
620 See, e.g., Anson Chan in USA Defends Electoral Changes, Rule of Law, supra
note 585 (presenting Anson Chan's comments that "[viarious groups in Hong
Kong have different views" about what mix of constituencies for the 1998 elec-
tions are "more or less democratic," that "[wle all know that there is no universal
truth about the perfect election," and that, while "[wie may prefer one system[,] ..
. each society should be allowed to develop its own process based on its own par-
ticular ... conditions"); Chief Executive in USA Defends Electoral Changes as Move
Towards More Democracy, supra note 586 (presenting Tung's remarks that "there
will always be debates" about constitutional questions of democracy, and that
[t]he Basic Law provides that further democratic evolution will depend on the..
* overall environment at that time with universal suffrage being the ultimate ob-
jective"); Hong Kong Chief Executive Promises More Democracy, Agence France
Presse, Sept. 9, 1997 (quoting Tung Chee-hwa, asserting that being "prudent and
careful" was a "good way of moving forward on democracy"), available at LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File; see also Tsang Yok-sing, Finding a System that Fits the
Bill, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 16, 1997, at 24 (presenting D.A.B. leader's as-
sessment of proposed electoral legislation and its validity in terms of compatibil-
ity with the text of the Basic Law).
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the will of the voters in geographic constituencies, and that the
narrowed functional constituencies will ensure proper representa-
tion of business and other important sectors of the community dur-
ing the transition to democracy. 621 An immediate leap to a system
of direct, universal suffrage would lack these virtues and, a pro-
China newspaper sycophantically opined, might have led to the se-
lection of someone other than the excellent and popular Tung
Chee-hwa if it had been applied in the Chief Executive selection
process.622 S.A.R. officials, with support from pro-China sources,
have further maintained that the new electoral law is the product
of adequate consultation with the people.623 In arguments that at
times evoke the P.R.C. and pro-China side's pre-reversion appeals
to Hong Kongers' senses of Chinese nationalism and anti-
colonialism, they also have asserted that the people would accept
the law, once they understood the opportunity it gave them for
participation in a system that ultimately would be more democ-
ratic than anything the people of Hong Kong had enjoyed under
colonial rule.
624
In keeping with the P.R.C.'s public restraint on most controver-
sial legal and institutional issues in early post-reversion Hong
621 See, e.g., Choy, Chan & No, supra note 618, at 1 (quoting Secretary for Con-
stitutional Affairs Ng's assertion that "[t]he proportional representation system
more accurately reflects the will of the voters" than the single-member district
system); Leung, supra note 592, at 21 (presenting Secretary for Justice Leung's as-
sertion that the revamped functional constituencies would "ensure that certain
important sectors within the community that have made significant contributions
are duly represented").
622 See Safeguard the Authority of the Basic Law, supra note 588, at A2.
623 See, e.g., Leung, supra note 592, at 21 (presenting comments of Secretary for
Justice Leung); New Constitutional Affairs Official Says 1998 Elections "Top Priority,"
WEN WEI Po, Aug. 6, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug.
13, 1997 (reporting favorably Secretary for Constitutional Affairs Suen's descrip-
tion of extensive consultation with the public concerning key aspects of the new
electoral law), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
624 See, e.g., New Constitutional Affairs Official Says 1998 Elections "Top Priority,"
supra note 623 (quoting, in favorable report in pro-China press, S.A.R. Secretary
for Constitutional Affairs' expectation that "the public will acquire an adequate
understanding" of the new law); Elections Called Stepping Stone to Universal Vote,
New China News Agency, Sept. 15, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World
Broadcasts (quoting Anson Chan's belief that "Hong Kong people will respond to
the opportunity-the historic opportunity-to take part in its first democratic
election as . . .part of an increasingly open, prosperous and powerful China"),
available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Hong Kong Chief Executive Promises
More Democracy, supra note 620 (quoting Tung's assertion that elections for the
second S.A.R. Legislature would provide greater democracy than Hong Kong had
ever experienced under colonial rule).
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Kong, Chinese official sources remained on the sidelines of the de-
bate over an electoral law that the S.A.R. was certain to adopt and
that would implement arrangements similar to those China had
favored in the pre-reversion clashes. Similarly characteristic of its
reduced role and quiet approach to post-reversion controversies,
the U.K. has staked out a moderate, perhaps reticent, position con-
cerning the legislation to govern the 1998 Legislative elections. Re-
iterating a commitment to democracy for Hong Kong, British offi-
cial statements criticized retrenchment from the baseline
established in the Patten reforms, but added that Britain believed it
would possible to have open and fair elections in 1998 under rules
that Britain expected to be substantially less broadly democratic
than those that had governed the 1995 elections.
625
Hong Kong liberals and democrats have pursued a much more
forceful and uncompromising critique of the S.A.R. government's
arrangements for the 1998 elections, one that often has echoed their
arguments concerning the legislature and democratization in the
early and middle 1990s. Martin Lee, Emily Lau and others have
denounced the new electoral arrangements as "disgraceful" and "a
giant leap backwards," and the beginning of the "Singaporisation"
of Hong Kong. 626 In their view, the new law is dangerously incon-
sistent with the requirements of a just and adequate rule of law,
which include having a democratically accountable government.
627
Liberal and pro-democracy leaders have charged that the legal ar-
rangements for the 1998 elections are consciously designed to re-
duce the number of seats in the legislature held by Democrats and
independents - the groups who have been the legislators most able
and dedicated to holding the administration accountable, and who
had triumphed in the universal suffrage constituencies under the
old rules. Specifically, they have attacked the shift to proportional
representation in the geographic constituencies, the drastic reduc-
tion in the size of the electorate for functional constituencies, the
establishment of a pro-business and pro-establishment Election
Committee, and the restriction of foreign passport-holders to can-
didacy in twelve functional constituencies. They have condemned
625 See, e.g., Lau, supra note 578, at 18; Hong Kong Rebuts Urgings of Former Sov-
ereign, supra note 577.
626 Lowe, supra note 590 (quoting Emily Lau); Ridding, supra note 581, at 22
(quoting Martin Lee).
627 See, e.g., Yeung, supra note 582, at 6 (quoting Martin Lee's comment that "a
lasting guarantee for the future lay with the establishment of a democratic sys-
tem" which would render the Legislature and Chief Executive truly accountable).
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these revisions as attempts to "work backwards" to achieve the re-
gime's desired results "by changing the law." 628 The new law's
critics asserted that such arrangements both undermined basic
principles of democracy and thwarted the popular will. In argu-
ments that echoed pre-reversion efforts to claim popular support
for liberal positions on a variety of issues, prominent democrats
charged that the new electoral scheme is "a big insult to the peo-
ple," in "serious contravention of public opinion," and the product
of a sham process of popular consultation.629 According to some of
628 See, e.g., Choy, Chan & No, supra note 618, at 1 (quoting Martin Lee's con-
demnation of the government's result-oriented approach to crafting electoral
laws); Hong Kong Democrats Warn of "Singaporisation," Agence France Presse, July
3, 1997 (reporting Martin Lee's assertion that Democrats in post-reversion Hong
Kong still "have the hearts and minds of the people" and thus would do very well
if S.A.R. legislative elections were "really fair and open"), available at LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Ng, supra note 600, at 27 (presenting Margaret Ng's
critique of the principal features of the proposed electoral laws as, "[s]hort of ac-
tually barring" democrats from running, "the most effective way to limit the
seats" that the government's "chief critics" can win); Ridding, supra note 581, at 22
(describing Martin Lee's denunciation of the shift to proportional representation
as an attempt to cut the ranks of government critics in the legislature); Linda Choy
& Quinton Chan, Passport Curb Challenged, Pro-Democracy Activists Hit Hardest by
SAR Poll Restrictions, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 10, 1997, at 8 (noting that Emily
Lau, Christine Loh, and Huang Chen-ya, leaders of three principal pro-democracy
parties in the S.A.R. and elected representatives of geographic constituencies in
the 1995-elected Legco, were foreign passport holders). With the exception of the
Legal constituency, few if any of the twelve functional constituencies in which
foreign passport-holders were to be permitted to run seemed, in light of the eco-
nomic sector or organization represented and the apparent political leanings of
the constituency's electorate, to be a plausible seat for any of the leading foreign
passport-holding democrats. The designated constituencies included Accountan-
cy, the General Chamber of Commerce, Engineering, Finance, Financial Services,
the Federation of Hong Kong Industries, Legal, Architectural, Real Estate and
Construction, Tourism, Import and Export, and Insurance. The Democrats had
won nineteen of sixty seats in the 1995 Legco elections, and many of the twenty
independents elected that year were staunchly "pro-democracy." See, e.g., do
Rosario, Stand Up and Be Counted, supra note 106, at 17.
629 Yeung, supra note 582, at 6 (quoting Martin Lee's criticism of the func-
tional constituency arrangements); Choy, Chan & No, supra note 618, at 1 (quoting
Martin Lee's criticism of the proportional representation, multi-member district
arrangements); Ng, supra note 581, at 19 (presenting Margaret Ng's criticism of a
mere seven-day public consultation period on planned electoral law changes);
Chris Yeung & Genevieve Ku, Public Gets Limited Say on Elections, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, May 28, 1997, at 1 (quoting Democratic Party vice chairman's criti-
cism that public consultation on proposed law was "consultation within a bird
cage" and "not a responsible way of collecting public opinion").
Early public opinion polls reinforced the credibility of critics' claims that the
planned electoral arrangements were unpopular. See Danny Gittings, Polls Give
Lie to Election Claims, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 14, 1997, at 10 (reporting 70%
opposition to the reduction in functional constituency electorates, and only 26%
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Hong Kong's leading liberals, the unaccountable S.A.R. govern-
ment that the new electoral law will permit is something that nei-
ther the people nor the business community should or would ulti-
mately welcome.
Although there has been substantial continuity between Hong
Kong liberals' and democrats' arguments against the law to govern
the 1998 elections and their arguments in favor the Patten reforms
(or more radically democratizing alternatives) for the laws govern-
ing the 1995 elections, liberal-democratic arguments in the post-
reversion period have seemed to indicate significant fragmentation
and a new uncertainty in Hong Kong's pro-democracy circles. As
developments in the final months of the colonial rule had fore-
shadowed, leading democrats and independents have divided over
how strictly to oppose the new electoral arrangements and how to
approach the elections to be held under them. Although sharp de-
nunciations of the new electoral law have been common, at least
one established pro-democracy politician has accepted the new
rules, and even Martin Lee has mixed his criticisms with a cautious
optimism about the state of the law and democratic institutions.
630
In what seems to be a more narrowly post-reversion phenomenon
(and perhaps in anticipation of bringing a court challenge to the
new election law's constitutionality), some leading pro-democracy
politicians have addressed the issue on more positivist terms.
Seemingly more than in pre-reversion debates, they have attacked
the new electoral arrangements for being incompatible with the re-
quirements set forth in the Basic Law, as well as with fundamental
democratic principles.631
support for proportional representation in geographic constituencies); Most Op-
pose New Voting System, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 1, 1997, at 4 (reporting 51%
support for first-past-the-post system for geographic constituencies, 21% support
for proportional representation, 44% agreeing that elections under the new rules
would be "open, fair, honest and acceptable to the Hong Kong people," and a
nearly equal number (38%) disagreeing with that proposition).
630 See, e.g., deLisle, supra note 27, at 110-12 (describing pre-reversion splits
among democrats as they began to contemplate their post-reversion future);
Rodger Lee, Christine Loh to Give Up Passport, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 25,
1997, at 1 (reporting Loh's acceptance of the proposed provisions concerning can-
didates with foreign passports as not "unfair" and her intention to give up her
foreign passport, and reporting Emily Lau's contention that the provisions were
not "right" and her consideration of a legal challenge); Yeung, supra note 582, at 6
(quoting Martin Lee).
631 See, e.g., Choy & Chan, supra note 628, at 8 (describing liberal objections to
restrictions on seats for foreign passport holders); Lee, supra note 630, at 1 (de-
scribing plans for a court challenge to restrictions on foreign passport-holding
candidates).
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4.2.2.3. The Court of Final Appeal and Judicial Review in the
S.A.R.
The installation of the Court of Final Appeal's four permanent
members, and the naming of expatriate and local judges who could
serve as the five-member bench's lone temporary judge, have pro-
vided another occasion for the principal participants in Hong Kong
politics to assess the propriety of the S.A.R.'s legal and institutional
arrangements. A fundamentally positivist conception of the Court,
evocative of P.R.C. and pro-China arguments from the pre-
reversion period, seemed evident in the Provisional Legislature's
July 1 confirmation of the previously vetted permanent judges' and
Chief Justice's appointments by means of the omnibus Reunifica-
tion Ordinance, and in the Provisional Legislature's early enact-
ment of additional legislation that tinkered with the laws govern-
ing the C.F.A.632 In addition and in an apparent effort to garner
support or acquiescence from the people and the business commu-
nity, S.A.R. sources (and favorable coverage in the P.R.C. media)
have emphasized the high quality and continuity of justice that
Hong Kong's new top jurists would provide. Making arguments
that were unavailable during the pre-reversion conflicts over the
Court's structure, jurisdiction and establishment date, these
sources pointed to the rich experience in Hong Kong law that the
632 See supra Section 4.2.2.1. (discussing the Reunification Ordinance); Basic
Law, supra note 21, art. 90 (requiring "endorsement" of the Legislature for Chief
Executive's appointment of C.F.A. judges); Emma Batha, Top Judge Expat Rule May
Ease, S. CHINA MORNING POsT, Aug. 15, 1997, at 7 (describing plan to amend Court
of Final Appeal Ordinance to allow a permanent C.F.A. justice, who does not meet
citizenship and related requirements for Chief Justice, to serve as acting Chief Jus-
tice in case of the Chief Justice's absence or incapacity); Court of Final Appeal Bill
Tabled at Provisional Legislative Council, New China News Agency, June 9, 1997,
translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (describing Provisional Legisla-
ture's pre-reversion consideration of amendment to the Court of Final Appeal Or-
dinance to incorporate requirements of Basic Law art. 90, which provides that the
chief justice of the C.F.A. be a Chinese citizen permanently resident in the S.A.R.
with no right of abode elsewhere), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File;
Provisional Legislative Council Discusses Judicial Service Commission Bill, New China
News Agency, June 9, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (de-
scribing Provisional Legislature's pre-reversion consideration of the Judicial Ser-
vice Commission (Amendment) Bill (1997), and amendment of related proposed
legislation, that would help to preclude challenges to the appointment of C.F.A.
judges on the ground that the members of the commission, whom Articles 88 and
90 of the Basic Law require to recommend C.F.A. nominees to the Chief Executive,
would not have taken their oaths and become members of the commission prior
to making recommendations for C.F.A. judges who were to be sworn in immedi-
ately after the reversion), available at LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File.
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permanent members bring to the Court, to the presence of British
Law Lords and other distinguished foreign jurists on the tempo-
rary judges list, and, implicitly, to the additional guarantee of judi-
cial independence inherent in most of the permanent judges hav-
ing rights of abode outside Hong Kong.633 Hong Kong liberals'
and democrats' responses to these developments and arguments
have been mixed and guarded. They appear to consider Chief Jus-
tice Andrew Li to be a fairly congenial choice, but some have ex-
pressed concern about the relatively modest calibre and status of
many of the jurists on the list of temporary judges.634 They seemed
633 See, e.g., HK VIPs Welcome Chief Justice Recommendation, New China News
Agency, May 20, 1997, translated in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (quoting
Anson Chan's praise of Chief Justice nominee Andrew Li as "a very distinguished
member of the Hong Kong bar" with "an outstanding record of public service,"
quoting Tung Chee-hwa's description of Li as "an outstanding lawyer ... who is
very highly regarded in legal and judicial circles," and quoting acting chief jus-
tice's comments that the selection would aid "a smooth transition in the judicia-
ry," which was "of fundamental importance" to Hong Kong), available at LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Chief Executive Announces Recommendations for Appeal
Court Permanent Judges, New China News Agency, June 12, 1997, translated in BBC
Summary of World Broadcasts (quoting Tung Chee-hwa's praise of the choices for
C.F.A. permanent justices as "distinguished" members of the appellate bench and
"outstanding legal practitioners before they joined the bench"), available at LEXIS,
Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Anson Chan in USA Defends Electoral Changes, Rule of
Law, supra note 585 (presenting Anson Chan's assertion that the agreement "to
make available two of Britain's Law Lords" to serve on the C.F.A. "was univer-
sally applauded for the signal it sent about the independence of our judiciary and
the quality of justice we can expect"); Batha, supra note 632, at 7 (noting that, aside
from the chief justice, all of the permanent C.F.A. justices had foreign passports or
rights of abode abroad). S.A.R. leaders' arguments stressing the continuity that
the judicial appointments would provide recalled some of the arguments that the
British colonial government made in seeking to justify and to promote acceptance
of Tung's selection as Chief Executive.
634 See, e.g., C.K. Lau, A Man to Keep Faith in the Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
May 22, 1997, at 19 (noting that "unlike the election of Tung Chee-hwa as chief
executive or Rita Fan Hsu Lai-tai to chair the provisional legislature, there has
been no criticism implying Mr. Li is 'Beijing's man,'" and noting that Li's "'Brit-
ish' background," which included service on Legco and a lack of open criticism of
the colonial regime, "should help allay fears" that Beijing's "influence may extend
to the judiciary"); Harmony Key to Rule of Law, Says Top Judge, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Sept. 6, 1997, at 4 (quoting Chief Justice Li's statement that he was commit-
ted to the rule of law, including a free press and an independent legal profession,
and that "[tihe judiciary is an institution that belongs to the community and
serves the community" and takes "[clompetence, integrity and independence" as
"its hallmarks"); May Sin-mi Hon, 15 Judges Selected to Sit on New Panel, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, July 23, 1997, at 1 (quoting Emily Lau's statement that she was
"stunned and disappointed" by the list of temporary justices, and that the eleven
Hong Kong-based judges on the list were not "up to the standard of judges in the
Privy Council"); The Non-Permanent Line-Up, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 18,
1997, at 5 (listing names and background of those appointed to the list of eligible
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to find little that was troubling in the substance of minor post-
reversion legislation affecting the Court, but doubtless saw cause
for concern in the S.A.R. regime's apparently easy willingness to
alter laws governing the Court.
Far more controversial has been the Hong Kong appellate
court's July 1997 decision denying a challenge to the legality of the
Provisional Legislature in HKSAR v. Ma Kwan David & Ors.635 In a
case that all sides viewed as an early indicator of the role of the
courts and the fate of judicial review in the post-reversion era, the
Court of Appeal rejected a criminal defendant's argument that the
court could, and should, declare the Provisional Legislature illegal
because it failed to conform to the requirements of the Basic Law or
other Chinese law. Largely accepting the S.A.R. government's ar-
gument, the three judges concluded that S.A.R. courts lacked au-
thority to review the "validity" of the decisions of the Chinese sov-
ereign, whether made by the N.P.C. or its Standing Committee or
the P.R.C.-established Preparatory Committee. The scope of the
court's inquiry was limited to the "existence" of such sovereign
acts, specifically whether the N.P.C. had established the Prepara-
tory Committee and authorized it to create a Provisional Legisla-
ture, and whether the Preparatory Committee had established the
Provisional Legislature pursuant to the authority that the N.P.C.
had granted. There was, in the court's view, nothing further it
could review concerning the lawfulness of the Provisional Legisla-
ture, once the judges determined that: the Basic Law and N.P.C.
and N.P.C. Standing Committee decisions had retained discretion
concerning the method for forming the body that would exercise
legislative power in the S.A.R., and had provided for the creation
of the Preparatory Committee and empowered it to do whatever
was necessary to establish the first S.A.R. government (which in-
cluded finding a solution to the problems created by the "derail-
ing" of the "through train" for Legco); the Preparatory Committee
had taken steps to establish a Provisional Legislature of limited
powers and tenure to make possible the orderly establishment of
an S.A.R. government; and the N.P.C. had ratified the Preparatory
Committee's establishment of the Provisional Legislature after the
fact.636
temporary justices).
635 HKSAR v. Ma Wai Kwan David & Ors, 1997-2 HKC 315, 1997 HK LEXIS
57 (Hong Kong Court of Appeal, July 22,1997).
63m See generally Ma, 1997 HK LEXIS 57; see also supra note 609 and accompa-
nying text. Like the court's related discussion of the Provisional Legislature ques-
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In the court's conclusions and in much of its analysis, leading
liberals and democrats have found signs that the worst fears they
had raised in pre-reversion debates over the C.F.A. were coming
true. They argued that the court's statement of the limits to its ju-
risdiction, and its unwillingness to strike down a body that failed
to conform to the Basic Law, marked the beginning of the end of
judicial review and of the rule of law that depended on strong and
independent courts being willing and able to check unconstitu-
tional and other unlawful government action.637 As some of the
territory's most prominent pro-democracy politicians and com-
mentators saw it, the court had "bow[ed] to power," "automati-
cally narrowed [S.A.R. courts'] jurisdiction," accepted the cession
to China of direct legislative authority over Hong Kong, and in-
vited the betrayal of Hong Kong's promised autonomy. These crit-
ics also dismissed as spurious the claims by the decision's defend-
ers that the ruling constituted a victory for the rule of law or that a
contrary ruling would have created a dangerous "legal vacuum" in
which many criminal acts would have been immune from prosecu-
tion.
638
tion, its decision on the permissible scope of judicial review was not necessary to
its principal holding that the Basic Law itself effected the adoption of the law un-
der which defendants were charged, the survival of the indictment, and the estab-
lishment of the S.A.R. court by which the defendants were being tried. The
court's conclusion that the Provisional Legislature was not the first S.A.R. legisla-
ture, and thus not subject to the election and composition requirements that the
Basic Law and other N.P.C. decisions imposed, provided yet another ground for
holding against he defendants that did not depend on the court's answer to the
questions concerning its jurisdiction.
637 See Erickson & Law, supra note 610, at 18 (quoting Martin Lee's comment
that the court's decision "raises very serious implications for the future of Hong
Kong's rule of law and autonomy," and former legislator James To Kun-sun's
comment, "The idea that national laws cannot be challenged by local courts is not
in accordance with the common law concept" of judicial review); Gargan, supra
note 609, at A10 (quoting Martin Lee's comment that "[tihere must be something
seriously wrong if the Chinese Central Government can introduce an appointed
body, ignore the Basic Law at will, and Hong Kong courts cannot do anything
about it"); Linda Choy & Genevieve Ku, Fears as "Bulwark of Basic Law Falls," S.
CHINA MORNING POST, July 30, 1997, at 7 (quoting Frontier's statement that "[w]ith
this ruling, Hong Kong is destroying the bulwark of the 'two systems' principle,
thus inviting interference with its rule of law"); cf. Ng, supra note 615, at 19 (criti-
cizing the court for adopting a vague concept of "unchallengeable acts of the sov-
ereign" which claimed for S.A.R. courts less power than colonial courts had to
"look into [the] validity and applicability in Hong Kong" of an act of Parliament).
638 See, e.g., Choy & Ku, supra note 637 (quoting statement from the Frontier);
Ng, supra note 615, at 19 (presenting former Legco member's criticism of the court
for abdicating its role of judicial review and suggesting that "the N.P.C. reserves
an unlimited, judicially unreviewable power to legislate for Hong Kong which it
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As some of these assertions suggest, additional arguments from
the liberal-democratic perspective have addressed actual and pro-
spective attitudes among Hong Kongers, and done so in terms
generally familiar from pre-reversion battles over the C.F.A. and
the rule of law. Liberal leaders warned Hong Kongers that the
court's decision indicated that the courts were no longer available
to "com[e] to the people's rescue" and to hear challenges to unjust
or improper laws-or lawless decisions-that the S.A.R. or the
Central People's Government might seek to impose. As some pro-
ponents of these arguments have seen it, the people (and presuma-
bly a rule-of-law-dependent business community) would recognize
the threat this posed to the rule of law and Hong Kong's auton-
omy, and would oppose the erosion of legality, government ac-
countability, and protection of Hong Kongers' interests counte-
nanced in the court's ruling.
639
Other arguments from some pro-democracy figures have de-
parted a bit farther from pre-reversion precedents and addressed
the question of Hong Kong courts' jurisdiction in more positivist
can exercise in any way and at any time it sees fit"; also presenting Ng's assertion
that, contrary to the Solicitor General's argument for invoking the "doctrine of ne-
cessity" in the Ma case, "[n]o one ... can advance the view that without a legisla-
ture from July 1, there would be legal vacuum and chaos); cf. Danny Gittings, Our
"Politically Correct" Courts, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Aug. 3, 1997, at 10 (criticizing
Ma court and a lower court which had dismissed Democrats' pre-reversion chal-
lenge to the Provisional Legislature for going "further than was necessary" in de-
fining narrow limits to Hong Kong courts' roles when "upholding the provisional
legislature's legality"); Ng, supra note 581 (arguing that the government's hailing
of the Ma decision as a "victory for the rule of law" was one of several points "in-
dicating a material," illiberal and anti-democratic "change in the direction of the
rule of law and the style of administration" in Hong Kong).
639 See, e.g., Choy & Ku, supra note 637, at 7 (quoting Democratic Party mem-
ber and former legislator Albert Ho's comment that the opinion seemed to estab-
lish that "Hong Kong people will be able to do nothing if the NPC violates the Ba-
sic Law," and quoting Hong Kong Human Rights Monitor director Law Yuk-kai
that "[w]hatever the mainland authorities do, there is no chance of the courts
coming to the people's rescue," and United Front Against the Provisional Legisla-
ture leader Andrew Cheng Kar-foo's assertion that the court's decision "signals
the beginning of allowing an autocratic government to control our people"); H.K.
Court Dismisses Legal Challenge to Constitution, Asian Political News, Aug, 4, 1997
(quoting Albert Ho's criticism that the court's ruling had cast into doubt "every
citizen['s] right to take any issue up to the court" -a right that "is of tantamount
importance" if "we are to preserve the rule of law in Hong Kong"), available at
LEXIS, Asiapc Library, Allasi File; Lau, supra note 578, at 18 (presenting Frontier
leader and former legislator Emily Lau's charge that "[tihe court's attempt to un-
dermine the S.A.R. judiciary has caused alarm and dismay," leaving the Hong
Kong people "worried" about "pressure on the courts" and surprised at the
court's acting "so swiftly to undermine the autonomy of the SAR").
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terms. The arguments that leading liberal barrister Gladys Li, with
her colleagues Margaret Ng and Paul Harris, made to the court in
the Ma case perhaps necessarily moved in this direction. The same
style of argument, however, seemed to characterize broader sug-
gestions that the court's ruling and the government's arguments in
the case reflected an opportunistic or hypocritical refusal by S.A.R.
entities - themselves the creations of Chinese laws - to use the
powers of judicial review, and to uphold the standards for a lawful
legislature, that were set forth in laws that China and its Hong
Kong allies had crafted. A considerable willingness to argue on
positivist terms also has seemed to surface in some liberals' post-
reversion calls for a strategy of using the Basic Law as a basis to
challenge or criticize S.A.R. government actions.640
On the other side of the principal divide in the political conflict
over Hong Kong's legal and institutional order, the S.A.R. gov-
ernment and some members of Hong Kong's pro-China circles
welcomed the court's ruling as a victory for the rule of law and an
independent judiciary. They also touted the government's will-
ingness to abide by any decision the court might reach as proof of
the government's commitment to the rule of law that is vital to
Hong Kong's success. Such sources' apparent comfort with the
positivist tone of the court's analysis, as well as its holding, sug-
gested parallels to the China and pro-China camp's pre-reversion
perspective on the courts and the rule of law.641
640 See, e.g., Ng, supra note 615, at 19 (presenting comments of Margaret Ng
which criticize the court for its abandonment of its Basic Law-conferred power
and duty to interpret the Basic Law, for failing to require the Provisional Legisla-
ture to satisfy the requirements of the Basic Law and other N.P.C. actions, for ar-
guably permitting an amendment to the Basic Law -by means of the N.P.C.'s rati-
fication or authorization of a non-conforming Provisional Legislature -that did
not conform to Basic Law-mandated procedures, for upholding the suspect Reuni-
fication Ordinance after determining that the Basic Law included positive acts that
solved the "legal vacuum" problem, and for suggesting that "there are two
sources of law" -one that "emanates from the Basic Law" and another that con-
sists of still-undefined "unchallengeable acts of the sovereign"); Ma, 1997 HK
LEXIS 57, at *42-*43, *80-*81, *120-*121 (describing defense counsel Gladys Li's ar-
gument that the Basic Law gives S.A.R. courts the jurisdiction and obligation to
examine and interpret the Basic Law, that the courts may and must therefore
judge whether the Provisional Legislature was properly established and whether
it conforms to the Basic Law and other N.P.C. enactments); Christine Loh, Future
Lies in Our Own Hands, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 14, 1997, at 16 (presenting
Citizens' Party leader and pro-democracy former Legco member's argument that
the Hong Kong people "can make the Basic Law a friend and use it to argue for
change" toward universal suffrage and a stronger legislature).
641 Choy, supra note 586, at 1 (quoting Tung Chee-hwa's statement that the
government had shown that it would argue its case in court and abide by the
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S.A.R. officials and pro-China politicians have further defended
the ruling with arguments that have sought to draw support, and
assuage concern, among the people. The Chief Executive asserted
that the litigation not only demonstrated the new government's
commitment to law, but also reflected the "respect" that "Hong
Kong society" has for the rule of law. Broadly echoing the China
and pro-China camp's assertions (and some of the colonial gov-
ernment's statements) concerning the C.F.A. and several other pre-
reversion legal and institutional issues, S.A.R. government officials
proclaimed that the Ma decision has still claimed for the post-
reversion Hong Kong courts a power of judicial review that is at
least equal to what Hong Kong courts exercised during the colonial
era.642 Moreover, the Solicitor General (who argued the govern-
ment's brief in the Ma case), broadly pro-China sources, and others
have added that the people of Hong Kong still enjoy a variety judi-
cial or political means to hold the S.A.R. and central governments
to account, and are, in any event, much better off than they would
have been if the court had declared the Provisional Legislature un-
constitutional and thrown Hong Kong into a state of legal chaos.
643
court's ruling, and that such legal challenges "are part and parcel of the Hong
Kong legal system... [and] are part and parcel of the rule of law itself); Anson
Chan in USA Defends Electoral Changes, Rule of Law, supra note 585 (presenting An-
son Chan's argument that, having won the "landmark case" challenging the Pro-
visional Legislature, the government still "expect[ed] further challenges which we
will meet in accordance with the law"); Li, supra note 611, at 6 (quoting Provi-
sional Legislature President Fan's comment that the process and the outcome in
the case "should strengthen our confidence in the independence of the judicial
system and the rule of law in Hong Kong").
642 See, e.g., Text of Statement of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa, TA KUNG PAO,
July 30, 1997, at Al; Leung, supra note 592, at 21 (presenting S.A.R. Secretary for
Justice Leung's assertion that, after the Ma case, "[tIhe truth is that the rule of law
in Hong Kong is at least as strong as ever" and that the Ma court's determination
that the courts could not review the validity of the sovereign actions of the N.P.C.
or its delegates was no more serious a restriction on judicial review than colonial
Hong Kong courts' having "had no jurisdiction to challenge the validity of an Act
of Parliament"); Ma, 1997 HK LEXIS 57, at *41-*44, *79-*80, *82-*84, *122-*123 (de-
scribing Solicitor General Fung's argument to the court that article 19 of the Basic
Law provided for the continuation of existing, pre-reversion restrictions on the
jurisdiction of courts and, thus, that the colonial Hong Kong courts' lack of juris-
diction to determine whether parliamentary legislation or imperial orders were
lawful under the U.K.'s unwritten constitution or the Letters Patent established
that S.A.R. courts lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity of actions by the
N.P.C., or P.R.C. entities authorized by the N.P.C. under the Basic Law, other
N.P.C. enactments or other national Chinese laws).
643 See, e.g., Parsons, supra note 611, at 1 (describing Solicitor General Daniel
Fung's assertion that there remained "judicial avenues, petitions, legislation, ad-
ministrative avenues and negotiations" to challenge N.P.C. decisions, and that the
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The other established political players in Hong Kong's end-
game appear to have kept some distance from these initial post-
reversion conflicts relating to the S.A.R.judiciary. Perhaps regard-
ing the issues as largely local matters of staffing a court or deciding
a particular case, or perhaps concluding that treating them as such
was the prudent course for a departed sovereign reluctant to un-
derscore its new impotence and a "resumed" sovereign eager to
demonstrate respect for S.A.R. autonomy, the U.K. and the P.R.C.
seem to have sought a low public profile, arguably even more than
they did in connection with the other significant legal and institu-
tional controversies of the S.A.R.'s first months.
4.2.2.4. The Chief Exectutive after Reversion
Events and statements that have helped to define the role of the
Chief Executive and his administration have been a final focus of
legal and institutional controversy during the S.A.R.'s early
months. The post-reversion conflicts over what the Chief Execu-
tive and the executive-led government are becoming, or should be-
come, have continued many of the themes evident in pre-reversion
controversies over the selection and activities of the Chief Execu-
tive-designate, with fairly subtle variations on established themes.
The high degree of continuity is unsurprising, given that much of
the endgame debate over the Chief Executive had focused explic-
itly on expectations and exhortations concerning Tung's use of the
office after July 1, 1997.
Broadly echoing the pre-reversion arguments of the Chief Ex-
ecutive-designate and pro-China sources, Tung and other S.A.R.
leaders have pointed to several characteristics of the new leader-
Provisional Legislature could still be challenged outside the S.A.R. by judicial or
political means at the national or international levels); Erickson & Law, supra note
637, at 18 (quoting Fung's comment that it was "the height of absurdity" for those
who brought the constitutional challenge in the Ma case "to cast doubt about the
legal system or create a state of chaos in the name of rule of law"); Li, supra note
611, at 6 (noting that D.A.B. leader Tsang Yok-sing's urged Hong Kong's N.P.C.
deputies to explore mechanisms to prevent procedurally improper N.P.C.
amendments to the Basic Law, and quoting Provisional Legislature President
Fan's welcoming the ruling for making it "very clear that the legality of the Provi-
sional Legislative Council is sound and strong and what we are doing is legiti-
mate"); cf. Status of Provisional Legislature Yet to be Decided by Court of Final Appeal,
SING TAO JIH PAO, July 30, 1997, at A2 (approving of the court's conclusion that it
was "impossible for a Hong Kong court to overrule a decision made by the
N.P.C." and asserting that "Hong Kong people" nonetheless could still "oppose
[N.P.C. decisions] through other channels" and "should not improperly belittle
themselves" by thinking that they cannot").
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ship that are consistent with positivist principles of legality and are
expected to appeal to the people and the business community.
They have asserted that the S.A.R. regime's appointments of senior
officials have yielded a government that is broadly representative
and suited to the needs and unique characteristics of Hong Kong
and its people. In comments that have been equally in keeping
with pre-reversion arguments from the P.R.C. and the colonial au-
thorities, Tung and his supporters have also emphasized the conti-
nuity in government that his administration's legal and policy
choices and its retention of experienced officials will provide.
644
Again playing the nationalism card that he and the pro-China
camp had deployed in the twilight of colonial rule, Tung also has
appealed to the people of Hong Kong to unite behind his admini-
stration and to accept the new legal restrictions on political organi-
zations and activities that might threaten state security and order.
Largely updating pre-reversion arguments from the Chief Execu-
tive-designate and the pro-China camp, Tung and proponents of
his administration have asserted, with some credibility, that the
people and the business community support the policies and ap-
pointments that the Chief Executive has pursued since taking of-
fice, and strongly desire the prosperity they are helping to pre-
serve. 645 Indeed, two of the most controversial legislative
initiatives during the S.A.R.'s first months-the freezing of labor
laws passed on the eve of the last colonial Legco's dissolution, and
new immigration restrictions imposed on mainland children-
seem to have played well with business and popular audiences, re-
spectively.
In the initial months of the S.A.R., Hong Kong's liberals and
democrats have also addressed the Chief Executive question with
644 See, e.g., Zhang Shouying, "I am a Servant of the Hong Kong People"-
Interview with Tung Chee-hwa, RENMIN RIBAO, June 23, 1997, at 2 (reporting Tung's
assertion that the S.A.R. Exco "enjoys the advantages of the past appointment sys-
tem and represents broader sections of the people, particularly grass-roots repre-
sentatives").
645 See, e.g., id. (reporting Tung's assertions that "personnel arrangements
have enjoyed widespread support in Hong Kong," that surveys by three major
foreign chambers of commerce in Hong Kong show 90% confidence, that "people
from all walks of life are confident" in the economy, and that "we should place
even more emphasis on 'one country' in the one country, two systems formula");
Danny Gittings, Polls Give Lie to Election Claims, supra note 629, at 10 (noting
Tung's 82% approval rating as a plausible indicator of support for his policies);
Maggie Farley, Hong Kong Leader Puts Emphasis on Family, China, L.A. TIMES, July 2,
1997, at Al (quoting Tung's statement that "economic vitality" and "sustain[ing]
economic growth" were top priorities).
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arguments similar to those they advanced during the final months
of colonial rule. Martin Lee and others have continued to urge
Tung to defend the interests of Hong Kong and Hong Kongers,
and have warned that Tung's moves on rights legislation and elec-
tions foretell an early end to Tung's "honeymoon" with the Hong
Kong people, as well as a threat to Hong Kong's rule of law upon
which the people and the business community depend. 646
Nonetheless, the post-reversion debates about the Chief Execu-
tive and his administration exhibit some significant discontinuities
with pre-reversion conflicts. The assertions concerning popular at-
titudes toward specific appointments to office and the immigration
and labor laws reflect inevitable changes in the legal and policy
foci of arguments that address broader rule-of-law-related ques-
tions. On both sides of the debates, there also has been a striking
"localization" of the conflict, as well as a decline in attention to the
underlying, fundamental issue of the legitimacy of the office and
the selection process. On the "pro-Tung" side, the source of the
arguments has changed perhaps even more extensively than in the
other legal and institutional controversies of the post-reversion pe-
riod. Since taking office, the Chief Executive and his administra-
tion have been arguing increasingly on their own behalf, with
P.R.C. and even local pro-China sources playing a more subdued
role in praising or defending the Chief Executive-led institutional
order developing in the S.A.R.
On the other side, liberals' and democrats' arguments have
shifted their substantive focus, perhaps more thoroughly than in
other conflicts over laws and institutions during the S.A.R.'s early
months. They have placed less emphasis on the claim that Tung
will be China's puppet or that his selection was fatally flawed, and
more on the fear that he and others in key S.A.R. institution will
betray the interests of Hong Kong by trying to do what they think
China wants even if Chinese officials have not yet pressured them'
w Braude, supra note 581, at 11 (quoting Martin Lee's statement that he was
"still waiting for [Tung] to show that he is actually standing up for Hong Kong's
freedoms and not China's spokesman or apologist"); No Kwai-yan, Tung "Disap-
points" Democrats, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 21, 1997, at 2 (similar); Linda
Choy, Lawyer Deplores Bill of Rights Rollback, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 18, 1997,
at 4 (quoting human rights lawyer's critique of the suspension of a bill extending
Bill of Rights to private sector as reflecting S.A.R. regime's bad attitude toward the
rule of law); Ho, supra note 582, at 21 (concluding that "[r]ecent moves by Mr.
Tung have made it increasingly difficult for even more tolerant citizens to give the
new administration the benefit of the doubt").
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to do so. 647 Having been in a difficult and ambivalent position
with respect to the Chief Executive question before reversion, the
now-departed colonial masters have been especially reticent to en-
gage publicly in this aspect of the post-reversion process of shap-
ing and evaluating the S.A.R.'s initial legal and institutional order.
4.3. Assessing Hong Kong's Endgame
Thus far, developments in post-reversion Hong Kong suggest
that transitional Hong Kong's endgame most nearly approaches
the "end of the game / on-going games" model identified in End-
game I. During the S.A.R.'s initial months, that type of endgame's
characteristic patterns of considerable continuity and moderate
change appear to be evident in the identity and roles of key par-
ticipants, in the legal and political questions over which those par-
ticipants have clashed, in the character of arguments they have
made about principles of legality and sovereignty and about the
actual and potential attitudes of the people and the business com-
munity.
In addition to these developments with respect to particular
political actors and specific issues and audiences, the possible links
between Hong Kong's reversion and the seeming localization, de-
polarization and fragmentation that have marked the conflicts of
the S.A.R.'s infancy reinforce the impression that the third, inter-
mediate type of endgame may best fit the limited available evi-
dence. The withdrawal of British colonial authorities, the disman-
tling of P.R.C.-established and not-purely-Hong Kong transitional
bodies, and the full establishment of S.A.R. laws, institutions and
offices appear to have created a newly local locus for legal and po-
litical conflict and to have shifted the substantive focus to even
more specific, more clearly "sub-constitutional" questions of S.A.R.
laws and institutions. Lessened polarization appears a relatively
unsurprising consequence, as combatants in the sharp conflicts of
the pre-reversion endgame and earlier battles have lost familiar
targets and have had to assess and address new or newly impor-
tant entities that have less clear and perhaps less settled allegiances
in the clash of legal-political visions, and less established images in
the eyes of the people or the business community. Considerable
647 See, e.g., Braude, supra note 581, at 11 (quoting Martin Lee's statement that
his "worry is not that [the P.R.C.] will actually be giving orders to fung" but that
Tung might "try to second guess China and give them what they never even
asked").
[Vol. 25:41740
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/7
HONG KONG'S ENDGAME (II)
fragmentation could be expected to follow as well, as established
actors may have begun to develop divergent interpretations of
their changed political and institutional environment, and conflict-
ing assessments of what their respective "visions" demand or per-
mit with respect to issues that seem very loosely or complexly
linked to basic principles of positivist legality or substantive jus-
tice.
Viewed in this context, the more serious disagreements among
Hong Kong liberals and democrats and among broadly "pro-
China" elements in the territory, or more frequent coalitions across
the fault lines dividing "vision"-based camps, or even the emer-
gence of political strategies that more frankly recognize divisions
within key social constituencies, are potentially significant post-
reversion changes that need not represent a qualitative break with
the pre-reversion endgame. Although marking the beginning of a
"new game," the changes in institutional contexts and specific top-
ics of legal-institutional conflict that appear to have attended these
developments seem to suggest discontinuity that stops short of an
abandonment of vision-based politics or the quest for broad sup-
port from "the people" or "the business community."648 In these
respects, the final, formal transfer of power over Hong Kong, the
establishment of S.A.R. institutions and the shift toward more
"sub-constitutional" issues thus may prove to be analogous to the
Tiananmen Incident, Patten's arrival and longer term "structural"
forces that triggered the commencement of the endgame. At the
end of the endgame, dramatic political changes and more diffuse
imperatives to address more concrete legal and institutional ques-
tions may again have combined to produce a new "game" in which
already-established participants, who continued to hew to long-
648 The seemingly increased prominence of "positivist" arguments in the
post-reversion repertoire of liberals and democrats need not mark the qualitative
shift away from "vision"-based politics that might mark a technical endgame. As
the discussion in Endgame I and in this Article have noted, liberals and democrats
in Hong often invoked the Basic Law and the Joint Declaration alongside appeals
to normative first principles during the pre-reversion period. As the discussion in
Section 4.2., supra, suggests, liberals' and democrats' appeals to normative first
principles have continued in the S.A.R. era. On the other hand, the "deals" struck
and the arrangements imposed during the pre-reversion endgame have not been
so well-settled during the S.A.R.'s opening months that a colloquial endgame
seems to have occurred. As the discussion in Section 4.2. indicates, the judicial
challenge to the Provisional Legislature and the political opposition to a number
of early moves by the S.A.R. government reflect a continuing battle to revisit and
revise legal and institutional arrangements that were nominally settled on the eve
of reversion.
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held visions, engaged in a newly fragmented and differently polar-
ized politics of addressing new, but not entirely novel, issues and
long-present, but differently perceived, social constituencies.
Any such conclusion must remain tentative, however. The suc-
cess or failure of principal parties' strategies of cultivating social
constituencies as "assets" for post-reversion conflicts remains un-
known, beyond the general point that, at least for now, stronger
forms of liberal-democratic arguments have not fared well with
much of the business community and perhaps with significant
segments of the general population. More fundamentally, the dis-
continuity between Hong Kong's pre-reversion endgame and the
"games" of the S.A.R. period may prove to be much sharper than it
initially appears, and the "technical" endgame then may provide a
better model. With the passage of even a relatively brief period or
the occurrence of a major crisis, it may become clear that the role of
the U.K. (and the outside world more generally) has indeed shrunk
to nothing, or that China will exercise extensively and intrusively
the power over Hong Kong that, in practice and in P.R.C. legal
theory, it has always held and has enhanced with Hong Kong's re-
version. 649  The fissures dividing liberals and democrats may
prove much more salient than the principles that have united
them, and the differences separating the D.A.B. from its P.R.C.
mentors and the S.A.R. administration may overwhelm the ties
that once bound them together in a broadly positivist camp. A
more clearly defined pro-business political block, strongly linked
to the S.A.R. administration, may take shape as an important new
participant and could force sharp departures from pre-reversion
patterns of conflict over one of the two key social constituencies.
In such a context, possible "populist" and "pro-business" coali-
tions might define a new principal cleavage in Hong Kong politics
649 The U.K.'s assertion that it will insist that China adhere to the pledges
China has made in the Joint Declaration (which Britain regards as a fully binding
treaty at international law) have been noted above. The United States has com-
mitted to promote the same general ends through a variety of means, including
conditioning retention of Hong Kong's preferential trade status on China's keep-
ing Hong Kong "sufficiently autonomous," with sufficient autonomy to be deter-
mined with reference to the terms of the Joint Declaration. 22 U.S.C. § 5722. See
generally The United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5701-32
(1996) (providing the principal statutory framework governing post-reversion
U.S.-Hong Kong relations); Kerry Dumbaugh, The U.S. Role During and After Hong
Kong's Transition, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 333 (1997) (reviewing the U.S.-Hong
Kong Policy Act and other legal and policy mechanisms available to the U.S. to
promote continuity, autonomy and adherence to the Joint Declaration in post-
reversion Hong Kong).
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that would group key participants very differently than the "vi-
sion"-based politics of the pre-reversion years.650 In extreme cir-
cumstances, the character, roles and even the existence of S.A.R.
laws and institutions might undergo rapid change in any number
of directions that would soon render pre-reversion "deals" irrele-
vant.
In this technical endgame scenario, some liberals' resort to
more positivism-accepting arguments during the S.A.R.'s early
days could appear in retrospect to be a significant shift away from
"vision"-based politics at a moment when the advent of a new
"game" made efforts to hold Hong Kong's new rulers to their own
post-reversion laws-rather than attempts to invoke transcendent
and timeless normative principles to bind those rulers-became
the most promising remaining weapon in the arsenal of politically
weak participants in struggles over laws and institutions. Simi-
larly, key participants' relative lack of focus on the attitudes of the
business community in the months following reversion may later
seem to have reflected an early recognition of changes in the busi-
ness community's political influence, roles and identity that, in
part, defined the terms of the post-reversion period's "new game."
In these and other respects, the initial semblance of continuity with
pre-reversion patterns will have proven illusory.
The mistaken initial impression that pre-reversion patterns and
bargains might be surviving the reversion then will appear to have
reflected the mundane fact that even a sharp and sudden break
with the past could not be expected to occur completely, or become
evident, at the stroke of midnight on June 30, 1997. It may also
have reflected the principal players' desire to preserve a contrary
impression during the S.A.R.'s initial months. An appearance of
continuity would have had considerable appeal for the P.R.C.,
which had long preached "convergence" and pledged "continuity"
between Hong Kong's immediate pre-reversion and post-reversion
legal and institutional orders, for Hong Kong's pro-democracy
650 See, e.g., Maggie Farley, Interview: Tsang Yok-sing on the Role of Democracy,
Communism in Chinese Hong Kong, L.A. TIMES, July 6, 1997, at M3 (reporting D.A.B.
leader Tsang Yok-sing's view that conflicts between "loyalty" to Hong Kong and
to the Chinese Communist Party may escalate considerably in the future, given
that "there could be certain changes in the policy" of the Party); Ho, supra note
607, at 21 (discussing early post-reversion controversies that point to the possibil-
ity of a populist alliance between Democrats and the D.A.B.); Yeung, supra note
602, at 17 (noting views that Tung's agenda sought, perhaps awkwardly, to com-
bine electoral laws that would appeal to the business community with housing
and other economic policies that would appeal to a populist constituency).
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forces and the British, who had reason to fear that any sharp dis-
junction would accelerate the erosion of their pre-reversion levels
of power and influence, and for S.A.R. officials and pro-business
politicians, who might enhance their own legitimacy and popular-
ity by claiming to implement pre-reversion legal and institutional
deals or directives that promised to preserve prior pro-business
laws, institutions, policies and practices.
Alternatively, the degree of continuity between the final pre-
reversion period and the S.A.R. era may be greater than early signs
of moderate disjunction and uncertainty suggest, and a colloquial
endgame may eventually provide a more convincing account of
Hong Kong's transition. In the S.A.R.'s first months, the S.A.R.
laws and institutions shaped during the pre-reversion endgame
arguably have already been surviving significant challenges, in the
courts' handling of challenges to the Provisional Legislature's con-
stitutionality and more mundane matters, in the preparations for
what appears likely to be broadly accepted legislative elections in
1998, and in the administration's pressing forward with controver-
sial laws and economic policies and its handling of the stock mar-
ket and currency shocks of late 1997.651 If the passage of more time
and the arrival of new crises do not produce a fundamental depar-
ture from - or a displacement of - the S.A.R.'s initial legal and in-
stitutional arrangements, then the specter of irrelevance or evanes-
cence that inevitably haunts new and untested institutions will
fade. The changes in laws, institutions, issues, and the roles and
orientations of participants and social constituencies that will
surely occur then will appear to have been meaningfully con-
strained by the arrangements that many of the same participants
crafted or accepted during the endgame of the middle 1990s.
In this colloquial endgame scenario, any sense that substantial
651 See supra Section 4.2.2. (describing the Provisional Legislature's enactment
of legislation on a wide range of sometimes-controversial subjects, the govern-
ment's role in proposing, supplementing and interpreting such legislation, and
the courts' handling of challenges to the Provisional Legislature); see also Angela
Li, Stage Set for Final Court's Debut, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 26, 1997, at 1;
Charlotte Parsons, Drug Case Review a First for Court of Final Appeal, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Sept. 24, 1997, at 8; Charlotte Parsons, Muffled Start for New Court,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, Sept. 12, 1997, at 4 (all describing the C.F.A.'s initial
docket, which did not include a challenge to the Provisional Legislature but did
include commercial and criminal law cases). See generally Henny Sender, Red Oc-
tober, FAR E. ECON. REv., Nov. 6, 1997, at 70-73 (describing the stock market and
currency crises and the Hong Kong government's response); Seth Faison, Hong
Kong Stocks Fall Steeply, New Victim of Region's Ills, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 23, 1997, at D1
(similar).
1744 [Vol. 25:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol25/iss4/7
HONG KONG'S ENDGAME (II)
discontinuity characterized the immediate aftermath of reversion
will appear to have reflected a short-sighted emphasis on short-
lived difficulties of the transition, or a failure to see the forest for
the trees. In retrospect, Hong Kong liberals' turn to more positiv-
ism-accepting arguments could seem to be the product of the pecu-
liar litigation-centered contexts in which much of that turn oc-
curred, or a lasting but limited turn in that direction may be found
to have had strong roots in liberals' fairly frequent invocations of
the Basic Law and Joint Declaration to supplement their more
natural law-rooted arguments during the pre-reversion endgame.
Similarly, the early S.A.R. era's fairly open splits between the
D.A.B. and other "pro-China" elements and S.A.R. officials later
may seem to reflect the unusual character of the issues (most nota-
bly labor rights) or the moment (when alignments in the Provi-
sional Legislature and within the administration seemed unusually
fluid or uncertain), or to be merely newly visible manifestations of
long-standing divisions that were less prominent, but still percep-
tible, during the pre-reversion endgame.
In addition, the notion that a new business block has emerged
to alter the mix of principal participants and key audiences may
prove misplaced as well, with any apparent consolidation behind
Tung's administration perhaps unravelling amid varied degrees of
distress and comfort in business circles with the Chief Executive's
embrace of industrial policy and increased spending for housing,
or perceptions of P.R.C. influence on (or frustration with) the
S.A.R. regime's economic policies and laws. More importantly,
what seem potentially to be major institution-defining moments of
the initial post-reversion period may only reflect another facet of
the undramatic point that real-world games often do not conclude
as suddenly and completely as simple models suggest. With hind-
sight, early post-reversion battles over the legal changes effected
by the Reunification Ordinance, the constitutionality of the Provi-
sional Legislature, and the electoral arrangements for the first
S.A.R. legislature may look like belated and merely gap-filling in-
stallments in a single, primarily pre-reversion, colloquial endgame
that did not end neatly on July 1, 1997.
In sum, an "end of the game / on-going games" paradigm
seems to fit best with the patterns that have emerged in the pro-
tracted struggle that adherents to broadly liberal-democratic and
P.R.C.-style positivist visions of legality and sovereignty have
waged over the legal and institutional issues of Hong Kong's end-
game and over the attitudes and allegiances of the people of Hong
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Kong and Hong Kong's business community. The principal politi-
cal participants' pre-reversion approaches to the conflicts among
themselves and over the two key social constituencies were suited
to this type of endgame, for they were compatible with expecta-
tions that the participants were involved in a technical endgame, a
colloquial endgame, or an endgame of this intermediate, "end of
the game / on-going games" type. The still-sketchy developments
of the post-reversion period have not yet yielded enough informa-
tion to provide a conclusive answer to the question of which of
these three types of endgame best approximates transitional Hong
Kong's experience. Subsequent developments could lead to either
a colloquial or a technical endgame model's seeming to provide, in
retrospect, a more persuasive account of the impact of the princi-
pled and pragmatic struggles over rule-of-law values, institutions,
the people and the business community that the principal sections
of this Article and Endgame I have examined. In these circum-
stances, a conclusion that transitional Hong Kong seems to have
ended one game in a series of on-going, evolving games must be
cautious and preliminary. Indeed, even the usually confident ora-
cle of Hong Kong's future legal and political order Martin Lee has
warned that it will be too soon to judge Hong Kong's legal, institu-
tional and political fate for some time, perhaps for years. 65 2
652 Braude, supra note 581 (quoting Martin Lee's statements that he is "an
eternal optimist" but that friends of civil liberties, democracy and the rule of law
would "have to live from anniversary to anniversary" because early tolerance
could offer limited reassurance where one could not "know" that a crackdown or
betrayal "won't happen tomorrow"). Lee added that "people will become more
comfortable" if "this first month" of relatively benign S.A.R. rule "becomes a
year." Id. Uncharacteristically and seemingly disingenuously, Lee asserted that
he "never sat down and tried to think seriously about what is going to actually
happen" and about whether the P.R.C. will interfere with Hong Kong's laws and
institutions. Id.
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